HARRIS v. HUDSON COUNTY JAIL et al

Filing 4

OPINION. Signed by Judge Jose L. Linares on 4/7/15. (DD, )

*NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

TERRELL HARRIS,
Civil Action No.14-6284 (JLL)

Plaintiff,
v.

:

OPINION

HUDSON COUNTY JAIL, et aL,
Defendants.
LINARES, District Judge:
Plaintiff, Terrell Harris, filed a complaint against Defendan
ts, Hudson County Jail,’
Director Oscar Aviles, Deputy Director Castillo, Lieutenan
t Yurecko, Sergeant Keisiah Ford,
Sergeant Matos, Officer Murtha, Hudson County Jail Medical
Department, and Jane Doe, on
October 9, 2014. (ECF No. 1). On March 10, 2015, This Cou
rt granted Plaintiffs application
to proceed informa pauperis. (ECF No. 3). At this time,
the Court must review the Complaint,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or

malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, or because it seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. Also before the Court is
Plaintiffs application for pro bono counsel (ECF No. 2). For
the reasons set out below, this Court
dismisses all claims as to Defendant Hudson County Jail
and Plaintiffs vicarious liability claim
against Defendant Medical Department with prejudice, dism
isses Plaintiffs supervisory liability

This facility would be more properly named as the Hudson
County Correctional Center.

claims against Defendants Aviles and Castillo without prejudice for failure
to state a claim on
which relief can be granted, but allows the following claims to proceed: Plainti
ffs conditions of
confinement claim against Defendants Ford and Matos, and, based on superv
isory liability,
Yurecko; and Plaintiffs deliberate indifference to serious medical needs
claims against
Defendants Matos, Murtha, and Jane Doe. Finally, Plaintiffs application for
pro bono counsel is
denied.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are drawn from the allegations contained in Plaintiffs compl
aint.
(ECF No. 1 ),2 Plaintiff is a pre-trial detainee currently incarcerated at the Hudso
n County Jail.
(ECF No. 1 at 25). He was originally classified as a maximum tier inmate on
the basis of the
crimes with which he is charged. (Id.). On or about April 15, 2014, Plainti
ff tore the Achilles
tendon on his right ankle during a game of basketball.

(Id.).

On April 29, 2014, Plaintiff

underwent surgery to reattach the tendon, after which he was transferred to
the Jail’s infirmary.
(Id.). Plaintiff alleges that while he was in the infirmary, he was able to
have ready access to

medical services and was also permitted considerable daily recreation time
as well as ready access
to showers and the ability to call his family. (Id. at 26).
On or about July 9, 2014, Plaintiff was moved, on the order of Defend
ant Ford, to the
medical pod/special needs unit designated A-1-W. (Id. at 26-27). Upon
arrival, Plaintiff, who

2

As the documents which Plaintiff attached to his complaint lack page numbe
rs, all page
numbers used in reference to ECF No. 1 refer to the clerk’s PageID numbe
r.
2

required crutches or a wheelchair to move following his surgery, was placed into a small cell with
another inmate. (Id. at 27). As both Plaintiff and the other inmate were both restrict
ed to a
bottom bunk, guards placed a second cot into the cell for Plaintiff’s use. (Id. at 27-28) Plainti
.
ff
was also informed that he would be placed on lock-down status while in A-i-W, wherei
n he would
be locked in his cell for twenty two hours a day with two hours of potential recreation permit
ted.
(Id. at 27). Plaintiff alleges that the placement of the cot into the cell severely limited the
amount
of open space, permitting only a two foot by three foot area in which either Plaintiff or his cellma

te

could stand while locked in their cell. (Id. at 28). Plaintiff also alleges that the foot of
his bed
was only six to eight inches from the cell’s toilet. (Id.).
Plaintiff alleges that the cramped conditions of this cell caused him considerable
difficulties given his need for crutches to walk. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he repeate
dly
struck his injured foot on either the bed or toilet while repositioning himself. (Id.). Plainti
ff also
alleges that, on at least one occasion, his crutches became caught on the frame of his cot,
3
causing
him to lose his balance and strike his head on the walls or doorway of his cell. (Id.
at 29, 33).
Plaintiff alleges that during this incident, he also struck his surgical scar which began
to bleed,
causing significant pain. (Id.at 33).
On July 10, 2014, Plaintiff and his cellmate were transferred, by order of Defendant
Ford,
to a different cell in the A-i -W unit. (Id at 29). Plaintiff and his ceilmate were
transported to
the new cell by Defendants Matos and Yurecko. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that this
new cell was
Plaintiff’s complaint repeats his allegations multiple times, thus it is difficult discern
to
whether there were multiple such incidents, or whether Plaintiff simply reitera
tes and expands on
his original assertion that he fell and injured himself. The lack of dates or other
identifying
features as to the fall incident further compounds this lack of clarity.
3

