GROMEK v. MAENZA et al
Filing
20
OPINION. Signed by Judge Jose L. Linares on 11/20/14. (jd, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
VTTOLD GROMEK,
Civil Action No.: 14-4455 (JLL)
Plaintiff,
V.
JUDGE PHILLIP MAENZA, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION
LINARES, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court by way of Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff
Vitold Gromek’s (“Plaintiff’) Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(l) and
12(b)(6). (ECF No. 7). No oral argument was heard pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
78. The Court has considered the submissions and arguments made in support of and in opposition
to the instant motion. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motions is granted.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint in this matter on July 15, 2014. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff
named the Honorable Thomas L. Weisenbeck, A.J.S.C., the Honorable Philip J. Maenza, J.S.C.,
the Honorable Ann R. Bartlett, J.S.C., the Honorable Marilyn R. Herr, J.S.C. (ret.), CSS2 Joseph
Adiele, SPO Inett Hewell, Essex Vicinage Chief Probation Officer Shazeeda Samsudeen, the
Director of the New Jersey Division of Family Development Jeanette Page Hawkins (collectively
the “State Defendants”), and Sharon Miller Gromek as Defendants.’ On September 8, 1999, a
Final Judgment of Divorce was issued in the Superior Court, Hunterdon County instructing
Defendant
1 Sharon Gromek Miller does not join this motion made by the State Defendants.
Plaintiff to pay child support. (Compi. at 2). Plaintiff alleges that the State Defendants have
violated his constitutional rights by mismanaging his child support matters. (Id. at 3).
Plaintiff contends that Child Support Services has incorrectly indicated that he in arrears
by as much as $400,000, thereby damaging his reputation and ability to find employment. (Id.).
Plaintiff further alleges that he has been denied the opportunity to present evidence at the state
court hearings related to those probation records. (Id.). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Judge
Maenza refused to consider Plaintiff’s proposed evidence and that the State Defendants have
made it impossible for him to correct the allegedly “erroneous account record.” (Id.). On August
14, 2013, Plaintiff alleges that Judge Maenza held and “falsely claimed” that Plaintiff had “not
advanced any proof that Probation’s records are inaccurate.” (Id. at 5). Plaintiff alleges Judge
Maenza’s ruling constiutes “harassment.” (Id.).
Plaintiff alleges that other rulings against him are “arbitrary, capricious, inconsistent, and
contradictory,” including: (1) Judge Maenza failed to enforce court orders; (2) Judge Maenza
improperly answered questions during cross-examination; (3) Judge Maenza failed to place
Plaintiff’s funds in trust; (4) Judge Maenza refused to permit tax returns from both litigants in the
state court matter to be entered into evidence; (5) Judges Maenza and Herr condoned the theft of
Plaintiffs money; (6) Judge Herr improperly considered Plaintiff’s ex-wife’s debt but not his
own; and (7) Judge Bartlett’s order denying Plaintiff’s motion to emancipate his child was not
supported by the evidence. (Id. at 5-9). Plaintiff also alleges that various judicial actions
constituted harassment against him.
Specifically, Plaintiff claims that (1) Judge Maenza made false statements during a matter
over which he presided; (2) Judge Herr’s Final Judgment Of Divorce was so egregious that it
amounted to harassment; (3) Judge Maenza denied Plaintiff’s request to reconsider a judicial
order; (4) Plaintiff was threatened with attorney’s fees; and (5) Plaintiff was improperly required
to carry duplicative health insurance for his children. (Id. at 9-12).
Plaintiff requests that the District Court: (1) Enter an Order to Appoint a licensed
independent third party accountant; (2) Enjoin the Superior Court of Morris County and Judge
Philip Maenza from further consideration of Plaintiff’s motions; (3) Enjoin the Superior Court of
Morris County, Essex County, Essex and Morris Counties Probation departments, and the N.J.
