KATES v. CHRISTIE et al

Filing 6

OPINION. Signed by Judge Jose L. Linares on 4/17/2015. (nr, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

EDWARD KATES,
Plaintiff,
v.
NEW JERSEY GOVERNOR CHRIS
CHRISTIE, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 14-5769 (JLL)

OPINION

LINARES, District Judge:
Plaintiff, Edward Kates, filed a complaint against Defendants on September 16, 2014.
(ECF No. 1). On March 12, 2015, this Court granted Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma
pauperis. (ECF No. 2). At this time, the Court must review the Complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. For the reasons set out below, Plaintiff’s complaint
will be dismissed, and plaintiff’s motion for class certification and application for pro bono counsel
will be denied as moot.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are drawn from the allegations contained in Plaintiff’s complaint.
(ECF No. 1). Plaintiff is a convicted prisoner currently incarcerated at East Jersey State Prison in
Rahway, New Jersey. (ECF No. 1 at 3). On July 3, 1991, Plaintiff was sentenced to a term of
life imprisonment with a thirty year period of parole ineligibility pursuant to New Jersey’s murder
statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:11-3(b). (Id. at 34). Plaintiff alleges that during his incarceration
he has been continually employed by the prison, and thus should have earned work credits towards
an early release. (Id. at 46). Plaintiff also suggests that he is entitled to commutation credits and
minimum status credits. (Id. at 36, 46-47).
In his complaint, Plaintiff also details the numerous attempts he has made at
administratively resolving his claims. Plaintiff has submitted several remedy forms and letters
requesting that he be given a numerical maximum sentence (as opposed to life), that he be given
the benefit of his alleged credits, that his life sentence be found to be unlawful, and that his life
sentence be treated as a seventy five year term reducible through various credits. (Id.at 34-40).
Plaintiff’s requests have been denied, as administration and the parole board have noted that
Plaintiff has been sentenced to a term of life, and that neither his life sentence nor his thirty year
parole disqualifier can be reduced through the credits to which he is entitled. (Id.). In one
instance, Plaintiff states that he was informed through the inmate remedy system that his “release
date for DOC will always be life.” (Id. at 37). In an attempt to show that various life sentence
inmates have been treated differently by the Department of Corrections, Plaintiff alleges that other
inmates have been told that “75 year is considered life.” 1 Id. at 41.
1

The “75 Years” concept appears to arise out of New Jersey’s No Early Release Act, N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 2C:43-7.2(b) which states that “[s]olely for the purpose of calculating the minimum term
of parole ineligibility pursuant [the No Early Release Act], a sentence of life imprisonment shall
2

Plaintiff now brings suit claiming that his sentence is unlawful, that he has been denied the
protections of the New Jersey Constitution, that his treatment as a life term inmate violates the
Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, that the State has
breached its employment contract with Plaintiff by denying him work credits, and that the
undefined length of his sentence subjects him and other life term prisoners to unfair treatment,
recognition, and financial issues, as well as causes discrimination and the families of such
prisoners to suffer a social stigma. (Id. at 30-64). As Defendants, Plaintiff names the current
Governor of New Jersey, the current members of the State Legislature (both the Senate and
Assembly), the Commissioner of the N.J. Department of Corrections, and the members of New
Jersey’s Parole Board, all of whom are named jointly, severally, and in both their individual and
official capacities.

(Id. at 3-32).

