J.F. et al v. BYRAM TOWNSHIP BOARD OF EDUCATION

Filing 31

OPINION/ORDER granting in part and denying in part 20 Motion to Dismiss; that Plaintiffs second claim (Count II) is hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; that Plaintiffs third claim (Count III) is hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; that this matter is CLOSED. Signed by Judge Faith S. Hochberg on 1/12/15. (DD, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

CLOSED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
:
:
:
Plaintiffs,
: Civil Case No. 14-5156 (FSH)
:
v.
: OPINION & ORDER
:
BYRAM TOWNSHIP BOARD OF EDUCATION, : Date: January 12, 2015
:
Defendant.
:
:
J.F., et al.,

HOCHBERG, District Judge:
This matter coming before the Court upon Defendant Byram Township Board of
Education’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), (Dkt. No. 20); and the Court having reviewed the
submissions of the parties and considered the motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
78; and
It appearing that this matter arises out of a dispute over the proper educational placement
for Plaintiff J.F., a teenage boy protected under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(“IDEA”); and
It appearing that Plaintiffs requested mediation from the New Jersey Commissioner of
Education on July 11, 2014, (Dkt. No. 6-4 at A1), which was subsequently converted to a Petition
for Due Process before the New Jersey Office of Administrative Law (“NJOAL”); that Plaintiffs
moved for emergent relief under the “stay put” provision of the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j), seeking
an injunction requiring Defendant to fund J.F.’s education at and transportation to/from a thirdparty private school retroactive to July 1, 2014, through the pendency of proceedings before the

NJOAL, (Dkt. No. 6-4 at A35); that the Honorable Irene Jones, A.L.J., denied Plaintiffs’ motion
in a written decision dated August 15, 2014, (Dkt. No. 6-4 at A173); and that Plaintiffs filed this
action in this Court on August 18, 2014 (Dkt. No. 1); and
It appearing that a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
challenges the existence of a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction. A motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction may either (1) “attack the complaint on its face” or (2) “attack
the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, quite apart from any pleadings.” Mortensen v.
First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). “The defendant may facially
challenge subject matter jurisdiction by arguing that the complaint, on its face, does not allege
sufficient grounds to establish subject matter jurisdiction.” D.G. v. Somerset Hills School Dist.,
559 F. Supp. 2d 484, 491 (D.N.J. 2008). On a facial attack, “the court must consider the allegations
of the complaint as true.” Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. When subject matter jurisdiction is
challenged under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion. McNutt v. Gen.
Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); and
It appearing that Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ second and third claims (Counts
II and III) 1; and
It appearing that Plaintiffs’ second claim (Count II) alleges that Defendant has violated the
IDEA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Section 504”), 29 U.S.C. § 794, by
unilaterally preparing an Individualized Educational Program (“IEP”) without conducting

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Defendant additionally moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ first claim (Count I). Plaintiffs’ first claim sought a
review and reversal of A.L.J. Jones’s August 15, 2014 order and sought injunctive relief pursuant to the
“stay put” provision of the IDEA. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 120.A–D.) This Court previously denied Plaintiffs’ first
claim in an Order dated November 7, 2014. (Dkt. No. 21.)

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educational assessments of J.F. or meeting with or seeking input from J.F.’s parents, among other
alleged deficiencies, (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 121–43); and
It appearing that Plaintiffs must obtain a final administrative decision prior to seeking relief
from federal court on this claim, see Komninos by Komninos v. Upper Saddle River Bd. of Educ.,
13 F.3d 775, 778 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[I]t is clear from the language of the [Individuals with
Disabilities Education] Act that Congress intended plaintiffs to complete the administrative
process before resorting to federal court.”); see also Swope v. Central York Sch. Dist., 796 F. Supp.
2d 592, 600–601 (M.D. Penn. 2011) (“[P]rovided at least part of the relief sought by Plaintiff . . .
is available through the IDEA’s administrative procedures, the IDEA’s exhaustion requirements
apply to Plaintiff’s . . . Section 504 claims.” (citations omitted)); and
It appearing that Plaintiffs’ complaint does not allege that a final administrative decision
has been rendered on their second claim and, therefore, that this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ second claim; and
It appearing that Plaintiffs’ third claim (Count III) seeks reimbursement of legal fees and
costs, (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 144–46); and
It appearing that a “prevailing party” under the IDEA may seek reimbursement of
“reasonable attorneys’ fees” pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) and that a “prevailing party”
parent under this statute is one who has obtained relief on a significant claim of the litigation and
shown a causal connection between the litigation and the actions of the defendant, see Metro.
Pittsburgh Crusade for Voters v. City of Pittsburgh, 964 F.2d 244, 250 (3d Cir. 1992); and
It appearing that Plaintiffs’ have not obtained relief on a significant claim in this matter, 2

2

Plaintiffs argue that their third claim should not be dismissed because they may prevail on an appeal of
this Court’s ruling on their first claim. Should Plaintiffs prevail before the Court of Appeals, they may move
to reopen this matter to seek attorneys’ fees pursuant to the statute.

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IT IS on this 12th day of January, 2015,
ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ second claim (Count II) is hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ third claim (Count III) is hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE; and it is further
ORDERED that this matter is CLOSED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Hon. Faith S. Hochberg
Hon. Faith S. Hochberg, U.S.D.J.

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