State Division of Family Development regarding enforcement actions against Plaintiff; (4) Enter
an Order requiring State of New Jersey, Probation and Child Support refrain [sic] from violating
Plaintiff’s Civil Rights; (5) Enter and Order to freeze Plaintiffs funds and property currently
held by Plaintiff’s ex-wife; (6) Enter an Order to return improperly andlor seized funds returned
to Plaintiff [sic]; (7) Enter an order to remove freeze on Plaintiff’s Heloc Loan; (8) Direct the
transfer of Essex County; (9) Request Damages, attorney fees, interests, and loss of income; (10)
Direct Probation to notice all credit agencies of previously erroneous notices regarding Plaintiff’s
supposed support arrears; and (11) Direct the Superior court and the Division of Family
Development, including Probabtion and Child Support Services, to provide Plaintiff with full
access to all the records reasonably requested by Plaintiff. (Id. at 14-17). Plaintiff also seeks
$9,000,000 in damages. (Id. at 17).
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure l2(b)(1) provides that a party may bring a motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Ballentine v. United States, 486 F.3d 806, 810
(3d Cir.2007). “A motion to dismiss for want of standing is also properly brought pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(1), because standing is a jurisdictional matter.” Id. “The party invoking federal
jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing the elements of standing, and each element must be
supported in the same way as any other matter in which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof,
i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.”
Focus v. Allegheny
cnty. Court of common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 838 (3d Cir.1996) (quoting
Lzjan v. Defenders of Wildhfe, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). A
motion under Rule I 2(b)( 1) “may be treated as either a facial or factual challenge to the courfs
subject matter jurisdiction.” Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir.2000).
Under a facial attack, the movant challenges the legal sufficiency of the claim and the
Court considers only “the allegations of the complaint and documents referenced therein and
attached thereto in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. “When standing is challenged on
the basis of the pleadings, [courts must] accept as true all material allegations in the complaint,
and
...
construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party.” Id. (quoting Pennell v. City of
San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 7, 108 S.Ct. 849, 99 L.Ed.2d 1(1988)). However, when the challenging
party presents a factual challenge, “the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself
as to the existence of its power to hear the case.” Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 204, 302 n.
3 (3d Cir.2006). In considering a factual attack on a 12(b)(l) motion, “no presumptive
truthfulness attaches to plaintiffs allegations,” and “the plaintiff will have the burden of proof
that jurisdiction does in fact exist.” Id. at n. 3 (quoting Mortenson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir.1977)).
“In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court
decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.” Storino v. Borough ofPoint Pleasant
Beach, 322 F.3d 293, 296 (3d Cir.2003) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct.
2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)). “It is axiomatic that, in addition to those requirements imposed by
statute, plaintiffs must also satisfy Article III of the Constitution.” Horvath v. Keystone Health
Plan East, Inc., 333 F.3d 450, 455 (3d Cir.2003) (citation omitted). As the Third Circuit has
articulated, the requirements of Article III standing are as follows:
(1) the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of
a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b)
actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) there must be a
causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the
injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant
and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before
the court; and (3) it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that
the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.
Taliafèrro v. Darby Tp. ZoningBd., 458 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir.2006).
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), “courts are required to
accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and to draw all reasonable inferen
ces
in favor of the non-moving party.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231 (citing In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props.
Secs. Litig., 311 F.3d 198, 215—16 (3d Cir.2002)). But, “[fjactual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555,
127 S,Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Courts are not required to credit bald assertions or legal
conclusions draped in the guise of factual allegations. See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec.
Litig.
.,
114 F.3d 1410, 1429 (3d Cir.1997). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or a
‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ “Ashcrofl v. Iqbal, 556
U.s. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555).
Thus, a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss if it contains “sufficient factual matter
” to
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows
the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id.
III.
DISCUSSION
A. 12(b)(1)
The State Defendants argue that dismissal of Plaintiffs Complaint is warranted pursuant
to Fed, R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The State Defendants assert that insofar as Plaintiff asserts claims
against the State Defendants in their official capacities, Plaintiffs claims are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. The State Defendants contend that this is a facial attack, meaning the
State Defendants are challenging that Plaintiff did not properly assert jurisdiction. This Court
agrees. Plaintiff does not address these arguments in his brief.