“designed for one person in a wheelchair” and contained only a single bunk
and a handicapped
toilet. (Id.). Following alterations by the officers, the metal framed cot was
placed into the new
cell at a ninety degree angle to the already present bed, providing Plaintiff and
his cellmate an area
of two and a half by six feet in which to stand or walk while locked inside the
cell. (Id.). Plaintiff
also alleges that, with the new set-up, the foot of his bed was twelve to fourtee
n inches from the
cell’s toilet. (Id.).
Plaintiff alleges that, while on lock-in status in unit A-i -W, he missed severa
l of his
scheduled medical visits. (Id. at 29-30). According to the complaint, inmate
s housed in A-1-W
need an escort in order to attend these medical visits. (Id. at 30). While
Plaintiff appears to
allege that these missed appointments continued throughout his time in
A-i -W, he specifically
states that, following an incident wherein another inmate attacked him withou
t provoc

ation on July

14, 2014, his medical visits became more sporadic.

(Id. at 30-31).

Apparently, after the

unprovoked attack, Plaintiff would notify Defendant Murtha of his need to
see medical personnel
to take care of his surgical wound and have his bandages changed. (Id. at
31). The officer would
then tell Plaintiff that medical had been informed and the officers were waitin
g on an escort that
would ultimately never arrive.

(Id.).

Plaintiff alleges that, when asked, medical personnel

informed him that no such call had ever been made. (Id.). In any event,
if Plaintiff repeated his
requests, he alleges that Officer Murtha would tell him that “someone’
in medical told [Murtha
that Plaintiffj was good and didn’t need any further medication or care.”
(Id.). Plaintiff states
that, when he confronted the officer regarding the issue, Defendant Matos
was summoned, but the
Sergeant looked at Plaintiff and left without taking any action. (Id.).
At some point during Plaintiff’s surgical recovery, his anide wound
became infected. (Id.
4

at 30-31). Although the complaint is unclear as to when exactly the infection occurr
ed, Plaintiff
was apparently taken to the hospital for physical therapy on July 10, 2014.
(Id.). During that
appointment, hospital staff noticed the smell coming from Plaintiff’s surgical
scar, and discovered
that a serious infection had developed which might require further surgery if
it worsened. (Id. at
31).

In response, Plaintiff was prescribed a stronger antibiotic than that he
had been taking

following his surgery and the doctor also ordered that Plaintiff’s bandage be change
d daily. (Id.).
Plaintiff also alleges that the doctor told him the cell conditions in which he
was housed (prior to
the July 10, 2014 reassignment) were not conducive to his healing. (Id.).
4
Following his return and reassignment on July 10, 2014, Plaintiff alleges that he
continued
to have problems getting medical attention for his surgical wound. (Id. at
34). Plaintiff alleges
that bandage changes usually accompany an inmate’s shower, but because
his shower time took
place in the afternoon and bandages were changed by a single nurse in
the morning, Plaintiff’s
bandage often went unchanged. (Id. at 34-35). Plaintiff admits, howev
er, that in response to
requests for medical aid, Officer Murtha brought a nurse to his cell who
provided Plaintiff an
ointment to rub onto the wound. (Id. at 35). Plaintiff also states that, when
he was informed of
the requests for medical aid, Sergeant Matos ignored Plaintiff’s request for
a bandage change visit
to medical, instead telling Officer Murtha that he had called medical and had

been told that Plaintiff

had received a bandage change that morning. (Id.).
Plaintiff’s final set of allegations arise out of problems he had with one
of the jail’s nurses
It is possible that the doctor’s reaction to the situation was responsible
for the move of Plaintiff
and his ceilmate, but the complaint is unclear on that point, instead allegin
g that Plaintiff’s lockin status and move were the result of some personal animus Defend
ant Ford felt towards
Plaintiff’s celimate. (See ECF No. 1 at 38-39).
5

