WOFFORD et al v. LANIGAN et al

Filing 66

OPINION. Signed by Judge Esther Salas on 3/26/2021. (ams, )

Not for Publication
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
ARTHUR WOFFORD, and
VINCENT RAY,
Plaintiffs,
v.
GARY LANIGAN, Commissioner of the
New Jersey Department of Corrections,
Defendant.

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Civil No. 14-5723 (ES)
OPINION

SALAS, DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment filed by Plaintiffs Arthur
Wofford and Vincent Ray (D.E. No. 60) and Defendant Gary Lanigan, the Commissioner of the
New Jersey Department of Corrections (“NJDOC”) (D.E. No. 61). Plaintiffs are two former
inmates of NJDOC, and they claim that Lanigan violated their rights under the Equal Protection
Clause by declining to pay them cash for work credits they received in prison. The Court has
considered the parties’ submissions and decides this matter without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 78(b); L. Civ. R. 78.1(b). Because Plaintiffs have provided no evidence that Lanigan, or anyone
else employed at NJDOC, paid a similarly situated former inmate, the Court GRANTS Lanigan’s
motion, DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion, and enters judgment in favor of Lanigan.
I.

Background
In the 1990s, both Plaintiffs were sentenced to mandatory minimum terms of thirty years.

Both were released in 2012. While incarcerated in various NJDOC facilities, both worked and
earned “commutation credits” and “work credits,” in addition to their regular hourly pay. Wofford

earned 3,904 commutation credits and 2,873 work credits, and Ray earned 3,651 commutation
credits and 2,642 work credits. Because they were serving mandatory minimum sentences,
N.J.S.A. § 30:4-123.51(a) prohibited them from using their credits to reduce their sentences.
However, relying on N.J.S.A. § 30:4-92—which says that compensation for inmates can be in the
form of cash, a reduction in sentence, or both—Plaintiffs contend they are entitled to cash payment
in exchange for their work credits. In other words, they appear to suggest that when they left
prison, they were entitled to a lump sum payment of some amount. Though the Court is not
convinced by that statutory argument—indeed, N.J.S.A. § 30:4-92 says, “Compensation for
inmates of correctional institutions may be in the form of cash at established inmate wage rates or
remission of time from sentence or both” (emphasis added), and Plaintiffs were paid a wage while
working in prison—Lanigan does not point to any authority suggesting that NJDOC cannot make
such a lump sum payment.
On September 9, 2014, Plaintiffs filed suit against Lanigan; Beverly Hastings, an
administrator of East Jersey State Prison; and NJDOC. (D.E. No. 1). They brought claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. On December 28, 2015, the Court dismissed their complaint in its entirety.
(D.E. Nos. 12 & 13). Most of their claims were dismissed with prejudice, but their personal
capacity equal protection claim was dismissed without prejudice. On April 18, 2016, Plaintiffs
sought to revive that claim by moving to reopen/amend. (D.E. No. 14).
The Court denied their motion on November 17, 2017. (D.E. No. 16). It appeared, the
Court said, that Plaintiffs were alleging a “class of one” theory of equal protection, which requires
them to allege they were intentionally and unreasonably treated less favorably than similarly
situated persons. (Id. at 4). However, the Court went on, they “failed to allege that . . . those
serving sentences whose maximum and minimum are the same[] were given pay and a reduction

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in their prison terms.” (Id.). The Court gave Plaintiffs one more opportunity to amend their
complaint. (Id. at 5).
On December 15, 2016, Plaintiffs filed the second amendment complaint (“SAC”), this
time naming Lanigan as the only defendant. (D.E. No. 18). After the Court granted Plaintiffs’
motion to reopen/amend (D.E. No. 21), Lanigan moved to dismiss the SAC. (D.E. No. 28). On
March 6, 2019, the Court denied the motion. (D.E. No. 38). In the SAC, as the Court explained,
Plaintiffs alleged that two former inmates—namely, Sheena Perry and Andre Judson—served
mandatory minimum sentences, just as Plaintiffs did, but were compensated for work credits they
earned while in prison, unlike Plaintiffs. (Id. at 2–3). If true, that could support a claim that
Lanigan, as commissioner of NJDOC, violated Plaintiffs’ rights to equal protection by failing to
similarly compensate them.
Now that discovery has concluded, both parties have moved for summary judgment on
Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim.
II.

