BROWN v. CANTINERI

Filing 12

OPINION. Signed by Judge Kevin McNulty on 2/6/17. (sr, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

STEVEN BROWN,
Civ. No. 14-6391 (KM) (JBC)

Plaintiff,
V.

MELISSA CANTTNERI,
Defendant.

STEVEN BROWN,
Civ. No. 14-733 5 (KM) (JBC)

Plaintiff,
V.

LAURA SCHRECK,
OPINION
Defendant.

KEVIN MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.
I.

INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND

The plaintiff, Steven Brown, is a pretrial detainee at the Passaic County Jail. He is
proceeding pro se with this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

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1983. He has filed

separate actions, captioned above, against two parole officers. The complaints are similar,
however, and they arise from the same events. I therefore consider them together, and direct that
this opinion be filed in both actions.
Previously, this Court screened Mr. Brown’s original complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
1915(e)(2)(B) and 19 ISA. Mr. Brown’s original complaint raised two distinct claims: (1) that

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these defendant Parole Officer, conspired to illegally search his home and arrest him without a
warrant on May 2, 2012; and (2) that they provided false testimony against him before a grand
jury on March 13, 201 3. The second claim I dismissed with prejudice because a grand jury
witness has absolute immunity from any

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1983 claim based on the witness’s testimony. The first

claim I dismissed as untimely under the applicable two-year statute of limitations. This
dismissal, however, was without prejudice, and I instructed Mr. Brown that he could file a
proposed amended coniplaint asserting facts tending to establish that the statute of limitations
should be tolled or otherwise did not apply.
Mr. Brown filed a request for an extension of time to file a proposed amended complaint,
and thereafter filed an application to amend, with a proposed amended complaint. Mr. Brown’s
request for an extension of time to file his proposed amended complaint will be granted, and the
Clerk will be ordered to reopen the file and file the proposed amended complaint.
The proposed amended complaint, like the original complaint, is subject to screening
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

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1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A. Under these statutes, I review the complaint

to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from suit. For the following reasons, the amended complaint will be dismissed with
prejudice.
IL

DISCUSSION

These facts are based on the amended complaint and documents attached to it.
In 1999, Mr. Brown pled guilty to sexual assault and was sentenced to 3 years’
imprisonment. The sentence, under Megan’s Law, also included community supervision for life.
Attached to the complaint is a form entitled “Community Supervision for Life,” signed by Mr.

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Brown, containing the conditions of supervision. Among them are a provision that “18. I am to
permit the assigned parole officer to visit me at any time at home or elsewhere and permit
confiscation of an{yj contraband observed in plain view by the parole officer.” A special
condition of supervision is that “2. I am to refrain from possession or use of a computer with
internet access without the prior approval of the District Par[ole] Supervisor.”
On May 2, 2012, Parole Officers Cantineri and Schreck, along with some police officers,
went to Mr. Brown’s home. They were admitted by a third person. Inside they seized a phone
and computer, and arrested Mr. Brown for violation of his conditions of parole supervision. A
complaint and arrest warrant were immediately obtained. Mr. Brown was charged with a
violation of N.J. Stat. Ann.

§ 2C:43-6.4(d). The allegation was that, having been convicted of a

sexual offense carrying a condition of community supervision for life, he violated the condition
of his supervision that forbade him from possessing a computer with internet capability.
On March 13, 2013, the grand jury heard testimony. Mr. Brown was indicted for the
parole violation offense.
Mr. Brown now sues for damages under the civil rights laws. The basis for the claims is
somewhat unclear. At the root of it seems to be a contention that Mr. Brown is not a danger and
should never have been placed on lifetime supervision in the first place. He claims that the
defendant Parole Officers arrested him without probable cause, were responsible for the filing of
a false arrest report, and testified falsely before the grand jury.
A. Grand Jury Testimony
Mr. Brown has re-alleged his claims against the defendant Parole Officers based on their
allegedly false grand jury testimony. As noted above, similar claims have already been dismissed

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with prejudice based on absolute immunity. See Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1506 (2012).
No further discussion is necessary.
B. Unlawful Search/False Arrest
Mr. Brown realleges claims of unlawful search and false arrest against the Parole Officers
in connection with the events surrounding his May 2, 2012 arrest.
My prior opinion cited the two-year statute of limitations governing a section 1983 claim.
The claims of unlawful search and false arrest accrued as of May 2, 2012, and the statute of
limitations expired on May 2, 2014. Because the original complaint was filed in November 2014,
those claims were time-barred.
My prior opinion instructed Mr. Brown as to the law governing equitable tolling of the
statute of limitations, and invited an amended complaint containing facts to support an
application for tolling. The amended complaint contains no facts, however, on which the Court
could find a basis for statutory or equitable tolling of these Section 1983 claims. The Section
1983 claims arising from the allegedly unlawful search and arrest on May 2,2012 will therefore
be dismissed. Because I have already given Mr. Brown one opportunity to amend, this dismissal
is with prejudice.
The complaint against Cantineri also alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C.

