MAXIUS v. HENDRICKS

Filing 8

OPINION. Signed by Judge Kevin McNulty on 1/26/2015. (anr)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
KURSAM J. MAXIUS,
Civ. No. 14-6782 (KM)

Petitioner,

OPINION

V.

ROY L. HENI)RICKS,
Respondent.

KEVIN MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Until December 19, 2014, the petitioner, Kursam J. Maxius, was in custody as an
immigration detainee at the Essex County Correctional Facility in Newark, New Jersey. Mr.
Maxius is a native and citizen of St. Lucia. While in custody, he filed apro se petition for a writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241. For the following reasons, the habeas petition

will be dismissed as moot.
II. BACKGROUND
Mr. Maxius was placed into immigration custody on April 14, 2014. He states in his
petition that his order of deportation became final on September 1, 2011.
On October 30, 2014, this Court received Mr. Maxius’s

§ 2241 petition. In that petition,

Mr. Maxius argued that his immigration detention had become so prolonged so as to violate
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). The relief sought in the petition was a release from
custody under reasonable conditions of supervision.
Approximately one week after receiving the petition, on November 7, 2014, I ordered
respondent to answer. On December 22, 2014, Respondent submitted a declaration which states

that Mr. Maxius was released from immigration detention under an order of supervision on
December 19, 2014. Respondent attached a copy of the order of supervision to the declaration.
III. DISCUSSION

The Attorney General has the authority to detain aliens in removal proceedings both
before and after the issuance of a final order of removal. Post-removal order immigration
detention is governed by 8 U.S.C.

§

123 1(a). Section 123 1(a)(1)(A) states that, “except as

otherwise provided in this section, when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall
remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days (in this section referred to as
the “removal period”).” Id.

§

123 1(a)(1)(A). The removal period begins on the latest of the

following:
(i)
(ii)

(iii)

Id.

§

The date the order of removal becomes administratively
final.
If the removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court
orders a stay of the removal of the alien, the date of the
court’s final order.
If the alien is detained or confined (except under an
immigration process), the date the alien is released from
detention or confinement.

123 l(a)(l)(B). Federal regulations provide that:
An order of removal made by the immigration judge at the
conclusion of the proceedings under section 240 of the Act shall
become final:
(a) Upon dismissal of an appeal by the Board of Immigration
Appeals;
(b) Upon waiver of appeal by the respondent;
(c) Upon expiration of the time allotted for an appeal if the
respondent does not file an appeal within that time;
(d) If certified to the Board or Attorney General, upon the date of
the subsequent decision ordering removal; or
(e) If an immigration judge issues an alternate order of removal in
connection with a grant of voluntary departure, upon overstay
of the voluntary departure period, or upon the failure to post a
required voluntary department bond within 5 business days. If
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the respondent has filed a timely appeal with the Board, the
order shall become final upon an order of removal by the
Board or the Attorney General, or upon overstay of the
voluntary departure period granted or reinstated by the Board
or the Attorney General.
8 C.F.R.

§

1241.1(a). Section 123 l(a)(2) requires that the alien be detained during the ninety day

post-removal order period. See 8 U.S.C.
ninety-day period, then

§

§

123 1(a)(2). If the alien is not removed during that

1231 (a)(6) authorizes either continued detention or release on bond:

An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under section 1982
of this title, under section 1227(a)(l)(C), l227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(4)
of this title or who has been determined by the Attorney General to
be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of
removal, may be detained beyond the removal period and, if
released, shall be subject to the terms of supervision in paragraph
(3).
8 U.S.C.

§

123 1(a)(6).

In Zadvydas, supra, the United States Supreme Court held that

§

1231 (a)(6) “limits an

alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s
removal from the United States. It does not permit indefinite detention.” 533 U.S. at 689. To
state a habeas claim under

§ 2241, the petitioner must provide facts showing good reason to

believe that there is no reasonable likelihood of his actual removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689. “Zadvydas does not delineate the boundaries of
evidentiary sufficiency, but it suggest that an inversely proportional relationship is at play: the
longer an alien is detained, the less he must put forward to obtain relief.” Alexander v. Attorney
Gen. of United States, 495 F. App’x 274, 276-77 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing Zadvydas,
533 U.S. at 701). As a rule of thumb, the Supreme Court stated that six months is a
presumptively reasonable period of post-removal detention under
533 U.S. at 701.

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§

123 l(a)(6). See Zadvydas,

With that as a legal background, I find that Mr. Maxius’s habeas petition is moot because
he has received the very relief the petition sought: release on bond. “Under Article III of the
Constitution, federal courts may adjudicate only actual, ongoing cases or controversies.” Lewis
v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990) (citations omitted). “To invoke the jurisdiction
of a federal court, a litigant must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable
to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Id. (citations
omitted).
Respondent has submitted sufficient proof that, on December 19, 2014, Mr. Maxius was
release from immigration detention under an order of supervision. In finding his petition moot, I
am guided by Nunes v. Decker, 480 F. App’x 173 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam). InNunes, the
petitioner unsuccessfully sought release from post-order-of-removal immigration detention under
Zadvydas, and appealed that denial. Id. at 174. After the matter was fully briefed on appeal, the
Court learned that Nunes had been released pursuant to an order of supervision which did not
provide for future detention, unless of course he violated the conditions of release. See Id. at 175.
There was no particular likelihood that Nunes’s detention would resume; Nunes himself had
acknowledged the conditions of release in writing, and the Court could not assume that he would
violate them and place himself at risk of detention. See Ed. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
case as moot.
Here, as in Nunes, Mr. Maxius has been released from immigration detention pursuant to an
order of supervision, as he requested. There is no reason to think he will be detained again unless
he violates conditions of supervision, a speculative state of affairs and one within his control.
Accordingly, Mr. Maxius’s petition seeking release from post-order removal immigration
detention is moot, as he “has achieved the result he sought in his habeas petition and his change

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in circumstances has ‘forestalled any occasion for meaningful relief.” Id. (quoting Artway v.
Att Gen., 81 F.3d 1235, 1246 (3d Cir. 1996)) (other citation omitted); see also Dubois v.
Hendricks, No. 14-3861, 2014 WL 4105482, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2014) (dismissing habeas
petition raising Zadydas claim as moot where petitioner was released from immigration
detention pursuant to an order of supervision); Rojas v. Lowe, No. 13-0871, 2013 WL 5876851,
at *3 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2013) (same).
IV. CONCLUSION

For the fbregoing reasons, the habeas petition will be dismissed as moot. An appropriate
order will be entered.

Dated: January 26, 2015
KEVIN MCNULTY
United States District Judge

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