CLAUSO v. SOLOMON et al

Filing 42

OPINION fld. Signed by Judge Claire C. Cecchi on 6/22/15. (sr, )

*NOT FOR PUBLICATION*
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

THOMAS JAMES CLAUSO,

Civil Action No.: 14-5280 (CCC)

Plaintiff,
OPINION
V.

JUDGE SOLOMON, et al.,
Defendants.
CECCHI, District Judge
I.

INTRODUCTION
Pro se Plaintiff Thomas James Clauso (“Plaintiff’), a convicted state prisoner confined at

the East Jersey State Prison in Rahway, New Jersey, files the instant Complaint pursuant to 42
U.S.C.

§ 1983, alleging that various defendants, either individually or in concert, violated

Plaintiffs constitutional rights by wrongfully convicting him of state crimes. Presently before
the Court are Motions to Dismiss filed by various defendants. (ECF Nos. 27, 28, 29, 30.) The
Court also must screen the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
prisoner seeking redress from government officials.
dismisses the Complaint under

§ 1915A(a) because Plaintiff is a

For reasons stated below, the Court

§ 191 5A screening, and dismisses the Motions to Dismiss as

moot.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was convicted in 1988 in a jury trial by the State of New Jersey of attempted
murder, unlawful possession of a handgun, possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, and

aggravated assault.’ Plaintiff was sentenced to an extended term of life in prison with a 25-year
period of parole ineligibility for attempted murder, a consecutive five-year term, with a two-andone-half-year period of parole ineligibility, for aggravated assault, and concurrent five and tenyear terms for the weapons charges.
In the instant Complaint, Plaintiff alleges claims against a long list of defendants who,
Plaintiff asserts, either acted individually or conspired to illegally obtain the aforementioned
conviction. Plaintiff further asserts that these defendants wrongfully imprisoned Plaintiff in
violation of his constitutional rights under the Bill of Rights, (ECF No. 1 at 3), the Fourteenth
Amendment, Id. at 7, and the Thirteenth Amendment, Id. at 8. Plaintiffs allegations are broad,
asserting violations by state judges, prosecutors, judicial staff, members of the New Jersey Parole
Board and Department of Corrections, certain private citizens, and even the Courier Post
Newspaper. (See ECF No. 1 at 1-2.) Yet, despite Plaintiffs assertions of wrongful conviction,
the Complaint does not allege that Plaintiffs conviction has been overturned or expunged;
indeed, it appears from the Complaint that Plaintiff is still serving his sentence in state prison.
The Complaint seeks only monetary damages. See Id. at 11.
III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Every complaint must comply with the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the
statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the.

.

.

claim is and the grounds upon

‘Because the Complaint does not contain details of Plaintiffs state conviction, the Court relies
on its prior findings of fact in its October 31, 2005 Opinion denying Plaintiffs petition for a writ
of habeas corpus, except where explicitly cited otherwise. See Clauso v. Hendricks, No. 033090, ECF No. 17 (D.N.J. decided on Oct. 31, 2005).
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which it rests.” Erickson v. Fardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted).
While a complaint.
does not need detailed factual allegations, a
plaintiffs obligation to provide the “grounds” of his “entitle[ment]
to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do
Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.
.

.

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted).
That is, a complaint must assert “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556). The determination of whether the factual allegations plausibly give rise to an entitlement
to relief is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012) (citations
omitted). Thus, a court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation,” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted).
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the Court must be mindful to accept
its factual allegations as true, see James v. City of Wilkes—Barre, 700 f.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir.
2012), and to construe it liberally in favor of the plaintiff. See Names v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520—21 (1972); US. v. Day, 969 f.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992).
In general, where a complaint subject to statutory screening can be remedied by
amendment, a district court should not dismiss the complaint with prejudice, but should permit
the amendment. Denton

V.

Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992); Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp.,

293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that leave to amend should be granted “in the absence
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of undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, unfair prejudice, or futility of amendment”).
IV.

DISCUSSION
A plaintiff can pursue a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.

§

1983 for certain violations of

his constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory. subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
.

Thus, to state a claim for relief under

.

§ 1983, a plaintiff must establish, first, the violation

of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the alleged
deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. Am. Mfrs.
Mist. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50-1 (1999); Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 166-7 (3d
Cir. 2013).
The Complaint is difficult to comprehend, but it appears to the Court that all of the

§ 1983 claims asserted in the Complaint against all defendants arise out of Plaintiffs state
conviction. Plaintiff asserts in the Complaint that all of the defendants, either by their individual
actions or by conspiracy, caused Plaintiff to be unconstitutionally convicted of state crimes. In
the four Motions to Dismiss, various defendants raised several affirmative defenses, including,
among others: statute of limitations, immunity, and waiver of claims by Plaintiff in a prior
settlement agreement. However, the Court need not address those defenses here because the
Court finds that Plaintiffs claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
In Heck, the Supreme Court stated:
in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions
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whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,
a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has
been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,
declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such
determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus, 2$ U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages
bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not
been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.
Id. at 486-87 (footnote omitted).

“[A] state prisoner’s

§ 1983 action is barred (absent prior

invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of
the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success
in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the confinement or its duration.”
Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S.
74, 8 1—82 (2005)). In other words, “where success in a

§ 1983 action would implicitly call into

question the validity of conviction or duration of sentence, the plaintiff must first achieve
favorable termination of his available state or federal habeas remedies to challenge the
underlying conviction or sentence.”
Here, all of Plaintiffs claims are tied to his state conviction. For example, Plaintiff
alleges that certain defendants “conspired together” to “cover up what took place in 1988 at my
trial,”

(ECF No. 1 at 5); “the Parole Board

.

.

.

conspired to hold me in prison with the

prosecutor’s office when there was no murder,” Id.; “the Dept. of Corrections and the Parole
Board have held me in lock-up

.

.

.

for over 26 years because I refuse to accept this illegal

conviction,” Id.; “I have repeatedly shown the committee the lies [and] illegal acts by the judge
in Camden County [and] the county prosecutor’s office, and they have done nothing except
promote the continued conspiracy of named defendants.” Id. for any of Plaintiffs claims to
succeed, it would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of his conviction and sentence, but
nowhere in the Complaint does Plaintiff allege that his conviction has been overturned or
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expunged. Indeed, this Court denied Plaintiffs petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 2005. See
Clauso v. Hendricks, No. 03-3090 (D.N.J. filed on June 26, 2003; denied on Oct. 31, 2005). As
such, Plaintiffs claims are barred by Heck.2
V.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.

Claire C. Cecchi, U.S.D.J.

Dated:

2

As the Court is dismissing the Complaint on
will be dismissed as moot.

§ 191 5A screening, the four Motions to Dismiss
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