LAZALA v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Filing 15

LETTER OPINION AND ORDER, The Court Affirms the Commissioner's final decision and the Clerk shall serve a copy of this Opinion and Order on Plaintiff by Certified mail return receipt, etc. Signed by Judge John Michael Vazquez on 4/26/2016. (JB, )

UNTED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DIS1RICT OF NEW JERSEY
CiLIBERs OF
JOHN M1CllAE. VAZQUEZ
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JUDGE

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG
POST OFFICE AND
CouRTHousE
2 FEDERAL SQUARE,
Rooi 417
NEwARK, NJ 07102

973-297-4851
April 26, 2016
VIA ECF
LETTER OPINION AND ORDER
Re:

Felicia Lazala v. Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social Security
Civil Action No. 14-6445

Dear Litigants:
Pro se plaintiff Felicia Lazala (‘Plaintiff’) appeals the final decision of the Commissioner
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of Social Security (Commissioner’). which denied her application for Disability Insurance
Benefits (DIB’) under the Social Security Act (the Act”). For the reasons that follow, the Court
finds that there was substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s determination and, as a
result, affirms the Commissioner’s determination.

On November 2, 2011, Plaintiff filed an application for DIB pursuant to Title Ii of the Act.
Plaintiff alleged a disability beginning on November 17, 2005. Pursuant to Section 2 16(i) of the
Act, disability is defined as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of
any medically determinable physical or mental impairment or combination of impairments which
can be expected to result in death or has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
of not less than 12 months{.]” 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(1). Moreover, Plaintiffs insured status
requirements resulted in her being insured through December 31, 2010 (the date of last insured),
so that the relevant period for this matter was November 17, 2005 to December 31, 2010.
Plaintiffs claims were initially denied on February 1, 201 2 and upon reconsideration on
May 1$, 2012. PlaintitY then filed a request for a hearing, which was held before Kimberly L.
Schiro. Administrative Lw Judge (the “ALF) on July 9. 2013. In a decision dated August 5.
2013. the AU found that Plaintiff was not disabled. On August 18. 2014. the Appeals Council
denied Plaintiffs request lbr review thereby rendering the AU’s ruling the final decision of the
Commissioner. This appeal followed.

Plaintiff was represented by counsel in the proceedings before the Administrative Law Judge.

In reaching her decision, the AU set Forth the five-step sequential evaluation process
required by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a) and 416.920(a). The ALT found that Plaintiff had not
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engaged in substantial gainful activity during the relevant period. The ALT further ruled that
Plaintiff had two medically determinable impairments, diabetes and mild cervical spondylosis.
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The AU determined, however, that Plaintiff did not have a severe impairment or combination of
impairments. As a result. the evaluation process stopped at the second step and Plaintiff was found
not disabled.
In rendering her decision, the AU noted that Plaintiff complained of diabetes, headaches.
and pain in multiple areas (back, stomach, and leg). The AU determined that Plaintiff was not
completely credible regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her medical
impairments. The AU continued that there was very little medical evidence indicating that
Plaintiff sought treatment during the relevant period and, consequently, it was reasonable to
conclude that the impairments did not result in significant functional limitations. Plaintiffs
medical records showed degenerative spondylosis in October 2010 later revealed to be mild
degenerative spondylosis in the cervical area. The latter test was dated several months after the
close of the relevant period. Similarly, Plaintiff testified as to severe leg pain but admitted that it
started over a year after December 31, 20l0.
Plaintiff claims that the Commissioner erred in not considering relevant medical evidence
in reaching the determination that Plaintiff is not disabled. D.E. 12 at 4-5. Tn opposition, the
Commissioner asserts that the AU’s decision v.’as supported by substantial evidence. D.E. 13 at
6-li. The Commissioner explains that Plaintiff did not prove that she had a severe impairment
and, in any event. Plaintiff did not meet the durational requirement of 12 continuous months. Id.
at 8-10.
In reviewing a final decision of the Commissioner, the Court exercises plenary review over
legal issues. Manhew.c v. Apfèl, 239 F.3d 589, 591 (3d Cir. 2001). An AU’s findings, including
credibility determinations, must be upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Such evidence is less than a preponderance but
more than a mere scintilla. Id. The Court reviews the record as a whole to determine whether an
AU’s finding is supported by substantial evidence. Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 610 (3d Cir.
2014) (citation omitted).

