HARGROVE v. SANTIAGO et al
OPINION. Signed by Judge William J. Martini on 7/5/17. (gh, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Civ. No. 2:14-4754 (WJM)
ANGEL SANTIAGO, et al.,
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.:
Pro se Plaintiff Sharodd Hargrove brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against
several employees of the New Jersey Department of Corrections, in their individual
capacities (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges that: certain Defendants retaliated
against him for exercising his First Amendment rights, by placing him in temporary closed
custody (“TCC”); certain Defendants subjected him to an involuntary strip search in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, as incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment; and
that the conditions of TCC violated his rights to due process and to equal protection under
the law. Plaintiff also raises several state law claims. Defendants now move for summary
judgment on all Counts under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. There was no oral
argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). Because Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity,
their motion is GRANTED and the action is DISMISSED with prejudice.
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. Since 2005, Defendant
Sharodd Hargrove has been civilly committed to the Special Treatment Unit (“STU”) in
Kearney, New Jersey, a facility jointly run by the New Jersey Department of Corrections
(“DOC”) and the New Jersey Department of Health Services (“DHS”) for the purpose of
incapacitating and rehabilitating “Sexually Violent Predators.” N.J.S.A. § 30:4-27.26. The
events giving rise to this action relate to Hargrove’s suspected participation in a smuggling
operation along with several other STU residents and former DOC employee Bobby
Singletary. On January 3, 2013, a grand jury indicted Plaintiff Hargrove for bribery in the
second degree and indicted Singletary for bribery, misconduct and conspiracy. The three
other residents of STU were indicted and plead guilty in exchange for their testimony
against one or more defendants. Immediately following the indictment, the DOC’s Special
Investigations Division (“SID”) requested that the offending residents be placed in
Temporary Close Custody (“TCC”), a form of administrative segregation.1 He was again
placed in TCC in September 2013 while his trial for bribery was ongoing. Hargrove was
ultimately acquitted. Singletary was found guilty.
The Alleged Strip Search of Hargrove
On January 4, 2013, before being placed in TCC, Hargrove and the other indicted
residents were strip searched. Hargrove steadfastly refused to consent to the search and
demanded that the officers provide probable cause, in accordance with STU guidelines.
Hargrove Dep. 60:16-24. According to the Complaint, Hargrove was then handcuffed and
taken into a separate room, where Defendants Troman and Salancho demanded that he
remove all of his clothing for visual bodily inspection. Compl. ¶ 5.3. According to the
Complaint, Defendants Jones, Troman, and Salancho all threatened Hargrove with physical
violence. Compl. ¶ 5.5. Hargrove alleges he ultimately submitted to the strip search because
he feared for his safety. Defendants deny that Hargrove was strip searched, though concede
that the Court must assume that the strip search took place for the purposes of summary
judgment. Defendants claim that Hargrove was searched only by use of a B.O.S.S. chair, a
device which scans the body for hidden metal objects. No contraband was recovered.
Hargrove does not allege that he sustained any physical injuries as a result of being
First Placement in TCC (January 2013)
Based on a recommendation from the DOC’s Special Investigations Division
(“SID”), Defendant Santiago ordered that Hargrove and the other indicted residents be
placed in TCC. Hargrove remained in TCC for roughly one and a half weeks. Lynch Decl.,
Ex. A, 70:13-20; Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶ 9. Normally, defendants are
processed at a county jail. In this case, however, the requirement that the DOC separate
SVPs from other inmates created practical impediments to transferring Hargrove to county
jail. Lynch Decl., Ex. A 77. During his stay in TCC, investigators from SID visited
Hargrove in order to elicit a written confession regarding the bribery charge. Hargrove was
read his Miranda rights and declined to sign a written confession.
Hargrove alleges that, while in TCC, Defendants deprived him of soap and other
toiletries, that he was permitted to shower only twice, and that he was denied legal phone
calls and access to legal resources. He alleges that he requested legal phone calls every day
but was denied, and that some of the guards stationed outside his cell harassed him and
The Sexually Violent Predators Act defines “TCC” as “the removal of a resident from the
general population, or other assigned status, with restriction to a room in a designated area for a
period not to exceed 72 hours.” N.J.A.C. 10A:35-1.4.
called him a “snitch.” Id. at 73:22-23; 77:24-25. He also lost his work assignment, as he
was unable to leave his cell.
