THOMAS v. BRIGGS et al
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge Esther Salas on 3/29/2016. (ld, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
________________________
AARON THOMAS,
Plaintiff,
v.
JAMES BRIGGS, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 14-6443 (ES) (JAD)
OPINION
________________________:
SALAS, DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff Aaron Thomas, a pre-trial detainee confined at Passaic County Jail in Paterson,
New Jersey at the time of filing, seeks to bring this action in forma pauperis. Based on his
affidavit of indigence, the Court previously granted Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma
pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and ordered the Clerk of the Court to file the Complaint.
(D.E. No. 2).
At this time, the Court must review the Complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A, to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes
that the Complaint may proceed in part.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings this civil rights action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendants
Joseph Del Russo; James Briggs; Steve Batte; James Stolz; Michael Fertitta; Salvatore Calafiore;
Judge Andrea Tombeno; Judge Raymond Reddin; John Dmuchowski; 1 Lisa Squitieri; William J.
Rohr; 2 Judge Gooden Brown; Judge Donna Gallucio; Judge Randal C. Chiocca; Michael Tolerio; 3
Camelia Valdes and Judge Madeleine Clark. The following factual allegations are taken from the
Complaint, and are accepted for purposes of this screening only. The Court has made no findings
as to the veracity of Plaintiff’s allegations.
On October 28, 2012, Plaintiff alleges that he was shopping at a Target store in Allentown,
Pennsylvania when he was “arbitrarily pursued” by Defendants Detective Briggs of the Little Falls
Police Department, and Detectives Batte and Stolz of the Passaic County Prosecutor’s Office.
(D.E. No. 4, Plaintiff’s Certification and Memorandum of Points and Authorities (“Pl. Mov. Br.”)
at 1). The detectives were investigating a case involving a missing fifteen year old girl from Little
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Defendant Dmuchowski appears to be named purely because of his supervisory role. (D.E. No.
1, Plaintiff’s Complaint (“Compl.”) at 12). However, “[g]overnment officials may not be held
liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior
[and] a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own
actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009); see also
Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 366 (3d Cir. 2012). Therefore, the claims against Defendant
Dmuchowski will be dismissed without prejudice.
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Plaintiff names his public defender in his underlying criminal case, William Rohr, as a defendant
in this action. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Rohr has failed to properly defend him. (Compl.
at 13). However, public defenders are not “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
See Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (holding that a public defender, although paid
and ultimately supervised by the state, “does not act under color of state law when performing the
traditional functions of counsel to a criminal defendant”). Therefore, all claims against Defendant
Rohr are dismissed with prejudice.
3
Plaintiff briefly references Defendant Tolerio, Warden of Passaic County Jail. He alleges that
Warden Tolerio had the “power and duty to restrain the defendants” but he refused to do so.
(Compl. 14). However, it is unclear what “power” Warden Tolerio had over the other named
Defendants, which consist of prosecutors, prosecutors’ office detectives, and judicial officials.
Moreover, none of the allegations are related to Passaic County Jail. Therefore, any intended
claims against Warden Tolerio will be dismissed without prejudice under Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678,
as discussed more fully below.
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Falls, New Jersey. (Id.). The detectives located the girl at the Target store through a “cell phone
trace wiretap” they conducted under the authority of a warrant issued by Passaic County Superior
Court Judge Marilyn Clark. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that he was “abducted” by these detectives
for merely being in the presence of the missing girl and taken to an empty room at Target where
he was interrogated for hours. (Id.).
Pennsylvania State Troopers eventually arrived and executed a “warrantless false arrest,”
taking Plaintiff into custody. (Id. at 2). After being held in Pennsylvania jails for a couple of
days, Plaintiff was “kidnapped” by Defendants Briggs and Detective Fertitta and brought to
Passaic County New Jersey pursuant to an arrest warrant for sexual assault, interference with
custody, endangering the welfare of a child, and luring. (Id. at 8; D.E. No. 6-1, Passaic County
Prosecutor’s Office Preliminary Investigation Report). On April 23, 2013, Plaintiff was indicted,
and he is now awaiting trial in Passaic County criminal court. (Id. at 13).