on July 24, 2014. On that date, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Jane Doe, a nurse who hands out
medication during the evening, refused to help change Plaintiffs bandages telling Plaintiff instead
that bandage changing was the responsibility of a different nurse during morning hours. Id. at 3839). When the situation was brought to Officer Murtha’s attention, he apparently told Plaintiff
that they had already discussed that issue and he would not deal with it again. (Id. at 38).
Plaintiff also apparently made efforts to inform jail staff about his situation and request
remedy, none of which apparently produced any results. On July 17, 2014, Plaintiff sent a letter
to Sergeant Ford asking for a transfer or, at least, clarification as to why he was on lock-up status.
(Id. at 46-50). On July 23, 2014, Plaintiff wrote instead to Lt. Yurecko requesting clarification of
the reason for his lock-up status and for information on how to get off of that status. (Id. at 5354). On July 30, 2014, Plaintiff sent another letter, this time to Deputy Director Castillo. (Id. at
55-58). In that letter, Plaintiff informed the deputy director regarding his situation, including his
health concerns, medical issues, lock-up status, and the pain and suffering he had allegedly
suffered as a result of his cell situation. (Id.). Finally, on August 12, 2014, Plaintiff wrote to
Director Aviles, again summarizing his lock-up status and alleged pain and suffering which
resulted therefrom. (Id. at 59-62). In this final letter, Plaintiff also requested compensation for
his suffering and that the Director inform him of the basis for his placement on lock-up status.
(Id.). Finally, Plaintiff also threatened suit if no action was taken by Director Aviles. (Id.).
After apparently not receiving a response to his satisfaction, Plaintiff thereafter filed the instant
complaint on October 9, 2014.

Plaintiff also includes in his complaint several letters he wrote to various law firms requesting
that they represent him in his suit, to no avail. The Court presumes these letters were intended
6

II. DISCUSSION
A.

Legal Standard

District courts must review complaints in those civil actions in which a litigant is
proceeding informa pauperis, see 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress against a

governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C.
prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C.

§ l9l5A(b), or brings a claim with respect to

§ I 997e. The PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte

dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. As Plaintiff
brings his claims in forma pauperis and against governmental employees, his complaint must be
screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A.

According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, “a pleading that offers
‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.” 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)). To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim the complaint must allege
,
6
“sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
to accompany Plaintiff’s application for pro bono counsel. (See ECF No. 1 at 63-80; ECF
No.
2).
6
“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 191 5(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to
Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir.
2012)
(citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)).
7

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Belmont v. MB mv. Partners, Inc.,
708
F.3d 470, 483 n.17 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Moreover, while prose
pleadings are liberally construed, ‘pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their
complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245
(3d Cir.
2013) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

B. Analysis

Plaintiff asserts that, based on the alleged facts recounted above, Defendants violated his
Fourteenth Amendment Rights and are thus liable to him under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. 42 U.S.C. §

1983 provides “private citizens with a means to redress violations of federal law commi
tted by
state individuals.” Woodyardv. Cnty. OfEssex, 514 F. App’x 177, 180 (3d Cir. 2013).
To assert
a

§ 1983 claim, Plaintiff must show that he was a deprived of a federal constitutional or statutory

right by a state actor. Id. In evaluating Plaintiff’s claims, the Court must identify the
contours
of the underling right Plaintiff claims was violated and determine whether Plaintiff
has properly
alleged an actual violation of that right. Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (3d Cir.
2000).
Based on the facts and allegations in his complaint, this Court construes Plainti
ff as asserting

claims that Defendants Ford and Matos confined him in conditions which amoun
t to improper
punishment in violation of Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights; that

Defendants

Yurecko, Aviles, and Castillo knew of and acquiesced to that violation of Plainti
ff’s Fourteenth
Amendment rights; and that Officer Murtha, Sergeant Matos, Jane Doe, and, by extens
ion, the

8

Jail’s medical department were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs.
78

1.