Second Placement in TCC (September 2013)
On September 12, 2013, Defendant Kennedy of DOC’s Central Transport Unit, was
preparing to transfer Hargrove from STU to court for trial. Resident Fitzpatrick, scheduled
to testify for the prosecution, was awaiting transportation in the same holding area as
Hargrove. Officer Kennedy overheard Hargrove tell Fitzpatrick “to keep his dam[n] mouth
shut [in court].” Hargrove does not deny making this statement, but insists that he made it
jokingly. According to Hargrove, Fitzpatrick “tried to tell the judge . . . that it wasn’t no
problem amongst me and him.” Hargrove Dep. 96:20-23. Upon learning of the incident
from Officer Kennedy, Investigator Wise nonetheless recommended that Hargrove be
placed in TCC until the trial ended in order to prevent witness-tampering. Lynch Decl. Ex.
H., Ans. #9. As a result, Hargrove was placed in TCC for a second time on September 12,
2013 until his trial ended on September 27, 2013. During this time, Hargrove was permitted
to shower and communicate with his attorney every day. Nonetheless, Hargrove asserts
that he was placed in TCC only because certain officers believed he intended to testify
against Officer Singletary at trial, and that his placement was therefore retaliatory.
Procedural History of this Action
Hargrove filed a complaint pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on July 30, 2014. On
March 1, 2016, the Court denied Hargrove’s application for pro bono counsel in light of
his demonstrated ability to engage in motion practice. On September 7, 2016, the Court
denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment without prejudice and granted
Plaintiff’s motion for completion of limited discovery to the extent of 25 written deposition
questions to Defendant Tromans pursuant to Rule 31. The Court denied Hargrove’s request
for additional discovery. Defendants now move for summary judgment.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides for summary judgment “if the
pleadings, the discovery [including, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file] and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 32223 (1986); Turner v. Schering-Plough Corp., 901 F.2d 335, 340 (3d Cir. 1990). A factual
dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party, and is material
if it will affect the outcome of the trial under governing substantive law. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court considers all evidence and
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Andreoli
v. Gates, 482 F.3d 641, 647 (3d Cir. 2007).
Initially, the moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party has met this
burden, the nonmoving party must identify, by affidavits or otherwise, specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. The opposing party must do more than
just rest upon mere allegations, general denials, or vague statements. Saldana v. Kmart
Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001). Rather, to withstand a proper motion for summary
judgment, the nonmoving party must identify specific facts and affirmative evidence that
contradict those offered by the moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256–57.
The Court construes the Complaint as asserting five distinct claims. First, Hargrove
claims that his September 2013 placement in TCC was a retaliation for Hargrove exercising
his First Amendment right to testify in court. Second, Hargrove argues that the strip search2
conducted on him prior to his initial January 2013 placement in TCC violated the Fourth
Amendment as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Third, Hargrove
claims that his placement in TCC in January and in September of 2013 violated his right
to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Fourth, Hargrove argues that Defendants
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Fifth, Hargrove claims
that Defendants violated various provisions of the New Jersey Bill of Rights and Rights of
Residents. Although the Court finds that several of these claims would otherwise survive
summary judgment, qualified immunity shields Defendants from liability for civil
damages. The case must therefore be dismissed.
1. First Amendment Retaliation Claim
Hargrove alleges that Defendants placed him in TCC in September 2013 because
they believed Hargrove intended to exercise his First Amendment right to testify against
Defendants’ former colleague, retired DOC employee Bobby Singletary.3 In order to prove
a retaliation claim, Plaintiff must establish “(1) he was engaged in constitutionally
protected conduct, (2) he suffered some ‘adverse action’ at hands of prison officials, and
(3) his constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the
decision to take that action.” Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352 (3d Cir. 2012).
Hargrove’s First Amendment claim fails because the facts show beyond dispute
that he was not engaged in a protected activity. Hargrove admitted at deposition that he
never intended to testify against Singletary, and that Defendants were aware of this fact.
Lynch Decl. Ex. A, 121:3-5. Hargrove also admits that Officer Kennedy overheard him tell
Fitzpatrick to “keep his dam[n] mouth shut” at trial, just as Kennedy documented in his
September 12, 2013 report. This testimony also supports an alternative basis for the
“adverse action” taken against Hargrove, and thus undercuts the theory that his
The term “strip search” herein refers to the visual inspection of a nude detainee.
Plaintiff alleges that Kennedy and Singletary “shared a casual relationship as corrections
officers.” Compl. ¶ 6.5.
“constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision
to take that action.” Indeed, Hargrove seemed to concede at deposition that his September
2013 placement in TCC was not an act of retaliation. See Lynch Decl. A., 123:22-124:4.
No reasonable jury would find that Defendants retaliated against Hargrove for exercising
his First Amendment right to testify at trial.
2. Fourth Amendment Claim
The Fourth Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, forbids unreasonable “searches” or “seizures.” See Const. Amend. IV. To
determine whether a search was “reasonable” within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment requires “balancing the significant and legitimate security interests of the
institution against the privacy interests of the inmates.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 560
(1995); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321–22, (1982) (applying the balancing test
from Bell v. Wolfish to involuntarily civilly committed defendant). The strip search in Bell
occurred when the detainee returned from a contact visit with someone outside the
institution, a scenario which presented an opportunity for smuggling contraband into the
facility. Bell, 441 U.S. at 560. This threat conferred a “strong governmental justification”
for invading the detainees’ privacy. See Randall v. Cty. of Berks, Pennsylvania, 2015 WL
5027542, at *17 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2015) (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 559). Yet, as the Third
Circuit recently instructed, “Bell does not categorically uphold all bodily searches in
prisons.” Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 326 (3d Cir. 2016). When there is no plausible
opportunity to smuggle contraband, the state must articulate an alternative basis for the
“particular intrusion” imposed on the detainee, in this case a nude visual inspection. Parkell
v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313 (3d. Cir. 2013) (denying defendants’ motion for summary
judgment because there was no apparent penological purpose justifying a detainee strip
search). Defendants fail to articulate any particularized basis for the strip search and thus
fail to satisfy the Fourth Amendment under the framework of Bell v. Wolfish.
Defendants argue that the search was lawful under Florence v. Board, which upheld
a jail’s blanket policy of strip-searching all incoming detainees in the interest of preventing
contraband from entering the facility. Florence v. Bd. Of Chosen Freeholders of Cty. Of
Burlington, 566 U.S. 318, 322 (2012). The Supreme Court held that the policy was
constitutional under Bell v. Wolfish because the plaintiff’s right to privacy was outweighed
by the state’s “legitimate interest . . . to ensure that jails are not made less secure by reason
of what new detainees may carry in on their bodies.” Id. (emphasis added). Yet, the Court’s
reasoning in Florence “proceed[ed] on the understanding that the officers searched
detainees prior to their admission to the general population.” Id. at 325. In contrast,
Hargrove was not being processed for intake into a general population, but rather was being
removed from the general population and placed in TCC, where he had no contact with
other residents or inmates. This distinguishes Hargrove’s case from Florence and from
cases within this circuit upholding strip searches of pretrial detainees. See Cooper v. Sharp,
2012 WL 274800, at *8 (D.N.J. Jan. 31, 2012) (upholding strip search of SVP returning
from “p.m. visits”); Randall, 2015 WL 5027542 at *13-14 (upholding strip search of
detainee returning from a court hearing, “which [was] akin to a contact visit that
necessitated strip searches in Bell”).
Alternatively, Defendants argue that the strip search was reasonable in order “to
ensure that Hargrove could not self-harm while in segregation.” Yet the record contains no
evidence that Hargrove in fact posed any threat to himself. Institutional awareness that
detainees may resort to self-harm does not license any and all intrusion into a detainee’s
privacy. Based on the record, neither Hargrove nor Defendants who searched him
mentioned anything about self-harm, and there is no evidence to suggest Defendants
believed Hargrove would harm himself.
In short, neither of the state’s purported interests outweighs the “particular invasion”
sustained by Hargrove during the naked visual search. Viewing the facts in a light most
favorable to Hargrove, a reasonable jury could find that Defendants’ search of Hargrove
was unreasonable and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. As explained below,
however, qualified immunity insulates Defendants from civil liability.
3. Due Process Claims
The Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals from punishment without due
process. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. “[I]f a particular condition or restriction of pretrial
detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without
more, amount to ‘punishment.’” Bell, 441 U.S. at 539 (citations omitted). “Conversely, if
a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal-if it is arbitrary or
purposeless-a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is
punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua detainees.” Id.
Hargrove argues that being placed in TCC in January and September 2013 amounted to
“punishment.” He describes the January 2013 stay as particularly punitive: he was deprived
of most of his personal property and hygienic products; permitted to shower only twice in
roughly ten days; prohibited from using the telephone or contacting his lawyer; and
deprived of the income he would have earned on work assignment. Compl. ¶ 5.10.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Bell v. Wolfish governs the constitutionality of
restrictions and conditions of confinement for pretrial detainees.4 See, e.g., Aruanno v.