Plaintiff is seeking monetary relief, as well as an injunction to prevent “retaliation” by
unidentified defendants. (Compl. ¶ 7).
II.
Legal Standard
A. Standards for Sua Sponte Dismissal
According to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat.
1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996) (“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those
civil actions in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B),
seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a
claim with respect to prison conditions, see 28 U.S.C. § 1997e. The PLRA directs district courts
to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
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This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and
1915A because Plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding as an indigent.
“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing
Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)). According to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, “a pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive sua sponte screening for
failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim
is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation
omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470, 483 n.17 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally construed, “pro se litigants still must
allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc.,
704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
B. Section 1983 Actions
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for certain violations of his
constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
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proceeding for redress . . . .
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed
or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988);
Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
III.
Discussion
A. Illegal Search and Seizure
Plaintiff alleges a claim for illegal seizure against Defendants Briggs, Batte, and Stolz for
holding him against his will at the Target store. Plaintiff also alleges a claim for illegal search
against Defendant Briggs when he searched Plaintiff and his car without a warrant. Specifically,
Plaintiff alleges that after Defendants Briggs, Batte, and Stolz approached him in Target,
Defendant Briggs “compelled” Plaintiff to surrender his identification. (Pl. Mov. Br. ¶ 5). After
Plaintiff informed the detective that he did not have his identification, Detective Briggs searched
Plaintiff’s pockets without consent. (Id.). The detective then “coerced” Plaintiff into telling him
where the vehicle was located so he could search the vehicle. (Id.). Thereafter, Plaintiff was
brought to a room in Target and questioned for “several hours” by the detectives. (Id. ¶ 6).
With regard to Plaintiff’s detention at Target and subsequent questioning, the right at issue
is the Fourth Amendment’s protection against “unreasonable searches and seizures.”
U.S.
Const. amend. IV. “Law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition
of unreasonable seizures merely by approaching individuals on the street or in other public places.”
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200 (2002); see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434
(1991) (“[A] seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and
asks a few questions.”). To establish such a violation, Plaintiff must allege facts to show that the
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officers lacked a reasonable basis to suspect that he “ha[d] committed, [was] committing, or [was]
about to commit a crime.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984). Reasonableness is
determined by “the totality of the circumstances, which can include [the individual’s] location, a
history of crime in the area, [the individual’s] nervous behavior and evasiveness, and [the officers’]
commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.” Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d
199, 206 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000)).
Here, Plaintiff was found with a missing fifteen year old girl from New Jersey at the time
he was detained. It is clear that the officers initially had a reasonable basis to suspect that Plaintiff
was in the process of committing a crime and to detain him in a back room at the store. See
Wardlaw, 528 U.S. at 124–25; Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 504–05 (1983) (“[T]here are
undoubtedly reasons of safety and security that would justify moving a suspect from one location
to another during an investigatory detention, such as from an airport concourse to a more private
area.”). Whether it was reasonable to hold Plaintiff for several hours for questioning thereafter,
however, is not as clear. Cf. Carrasca v. Pomeroy, 313 F.3d 828, 837 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[I]t is
unlikely that a reasonable police officer would believe that a Terry stop would justify detention
under chains for several hours.”). It is obvious that at some point during the “several hours” of
questioning, the detectives had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff because they were able to secure
an arrest warrant. However, at this early juncture of the case, with only the allegations of the
Complaint to rely upon, the Court is unable to determine when the sufficient probable cause for
arrest arose and whether Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right was violated prior to that time. As
a result, the Court will allow the unlawful seizure claim to proceed against Defendants Briggs,
Batte, and Stolz.
With regard to Plaintiff’s claim for unlawful search of his person and vehicle, Plaintiff has
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also pled sufficient facts to allow this claim to proceed past sua sponte screening against Defendant
Briggs. “It is well settled under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments that a search conducted
without a warrant issued upon probable cause is per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 219 (1973) (citation omitted). Those exceptions include search incident to arrest, search
made in “hot pursuit,” and search pursuant to consent. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 35758.
