LEES-PECKHAM v. RUNA, LLC et al

Filing 11

OPINION. Signed by Judge Jose L. Linares on 1/12/15. (jd, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JACKIE LEE-PECKHAM

Civil Action No.: 14-6635 (JLL)
Plaintiff,

V.

RUNA, LLC, TYLER GAGE,
MACCOMBIE, SARA PERKINS,
JOHN DOES 1-5,

DAN
AND

OPINION

Defendants.

LINARES, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court by way of Defendants Runa LLC (“Runa”), Tyler
Gage, Dan MacCombie, and Sara Perkins (“Individual Defendants”)(Collectively
“Defendants”)’motion to dismiss (ECF No. 4-7) Plaintiff Jackie-Lee Peckham (“Plaintiff’)’s
Complaint (ECF No. 1) pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6). The
Court has considered the parties’ submissions in support of and in opposition to the instant
motion and decides this matter without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 78. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Defendants motion.
I. BACKGROUND’

On September 18 Plaintiff filed a civil action against Defendants in the Superior Court of
New Jersey, Essex Vicinage, Law Division. (See ECF No. 1 at 2). Defendants removed this case
to this Court on October 24, 2014. (See ECF No. 1-2). Defendant Runa is a privately held
beverage company that processes and sells guayusa to retailors in the form of energy drinks,

1

The following facts are taken as true solely for the purposes of this motion.

bottled iced teas, tea boxes, and loose tea leaves. (Comp at ¶ 7). Runa is a Rhode Island LLC,
authorized to do business in New York, where its principal place of business is located. (Id. at
¶
2). Defendant Gage (“Gage”) and Defendant MacCombie (“MacCombie”) are the Co-Chief
Executive Officers of Runa. (Id. at ¶J 3-4). Defendant Perkins is the Chief Financial Officer of
Runa. (Id. at ¶ 5). Plaintiff was the former Executive Vice President of Operations at Runa. (Id.
atJ 10).
In January 2014, Plaintiff reported activity seemingly in violation of the FDCA to
Defendant. (Id. at

¶ 16).

In the same month, Plaintiff also protested against alleged false

financial reporting practices by Runa through the manipulation of “the cost of goods sold
calculation.” (Id. at ¶ 17). Plaintiff alleges that after expressing her disagreement with Runa’ s
labeling and financial reporting practices, Plaintiff was unjustly terminated via an email dated
June 3, 2014. (Id. at ¶ 18). On or about June 3, 2014, Defendants allegedly published
communications to third parties concerning Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s occupation, trade, and
profession. (Id. at ¶ 19). These disclosures allegedly created the impression that Plaintiff had
been terminated for a cause on an emergency basis that may have been prompted by a lack of
personal integrity, by dishonest conduct, or both. (Id.).
In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following cause of actions against Defendants: (1)
Wrongful termination in Violation of Public Policy; (2) Defamation Per Se; (3) Breach of
Express Employment Contract; (4) Breach of Implied Employment Contract; (5) Breach of
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (6) Fraud; (7) Malicious Misrepresentation
Deceit: (8) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (9) Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress; and (10) Age Discrimination in Employment Act.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1 2(b)(2) states that a defendant may move to dismiss a
complaint for “lack of personal jurisdiction.” Fed.R.Civ.P. I 2(b)(2). Once a defendant has
asserted a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff carries the burden of “establishing with reasonable
particularity sufficient contacts between the defendant and the forum state.” Provident Nat’!.
Bank v. Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass’n, 819 F.2d 434, 437 (3d Cir.1987). The Third Circuit has
held that “[w]hen a Defendant raises the defense of the court’s lack of personal jurisdiction, the
burden falls upon the plaintiff to come forward with sufficient facts to establish that jurisdiction
is proper. “Mellon Bank (East) P.S.F.S., Nat’lAssn. v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1223 (3d