Plaintiff’s Claim against the Hudson County Jail
Plaintiffs names as his first Defendant the Hudson County Jail. Although Plaintiff so

names the Jail, he asserts no direct claims against the jail itself, instead asserting wrongs committed
by its employees. In any event, Claims for relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 can only be brought

against “persons.” A County jail, such as the Hudson County facility, is not a person
amenable
to suit under the statute. See Kitchen v. Essex Cnty. Corr. Facility, No. 12-2199, 2012 WL
1994505, at *3 (D.N.J. May 31, 2012); Ingram v. Atl. Cnty. Justice Facility, No. 10-137
5, 2011
WL 65915, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 7, 2011); see also Marsden v. Federal B.O.P., 856 F. Supp. 832,
836
(S.D.N.Y. 1994); Powell v. Cook Jounty Jail, 814 F. Supp. 757, 758 (N.D. Ill. 1993); McC’oy
v.
Chesapeake Corr. Cntr., 788 F. Supp. 890, 893-894 (E.D. Va. 1992). The correct entity subjec
t
to suit under

§ 1983 for claims against the jail would be the county which operates the facility.

‘

Although Plaintiff includes in his facts the unprovoked attack by another inmate during
movement from medical back to his cell, he does not appear to assert a failure to protect
claim
against the jail or other Defendants for that incident. As Plaintiffs complaint states
that the
attack occurred with no apparent warning or purpose, such a claim would likely fail
as Plaintiff
does not plead that the officers were deliberately indifferent to the apparently unkno
wn threat
this other prisoner posed to Plaintiff. See Paulino v. Burlington Cnty. Jail, 438 F. App’x
106,
109 (3d Cir. 2011) (requiring that pre-trial detainees claiming a failure to protect show
that the
officials who allegedly so failed acted with at least deliberate indifference). As
in Paulino,
Plaintiff provides no allegations which, taken as true, would support a conclusion that
jail
officials had any indication that this unknown and random attacker posed any threat
to Plaintiff
to which Defendants could have been deliberately indifferent. See Id.
8

The Court does not refer to these claims by the count numbers used in Plaintiffs
complaint as
the complaint contains repetitious counts which re-raise the same claim numer
ous times with
slightly different wording. Counts 1, 3, 5, and 6, for example, all refer to Plainti
ff’s conditions
of confinement claim. (ECF No. I at 15-19).
9

See Kitchen, 2012 WL 1994505; Vance v. Cnty. OfSanta Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 996 (N.D.
Cal.
1996) (the county “Department of Corrections is an agency of the County..
proper defendant in a

.

[tjhe County is a

§ 1983 claim, an agency of the County is not”). As such, to the extent that

Plaintiff asserts a claim against the jail, that claim must be dismissed with prejud
ice.

2. Plaintiff’s supervisory liability claims against Director Aviles, Deputy Directo
r Castilo,
Lieutenant Yurecko, and the Jail’s Medical Department

In his complaint, Plaintiff names as Defendants Aviles, Castillo, Yurecko, and the
Hudson
County Jail Medical Department. With the exception of the Medical Department which
is named
in place of the employees responsible for Plaintiff’s care, Plaintiff names these individ
uals as
Defendants under the theory that, as supervisors, they are liable for the actions ofthei

r subordinates

to whose actions they have acquiesced. Government officials may not be held vicario
usly liable
for the actions of their subordinates under a respondeat superior theory of liabilit
y in a § 1983
action. fqbal, 556 U.S. at 675-76. Municipalities and other municipal defend
ants likewise not
subject to vicarious liability under

§ 1983. Id. at 676; see also Monell v. New York City Dep ‘t of

Social Senis., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). As claims brought pursuant to

§ 1983 do not permit

vicarious liability, a plaintiff must “plead that each Government-official defend
ant, through the
officials own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 676.
While vicarious liability is impermissible in a

§ 1983 claim, supervisors may be held liable

under certain circumstances. Specifically, supervisors may be held liable where
they either “with
deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained
a policy, practice or
custom which directly caused [a] constitutional harm,” or “participated in
violating the plaintiff’s
10

rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquie

sced

in his subordinates violations.” A.M ex rel. JMK. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr.,
372 F.3d
572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 3 16-320
(3d Cir.
2014); Queer v. Westmoreiand Cnty., 296 F. App’x 290, 295 (3d Cir. 2008); Baker
v. Monroe
T14p., 50 F.3d 1186, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1995); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207
(3d Cir.
1988). To make out a supervisor liability claim based on acquiescence, Plaintiff must show
that
the supervisor had authority over a subordinated, had actual knowledge of a violati
on of a
plaintiff’s rights, and then acquiesced to that violation. Queer, 296 F. App’x at 295;
Rode, 845
F.2d at 1207; See also Third Circuit Model Jury Instructionsfor Civil Rights Claims Under
Section
1983, Model Instruction 4.6.1 (October 2014) (“As to acquiescence, ‘[wihere a superv
isor with
authority over a subordinate knows that the subordinate is violating someone’s rights but
fails to
act to stop the subordinate from doing so, the factfinder may usually infer that the
supervisor
‘acquiesced’ in (i.e. tacitly assented to or accepted) the subordinate’s conduct.’ Robbin
son v. City
ofPittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1294 (3d Cir. 1997) [abrogated in part on other grounds,
Burlington
iM

and Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).]”). To recover on such a claim,
a plaintiff

must also show that the supervisor acted with the requisite mental state, which varies
based on the
tort alleged. Barkes, 766 F.3d at 3 19-20. In a conditions of confinement claim,
the requisite
mental state is deliberate indifference. Id. at 319.
Allegations of knowledge and acquiescence must be alleged with particularity. Rode,
845
F.2d at 1207. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that plaintiffs
set forth “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that a pleader is entitled to relief.”
Detailed factual
allegations are not required by the rule, but a plaintiff must supply more than
“an unadorned, the
11

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

complaint must “give the defendants fair notice of what the

.

.

.

At the very least, a

claim is and the grounds upon

which it rests.” Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007) (internal citatio
n omitted).
Turning first to the Jail’s medical department, Plaintiff’s claims appear to be based solely
on a respondeat superior form of vicarious liability. The only member of the departm
ent against
which Plaintiff pleads specific facts in regard to the failure to treat is the nurse
Jane Doe.
Although Plaintiff asserts that the department is responsible for changing dressings and
did not do
so in his case, his pleadings with regard to Officer Murtha and Sergeant Matos make clear
that this
failure is either the fault of the officers for failing to properly request an escort for Plainti
ff to
medical, or the fault of the evening nurse who Plaintiff names as a Jane Doe Defendant.
Plaintiff
has pled no specific acts injurious to his constitutional rights which were undert
aken by the
organization which operates the jail’s medical department or any specific individual
other than the
Jane Doe, and as such any claim asserted against the department which cannot act in
and of itself
(or, more properly, the organization who operates the facility on behalf of Hudso
n County) as pled
could only arise out of a theory of vicarious liability. Plaintiff’s claims agains
t the medical
department are therefore barred as they are based upon an impermissible theory of

liability. Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 675-76.
Turning to Director Aviles and Deputy Director Castillo, Plaintiff has failed
to allege
sufficient conduct by Defendants to show that they had knowledge of the violati

ons Plaintiff claims

occurred and acquiesced to their occurrence.

While Plaintiff pleads a bare recitation of an

acquiescence claim, the information he provides to support that claim falls
short. Plaintiff has
only alleged that he sent letters to the Director and Deputy Director asking
for clarification of the
12

basis for his placement into the cell he decries and asking that he be moved, long after he had
already been placed into the cell. Plaintiff alleges no response from these officials, or any
other
action on their part which could be said to demonstrate that these officials knew
of the alleged
violations or acted in such a manner that they could be said to have acquiesced
to the actions of
Sergeant Ford.

Plaintiff has likewise failed to plead that these Defendants were deliberately

indifferent to his confinement conditions. As Plaintiff has therefore failed to
state a claim for
which relief can be granted as to knowledge and acquiescence, see Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678; Barkes,
766 F.3d at 3 19-20; Queer, 296 F. App’x at 295; A.M., 372 F.3d at 586; Rode, 845
F.2d at 1207,
and as these Defendants cannot otherwise be held liable under a theory of respon
deat superior
liability, Jqbal, 556 U.S. at 675-76, Defendants Aviles and Castillo must
be dismissed without

prejudice.
As to Lt. Yurecko, however, plaintiff has sufficiently pled a claim that the Defend
ant knew
of and acquiesced in Plaintiffs allegedly punitive confinement.

In his complaint, Plaintiff

specifically pleads that Yurecko was involved in the transfer or Plaintiff to

the second cell in which

he was confined, and was specifically aware of Ford’s placement of Plainti
ff into the original cell.
As such, Plaintiff has pled facts which support the allegation that Yureck
o knew of Plaintiffs
confinement, and not only acquiesced in it but, to the extent that he helped
move Plaintiff to the
second cell, participated in that confinement. Thus, as this Court will
permit the conditions of
confinement claim to proceed as detailed below, Plaintiffs claim for
supervisor liability against
Yurecko may proceed as well. Barkes, 766 F.3d at 3 16-20; Queer, 296
F. App’x at 295; A.M.,
372 F.3d at 586; Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.