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1986:

Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs
conspired to be done, and mentioned in section 1985 of this title,
are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in
preventing the commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to
do, if such wrongful act be committed, shall be liable to the party
injured, or his legal representatives, for all damages caused by such
wrongful act, which such person by reasonable diligence could
have prevented; and such damages may be recovered in an action
on the case; and any number of persons guilty of such wrongful
neglect or refusal may be joined as defendants in the action; and if
the death of any party be caused by any such wrongful act and
neglect, the legal representatives of the deceased shall have such
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action therefor, and may recover not exceeding $5,000 damages
therein, lbr the benefit of the widow of the deceased, if there be
one, and if there be no widow, then for the benefit of the next of
kin of the deceased. But no action under the provisions of this
section shall be sustained which is not commenced within one year
after the cause of action has accrued.
42 U.S.C.

§ 1986. Section 1986 contains an explicit statute of limitations of one year, shorter

than the borrowed 2-year period that governs section 1983. The Section 1986 claim, too, is
therefore dismissed with prejudice, because amendment would be futile.
My prior opinion instructed Mr. Brown as to the law governing equitable tolling of the
statute of limitations, and invited an amended complaint containing facts to support an
application for tolling. The amended complaint contains no facts on which the Court could find a
basis for statutory or equitable tolling of these Section 1983 or 1986 claims. They will therefore
be dismissed with prejudice.
C. False Imprisonment
In my prior Opinion, I also instructed Mr. Brown that it might be possible to allege a
timely false imprisonment claim:
A false imprisonment claim requires an allegation that the plaintiff
was arrested without probable cause and that he was detained
pursuant to that arrest. See Simpson v. Owner of Dollar Tree Store,
No. 09—6 162, 2010 WL 3364200, at *6 (E .D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2010)
(quoting Groman v. Twp. OfManalapan, 47 F .3d 628, 636 (3d
Cir. 1995) (citing Thomas v, .Kippermann, 846 F.2d 1009, 1011
(5th Cir. 1988))).
Thus detention without legal process, if it continues, may extend
the accrual period until “that person is held pursuant to legal
process, such as when a person is bound over by a magistrate or
arraigned on charges.” LeBlanc v. Snavely, 453 F. App’x 140, 142
(3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384,
3 89—90, 127 S. Ct. 1091 (2007)); see also Yagla v. Simon, No. 14—
0181, 2015 WL 1326341, at *16 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2015);
Wimbush v. Jenkins, No. 13—4654, 2014 WL 1607354, at *9
(D.N.J. Apr. 22, 2014).

S

(Dkt. No. 2 at p.6)
Mr. Brown’s complaint alludes generally to false imprisonment. I have examined the
complaint and the exhibits attached to the complaint, with an eye to the liberal construction to be
given pro se pleadings. There is no clear allegation of facts that would make a false
imprisonment claim timely. Rather, the false imprisonment claim seems largely to repeat earlier
allegations that the State Court should never have placed Mr. Brown on supervision in the first
place, and that there was no probable cause for the search or arrest. Therefore, this false
imprisonment claim will be dismissed as untimely.
Because this is Mr. Brown’s first attempt to allege false imprisonment, however this
dismissal is without prejudice to the filing, within 30 days, of a complaint that sets forth facts
supporting a false imprisonment claim that is timely.
D. Phone and Computer Seizure
Finally, Mr. Brown may be asserting a more general due process claim related to a
seizure of his phone or computer. The deprivation of his property does not state an independent
constitutional claim.
An unauthorized deprivation of property by a state actor, whether
intentional or negligent, does not constitute a violation of the
procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy
for the loss is available. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530—36
(1984); Parrattv. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543—44 (1981), overruled
in part on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328
(1986). In Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435—36
(1982), the Supreme Court explained, however, that postdeprivation remedies do not satisfy the Due Process Clause if the
deprivation of property is accomplished pursuant to established
state procedure rather than through random, unauthorized action.
Stokes v. Lanigan, No. 12—1478, 2012 WL 4662487, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 2, 2012). New Jersey
provides a post-deprivation remedy for unauthorized deprivation of property by public
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employees through the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J. STAT. ANN.

§ 59:1—I, et seq. Because a

meaningful post-deprivation remedy is available, Mr. Brown fails to state a due process claim
with respect to the purported taking of his property. Therefore, to the extent that Mr. Brown is
seeking to assert such a claim under the Constitution, he fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, and it will be dismissed with prejudice.
III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the complaint will be dismissed with prejudice, except for the
false imprisonment claim, which is dismissed without prejudice. An appropriate order will be
entered.

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DATED: February 6,2017

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K VIN MCNULTY
United States District Judge

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