HARGROVE v. SANTIAGO et al

Filing 36

OPINION AND ORDER denying 33 Motion to Appoint Pro Bono. Signed by Judge William J. Martini on 3/1/16. (gh, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Civ. No. 14-4754 (WJM)

SHARODD HARGROVE,
Plaintiff,

OPINION AND ORDER
v.
ANGEL SANTIAGO, et al.,
Defendant.
This matter comes before the Court on pro se Plaintiff Sharodd Hargrove’s second
motion for appointment of pro bono counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). The Court
assumes the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts of the case and prior decisions
of the Court. For the reasons stated below, the Court will DENY the motion.
Section 1915(e)(1) provides that a “court may request an attorney to represent any
person unable to afford counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). District courts have “broad
discretion” to decide whether requesting counsel is appropriate and may request counsel
sua sponte at any point in the litigation. Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 498 (3d
Cir. 2002) (citing Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153 (3d Cir. 1993)). In exercising its discretion to appoint counsel, the Court must first assess whether a given case or defense has
merit. Tabron, 6 F.3d. at 155. If the case has merit, the Court must next weigh specific
factors, including (1) the litigant’s ability to present his or her own case; (2) the difficulty
of the particular legal issues; (3) the degree to which factual investigation will be necessary and the ability of the litigant to pursue that investigation; (4) the litigant’s capacity to
retain counsel on his or her own behalf; (5) the extent to which a case is likely to turn on
credibility determinations; and (6) whether the case will require testimony from expert
witnesses. Id. at 155-57. The list is non-exhaustive, and the Court may consider other
facts or factors it determines are important or helpful. Montgomery, 294 F.3d at 499.
The Court assumes without deciding that Plaintiff’s claim has “some merit in fact
and law.” However, the Tabron factors do not currently weigh in favor of appointing pro
bono counsel. Since the Court last considered Plaintiff’s application to appoint pro bono
counsel in March 2015, Plaintiff has filed, pro se, a successful motion to compel discovery
and a successful motion to extend the time to compel discovery, indicating that he remains
capable of presenting his own case, and thereby continuing to satisfy the first Tabron factor.
See ECF docs. 25, 28. Because nothing else has materially changed in the litigation that
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would alter the Court’s previous determination, the Court incorporates its findings from its
March 23, 2015 Order regarding the remaining prongs of the Tabron test. See ECF doc.
21.
Thus, for the above reasons and for good cause shown;
IT IS on this 1st day of March 2016, hereby,
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s application for pro bono counsel is DENIED.
Plaintiff may renew his application for pro bono counsel if future proceedings increase
his need for legal assistance. The Court may also sua sponte renew Plaintiff’s application
in the future at any time it deems appropriate.
/s/ William J. Martini
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.

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