13

3.

Plaintiff’s Conditions of Confmement Claim against Sergeants Ford
and Matos

Plaintiff raises a condition of confinement claim against Sergeants Ford
and Matos.
Plaintiff claims that Sergeant Ford determined, and Sergeant Matos enforc
ed, Plaintiffs lock-up
status in a cell which was not adequate in size to support an additional metal
framed bed and the
use of a wheelchair or crutches while Plaintiff was locked in his cell with
a celimate for twenty
two or twenty three hours a day. “When a pre-trial detainee claims that
the conditions of his
confinement violate his due process rights, ‘the proper inquiry is whethe
r those conditions [at
issue] amount to punishment of the detainee.” Carson v. Mulvihill, 488
F. App’x 554, 559-60
(3d Cir, 2012) (quoting Bell v. WoUIsh, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)).

In order to make that

determination, the Court must consider whether the questioned restrictions
“are rationally

related

to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose[,]’ and ‘whether they
appear excessive in
relation to that purpose.”

Id. (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 561).

In determining whether a

nonpunitive purpose exists, the Court must analyze whether any legitimate
purpose is served by
the conditions of confinement and whether those conditions are rationa
lly related to those
purposes. Id.; see also Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 159 (3d Cir. 2005).
The Supreme Court has held that there is no requirement that a detaine
e be provided a
single occupancy cell. Bell, 441 U.S. at 542. That said, the Court
has also held that confining a
number of individuals in so small a space that these individuals suffer “genui
ne deprivations and
hardship over an extended period of time” raises questions as to whethe
r those conditions amount
to punishment. Id.

The Third Circuit has likewise held that confinement in “unsanitary
and

humiliating” conditions, such as where bedding is placed beside toilets
in small cells, is sufficient
to impugn due process. See Union Cnry. Jail Inmates v. Di Buono
, 713 F.2d 984, 996 (3d Cir.
14

1983). The Third Circuit has also held that where a plaintiff has pled that he was confined to a
small cell with another inmate for “23 hours per day for 5 days out of the week, and for 32 hours
over the course of the remaining two days of the week” resulting in psychological harm
and a
deprivation of privacy, that plaintiff’s claim should proceed beyond screening. Southe
rland v.
Cnty. Of[-fudson, 523 F. App’x 919, 92 1-22 (3d Cir. 2013).
Here, Plaintiff has pled that the Sergeants, and in turn through his acquiescence
Lt.
Yurecko, violated Plaintiffs due process rights by confining him in two small
cells which he
shared with a ceilmate for twenty two to twenty three hours a day. Plaintiff has also
pled that this
required that the foot of his bed, and, by extension, his surgery scar, be placed quite
close to toilet
facilities which may have exacerbated his infection. Plaintiff complaint further
compounds the
issue by pleading that the small size of the cell made his use of crutches extremely
difficult, which
resulted in his injury when the crutches became caught in his bedding due
to the cramped
confinement conditions. Plaintiff has therefore sufficiently pled his condit
ion of confinement
claim to survive screening, and that claim shall be allowed to proceed. See
Southerland, 523 F.
App’x at 921-22; Di Buono, 713 F.2d at 996.

4.

Plaintiff’s Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs claims agains
t Defendants Matos,

Murtha, and Jane Doe

The final claim Plaintiff pleads is that Defendants Matos, Murtha, and
Jane Doe were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. A pre-trial detaine
e’s due process rights to
medical care are “at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protect
ions available to a convicted
prisoner,” and thus are violated where a convicted prisoner’s Eighth
Amendment rights would
15

have been violated. See City ofRevere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239,244-45
(1983). Under
the Eighth Amendment analysis, a prisoner’s rights are violated where the
official is deliberately
indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. See Green v. Coleman, 575
F. App’x 44, 47 (3d
Cir. 2014);Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326,
346 (3d Cir. 1987), cert

denied, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988). A medical need is serious where it “has
been diagnosed by a
physician as requiring treatment or [is] one that is so obvious that a lay
person would easily
recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Green, 575 F. App’x at
47 (quoting Colburn v.
Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1023 (3d Cir. 1991)). A prison officia
l acts with deliberate
indifference when the official recklessly disregards “a substantial risk of
serious harm.” Giles v.
Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 330 (3d Cir. 2009).
Here, Plaintiff has alleged that he received surgical care for a torn Achill
es tendon. He
alleges that this resulted in a scar which was covered by a bandage. Plainti
ff also asserts that this
scar became infected, and he was specifically told by doctors that
the bandage needed to be
changed on a daily basis.