Main, 2010 WL 251590, at *8 (Jan. 10, 2010). The Third Circuit has “distilled [Bell] into
the following two-step test: we must ask, first, whether any legitimate purposes are served
by these conditions, and second, whether these conditions are rationally related to these
purposes.” Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 159–60 (3d Cir. 2005). The record suggests
that Hargrove was placed in TCC in January 2013 at the request of Administrator Santiago
in order to facilitate a criminal investigation into charges against Hargrove and three other
The parties both cite to Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), but that case applies only to
sentenced prisoners. See Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 374 (3d Cir. 2012); Fuentes v. Wagner,
206 F.3d 335, n. 9 at 342 (3d Cir. 2000).
residents, who had been indicted along with a former DOC employee for charges relating
to smuggling contraband into the facility. Under these circumstances, the Court finds that
segregating Hargrove from the general population was reasonable under Bell, given the
state’s interest in conducting an efficient and safe investigation. 441 U.S. at 559. Further,
the conditions themselves were not so “shocking to the conscience” so to give rise to a
freestanding conditions-of-confinement claim. See, e.g. Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 174
F.3d 368, 375 (3d Cir. 1999).
Yet there is one defect of constitutional significance in Hargrove’s January 2013
confinement in TCC: his inability to contact an attorney. “Inmates must be afforded
reasonable access to telephones so as not to infringe the First Amendment or impede
meaningful access to the courts in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Richardson v.
Morris Cty. Corr. Facility, , 2006 WL 3000234, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2006). Correctional
facilities have broad discretion to restrict telephone access, but they must do so in a way
that is “reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 539.
For the purpose of summary judgment, the Court must accept as true Hargrove’s assertion
that he was denied legal calls during his first stay in TCC. Lynch Decl. Ex. A., 78:4-6.
Further, Hargrove testified at deposition that some officers denied him access because
“they was saying that I was a snitch.” Lynch Decl. Ex. A., 77:24-25. This supports the
inference that Hargrove’s telephone restrictions were punitive in nature. Meanwhile,
Defendants offer no explanation or justification for denying Hargrove telephone access.
Although the state enjoys broad judicial deference in operating its custodial facilities,
officials are not entitled to a rubber stamp of constitutionality where they make no effort
to justify behavior that needlessly threatens due process. A reasonable jury could find that
Hargrove’s phone restrictions violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s guaranty of due
process. As explained below, however, qualified immunity insulates Defendants from civil
Hargrove’s second placement in TCC, in September 2013, clearly served the
legitimate purpose of separating Hargrove from witnesses in an ongoing trial in which
Hargrove was a defendant.5 Placement of Hargrove in TCC during his trial did not violate
procedural due process.
4. Equal Protection Claim
Hargrove argues that Defendants Santiago and Wise violated the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause by holding Hargrove in TCC for prolonged
periods on two separate occasions. Equal protection claims may be asserted by a “class of
one where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from
other similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.”
Further, Hargrove concedes that the conditions in TCC in September 2013 were much less
restrictive than in January 2013. He was permitted to shower daily and to communicate freely
with his attorney.
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (quotations omitted). A class
–of-one claim succeeds if the plaintiff proves “(1) the defendant treated him differently
from others similarly situated, (2) the defendant did so intentionally, and (3) there was no
rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225,
239 (3d Cir. 2006).
Hargrove’s equal protection claim fails because he provides no evidence that he
was “treated differently from others similarly situated.” The three other residents of STU
implicated in the indictment were strip-searched and placed in TCC, just like Hargrove.
Hargrove provides no evidence that other STU residents held in TCC following criminal
indictments have been released earlier or otherwise treated differently from Hargrove.
See Carson v. Mulvill, 488 Fed. App’x 554, 563 (3d Cir. 2012). Hargrove leans heavily
on N.J.A.C. § 10A:35-1.4, a regulation which limits placement in TCC to 72 hours
barring “emergent reasons for extension.” Yet this very language implies that the
Administrator has discretion to keep individuals in TCC for longer than 72 hours when
deemed appropriate. Id. Hargrove’s equal protection claim cannot withstand summary
5. N.J. State Law Claim
Count IV alleges statutory and regulatory violations of the New Jersey Patient Bill
of Rights and Rights of Residents. N.J.S.A. 30:4-24.2 states that “a resident shall not be
deprived of a civil right solely by reason of receiving treatment” pursuant to state law,
including the Sexually Violent Predators Act (“SVPA”). N.J. Admin. Code § 10A:35-2.1.