The discussion concerning the AU’s opinion is taken from the August 5. 2013 decision. D.F.
9-2 at 16-21. The transcript from the July 9.2013 hearing can be found at D.E. 9-2 at 35-52.
Spondylosis is defined as “ankvlosis of the vertehra[.]” STEDMac’s MEDICAL DIcTIoNARY,
1813 (28° ed. 2006). Ankvlosis is the [sjtiffening or fixation of ajoint as the result of a disease
process[.]” Id. at 95.
The AUJ also held the record open for several months flullowing the hearing so that Plaintiff
could submit additional medical evidence hut the additional information did not pertain to the
relevant period or did not add any additional. substantive information to the record,

As to Plaintiff’s diabetes, the record reveals that while Plaintiff does suffer from the
disease, her condition appears to stable. The medical evidence concerning Plaintiffs diabetes
primarily shows her making regular doctor’s appointments to obtain a refill for her medication.
See, e.g., D.E. 9-8 at 408-09. As to Plaintiff’s leg pain, as the AU noted, Plaintiff acknowledged
that it became very painful well after the relevant period ended. D.E. 9-2 at 47. In fact. on several
occasions the AU expressly informed the Plaintiff that the date of last insured was December 31.
2010 and that the AU was focused on potential impairments during the relevant period. D.E. 9-2
at 41. 44-45, 46, 47.
The Court also reviewed the x-ray results of Plaintiffs cervical spine on October 22. 2010,
D.E. 9-7 at 293. which occurred approximately two months before Plaintiff’s date of last insured.
The AU noted this finding in her opinion, D.E. 9-2 at 20, but mistakenly indicated that there was
no evidence of cervical spondylosis during the relevant period. The Court is aware that while a
plaintiff has the burden of proof, the plaintiffs burden is “not demanding” in establishing that a
medical impairment is severe at the second step of the evaluation process. Jakithowski v. Comm ‘r
of Soc. Sec., 215 Fed. Appx. 104, 107 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing McC’rea v, Comm ‘r Soc. Sec. 370 F.
3d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 2004) Newell v. Comm ‘r Soc. Sec.. 347 F.3d 541, 546-47 (3d Cir. 2003)).
The Commissioner claims that the evidence does not support a finding that Plaintiff’s impairments
“resulted in work-related limitations for 12 continual months prior to December 31, 2010.” D.E.
13 at 10. However, the Court can consider evidence after the relevant period since it may be
pertinent to the severity of a claimant’s condition before the expiration of her insured status.
Basinger v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1166, 1169 (3d Cir. 1984) (“[M]edical evidence of a claimanfs
condition subsequent to the expiration of the claimant’s insured status is relevant evidence because
it may bear upon the severity of the claimant’s condition before the expiration of his or her insured
status.” (citations omitted)). See a/sc) Newell, 347 F.3d at 547 (“Retrospective diagnosis of an
impairment. even if uncorroborated by contemporaneous medical records, but corroborated by lay
evidence relating back to the claimed period of disability, can support a finding of past
impairment.”)
Nevertheless, the Court finds that there was substantial evidence to support the AU’s
finding that Plaintiffs cervical spondylosis was not a substantial impairment. As the AU noted
(D.E. 9-2 at 20), when Plaintiff had a MRI of her cervical spine after the relevant period, as
opposed to the x-ray in 2010. the test revealed the condition to be mild. More importantly, and
also recognized by the i\LJ (D.E. 9-2 at 20). Plaintiffs subjective complaints during the relevant
period did not reveal continuous complaints of neck pain. Instead. Plaintiffs regular visits with
her primary care physician indicated that she usually needed refills for her diabetes medication.
To be sure, Plaintiff on occasion complained of neck pain and headaches (as well as other sporadic
ailments), but these complaints were relativel few and far between. D.E. 9-8 at 392-416. The
current matter is not like that of the claimant’s in Newell, in which the claimant testified that she
did not seek medical assistance during the critical period because she did not have health insurance.
Newell, 347 F.3d at 544. 547-48. Here, Plaintiff regularly sought medical treatment during the
relevant period but only rarely complained of neck pain. Nor is this matter similar to Fargnoli i’.
Masssanari. 237 F.3d 34. 43-44 (3d Cir. 2001), in which the claimant regularly sought medical
treatment and was “consistently found” by his physicians ‘to suffer from a severe and debilitating

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chronic back condition[.i” In comparison, Plaintiff regularly visited her doctor but no such
medical finding of debilitating neck pain or headaches was ever made during the relevant period.
Finally. many other tests conducted after December 31. 2010. reflected no medical
irregularities. An August 26, 2011 MRI of the pelvis showed no abnormality. D.E. 9-7 at 246.
An October 8, 2011 overhead projection of Plaintiff’s upper gastrointestinal series was normal.
lii at 289. An August 26, 2011 x-ray of Plaintiff’s shoulder reflected no fracture or dislocation
and that the soft tissue was normal. IcL at 291, Similarly, a chest examination on December 30,
2011 was normal. Id. at 362. These after-the-fact tests are relevant to Plaintiff not being under a
disability during the relevant period.
For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner’s final decision was supported by substantial
evidence.
The Court AFFIRMS the Comrnissioners final decision and the Clerk shall serve a copy
of this opinion and order on Plaintiff by certified mail return receipt.
SO ORDERED.

C\c /

JOHN MIdHAELUEZ
UNITED STATES DJs1RIè+ JUDGE

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