Here, as discussed above, Plaintiff states that when the detectives first approached him at
Target, Detective Briggs asked for identification, and when Plaintiff informed him that it was in
his car, Detective Briggs searched him without consent. (Pl. Mov. Br. ¶ 4). When he did not
find any identification on his person, the detective went out into the parking lot and searched
Plaintiff’s car, also without consent. (Id. ¶ 5) Although Plaintiff was later arrested pursuant to a
warrant, at the time of the searches, Detective Briggs did not have a warrant, nor was the search
conducted pursuant to a warrantless search exception. As also discussed above, while the
detectives had reasonable suspicion to initially detain Plaintiff, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a
lack of cause to conduct a warrantless search of his person and vehicle at that juncture. As such,
Court will allow the unlawful search claim against Defendant Briggs to proceed past screening.
B. False Arrest
Plaintiff alleges a claim for false arrest against Defendants Briggs, Batte, Stolz, Fertitta,
and Calafiore.
“To state a claim for false arrest under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must establish:
(1) that there was an arrest; and (2) that the arrest was made without probable cause.” James v.
City of Wilkes–Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d Cir. 2012). “Probable cause to arrest exists when
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the facts and the circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient in
themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed
by the person to be arrested.” Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 2111 F.3d 782, 788 (3d Cir.
2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). An arrest warrant issued by a magistrate
or judge does not, in itself, shelter an officer from liability for false arrest. See Wilson v. Russo,
212 F.3d 781, 786-87 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). Rather, a plaintiff may succeed
in a § 1983 action for false arrest made pursuant to a warrant if the plaintiff shows, by a
preponderance of the evidence: (1) that the police officer “knowingly and deliberately, or with a
reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that create a falsehood in
applying for a warrant;” and (2) that “such statements or omissions are material, or necessary, to
the finding of probable cause.” Id.
Here, Plaintiff was arrested by Defendants Briggs, Batte, and Stolz based on a warrant
issued by Passaic County Judge Andrea Tombeno. (Pl. Mov. Br. at 6, ¶ 16). Plaintiff alleges no
facts to support a claim that the warrant was obtained by use of false statements or material
omissions. In fact, the probable cause used to obtain the warrant included the fact that Plaintiff
was in the presence of the missing girl when the detectives found her at Target. Further probable
caused existed because Plaintiff had been corresponding with the girl in previous weeks. Indeed,
Plaintiff’s cell number appeared on her phone records, and the detectives used the number and
“pinged” the location of phone pursuant to a warrant. 4 (D.E. No. 6-2, Supporting Exhibits, Ex. 10,
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To the extent Plaintiff is challenging the issuance of the search warrant by Passaic County Judge
Marilyn Clark on October 28, 2012, that claim also fails. The warrant was issued by Judge Clark
to “ping” the locations for two phones numbers that showed up on the missing girl’s phone records
most frequently in the time leading up to her disappearance. The phone number, which later lead
to locating the girl at Target, had exchanged over one thousand text messages with her during the
month leading up to her disappearance. (D.E. No. 6-2, Supporting Exhibits, Ex. 1, Transcript of
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Det. Briggs’s Investigation Report).
At the time of the issuance of the arrest warrant, the
detectives had also interviewed Plaintiff and the missing girl for several hours. In short, the Judge
had more than sufficient probable cause to issue the arrest warrant for Plaintiff. Accordingly, the
Court dismisses this claim without prejudice.
C. Malicious Prosecution
Plaintiff alleges a claim for malicious prosecution against Prosecutors Squitieri, Valdes,
Del Russo, Briggs, Batte, Stolz, Fertitta, and Calafiore.
To prevail on a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, a “plaintiff must show that: (1)
the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in the plaintiff’s
favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the defendants acted
maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered
deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal
proceeding.” McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, 582 F.3d 447, 461 (3d Cir. 2009).
Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim must fail as a matter of law because the criminal
proceeding did not end in Plaintiff’s favor. In fact, as discussed above, Plaintiff’s criminal
proceeding is still ongoing. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot state a claim for malicious prosecution at
this time, and said claim will be dismissed without prejudice. 5
Detective Briggs’s Telephonic Warrant Application 12). Based on said information, probable
cause existed for the issuance of the search warrant.
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To the extent Plaintiff intended to raise any other claims against the Prosecutor Defendants, those
claims would also be dismissed. “[A] state prosecuting attorney who act[s] within the scope of
his duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution” is not amenable to suit under § 1983.
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 410 (1976). The immunity afforded to prosecutors is very
broad. See, e.g., Schrob v. Catterson, 948 F.2d 1402, 1411 (3d Cir. 1991) (absolute immunity for
instituting grand jury proceedings without proper investigation and without a good faith belief that
any wrongdoing occurred); Rose, 871 F.2d at 345 & n.12 (same); Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d
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D. Judicial Immunity
Plaintiff has named Judges Donna Gallucio, Greta Gooden Brown, Randal Chiocca,
Raymond Reddin, Andrea Tombeno and Marilyn Clark as Defendants. It is well settled that
judges are absolutely immunized from a civil rights suit for money damages arising from their
judicial acts. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57
(1978) (“A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was
done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when
he has acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction”) (citations omitted).
Additionally,
“‘injunctive relief shall not be granted’ in an action brought against ‘a judicial officer for an act or
omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or
declaratory relief was unavailable.’” Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 304 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 1983).
There are only two circumstances in which a plaintiff can overcome judicial immunity.
“First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the
judge’s judicial capacity. Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature,
taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11–12 (internal citations
omitted). In determining whether judicial immunity applies, the court “must decide whether the
Complaint set forth allegations that, taken as true, establish that the application of an exception to
1454, 1464 (3d Cir. 1992) (initiating a prosecution without a good faith belief that any wrongdoing
has occurred).
Here, all of the allegations against the Prosecutor Defendants relate to their involvement in
Plaintiff’s criminal prosecution, including bail hearings, probable cause hearings, and grand jury
presentments. As such, the Prosecutor Defendants are protected by absolute immunity.
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the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity is above the speculative level.” Kirkland v. DiLeo, 581
F. App’x 111, 114–15 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Judge Donna Gallucio “refuse[d] to dispose of the fraud
procured case # 12-06394C and indictment 130404271;” that Judge Greta Gooden Brown presided
over his arraignment and refuse[d] to dispose of the fraud procured case # 12-6394;” that Judge
Randal Chiocca “refuse[d] to dispose of the fraud procured case # 12-06394C and indictment
130404271;” that Judge Raymond Reddin set a bail amount of $500,000 on the “fraud procured
NJ Complaint/Warrant CDR2;” that Judge Andrea Tombeno “sign[ed] as the judicial officer
issuing warrant for Detective James Briggs #734 fraud procured warrant;” and that Judge Marilyn
Clark improperly issued a “cell phone wiretap.” (Compl. at 11-14; D.E. No. 3, Plaintiff’s Motion
to Supplement and Amend at 4).
All of these allegations relate exclusively to judicial actions. Issuing warrants, presiding
over bail hearing, and conducting arraignments are plainly judicial acts, and these judges clearly
had jurisdiction to undertake such actions. Because Judges Donna Gallucio, Greta Gooden
Brown, Randal Chiocca, Raymond Reddin, Andrea Tombeno, and Marilyn Clark have absolute
immunity for the judicial acts described in Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court dismisses the claims
against these individuals with prejudice.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the unlawful seizure claim against Defendants Batte, Briggs
and Stolz, and the unlawful search claim against Defendant Briggs will be permitted to proceed.
All claims against Defendant Rohr and the Judicial Defendants are dismissed with prejudice
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), (iii) and 1915A(b)(1), (2). All other claims are
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dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. An
appropriate Order follows.
s/Esther Salas
Esther Salas, U.S.D.J.
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