Plaintiff seeks both injunctive and monetary relief from

Defendants. 2

II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard

be deemed to be 75 years.”
2

Plaintiff’s complaint provides few other facts, but contains many pages of allegations which
the Court need not discuss to perform its screening inquiry. Most of these allegations are
duplicative of the facts herein laid out or otherwise restate Plaintiff’s other claims in an
alternative manner.
3

Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 132166 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996) (“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil
actions in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B),
seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a
claim with respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. The PLRA directs district courts
to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A because Plaintiff is a prisoner who has been granted in forma pauperis
status and seeks damages from governmental employees.
According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, “a pleading that offers
‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.’” 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)). To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim 3, the complaint must allege
“sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster,

3

“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012)
(citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x
230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Courteau v. United States, 287 F.
App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).
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764 F.3d 303, 308 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Moreover, while pro se
pleadings are liberally construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their
complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir.
2013) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

B. Analysis
In addition to numerous state law claims, Plaintiff raises two federal claims, both of which
arise out of violations of the Fourteenth Amendment which Plaintiff suggests are actionable under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides “private citizens with a means to redress violations of
federal law committed by state individuals.” Woodyard v. Cnty. Of Essex, 514 F. App’x 177, 180
(3d Cir. 2013). A plaintiff states a claim under the statute where he shows that he was deprived
of a federal constitutional or statutory right by an individual acting under color of state law. Id.
In evaluating such a claim, the Court must first identify the contours of the right which Plaintiff
alleges has been violated and determine whether Plaintiff has successfully pled such a violation.
Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (3d Cir. 2000). Based on the allegations in Plaintiff’s
complaint, Plaintiff has raised two Fourteenth Amendment claims: that a life term under the New
Jersey Statute violates a prisoner’s Due Process rights, and that such a term provides for disparate
treatment and therefore violates the Equal Protection Clause. Because Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims
are based upon the assertion that Plaintiff is serving an unlawful sentence and is being denied the

benefits of his commutation, work, and minimum credits, those claims are not actionable under §
1983, and shall be dismissed.
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1. Plaintiff’s claims are not cognizable under § 1983
Although Plaintiff attempts to plead that he is seeking neither an immediate nor speedier
release, that is, in effect, what he seeks. Plaintiff brings two federal claims: that the denial of a
numerical maximum term and the ability to apply commutation, work, and minimum credits to
their parole eligibility amounts to an equal protection violation (as life prisoners are treated
differently from non-life prisoners); and that the lack of a numerical maximum to which benefits
would apply deprives life prisoners of liberty without due process of law. Plaintiff’s requests for
relief clearly establish that he is seeking that his sentence be reduced in so much as he requests:
that his sentence be declared unconstitutional or unlawful, that Plaintiff’s earned work,
commutation, and minimum credits be applied to his parole eligibility and maximum term,
requiring that the maximum sentence for murder be reduced to a set term of 75 years, as well as
fees and monetary damages for the inflicted disparate treatment. 4
The issues Plaintiff raises in his Fourteenth Amendment claims, that he be given a
numerical maximum term and that credits be applied to his life sentence, have previously been
raised in this District. See generally Brown v. Christie, No. 10-1572, 2010 WL 5149341 (D.N.J.
Dec. 13, 2010), affirmed, 432 F. App’x 45 (3d Cir. 2011). 5 In that case, this Court recognized
4

Plaintiff also requests various forms of injunctive relief relating to his less defined claims such
as orders that life prisoners receive equal consideration from private individuals or that life
prisoners’ children be “free from specific harms.” These forms of “relief” arise, however, out of
Plaintiff’s pleadings of general unfair treatment or stigmatization which do not appear to state a
claim for relief separate from Plaintiff’s claims under the New Jersey Constitution of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
5