Cir. 1992). In evaluating a movant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule 1 2(b)(2), “courts
must accept the plaintiffs allegations as true and construe disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff.”
Machuisky v. Hall, 210 F.Supp.2d 531, 531 (D.N.J.2002) (citing C’arteret Say. Bank, F.A. v.
Shushan, 954 F.2d 141, 142 n. I (3d Cir.1992)).
A district court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident of the forum only to
the extent authorized by the forum state’s long-arm statute. M. Eagles Tool Warehouse v. Fisher
Tooling, 205 F.Supp.2d 306, 311 (D.N.J.2002). New Jersey’s long-arm statute permits the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant to the extent of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. N.J. Sup.Ct. R. 4:4—4(c)(1). See also Weber v.
Jolly Hotels, 977 F.Supp. 327, 334 (D.N.J.1997). The Fourteenth Amendment requires (1) that
the “defendant ha{vej constitutionally sufficient ‘minimum contacts’ with the forum,” id.
(quoting Burger King C’orp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528
(1985)), and (2) that “subjecting the defendant to the court’s jurisdiction comports with

‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ “Id. (quoting *609 Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154,90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)).
A court may exercise either “general” or “specific” personal jurisdiction over a

defendant. General jurisdiction is based upon the defendant’s “continuous and systematic”
contacts with the forum state. Eagles Tool Warehouse, 205 F.Supp.2d. at 312 n. 8 (citing Remick
v Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 255 (3d Cir.2001)). Specific jurisdiction arises only when the
plaintiffs claim is related to, or arises out of, the defendant’s contacts with the forum.
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984).
II. DISCUSSION
A. 12(b)(2)

The Individual Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Rule
1 2(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Individual
Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot carry her burden of proving that there are sufficient
contacts between each of the Individual Defendants and the State of New Jersey to support in
personam jurisdiction. The Individual Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s Complaint does not
allege any facts to establish jurisdiction over the individual Defendants. Moreover, the Individual
Defendants contend that specific jurisdiction does not exist either, because the Individual
Defendants have not purposefully directed their actions at New Jersey nor do Plaintiff’s claims
arise out of or relate to any of the Individual Defendants’ activities that were aimed at New
Jersey.
The Court notes that each count of Plaintiff’s Complaint contains the statement “Plaintiff
restates each and every claim, assertion, and allegation set forth in the foregoing paragraphs as it
fully set forth herein.” Although there may be circumstances in which it is appropriate to

incorporate certain allegations by reference, there is no question that each count of a properly
pled complaint must contain: (a) its own cause of action against a clearly identified defendant(s),
and (b) those particular factual allegations that would allow the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for that cause of action. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Plaintiff’s Complaint, as currently drafted, fails to meet this requirement. See, e.g., Anderson v.
District Bd. of Trustees of cent. Florida cmty. College, 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996)
(“Anderson’s complaint is a perfect example of ‘shotgun’ pleading in that it is virtually
impossible to know which allegations of fact are intended to support which claim(s) for relief.”).
Therefore, the Court will grant Plaintiff an opportunity to amend this Complaint insofar as
Plaintiff can meet its burden to plead facts which establish jurisdiction over each Defendant.
Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Complaint is dismissed without prejudice.
To the extent Plaintiff intends to re-plead these claims, Plaintiff is hereby advised that he
must assert facts showing each defendant’s actual personal involvement in each of the alleged
wrongs. Stated differently, Plaintiff must present sufficient facts establishing each defendant’s
liability for each claim asserted. See, e.g., See Smart v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm ‘n, No. 96-3 586,
1996 WL 442618, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 2, 1996) (instructing pro se plaintiff that a complaint
“should clearly identify each defendant, the conduct of each defendant allegedly harming him,
and the relief he seeks, setting forth the facts relating to each defendant and to each claim”);
Schiano

MBNA, No. 05-1771, 2013 WL 2452681, at *7 (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 2013) (reiterating that

Plaintiff must “make clear which claims were being asserted specifically against which
defendants, and the specific factual basis for each claim against each defendant, as well as the
specific relief being sought and the grounds for that relief’); see generally Binsack v.
Lackawanna Cnty. Prison, 438 F. App’x 158, 160 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that the district court

did not abuse its discretion in dismissing complaint for failure to “provide a short and plain
statement of each claim against each defendant”). Defendants are free to reassert its remaining
arguments in support of dismissal of the Complaint once Plaintiff has filed an Amended
Complaint in accordance with the directives set forth above.
IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons herein expressed, Plaintiffs Complaint dismissed without prejudice.
Plaintiffs may amend within 30 days. Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction is granted.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

DATE: January

2015

States District Judge