LANGLEY v. STATEBRIDGE COMPANY, LLC. et al

Filing 7

OPINION. Signed by Judge Jose L. Linares on 12/16/14. (DD, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

PAULETTA LANGLEY,

Civil Action No.: 14-6366 (JLL)
Plaintiff,

V.

STATEBRIDGE COMPANY, LLC., JOHN
DOES 1-X,

OPINION

Defendants.

LINARES, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court by way of Defendant Statebridge
Company LLC.
(“Defendant”)’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 4) Plaintiff Pauletta Langle
y (“Plaintiff’)’s
Complaint. (ECF No. 1) via Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6
). No oral argument was
heard pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78. The Court has considered the
submissions of both parties in
support and in opposition of the instant motion. Based on the forego
ing reasons, Defendant’s
motion is denied.
I. BACKGROUND’

Plaintiff is the owner of real property located at 207-209 Shepar
d Avenue, East Orange,
New Jersey (“the Property”). (Comp. at 3). Defendant is a Colora
¶
do LLC and the loan servicer
of a first mortgage loan relating to the Property. (Id. at
¶J 3-4). On April 13, 2007, Plaintiff
entered into a mortgage loan agreement with Weichert Financial
Services, which required the
owner of the loan or its agent to pay real estate taxes. (Id. at
¶J 5-6). Weichert sold the note and
1

The following facts are taken as true solely for the purposes
of this motion.

mortgage shortly after the loan closed. (Id. at 7). The note and mortgage
is presently claimed to
¶
be owned by Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, solely as trustee for
the Primestar-H Fund
I Trust (“Wilmington Savings Fund”). (Id. at 8). The loan went into default
¶
in 2009. (Id. at ¶ 9).
On or about December 2012, Wilmington Savings Fund retained Defend
ant to be the
servicer of the loan. (Id. at ¶ 10). Defendant has admitted to not making any
payments for real
estate taxes or insurance on the property. (Id. at
¶J 11.14). The monthly loan statements sent to
Plaintiff contain a charge for taxes and insurance in the amount of $945.2
5. (Id. at ¶ 15).
Subsequently, each month Defendant adds that amount to balance due
on the mortgage loan. (Id.
at ¶ 16). In 2013, after Plaintiff was notified by the town of East Orange,
NJ that taxes were
delinquent and the property could be subject to a tax lien, Plaintiff paid the
past due taxes,
including additional penalty interest, in the amount of $12,650.65. (Id. at
¶J 17-19). Plaintiff
took these same actions again in July 2014, in the amount of $9,436
.02. (Id. at

¶ 21). Plaintiff

alleges that she maintains an insurance policy on the property and has provid
ed proof of the
policy to the Defendant at their request. (Id. at ¶j 22-23). Despite providing
proof, Plaintiff still
continues to be billed for insurance by Defendant. (Id. at 24).
¶
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has violated the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act by
making false representations as to the amount owed by Plaintiff, by
demanding payment of funds
that are not owed by Plaintiff, by charging Plaintiff for property taxes
in 2013 and 2014 when
Defendant and its principal have not made a single payment on real
estate taxes during the time
period in question, and by charging Plaintiff insurance premiums in
2013 and 2014 that were not
reflective of costs incurred by Defendant or its principal. (Id. at
¶J 27-30). Plaintiff filed the
instant action with this Court on October 14, 2014, alleging one count
of a violation of the Fair

Debt Collection Practices Act against Defendant. On November 11, 2014,
Defendant filed a
motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 2(b)(6), seeking to dismiss Plaintiff’s Compl
aint.
II. LEGAL STANDARD

For a complaint to survive dismissal, it “must contain sufficient factual matter
, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ “Ashcrofl v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 62, 678
(2009) (citing Bell Ati. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)
).

In determining the

sufficiency of a complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual
allegations
complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving

in

the

party. See Phillips

v. Cnty. ofAllegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008). Additionally
, in evaluating a plaintiffs
claims, generally “a court looks only to the facts alleged in the complaint
and its attachments
without reference to other parts of the record.” Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brie
n & Frankel, 20
F.3d 1250, 1261 (3dCir. 1994).
III. DISCUSSION

Section 1692(e) of Title 15 of the United States Code pertains to false or
misleading
representations by debt collectors in connection with the collection of any
debt and prohibits
certain conduct. 15 U.S.C.

§ 1692(e). Plaintiff contends that Defendant violated section

1 692(e)( 10) which prohibits “{t]he use of any false representation or
deceptive means to collect
or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consum
er.” 15 U.S.C.

