BROWN v. CANTINERI

Filing 6

OPINION fld. Signed by Judge Kevin McNulty on 7/13/15. (sr, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

STEVEN BROWN,
Civ. No. 14-6391 (1(M) (JBC)

Plainti if,
V.

OPINION

MELISSA CANTINER1,
Defendant.

KEVIN MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.
I.

iNTRODUCTION

The plaintiff, Steven Brown, is a pretrial detainee at the Passaic County Jail in Paterson,
New Jersey. He is proceeding pro se with an amended civil rights complaint pursuant to 42
U.S.C.

§

1983. This Court previously administratively terminated this case because Mr. Brown

had neither paid the filing fee nor had he submitted an application to proceed in/àrrnapauperis.
Subsequently, Mr. Brown submitted an application to proceed informa pauperis. That
application is granted, and the Clerk will be ordered to reopen this case.
After he filed his application to proceed informa pauperis, Mr. Brown submitted an
amended complaint. 1 will review that amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§

1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious,
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from suit. For the reasons set forth below, the complaint will he
dismissed, in part without prejudice and in part with prejudice.

II.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Brown filed his initial complaint in this matter in October, 2014. lIe filed an
amended complaint in November, 2014. The allegations of the amended complaint are construed
as true for purposes of this

Opinion.

The amended complaint names Melissa Cantineri

—

Senior

Parole Officer, as the sole defindant in this case.
The amended complaint alleges that on May 2, 2012, Ms. Cantineri prepared a knowingly
false report. She allegedly is responsible for the narrative of facts on an arrest report filed against
Mr. Brown lbr violating his supervised release. The entirety of the narrative section of the arrest
report reads: “Steven l3rown was arrested for violation of community supervision for life.

Specifically by possessing/owing a computer with internet capability.” (Dkt. No. 5 at p. 28.) The
amended complaint ftirther alleges that on March 13, 2013, Ms. Cantineri made false statements
about Mr. Brown to a grand jury. Brown alleges that these falsehoods violated his constitutional
rights, and he seeks compensatory and punitive damages against Ms. Cantineri.
III.

LEGAL STANDARDS

A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.

§

1983 for certain violations of

his constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or lerritory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding fbr redress, except that in any action brought against a
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable.

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Thus, to state a claim for relief under

§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a right

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and second, that the alleged deprivation
was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See flarvey v. Plains Twp.
Police Dep’i, 635 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see

also

West v. Atkins, 487

U.S. 42,48 (1988).
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. 104-134,

§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66

to 1 321 -77 (Apr. 26, 1 996) (‘PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil
actions in which a prisoner is proceeding in fbrrnapauperis, see 28 U.S.C.
seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C.
claim with respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C.

§ 191 5(e)(2)(B),

§ 1915A(h), or brings a

§ I 997e. The PLRA directs district courts

to dismiss szuz sponte any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 191 5(e)(2)(B).

“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28
U.S.C.

§ 191 5(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(6).”Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (per
curiam)

(citing

Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F.

App’x 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (discussing 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(c)(1)); Courteuu v.

United States, 287 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b)). That

standard is set forth in Ashcro/i v. Iqhal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp.

V.

Twonthly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), as explicated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit. To survive the court’s screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege
“sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible. See Fowler

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UP/tiC

Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads fhctual

content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, inc. v. i)empster, 764
F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting iqha/, 556 U.S.
‘labels or conclusions’ or

a

at

678). “IA] pleading that offers

formulaic recitation othe elements of a cause of action will not

do.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twomhly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Pro se

pleadings, as always, will he liberally construed. Nevertheless, “pro se litigants

still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Ma/a v. (‘rown Bay
Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted; emphasis added).
IV.