Despite construing Plaintiffs pleadings liberally and in a light most favorable to him,
nowhere in his Complaint or in his Opposition to the instant motion has Plaintiff demonstrated
that this Court has Subject Matter Jurisdiction to hear this case. Plaintiff has the burden of
proving Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction. Gould Elecs. Inc.
i
United States, 220 F.3d 169,
176 (3d Cir.2000). Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff has not met his burden of demonstrating
Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction. The State Defendants’ motion is granted.
B. 12(b)(6)
I. Sovereign Immunity
It is well-recognized that the States, state agencies and state officials acting in their
official capacity cannot be sued under the principles of sovereign immunity and the Eleventh
Amendment. See Will v. Michigan Dep ‘t ofState Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989). The
Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution makes explicit reference to the States’
immunity from suit:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subject of any
Foreign State U.S. Const. amend. XI. “The States’ immunity from suit is a
fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the
ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today..
.
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712-13 (1999). This sovereign immunity is not limited
to the State itself, but extends to state agencies and state officers who act on behalf of
the State. Regents ofthe Univ. of California v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997).
The State Defendants argue that they are entitled to dismissal under the doctrine of
Sovereign Immunity because the New Jersey State Court Judges and employees, as well as
Director Hawkins, are employees who were acting on behalf of the state and are entitled to
sovereign immunity. Moreover, the State Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s state law tort claims
must be dismissed because the supplemental jurisdiction statute does not authorize district courts
to exercise jurisdiction over claims against non-consenting states. Plaintiff does not address these
arguments in his brief.
Even if the Court had jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s case, the Court finds that the State
Defendants are entitled to dismissal under the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity. Plaintiff may not
assert claims against the State Defendants, as they are state officers that are acting on behalf of
the state. Moreover, Plaintiff’s tort law claims are also barred by the holding in Raynor v.
Regents ofthe University ofMinnesota, 534 U.S. 533, 541 (2002).( “[T]his Court held that the
Eleventh Amendment bars the adjudication of pendent state law claims against nonconsenting
state defendants in federal court.”) Therefore, the State Defendants’ motion is granted.
2. §1983
To the extent that Plaintiff tries to invoke §1983 as a basis for his claims against the State
Defendants, those claims will also fail because the State nor its officials are considered persons
open to suit.
42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial
officer for an act or omission taken in such office?s judicial capacity,
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of
Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
In this case Plaintiff is alleging that the acts by the State Defendants caused harm to him.
The Court finds that Plaintiff is attempting to sue the State Defendants in the course of their
duties as state officials. The Supreme Court has held that “neither a State nor its officials acting
in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t ofState Police,
491 U.S. 58, 71(1989). Plaintiff argues that the State Defendants’ “mis-administration of
divorce laws by New Jersey by the Superior Court and Probation Department effectively makes
those laws unconstitutional and the misadministration violates Plaintiff’s constitutionally
protected civil rights.” However, Plaintiff does not allege facts which explain how the State
Defendants were acting beyond their official capacities. The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed
to allege facts sufficient to survive the State Defendants motion to dismiss. Therefore, the State
Defendants’ motion is granted.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State Defendants motion to dismiss is granted. Plaintiff’s
complaint is dismissed with prejudice as to the Honorable Thomas L. Weisenbeck, A.J.S.C., the
Honorable Philip J. Maenza, J.S.C., the Honorable Ann R. Bartlett, J.S.C., the Honorable
Marilyn R. Herr, J.S.C. (ret.), CSS2 Joseph Adiele, SPO Inett Hewell, Essex Vicinage Chief
Probation Officer Shazeeda Samsudeen, the Director of the New Jersey Division of Family
Development Jeanette Page Hawkins (collectively the “State Defendants”).
An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.
DATE
,
,
2014
-
Jo$ê L. Linares
tUnited States District Judge
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