ADAMS v. GRAND OASIS CANCUN et al
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge William J. Martini on 11/9/15. (gh, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
LINDA ADAMS,
Civ. No. 14-4917 (WJM)
Plaintiff,
v.
GRAND OASIS CANCUN, OASIS
HOTELS & RESORTS, and “ABC Corp.
1-10”, fictitious names for corporations
and/or business entities whose true names
are presently unknown,
OPINION
Defendants.
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Linda Adam’s (“Plaintiff”)
motion for default judgment. The Court previously held a proof hearing as to the
injuries suffered by the Plaintiff, and the Court reserved its decision as to damages.
Subsequently, the Plaintiff moved for default judgment. For the reasons below,
Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment is DENIED.
I.
BACKGROUND
On August 4, 2014, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Grand Oasis Cancun
(“Grand Oasis”), Oasis Hotels & Resorts, and ABC Corp. 1-10 (collectively, the
“Defendants”) seeking to recover damages for personal injuries sustained on one of
their premises. (See Complaint (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 25-26, ECF No. 1.) While on
vacation at Defendants’ hotel in Cancun, Mexico, Plaintiff slipped and fell on a
walkway where water had accumulated. (See id. ¶¶ 17-21.) Plaintiff brought the
instant action, arguing that Defendants’ failure to properly maintain the area caused
her to sustain serious and permanent injuries. (See id. ¶ 25.) Consequently, Plaintiff
asks for compensatory damages, disbursements, costs, reasonable attorney’s fees,
and pre-judgment interest. (See id. ¶ 1.) Plaintiff requested the Clerk of the Court
to enter a default against the Defendants on February 24, 2015, and the Clerk did so
on February 25, 2015. Subsequently, this Court conducted a proof hearing as to
damages on June 23, 2015. The Plaintiff now seeks a default judgment against the
Defendants.
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II.
DISCUSSION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 governs the entry and grant of default
judgment. The mere fact of default does not entitle plaintiff to judgment. To enter
default judgment, the court must first determine whether it has: (1) subject matter
jurisdiction over the case, (2) personal jurisdiction over the defendant, and (3) a
sufficient cause of action has been stated. See, e.g. AnnexTelecom Co. v. Brown,
No. CIV.A. 13-4605, 2014 WL 5149101, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 2014); Chanel,
Inc. v. Gordashevsky, 558 F.Supp. 2d 532, 535-36 (D.N.J. 2008). A court must
treat the factual allegations in the complaint as true, including the jurisdictional
allegations. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Pepe, 431 F.3d 162, 165 (3d Cir. 2005); D'Onofrio
v. Il Mattino, 430 F.Supp.2d 431, 439 (E.D. Pa. 2006). In order to satisfy its
burden, the plaintiff may prove personal jurisdiction with a “prima facie showing
and ‘may rest [its] argument on [its] pleadings, bolstered by such affidavits and
other written materials as they can otherwise obtain.’” AnnexTelecom, 2014 WL
5149101, at *1.
For a court to obtain personal jurisdiction over the parties, the complaint and
summons must be “properly served upon the defendant.” Lampe v. Xouth, Inc.,
952 F.2d 697, 700–01 (3d Cir. 1991). “Effective service of process is therefore a
prerequisite to proceeding further in a case.” Id. Consequently, in ruling on a
motion for default judgment, a court may sua sponte consider whether its exercise
of personal jurisdiction over the defendant is appropriate. See Allaham v. Naddaf,
No. CIV.A. 13-3564, 2015 WL 3421464, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 28, 2015); Gold
Kist, Inc. v. Laurinburg Oil Co., Inc., 756 F.2d 14, 19 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting that
“[a] default judgment entered when there has been no proper service of the
complaint is, a fortiori, void, and should be set aside.”) “In reviewing its personal
jurisdiction, the court does not assert a personal defense of the parties; rather, the
court exercises its responsibility to determine that it has the power to enter the
default judgment.” Williams v. Life Sav. & Loan, 802 F.2d 1200, 1203 (10th Cir.
