WEBB v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al

Filing 27

OPINION. Signed by Judge Stanley R. Chesler on 7/8/2016. (nr, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ANNA WEBB,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 14-6378 (SRC)(CLW)

OPINION

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CHESLER, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court upon Defendant United States of America’s
(“Defendant”) motion for summary judgment [Docket Entry 13]. Plaintiff Anna Webb
(“Plaintiff”) has opposed the motion. The Court has considered the parties’ submissions and
held oral argument on May 25, 2016 [Docket Entry 21]. For the reasons set forth below, the
Court will grant Defendant’s motion.
This case arises from Plaintiff’s trip and fall outside of the VA hospital at 385 Tremont
Avenue, East Orange, New Jersey, on January 25, 2013. (Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed
Material Facts ¶¶ 1, 2, 6 [hereinafter SUF].) Plaintiff parked her car near the entrance of the VA
hospital in a handicapped spot, and tripped and fell while walking towards the building,
sustaining injuries. (SUF ¶¶ 5-6.) Plaintiff alleges that the VA is responsible for her injuries,
because she was caused to fall on the curb on the sidewalk near the entrance of the VA hospital
due to Defendant’s negligence in maintaining, repairing, and/or inspecting the property. (Compl
¶¶ 11, 14-15, 18-19.)
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The Court held oral argument in this matter on May 25, 2016 [Docket Entry 21], and
subsequently reopened discovery to permit a second deposition of Plaintiff for the purpose of
identifying the alleged defect that caused her fall [Docket Entry 22]. Both sides were given the
opportunity to supplement their submissions following the second deposition, which was taken
on June 15, 2016 [Docket Entry 23]. Defendant submitted a response on July 6, 2016 [Docket
Entry 26], and Plaintiff failed to file a supplemental submission with the Court following the
second deposition, within the time frame the Court outlined in its order reopening discovery.
Summary judgment is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) when the moving party
demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the evidence establishes the
moving party’s entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322-23 (1986). A factual dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the non-movant, and it is material if, under the substantive law, it would affect the outcome of
the suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “In considering a motion
for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility determinations or engage in any
weighing of the evidence; instead, the non-moving party's evidence ‘is to be believed and all
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.’” Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241,
247 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).
“When the moving party has the burden of proof at trial, that party must show
affirmatively the absence of a genuine issue of material fact: it must show that, on all the
essential elements of its case on which it bears the burden of proof at trial, no reasonable jury
could find for the non-moving party.” In re Bressman, 327 F.3d 229, 238 (3d Cir. 2003)
(quoting United States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d 1428, 1438 (11th Cir. 1991)).
“[W]ith respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof . . . the
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burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district
court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex,
477 U.S. at 325.
Once the moving party has satisfied its initial burden, the party opposing the motion must
establish that a genuine issue as to a material fact exists. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v.
Lacey Twp., 772 F.2d 1103, 1109 (3d Cir. 1985). The party opposing the motion for summary
judgment cannot rest on mere allegations and instead must present actual evidence that creates a
genuine issue as to a material fact for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Siegel Transfer, Inc. v.
Carrier Express, Inc., 54 F.3d 1125, 1130-31 (3d Cir. 1995). “A nonmoving party has created a
genuine issue of material fact if it has provided sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find in its
favor at trial.” Gleason v. Norwest Mortg., Inc., 243 F.3d 130, 138 (3d Cir. 2001).
If the nonmoving party has failed “to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence
of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof
at trial . . . there can be ‘no genuine issue of material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof
concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts
immaterial.” Katz v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 972 F.2d 53, 55 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Celotex,
477 U.S. at 322-23).
“The fundamental elements of a negligence claim are a duty of care owed by the
defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty by the defendant, injury to the plaintiff
proximately caused by the breach, and damages.” Robinson v. Vivirito, 217 N.J. 199, 208 (2014)
(citations omitted). The plaintiff bears the burden to show that the defendant’s negligence
caused her injury. Fedorczyk v. Caribbean Cruise Lines Ltd., 82 F.3d 69, 74 (3d Cir. 1996). For
a plaintiff to show proximate cause, a defendant’s conduct must be a cause-in-fact of the
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plaintiff’s injury, and the plaintiff must prove this fact by a preponderance of the evidence.
Kulas v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 41 N.J. 311, 317 (1964). “Proof of a fall alone would not
be adequate to create an inference of negligence.” Simpson v. Duffy, 19 N.J. Super. 339, 343
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952) (citations omitted), certif. denied, 10 N.J. 315 (1952). Rather,
“[t]he plaintiff must introduce evidence which provides a reasonable basis for the conclusion that
it was more likely than not that the negligent conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of the
injury.” Fedorczyk, 82 F.3d at 74.
Plaintiff alleges that she tripped and fell due to a defect in the sidewalk near the entrance
of the VA hospital, but Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
that the conduct of Defendant was the cause-in-fact of her fall. Plaintiff failed in both of her
depositions to identify the location where she fell with any certainty. (See Webb 6/15/16 Dep. at
170:25-171:17; 181:7-14; 184:10-20.) Furthermore, Plaintiff has not established that a defect in
the sidewalk actually existed on the day of her fall. Plaintiff testified that she did not, in fact,
observe a defect in the sidewalk at the time of her fall, or even on the day of her fall, and she has
not offered any other evidence to establish the presence of a defect on January 25, 2013. (Webb
3/2/16 Dep. at 72:2-76:14; 77:5-78:1.) Her deposition testimony indicates that she did not
observe a defect in the sidewalk until months after her fall. (Webb 3/2/16 Dep. at 76:12-14.)
The Court finds that Plaintiff has offered no admissible evidence that a defect in the sidewalk
caused her fall, and therefore any argument Plaintiff may offer as to a defect as the cause-in-fact
of her injury is mere speculation.
Plaintiff has failed to show that a defect in the VA hospital premises was the cause-infact of her fall. Without this showing, Plaintiff has not adequately proven her negligence claim.

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For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. An
appropriate Order will be filed herewith.
s/ Stanley R. Chesler
STANLEY R. CHESLER
United States District Judge
Dated: July 8, 2016

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