§

1 692(e)(l 0).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff improperly seeks to extend the scope
and purposes of the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). Specifically, Defend
ant asserts that the conduct
that Plaintiff complains about, the transmission of a monthly accoun
t statement, is not the type of

activity that Congress sought to prevent when adopting the FDCPA. Defend
ant contends that
Plaintiff has failed to allege that she was harassed, subject to unfair or decept
ive collection
procedures, received letters threatening suit, or received abusive calls late
at night or at her place
of employment.
Moreover, Defendant maintains that the monthly mortgage statements sent
to Plaintiff are
not communications in connection with the collection of a debt, and thus
are not a violation of
the FDCPA. Defendant states that although the monthly statements generic
ally state that
foreclosure may result if the loan is not brought current, they do not contain
a demand for
payment or a threat to begin enforcement proceedings if payment is not
made by a specific date.
Finally, Defendant argues that the inclusion of an escrow component in
Plaintiff’s
monthly payment is not a false, deceptive, or misleading representation
under the FDCPA.
Defendant states that at the inception of the loan, Plaintiff and the loan
originator agreed that
property taxes and hazard insurance payments would be paid throug
h an escrow account.
Defendant claims that Plaintiff has failed to make any monthly mortga
ge payments to the escrow
account. Defendant then cites to a statute for the proposition that there
is no requirement for the
lender to make escrow advances on the buyer’s behalf when the loan is
in default.
Plaintiff responds to Defendant’s arguments by stating that she has
set forth a claim for
relief under the FDCPA. Plaintiff goes on to recite the elements of a
claim under the FDCPA,
while providing examples of how these elements are met within the
Complaint. Specifically,
Plaintiff contends that the Complaint clearly sets forth that Defend
ant has violated the FDCPA
by making false or misleading representations as to the amount of
the debt owed by Plaintiff, by
demanding payment of funds that Defendant was not entitled to collect
and by communicating

directly with Plaintiff regarding the debt even though Defendant knows Plainti
ff is represented
by counsel.
Plaintiff points to 15 U.S.C.

§ 1692(e) for the proposition that strict liability will be

imposed on a defendant for “the false representation of (A) the charac
ter, amount, or legal status
of any debt; or (b) any services rendered or compensation which may be
lawfully received by
any debt collector for the collection of a debt.” 15 u.s.c.

§ 1 692(e)(2). Plaintiff asserts that by

demanding payment of taxes and insurance each month, Defendant has
violated the FDCPA by
making false representations as to the amount of money owed on the debt.
Plaintiff also states
that insofar that Defendant tries to argue that these monthly charges constit
ute reimbursement for
tax and insurance payments made, the Court must reject this argument
because Defendant has
not actually made any tax or insurance payments that they may be reimbu
rsed for.
While the Court is cognizant of the alleged agreement between the parties
regarding
Plaintiff’s obligation to pay her mortgage payment into the escrow accoun
t, the Court still finds
that Plaintiff has alleged, at this point in the litigation, a violation of the
FDCPA sufficient to
survive Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
Because the FDCPA is a remedial statute, Hamilton v. United Health
care ofLa., 310
F.3d 385, 392 (5th Cir.2002), Courts construe its language broadly,
so as to effect its purpose.
See Stroh v. Director, OWCP, 810 F.2d 61, 63 (3d Cir.l987). Accord
ingly, in considering claims
under another provision of the FDCPA, Courts have held that certain
communications from
lenders to debtors should be analyzed from the perspective of
the “least sophisticated debtor.”
See Wilson v. Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350, 354 (applying the
perspective of the least
sophisticated debtor to the notice provision of the Act,

§ 1692g) (citation omitted); Graziano v.

Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 111 (3d Cir.1991) (“Statutory notice under the
Act is to be interpreted
from the perspective of the ‘least sophisticated debtor.’

“).

Thus, Courts have concluded that any

lender-debtor communications potentially giving rise to claims under the
FDCPA should be
analyzed from the perspective of the least sophisticated debtor. Brown
v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464
F.3d 450, 453-54 (3d Cir. 2006).
A debt collection letter is deceptive where “it can be reasonably read
to have two or more
different meanings, one of which is inaccurate.” Quadramed, 225 F.3d
at 354. Here, Plaintiff has
sufficiently alleged that the statements sent by Defendant violated the FDCP
A by making false
statements as to the amount owed upon the debt. Moreover, Plaintiff alleges
that Defendant has
admitted to not paying for any of the monies themselves, while still
demanding they be
reimbursed by Plaintiff. Accordingly, a court “may dismiss a complaint
only if it is clear that no
relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consis
tent with the
allegations,” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct.
2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984).
At this point of the litigation, the Court finds that it is possible that relief
could be granted
consistent with Plaintiff’s allegations. Therefore, Defendant’s motion
to dismiss is denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss (ECF
No. 4), is denied.
An Appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

Date: December 16, 2014
U.S.D.J.