DISCUSSION

The amended complaint centers around two alleged actions of Ms. Cantineri: (1) false
statements on the arrest report dated May 2, 2012; and (2) false grand jury testimony on March
13, 2013.
A. Statements in Arrest Report
Mr. Brown first argues that his constitutional rights were violated when Ms. Cantineri
prepared a knowingly false narrative on an arrest report against him on May 2, 2012. The

§ 1983

claims arising from Ms. Cantineri’s arrest report are barred by the statute of limitations.
Section 1983 claims are subject to New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations. See
Patyrak v. Apgar, 511 F. App’x 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2013)

(per curiarn) (citing

Dique v. N.J. Slate

Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010)). The date when a cause of action under

§ 1983 accrues,

however, is a matter of federal law. See Kach v. I-lose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing
Gentry v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 919 (3d Cir. 1991)). “Under federal law, a cause
of action accrues, and the statute

of limitations

begins to run when the plaintiff knew or should

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have known of the injury upon which its action is based.” id. (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). “As a general matter, a cause of action accrues at the time of the last event
necessary to complete the tort, usually at the time the plaintiff suffers an injury.” Id. (citing
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. lii, 120 (1979)).
The act giving rise to this claim against Ms. Cantineri is the filing of the arrest report on

May 2, 2012. The two-year statute of limitations began to run on that date, and expired on May
2, 2014. Mr. I3rown filed the original, unamended complaint in this action in October, 2014, five
months after the statute of limitations had expired.
I also consider, however, whether the limitations period was suspended or tolled. “State
law, unless inconsistent with federal law, also governs the concomitant issue of whether a
limitations period should be tolled.” McPherson v. United States, 392 F. App’x 938, 944 (3d
Cir. 2010) (quoting Dique, 603 F.3d at 185).
Statutory tolling, under New Jersey law, may arise from bases specifically listed in the
statute. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN.

§ 2A:14—21 (minority or insanity); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14—

22 (non-residency of persons liable). Nothing in the amended complaint, however, supports any
of those statutory bases for tolling.
Equitable tolling, under New Jersey law, may arise “where ‘the complainant has been
induced or tricked by his adversary’s misconduct into allowing the deadline to pass,’ or where a
plaintiff has ‘in some extraordinary way’ been prevented from asserting his rights, or where a
plaintiff has timely asserted his rights mistakenly by either delective pleading or in the wrong
forum.” Cason v. Arie Street Police Dep’t, No. 10—0497, 2010 WI. 2674399, at *5 n. 4 (D.N.J.
.June 29, 2010) (citing Freeman v. Stale, 347 N.J. Super. 11,31,788 A.2d 867 (N.J. Super. Ct.

5

App. Div. 2002). The amended complaint, however, does not articulate any fact that would
support any of these bases for equitable tolling.
Because the limitations bar is apparent liom the face of the amended complaint, the
complaint must be dismissed. See Osiuni v. Wa Wa’s Mart, 532 F. App’x 110, 111—12 (3d
Cir.2013) (per curiam) (“Although the running of the statute of limitations is ordinarily an
affirmative defense, where that defense is obvious from the face of the complaint and no
development of the record is necessary, a court may dismiss a time-barred complaint sun .vponle
under

§ 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) Ihr failure to state a claim.”) (citing Fog/c v. Peirson, 435

F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir.2006)); Ilunterson v. Disabato, 244 F. App’x 455, 457 (3d Cir.2007)
(per curiam) (“IA I district court may sua sponre

dismiss a claim as time-barred under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1 91 5A(h)(1) where it is apparent from the complaint that the applicable statute of limitations
has run.”).
This dismissal is, however, without prejudice to the filing of a proposed second
complaint within thirty days. In such a complaint, Mr. Brown may assert facts to demonstrate
that the applicable two-year statute of limitations does not bar claims arising from the May 2,
2012 arrest report.
B. March 13, 2013 Grand Jury Testimony
Mr. l3rown also alleges that, on March 13, 2013, Ms. Cantineri violated his constitutional
rights by testifying falsely to the grand jury. In Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497 (2012), the
Supreme Court held that “grand jury witnesses should enjoy the same immunity as witnesses at
trial. This means that a grand jury witness has absolute immunity from any

§ 1983 claim based

on the witness’ testimony.” Id. at 1506 Based on that absolute immunity, the claims that relate to
Ms. Cantineri’s 2013 grand jury testimony are dismissed with prejudice.

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V.

CONCLUSION

For the firegoing reasons, Mr. Brown’s claims based on Ms. Cantineri’s statements in the
May 2, 2012 police report are dismissed without prejudice, because they are barred by the statute
of limitations. His claims based on Cantineri’s 2013 grand jury testimony are dismissed with
prejudice because she is immune from suit. An appropriate Order will he entered.

Dated: July 13, 2015

(
KEVIN MCNULTY
United States District Judge

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