STEPHENS et al V. CITY OF ENGLEWOOD, ET AL
Filing
99
OPINION. Signed by Judge William J. Martini on 4/6/16. (gh, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
MARC AND TYRONE STEPHENS,
Civ. No. 2:14-05362 (WJM)
Plaintiffs,
OPINION
v.
CITY OF ENGLEWOOD, et al.,
Defendants.
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.:
Proceeding pro se, Plaintiffs Tyrone and Marc Stephens have asserted legal malpractice
claims against a law firm, Comet Law Offices, LLC (“Comet”). This matter comes before
the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment against Comet. Because the remaining
claims in the case arise exclusively under state law, the Court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over those claims and dismisses the claims without prejudice to
Plaintiffs’ right to refile them in state court. Consequently, Plaintiffs’ motion for default
judgment will be DENIED AS MOOT.
I.
BACKGROUND
In August of 2014, Plaintiffs filed suit against (1) the City of Englewood, (2) the
Englewood Police Department, (3) a number of individual police officers; (4) an attorney,
Nina Remson; and (5) Comet. On November 3, 2015, this Court issued an order entering
summary judgment in favor of Remson, the City of Englewood, the Englewood Police
Department, and all individually named police officers.
Consequently, all that remains is a “Negligence/Malpractice” claim and an “Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel” claim, both made against Comet. Despite being named in the
complaint, Comet has failed to plead or otherwise respond. Consequently, Plaintiffs have
moved for default judgment against Comet.
II.
DISCUSSION
Before reaching Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment, the Court must decide whether
it should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims against Comet. For the
reasons that follow, the Court answers that question in the negative.
28 U.S.C. § 1367 provides that a district court may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a claim where:
1. the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
2. the claim substantially predominates the claim or claims over which the district
court has original jurisdiction
3. the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,
or
4. in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining
jurisdiction.
§ 1367(c). Moreover, “in the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated
before trial, the balance of factors … will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction
over the remaining state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350
(1988).
Here, judgment has been entered on all of the federal claims in this action and all that
remains are two claims against Comet. The first claim is for “Negligence/Malpractice,”
which arises exclusively under state law. And while the second claim is labeled
“Ineffective Assistance of Counsel,” it too arises under state law given that there is no such
thing as a §1983 ineffective assistance of counsel claim against a private attorney. See
Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981) (§1983 does not provide for a “constitutional
tort” against a public defender for providing ineffective assistance). See also Clark v.
Vernon, 228 Fed.Appx. 128, 131 (3d Cir. 2007) (“private attorneys…do not act under the
color of state law when performing their function as counsel.”)1 Consequently, the Court
will liberally construe the complaint as alleging two separate claims for legal malpractice.
See Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003) (a court “must liberally construe
[pro se] pleadings, and … apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether the pro se
litigant has mentioned it by name.”) (citations omitted).
It is therefore apparent that the remaining claims in this case exclusively involve state
law concerns, such as the professional standard of conduct applicable to New Jersey
attorneys and whether Comet met that standard when performing its services for Plaintiffs.
Moreover, it is appropriate to construe the “Ineffective Assistance of Counsel” claim as a
malpractice claim because the claim extensively cites New Jersey’s Rules of Professional
Conduct.
1
2
Moreover, while the Court has expended time and resources on Plaintiffs’ other claims, the
claims against Comet have essentially remained stagnant at the early pleading stage. See
Hernandez v. Bank, Civ. No. 15-cv-470 (KM), 2016 WL 816746, *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 25, 2016)
(declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction may be appropriate where the court has
not expended resources in handling the state law claims). The balance of factors decidedly
points to this Court declining to exercise jurisdiction over what is now a state law
malpractice lawsuit. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ claims against Comet with be DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Plaintiffs’ right to refile those claims in state court. As a
result, Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment against Comet will be DENIED AS MOOT.
See, e.g., FDIC v. Madison Title Agency, LLC, Civ. No. 12-3009(MAS)(LHG), 2014 WL
7333196 (D.N.J. Dec. 18, 2014) (denying default judgment motion after declining to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims that were the subject of the motion).
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the claims against Comet be DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE to Plaintiffs’ right to refile those claims in state court. Consequently,
Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment is DENIED AS MOOT.
/s/ William J. Martini
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.
Date: April 6, 2016
3
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?