Hargrove alleges a violation of the “the right to be free from corporal punishment,”
N.J.S.A. § 30:4-24.2(d)(4); the right “[t]o the least restrictive conditions necessary to
achieve the purposes of treatment,” id. at e(2); and his right to “reasonable continuity of
care,” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:2H-12.8 (West). Lastly, he alleges a violation of his “right to
confidential communications” with his attorney and access to court. N.J.A.C. § 10a:352.2(a)(3). Unfortunately for Hargrove, Title 10A of the New Jersey Administrative Code
does not create a private cause of action for enforcing any of these rights. Drake v.
Muniak, 2016 WL 1162375, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2016). Defendants’ motion to dismiss
Count IV of the Complaint is granted.
6. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity insulates officials from civil damages unless an official
violates a statutory or constitutional right that was “clearly established” when the conduct
took place. Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012). Courts must therefore
determine (1) whether a constitutional violation took place and, if so, (2) whether the
right violated was “clearly established.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
As explained above, a reasonable jury could find certain Defendants liable under the
Fourteenth Amendment for the strip search and for refusing to allow Hargrove to contact
his attorney. The analysis now pivots towards whether these official acts violated rights
which were “clearly established.” The Court must examine the “objective legal
reasonableness of the action . . . in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at
the time it was taken.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244 (citations omitted). “The focus is on
whether the law, at the time of the challenged incident, is sufficiently clear to provide[ ]
fair warning to the defendants that their alleged conduct was unconstitutional.” Muth v.
Woodring, 666 F. App'x 137, 139 (3d Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). “We do not require a
case directly on point before concluding that the law is clearly established, ‘but existing
precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.’”
Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 5, 187 L. Ed. 2d 341 (2013) (citations omitted).
The Strip Search
Although constitutionally suspect, Hargrove’s right to be free from a strip search
before placement in TCC was not “clearly established” at the time it took place. Stripsearching detainees has been found constitutional in many other circumstances. See, e.g.,
Bell, 444 U.S. at 559; Zalazar v. Stem, No. 16-1792 (SDW), 2016 WL 7387416, at *4
(D.N.J. Dec. 20, 2016). Defendants’ reliance on Florence, while misplaced, was not
unreasonable. From the perspective of an objectively reasonable officer, Hargrove’s
“hybrid” status as both a pretrial detainee and a civilly committed “resident” might further
obscure the scope of Hargrove’s legal rights. Because they did not violate “clearly
established” law, Defendants are immune from liability for damages for the strip search.
Restrictions on Telephone Access in January 2013
To the extent Hargrove was constitutionally entitled to contact his attorney during
his one-and-a-half week stay in TCC, the Court does not find that such a right was “clearly
established” at the time of the alleged violation. In short, there is no uniform rule as to how
long a detainee may be held in isolation before due process requires that he or she be
allowed access to legal phone calls. “Numerous and sometimes stringent restrictions on
personal telephone calls by inmates have been upheld as constitutional.” Richardson, 2006
WL 3000234, at *5 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2006). “Case law suggests that so long as there is not
an outright policy that prohibits telephone use by pretrial detainees, any [reasonable]
restriction or limitations that serve a legitimate governmental purpose . . . are constitutional
under the Due Process Clause.” Newkirk v. Sheers, 834 F. Supp. 772, 792 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
Given the lack of clarity in this area of the law and the substantial deference historically
accorded to prison officials, the Court cannot say that Defendants violated “clearly
established” law by prohibiting Hargrove from using the telephone while in TCC in
January 2013 for a relatively limited period of time. Defendants are immune from liability
The Court notes that qualified immunity shields state actors only from civil
damages, not declaratory relief. Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 161 (3d Cir.1997). The
Court declines to issue declaratory relief in these circumstances. See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2201,
2202. To be clear, the Court does not hold as a matter of law that any Defendants committed
a constitutional violation. Rather, it has found that, construing the facts in a light most
favorable to Hargrove, a reasonable jury could find that Hargrove’s Fourteenth
Amendment rights were violated; however, it also found that Defendants are immune from
civil liability. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 (2009).
For the reasons foregoing, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED and Plaintiff’s motion is DISMISSED with prejudice.
/s/ William J. Martini
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.
July 5, 2017
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