Legal Standard
Under Rule 56(a), a “court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” The mere existence of an alleged disputed fact is not enough. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). Rather, the opposing party must prove that there is a genuine
dispute of a material fact. Id. at 247–48. An issue of material fact is “genuine” if “the evidence
is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248. A fact
is “material” if under the governing substantive law, a dispute about the fact might affect the
outcome of the lawsuit. Id. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not preclude
summary judgment. Id. On a summary judgment motion, the moving party must first show that

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no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The
burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to present evidence that a genuine issue of material fact
compels a trial. Id. at 324. To meet its burden, the nonmoving party must offer specific facts that
establish a genuine issue of material fact, not just “some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986). Thus,
the nonmoving party cannot rely on unsupported assertions, bare allegations, or speculation to
defeat summary judgment. See Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 252
(3d Cir. 1999). The Court must, however, consider all facts and their reasonable inferences in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Pa. Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 236 (3d
Cir. 1995).
III.

Discussion
Plaintiffs do not challenge New Jersey’s statutory scheme prohibiting inmates detained

pursuant to mandatory minimum sentences from using their work credits to reduce their sentences.
Rather, they claim that they, as two inmates detained pursuant to mandatory minimum sentences,
were treated less favorably than other inmates detained pursuant to mandatory minimum sentences.
(D.E. No. 60-2 (“Pls.’ Mov. Br.”) at 6–7, 10).
Where a plaintiff does not allege membership to a particular class or group, the plaintiff
can advance a “class of one” theory of equal protection. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528
U.S. 562, 564 (2000). To advance such a theory, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) the defendant[s]
treated him differently from others similarly situated, (2) the defendant[s] did so intentionally, and
(3) there was no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455
F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir. 2006). To be “similarly situated,” parties must be “alike in all relevant
aspects.” Perano v. Twp. of Tilden, 423 F. App’x 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Startzell v. City

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of Philadelphia, 533 F.3d 183, 203 (3d Cir. 2008)); see also Mosca v. Cole, 217 F. App’x 158,
164 (3d Cir. 2007) (affirming a grant of judgment for the defendant on an equal protection, “class
of one” claim where the plaintiff failed to identify a similarly situated individual who was treated
differently).
Thus, Plaintiffs must point to former inmates who served a mandatory minimum sentence,
like Plaintiffs, but were compensated for their earned work credits. Plaintiffs point to four such
persons whom they claim received this more favorable treatment: Sheena Perry, Andre Judson,
Lester Johnson, and Steven Geiger. (Pls.’ Mov. Br. at 6–7, 10). Not one, however, supports their
claim.
Plaintiffs provide very little information about Sheena Perry. (Id. at 7). In their SAC, they
allege that in 2001, “the court” held Perry was entitled to receive monetary compensation for work
credits. (SAC ¶ 16). Plaintiffs further allege Perry did receive such compensation. (Id.). In
support, they provided a partial case citation, which appears to be from the New Jersey Superior
Court Appellate Division, but they do not provide a copy of an opinion or order or any other way
to obtain either. (Id.). In their statement of undisputed material facts, Plaintiffs do not so much as
mention Perry. (D.E. No. 60-1). Nor did they submit any evidence supporting their claim that
Perry is a proper comparator, i.e., that she served a mandatory minimum sentence and was paid
cash for earned work credits after so serving. Lanigan submits only a little more with respect to
Perry, in the form of a sworn declaration of Karen Hughes, an administrative analysist in the
Division of Operations of NJDOC. (D.E. No. 61-4, Ex. D (“Hughes Decl.”)). Hughes attests that
Perry is a former inmate of NJDOC who was originally sentenced to serve a mandatory minimum
term of thirty years. (Id. ¶ 8). But Hughes goes on to say that Perry was resentenced to time served
on June 19, 2002, after serving only nineteen years. (Id.). There is no indication in the record as