1986).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h)(1)(B) authorizes service of process on
a foreign corporation “by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint
to an officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent authorized by
appointment or by law to receive service of process.” A foreign corporation can
also be served pursuant to New Jersey Court Rule 4:4-4(a)(6). See Fed. R. Civ. P.
4(h)(1)(A). New Jersey law, similar to Rule 4(h)(1)(B), allows service of process
on “any officer, director, trustee or managing or general agent, or any person
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authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process on behalf of the
corporation, or on a person at the registered office of the corporation in charge
thereof.” N.J. Ct. R. 4:4–4(a)(6).
For service on an agent, “in the absence of circumstances which clearly
show that [an agency agreement] was intended by the parties, authorization to
accept service of process on behalf of a corporation . . . would not be deemed to
exist.” Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Sparta, 198 N.J. Super. 370, 377 (quotations
and citations omitted). In other words, “[a]n ‘agency appointment’ for purposes of
service of process usually requires an actual appointment for the specific purpose
of receiving process.” Gelber v. Kirsch, No. 2:14-CV-6768 JLL JAD, 2015 WL
1471960, at *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2015) report and recommendation adopted, No.
CIV.A. 14-6768 JLL, 2015 WL 2403971 (D.N.J. May 20, 2015); W. v. Am. Honda
Motor Co., No. CIV.A. 08-0700 (NLH), 2008 WL 4104683, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 28,
2008) (“In order for service of process upon an agent to be effective, it must be
shown that the agent was actually appointed by the defendant for the specific
purpose of receiving process.”) The plaintiff shoulders the burden of
demonstrating that an alleged agent has specific authority, express or implied, for
the receipt of process. Am. Honda Motor, 2008 WL 4104683, at *2.
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate an agency relationship between the
Defendants and TravAmerica, Inc. (“TravAmerica”) for the purpose of service of
process. Grand Oasis and Oasis Hotels and Resorts are both foreign corporations
with a principal place of business in Boulevard Kulkulcan KM 16.5, Cancun,
Mexico. (See Compl. ¶¶ 2-3.) Plaintiff’s proof of service on the Defendants states
that service of process was effected on TravAmerica, the travel agent she used to
book her trip, at its office in Duluth, Georgia. (See Brief in Support of Motion to
Enter Default Against Defendants (“Pl. Br.”), Ex. B, ECF No. 14-2.) Plaintiff argues
that TravAmerica is the exclusive travel agent for the Defendants and, thus, suffices
as an agent for service of process. However, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged or
established that TravAmerica was either explicitly or implicitly authorized to accept
service on behalf of the Defendants.
Plaintiff’s primary support is a complaint filed by TravAmerica in which
TravAmerica claims that it “has held the exclusive contract rights to exploit the
Commercialization Rights” for the Defendants. (See Pl. Br., Ex. D ¶ 4, 19.)
However, this statement—as well as the accompanying allegations in that
complaint—demonstrate a form of limited agency at best, encompassing only a
commercial relationship. The Plaintiff’s additional allegations bolster the Court’s
understanding regarding this commercial relationship, as they concern only
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TravAmerica’s role as travel agent for the Defendants. (See Pl. Br. at 3-4.)
Consequently, Plaintiff has failed to put forth any evidence that the Defendants
expressly designated TravAmerica to serve as their agent for acceptance of
process. See Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 1097, 1101
(stating that “the cases dealing with agency by appointment indicate that an actual
appointment for the specific purpose of receiving process normally is expected.”)
Since Plaintiff only served TravAmerica, the attempted service on the
Defendants failed to meet the requirements of the Federal Rules or New Jersey
law, and the Clerk’s entry of default against the Defendants was in error. Thus, the
motion for default judgment is denied.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment is
DENIED. Plaintiff is allowed thirty days in which to effect valid service of
process. An appropriate order follows.
/s/ William J. Martini
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.
Date: November 9, 2015
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