KATES v. CHRISTIE et al

Filing 15

OPINION. Signed by Judge Jose L. Linares on 7/6/15. (cm )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
EDWARD KATES,
Civil Action No. 14-5769 (JLL)

Plaintiff,

v.

:

OPINION

NEW JERSEY GOVERNOR CHRIS
CHRISTIE, et al.,

Defendants.
LINARES, District Judge:
Plaintiff, Edward Kates, filed a complaint against Defendants on September
16, 2014.
(ECF No. 1). On March 12, 2015, this Court granted Plaintiffs application
to proceed informa
pauperis. (ECF No. 2). On April 21, 2015, this Court entered an order
and opinion dismissing
Plaintiffs complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim for which relief
could be granted
following sua sponte screening. (ECF No. 6, 7). On April 30, 2015, Plainti
ff filed a motion for
reconsideration of that order. (ECF No. 9). Petitioner has also filed motion
s for leave to file an
amended complaint and for the issuance of a certificate of appealability
. (ECF No .10, ii). For
the reasons set out below, this Court will deny Plaintiffs motion for recons
ideration, and will deny
without prejudice Plaintiffs motion for leave to amend and for a certific
ate of appealability for
lack ofjurisdiction.

I.

BACKGROUND

As this Court previously summarized the facts underlying Plaintiff’s complaint in its
April
21, 2015 opinion (ECF No. 6), only a brief summary of this Court’s prior decisio
n and Plaintiffs
motion is necessary here. On April 21, 2015, this Court dismissed Plaintiffs 42
U.S.C.

§ 1983

claims as plaintiff is a life sentence inmate seeking to have his life sentence declare
d unlawful, to
gain the benefits of work, commutation, and minimum status credits, and to have
his life sentence
effectively reduced to a seventy-five year term sentence, and as such his claims
are not cognizable
under

§ 1983. (ECF No. 1 at 34, 46-47; ECF No. 6 at 6-9). Plaintiff now asks this Court to

reconsider that decision, arguing that he seeks only a possible review of his
sentence, and not a
speedier or immediate release, and as such his claims are not barred by either
Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973), or Heck v. Humpries, 512 U.S. 477, 489-90. (ECF
No. 9 at 2-1 1).’

II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard

Motions for reconsideration are to be granted sparingly and only when Plainti
ff has met
the high standard required to merit such relief. Delanoy v. Tp. Of Ocean
, No. 13-15 55, 2015
WL 2235103, at *2 (D.N.J. May 12, 2015). “A judgment maybe altered
or amended under
Rule 7.1(i) if the movant shows at least one of the following grounds: ‘(1)
an intervening
change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that
was not available when

Plaintiff also argues that Defendants are not entitled to qualified immun
ity. As this Court did
not base its dismissal on immunity grounds, that argument is of no momen
t and does not address
the basis for this Court’s prior order, and therefore is an improper
basis for reconsideration.
2

the court [issued its order]; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact to prevent
manifest injustice.” Id. (quoting Max’s Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669,
677 (3d Cir.
1999)), Reconsideration motions may not be used to relitigate old matters or to
raise arguments
or present evidence that could have been raised prior to entry ofjudgment but
were not, and
courts should only grant such a motion where the prior decision “overlooked
a factual or legal
issue that may alter the disposition of the matter.” Id.

B. Analysis
Plaintiff’s main argument for reconsideration is that his claims do not seek his
immediate
or speedier release, and are thus not barred by the Preiser and Heck doctrines.
Under Preiser,
“when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physic
al imprisonment, and
the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release
or a speedier release
from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.”
Brown v. Christie,
No. lO-1572,2010WL5149341 (D.N.J.Dec. 13,2010),affirmed,423 F.App
’x45(3dCir. 2011).
Under Heck, the habeas bar is extended to those cases where a plaintiff
seeks money damages
“attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence,” and as such any
such claim “does not
accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.” Id. (quotin
g Heck, 512 U.S. at 48990). Thus, a prisoner may not use

§ 1983 to challenge “the fact or duration of his confinement.”

Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005). Under this doctrine,
any claim which necessarily

would result in the shortening of a sentence if succesful, including by
requiring the application of
time credits, lies “at the core of habeas corpus” and is thus not cogniz
able under
79. Prisoners may therefore not use

§ 1983.

Id. at

§ 1983 “to obtain the restoration of [good time or similar]
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credits.” Id. Although Prisoner’s may bring claims which attack only
the procedures used to
make a determination without attacking the determination itself,
such as by attacking the
procedures used to make parole determinations, Id. at 80-82, if
a plaintiffs success “would
necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of [his] confinement or its duratio
n,” that action is barred
“no matter the relief sought[, and] no matter the target of the prisoner’s
suit.” Id. at 8 1-82.
Here, Plaintiff attempts to argue, as he alleged in his complaint, that
he does not seek an
immediate or speedier release, only an eligibility review. (ECF No.
9 at 10).

In that same

sentence, however, Plaintiff states directly to the contrary that he is
seeking “application of the
statutorily guaranteed commutation credits” to his sentence.

(Id.).

Plaintiff is not seeking a

parole eligibility review as he attempts to suggest. Throughout his
complaint he makes it clear
that he, like the plaintiff in Brown, is asking this Court to find his life
sentence illegal, to find that
his sentence should be treated not as an interminable life sentence
but to a set term of 75 years,
and to hold that commutation, work, and other credits apply to reduce
that set term sentence. As
with the plaintiff in Brown, it is clear that the benefit Plaintiff seeks

is to have his sentence declared

void, reduced to a set 75 year term, and then further reduced by
his “earned” credits. The “only
conceivable benefit he might receive,” as in Brown, is a speedi
er or immediate release and
monetary damages stemming from his “illegal” detention. Brown
v. Governor ofNew Jersey, 432
F. App’x 45, 46 (3d Cir. 2011). As such, despite Plaintiffs contrad
ictory assertions otherwise,
his claims are properly habeas claims and must be raised through

a habeas petition, or fail to accrue

until such time as his sentence is overturned through such a
petition. Id. This Court therefore
did not commit a clear error of fact or law, and reconsideration
is therefore not appropriate at this
time. As Plaintiff does not claim any new evidence nor that
the contro

lling law has changed since

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the Court’s April 21, 2015, decision, no valid grounds for reconsideration exist, and this Court will
deny Plaintiff’s reconsideration motion. Delanoy, 2015 WL 2235103 at *2.
Finally, this Court notes that Plaintiff has also filed a motion for leave to file an amended
complaint and a motion for the issuance of a certificate of appealability. (ECF No. 10, 11).
After
filing those motions but before this Court could rule on them, Plaintiff filed a notice of his
intent
to appeal this Court’s April 21, 2015, order. (ECF No. 12). As Plaintiffs notice of appeal
has
divested this court ofjurisdiction to decide these motions, see, e.g., United States v. Georgi
ou, 777
F.3d 125, 145 (3d Cir. 2015) (the “filing of a notice of appeal.. confers jurisdiction on the
court
.

of appeals and divests the district court of [jurisdiction]”), this Court will deny those motion
s
without prejudice to Plaintiffs refihing them after the conclusion of his appeal.
2

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, this Court will deny Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration
and deny without prejudice Plaintiffs motions leave to amend and for a certificate of appeal

ability.

An appropriate order follows.

Jose L. Linares,
2tJnited States District Judge

2

This Court notes, however, that a certificate of appealability is only necessary
to the filing of
an appeal in habeas cases brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
2254 and 2255, see 28 U.S.C. §
§
2253(c), and that Plaintiffs complaint was dismissed without prejudice to his
filing of an
amended complaint.
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