Plaintiff has therefore sufficiently alleged that he was subject to
a

serious medical need, as this need was both diagnosed and, as pled, would
be fairly obvious to a
lay person. Green, 575 F. App’x at 47. Plaintiff further alleges that, even
after he made requests
and explained why he needed medical care, both Officer Murtha and
Sergeant Matos refused to
escort him to medical or provided him with excuses as to why he would
not be taken to have his
bandage changed. Plaintiff has likewise pled that the Jane Doe nurse was
directly asked

to change

the bandage, and refused claiming that it was the responsibility of
a different nurse. Plaintiff has
therefore sufficiently pled that Defendants Murtha, Matos, and Doe
acted with reckless disregard
for his medical claim to survive screening.

Id.

16

As such, Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants

Murtha, Matos, and Doe were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious
medical needs will be
permitted to proceed at this time.

5.

Plaintiff’s Application for Pro Bono Counsel

Plaintiffhas also submitted an application for the appointment of pro
28 U.S.C.

bono counsel. Under

§ 1915(e)(l), a court may request that an attorney represent any person who is unable

to afford counsel. The courts have broad discretion to decide when
a request for counsel is
warranted. Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 498 (3d Cir. 2002);
see also Tabron v. Grace,
6 F.3d 147, 153 (3d Cir. 1993). In exercising its discretion, the court
is first called to assess
whether a plaintiff’s claims have merit, and if so, the court must
make a determination after
weighing factors which include: the litigant’s ability to present his
own case, the difficulty of the
legal issues involved, the degree to which factual investigation will be
necess

ary and the plaintiff’s

ability to conduct such investigation as is necessary, the litigant’s ability
to retain counsel on his
own behalf the extent to which the case will turn on credibility determ
inations, and whether the
case will require expert testimony.

Tabron, 6 F.3d at 155-57; Cuevas v. United States, 422 F.

App’x 142, 144-45 (3d Cir. 2011). These factors are not exhaus
tive, and the Court is free to
consider any other facts or factors it deems relevant. Montgomery,
294 F.3d at 499.
Plaintiff requests counsel as he is not familiar with the rules of
procedure, believes that
discovery and depositions will need to be taken, and limited access
to the law library, and has been
unable to find or afford counsel on his own.

As discussed above, Plaintiff’s conditions of

confinement and deliberate indifference claims have been suffici
ently pled to survive screening.
The Court therefore examines Plaintiff’s request under the Tabron
factors. Here, Plaintiff has
17

pled to relatively straightforward claims and in so doing has shown that he appears to understand
the causes of action he has raised. The Court finds that it is unlikely that extensive discovery will
be as necessary as Plaintiff suggests as the jail Defendants will likely provide all of the relevan
t
documents in answering and defending against Plaintiff’s claims. It also appears unlike
ly that
expert testimony will be necessary at this time. Although the Court recognizes that credibi
lity
may be an issue and that Plaintiff does not have the means to afford an attorney given his inform
a
paIperis status, the Court does not find that the Tabron factors merit a request for counse
l at this
time. 6 F3d at 155-57. Plaintiff’s request will therefore be denied at this time; however,
should
Plaintiff be unable to complete discovery, or require other assistance at a later stage
in the
proceedings, he may reapply for counsel at that time.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, plaintiff’s claims against the Hudson County Jail and
vicarious liability claim against the Jail’s medical department are dismissed with
prejudice;
Plaintiff’s supervisory liability claims against Defendants Aviles and Castill are
o
dismissed
without prejudice; Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claim will proceed agains
t Defendants
Ford, Matos, and through supervisory liability, Yurecko; Plaintiff’s deliberate indiffe
rence to a
serious medical need claim will proceed against Defendants Matos, Murtha, and
Jane Doe; and
Plaintiff’s request for pro bono counsel will be denied. An appropriate order follow
s.

H3ose L. Linares, U.S.D.J.
18