Although the claims in Brown had the added wrinkle that the plaintiff there also claimed that
the No Early Release Act had, in some unspecified way, been unlawfully applied to him
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that, under Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973), “when a state prisoner is challenging
the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination
that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole
federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” Brown, 2010 WL 5149341, at *3 (quoting Preiser,
41 U.S. at 500). This Court also held that a claim such as those here, which seeks money damages
“attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction or
sentence has been invalidated.” Id. at *4 (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489-90
(1994)). As the requested prospective relief requested in that case, which parallels that which
Plaintiff requests here, was only available by way of a habeas petition, and the monetary relief
sought was not cognizable under § 1983 until such time as the plaintiff’s conviction had been
overturned, this Court dismissed that complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief could
be granted. Id.
The Court of Appeals upheld that decision, observing that
[t]here is no basis to challenge the District Court's ruling. [The
plaintiff's] allegations are not entirely clear, but what is clear is that
he has not raised any challenge to the legality of any procedure or
its application that might arguably be cognizable under § 1983. Cf.
Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82, 125 S. Ct. 1242, 161 L.Ed.2d
253 (2005) (addressing challenge to state parole procedures).
Instead, his apparent challenges relate solely to the “‘the fact or
duration of his confinement.’” Id. at 78, 125 S. Ct. 1242 (quoting
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489, 93 S. Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d
439 (1973)). Thus, they “lie ‘within the core of habeas corpus' ” and
must be raised in a habeas petition. Id. at 79, 125 S. Ct. 1242
(quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 487, 93 S. Ct. 1827). In [the plaintiff's]
case, his status as a state prisoner means that he must raise his
challenges in a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Coady
v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 484–85 (3d Cir.2001).
retroactively, Brown’s claims otherwise mirror in all relevant aspects Plaintiff’s claims. Brown
v. Christie, 2010 WL 5149341 at *1-3.
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On appeal, [the plaintiff] insists that he is not seeking credits
per se, but . . . [e]ntitlement to credits . . . appears to be the only
conceivable benefit he might receive. He also continues to argue that
his sentence is illegal under New Jersey law and that New Jersey
courts “will not comply” with New Jersey law. These are habeas
claims. . . . If he wants to raise [these claims] in federal court, he
must do so by means of a habeas petition[.]
Brown v. Governor of New Jersey, 432 F. App’x 45, 46 (3d Cir. 2011).
Although Plaintiff attempts to obscure the fact by pleading his claims as Equal Protection
claims or as claims for fair treatment in the face of the “stigma” of a life sentence, 6 what Plaintiff
seeks here is precisely what Brown sought, that he receive the benefit of commutation, work, and
minimum credits, and be treated as if his maximum sentence were seventy five years. The only
conceivable benefit Plaintiff could receive from his suit is the application of those credits or a
declaration that his sentence was unlawful, and therefore his claims are habeas claims and cannot
be brought under § 1983. Brown, 423 F. App’x at 46. To the extent that Plaintiff instead seeks
monetary damages, success on his claims would directly impugn his sentence, and such claims are

thus barred by Heck until such time as Plaintiff’s sentence has been overturned. Brown, 2010 WL
5149341, at *4 (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 489-90).
Plaintiff’s federal claims brought pursuant to § 1983 must therefore be dismissed. As no
claims over which this Court has original jurisdiction remain after the dismissal of Plaintiff’s §
6

This Court notes both that the “stigma” in Plaintiff’s case arose only because he had been
convicted of murder, and that Plaintiff’s equal protection claim, even were it cognizable would
fail as a matter of law as Plaintiff cannot show that life-term inmates are a protected class. See
Keenan v. City of Philadelphia, 983 F.3d 459, 465 (3d Cir. 1992) (a claim under § 1983 requires
that plaintiff plead that he was a member of a protected class and that he received different
treatment from similarly situated individuals); see also Overly v. Garman, --- F. App’x ---, 2015
WL 1137427, at *1 (3d Cir. March 16, 2015).
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1983 claims, this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law
claims.

28 U.S.C. §1367(c)(3).

Plaintiff’s complaint will therefore be dismissed without

prejudice. As the Court is dismissing the complaint in its entirety, the complaint shall also dismiss
as moot Plaintiff’s motion for class certification (ECF No. 2) and application for pro bono counsel.
(ECF No. 3).

III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court will dismiss plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice
and deny as moot Plaintiff’s motion for class certification and application for pro bono counsel.
An appropriate order follows.

DATED: April 17, 2015
s/ Jose L. Linares
JOSE L. LINARES
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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