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to why Perry’s sentence was reduced. The Court is thus left without any evidence supporting
Plaintiffs’ claim that Perry is similarly situated to Plaintiffs but treated more favorably by Lanigan,
i.e., that she was paid cash for earned work credits after serving a mandatory minimum sentence.
They provide no evidence she was ever even paid. Much less do they rebut Lanigan’s assertion
that, if she was paid, it was after she received a sentence reduction from her original mandatory
minimum term.1
Similarly, Plaintiffs have provided very little information about Judson. (Pls.’ Mov. Br. at
7). In their SAC, they allege that “the New Jersey Court of Appeals ruled that Andre Judson, an
ex-offender, should receive cash for credits he earned while incarcerated.” (SAC ¶ 17). In support,
they provide, as they did for Perry, a partial case citation, which appears also to be to a case from
the New Jersey Appellate Division, but they do not provide a copy of an opinion or order or any
other way to obtain either. (Id.). And just as they failed to do with Perry, Plaintiffs did not mention
Judson in their statement of undisputed facts, nor did they provide any evidence supporting their
allegations concerning Judson’s situation. However, the Court was able to obtain the case
document Plaintiffs cite through the court filings in Judson’s federal habeas case. (Case No. 050697, D.E. No. 1-2, at 2–4 (CM/ECF pagination)). In an unpublished per curiam decision, the
Appellate Division rejected Judson’s argument he was entitled to a reduction in sentence as a result
of his earned work credits and noted “[h]e thus will receive cash pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-92 and
N.J.A.C. 10A:9-5.1(b)2.” (Id. at 4). There is no further discussion of the issue, nor is there any
indication whether Judson was ever even compensated. In addition, there is no indication that the

In their opposition to Lanigan’s motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs complain that there is “no
explanation as to why [P]laintiffs were not entitled to the same relief as Ms. Perry because they were similarly situated
to her.” (D.E. No. 65, at 4). But the Court cannot assume why Perry’s sentenced was reduced, or that her sentence
was reduced because of her earned work credits. It is Plaintiffs’ job to figure that out and to inform the Court why
they were similarly situated to Perry with respect to her reduction in sentence.
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Appellate Division was referring to any payment beyond that which Plaintiffs received and all
other inmates receive for the work they perform in prison. Importantly, Lanigan submits evidence
suggesting Judson was never paid. In her sworn declaration, Hughes attests that “Judson was paid
for his work time, but was not awarded further remuneration for his inapplicable credits.” (Hughes
Decl. ¶ 14). Plaintiffs have put forth no evidence to refute this contention.
In their moving brief, Plaintiffs argue they are similarly situated to Johnson and Geiger.
(Pls.’ Mov. Br. at 6, 10). They named neither person in their SAC, and it appears to be the first
time they have mentioned these individuals. Even assuming it appropriate to consider Plaintiffs’
arguments concerning those two alleged comparators, their presence does not create a genuine
dispute of material fact. In support of their claim that Johnson and Geiger are appropriate
comparators, Plaintiffs cite the dismissals of Johnson and Geiger’s respective civil rights
complaints. (Id. at 6 (citing Johnson v. New Jersey Dep’t of Corr., No. 06-0926, 2006 WL
1644807 (D.N.J. June 2, 2006)); id. at 10 (citing Geiger v. Balicki, No. 11-5888, 2012 WL 1339436
(D.N.J. Apr. 17, 2012))). In both cases, Johnson and Geiger claimed they were entitled to cash
payment for their work credits, and in both cases, the Court dismissed their claims on the basis
they had not alleged their mandatory minimum sentences had expired as would be required to
receive such payment under N.J.S.A. § 30:4–123.51(a). Geiger, 2012 WL 1339436, at *3;
Johnson, 2006 WL 1644807, at *3. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ suggestions, however, in neither case
did the Court hold that Johnson and Geiger were entitled to cash payments. And there is no
evidence suggesting that either of them, upon completion of their sentences, received such
payment. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to show that Johnson and Geiger
are similarly situated to them and were intentionally treated more favorably.

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In sum, there is no evidence in the record on which a reasonable juror could find that
another former prisoner, whose sentence and mandatory minimum were the same length, received
payment for unused work credits upon release from custody. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed
to meet the first two prongs of their equal protection claim. See Hill, 455 F.3d at 239. The
undisputed material facts make clear that Defendant Lanigan is entitled to judgment in his favor.
IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (D.E. No. 61)

is GRANTED and Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED (D.E. No. 60). An
appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

/s/Esther Salas
Esther Salas, U.S.D.J.

Date: March 26, 2021

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