JIMENEZ v. RIORDAN

Filing 2

OPINION. Signed by Judge Jose L. Linares on 8/25/2014. (nr, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JOHN JIMENEZ,
Civil Action No. 14-4349 (JLL)

Petitioner,

v.

:

OPINION

BRIAN RIORDAN,

Respondent.

LINARES, District Judge:
Petitioner John Jimenez (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
challenging his pre-trial detention at the Union County Jail in Elizabeth, New Jersey. For the
reasons expressed below, this Court will construe the matter as a habeas petition pursuant to 28
U.S.C.

§ 2241, dismiss the petition without prejudice to the filing of a petition pursuant to 28

U.S.C.

§ 2254 after Petitioner exhausts remedies available in the courts of the State of New Jersey,

and deny a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254, Rule 4.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner is challenging his pre-trial detention at Union County Jail arising from state
criminal charges.

Petitioner alleges that his bail is excessive; that the court did not have

jurisdiction to issue a search warrant and conduct surveillance; that the charge “for legally
prescribed medication” is a violation of due process; and that depriving Petitioner of
his
medication while incarcerated is cruel and unusual punishment.’
1

(Pet. 7-9.)

Petitioner is

To the extent a prisoner challenges his conditions of confinement, such claims must be raised by
way of a civil rights action. See Learner v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532 (3d Cir. 2002). See also Ganim

requesting that this Court compel the state court to dismiss all charges against him and to
immediately release him. (Id. at 9.)
II.

DISCUSSION

A.

Legal Standard

“Habeas corpus petitions must meet heightened pleading requirements.” McFarland v.
Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994). A petition is required to specify all the grounds for relief
available to the petitioner, state the facts supporting each ground, state the relief requested, and
be
signed under penalty of perjury. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 Rule 2(c), applicable to § 2241 petitions

through Rule 1(b). “Federal courts are authorized to dismiss summarily any habeas petitio that
n
appears legally insufficient on its face.” McFarland, 512 U.S. at 856; Siers v. Ryan, 773 F.2d 37,
45 (3d Cir. 1985). Habeas Rule 4 accordingly requires the Court to examine a petition prior
to
ordering an answer and, if it appears “that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court,
the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.” 28 U.S.C.

§

2254

Rule 4, applicable through Rule 1(b).
B. Analysis
A district court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241(c)(3) to entertain a

pre-trial petition for habeas corpus brought by a person who is in custody pursuant to
an untried
state indictment. See Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490 (1989); Braden v. 30th Judicia Circuit
l
v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 235 F. App’x 882 (3d Cir. 2007) (challenge to garden
-variety
transfer not cognizable in habeas); Castillo v. FBOP FCI Fort Dix, 221 F. App’x 172
(3d Cir.
2007) (habeas is proper vehicle to challenge disciplinary proceeding resulting in loss of
good-time
credits, but claims regarding sanctioned loss of phone and visitation privileges not
cognizable in
habeas). A challenge to any medical issues is the type of conditions of confin
ement claim that
must be brought by way of a civil rights action or action for declaratory and injunct
ive relief.
Petitioner may pursue these claims by filing a civil rights complaint with a proper
ly completed
application to proceed informapauperis in a civil rights action. This Court expres
ses no opinion
as to the merits of Petitioner’s medical claims.
2

Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484 (1973); Mokone v. Fenton, 710 F.2d 998, 999 (3d Cir. 1983);
Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 442, 443 (3d Cir. 1975). This Court has jurisdiction over the
Petition under 28 U.S.C.

§

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

2241 and construes the Petition as such.

§ 2241

While this Court has

to entertain this pre-trial habeas corpus Petition, it is clear that

such relief should not be granted. Petitioner asks this Court to grant pre-trial habeas relief based
on grounds related to his arrest and state pre-trial proceedings thus far. The problem with the
Petition is that “federal habeas corpus does not lie, absent ‘special circumstances,’ to adjudicate
the merits of an affirmative defense to a state criminal charge prior to a judgment of conviction by
a state court.” Braden, 410 U.S. at 489 (quoting Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 253 (1886)).
Moreover, the doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), forbids federal court interference
in pending state criminal proceedings. As the Supreme Court explained over 100 years ago,
2
We are of the opinion that while the
court has the power to do so, and may
discharge the accused in advance of his trial if he is restrained of his liberty in
violation of the national constitution, it is not bound in every case to exercise such a
power immediately upon application being made for the writ. We cannot suppose
that congress intended to compel those courts, by such means, to draw to
themselves, in the first instance, the control of all criminal prosecutions
commenced in state courts exercising authority within the territorial limits, where
the accused claims that he is held in custody in violation of the constitution of the
United States. The injunction to hear the case summarily, and thereupon ‘to dispose
of the party as law and justice require,’ does not deprive the court of discretion as to
the time and mode in which it will exert the powers conferred upon it. That
discretion should be exercised in the light of the relations existing, under our
system of government, between the judicial tribunals of the Union and of the states,
and in recognition of the fact that the public good requires that those relations not
be disturbed by unnecessary conflict between courts equally bound to guard and
protect rights secured by the constitution.
.

.

.

2

In Younger, the Supreme Court held that principles of equity and comity require district
courts to
abstain from enjoining pending state criminal proceedings absent extraordinary circumstance
s.
See also Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 69-73 (1971) (Younger abstention doctrine
applies to
declaratory judgment actions).
3

ExparteRovall, 117 U.S. at 251.
The proper procedure for Petitioner is to exhaust his constitutional claims before all three
levels of the New Jersey courts and, if he is unsuccessful, to thereafter present them to this Court in
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. See Moore, 515 F.2d at 449.

Upon careful review, this Court finds that the petition does not present any extraordinary or
exceptional circumstances and is an attempt “to litigate constitutional defenses prematurely in
federal court.” Id., 515 F.2d at 445. Petitioner is not entitled to a pretrial Writ of Habeas Corpus,
and this Court will dismiss the Petition without prejudice to the filing of a petition pursuant to 28
U.S.C.

§ 2254 after he exhausts remedies available in the courts of the State of New Jersey. See

Duran v. Thomas, 393 F.App’x 3 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal of 2241 petition alleging
§
that petitioner was subjected to warrantless arrest, was detained without probable cause hearing,
and that state court had imposed excessive bail).
III. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
This Court denies a certificate of appealability because Petitioner has not made “a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2). See

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003).
IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, this Court will dismiss the Petition without prejudice and deny a
certificate of appealability.

DATID:

;

,‘4øse L.Linares, U.S.D.J.
4

.