DEY-EL v. ROSENBERG et al

Filing 12

OPINION fld. Signed by Judge Susan D. Wigenton on 7/15/15. (sr, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Civil Action No. 2:14-cv-07091 (SDW)

DEREK FENTEY DEY-EL,
Plaintiff,

(SCM)

v.
NED M. ROSENBERG, MICHAEL C.
GAUS, JAMES LUBRICH, CAROLINE
ADAMS, SILVIA GONZALEZ,
and SHAZEEDA SAMSUDEEN,

OPINION

July 15, 2015
Defendant.

WIGENTON, District Judge.
Before this Court is a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint of Derek Fentey Dey-El
(“Plaintiff”) for lack of jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), and for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) (“Motion”). The Motion was filed by the State of New Jersey on behalf of the
Honorable Ned Rosenberg, Michael Gaus, James Lubrich, Caroline Adams, Silvia Gonzalez, and
Shazeeda Samsudeen (collectively, “Defendants”).
Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391. This opinion is issued without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
78.

1

For the reasons stated below, the Motion to Dismiss with respect to claims against the
Honorable Ned Rosenberg, Caroline Adams, Silvia Gonzalez, and Shazeeda Samsudeen is
GRANTED. 1
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff’s Complaint is unclear and it very difficult to determine what Plaintiff intended to
claim. Plaintiff alleges that “[a]n invitation dated December 4, 2013 was received from [the]
Superior court child support division in regards to a claim made by Ned M. Rosenberg, Michael
C. Gaus, James Lubrich, Coraline Adams, Silvia Gonzales, Shazeeda Samsudeen.” (Dkt. No. 1,
Compl., Ex. 1 at 2.) The Honorable Ned Rosenberg (“Judge Rosenberg”) is a judge in the Superior
Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division-Family Part. (Dkt. No 4, Ex. 2, 2.) Caroline Adams,
Silvia Gonzalez, and Shazeeda Samsudeen (“Judicial Officers”) are officers of the court in child
support matters. 2 (Id.) It appears that Michael Gaus and James Lubrich are also associated with
the court, but the capacity in which they worked has not been clearly established. 3 (See generally
Dkt. No. 1.)
On January 13, 2014, Judge Rosenberg issued an order (“2014 Order”) directing Derek
Fenty Dey-El (“Plaintiff”) to pay $5,066.06 in child support arrears. (Dkt. No. 5, Ex. A.)
Thereafter, Plaintiff sent various communications to Defendants referring to the “Moorish Divine
and National Movement.” (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 1, Ex. 1.) Plaintiff attached these communications
as exhibits to his Complaint. (Dkt. No. 1, Ex. 1-6.) On April 15, 2014, Plaintiff sent a letter to
Judge Rosenberg, asking various questions with respect to the child support order, such as, “Who

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As discussed briefly herein, claims against Michael Gaus and James Lubrich will also be dismissed.
In the Superior Court of New Jersey, Essex Vicinage, Caroline Adams works as an Investigator in the Child Support
Enforcement Unit and Shazeeda Samsudeen works as Chief Probation Officer. In the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Hudson Vicinage, Silvia Gonzalez works as Chief Probation Officer. (Dkt. No. 4, Ex. 2 at 2.)
3
Michael Gaus and James Lubrich have not moved to dismiss nor answered in this case.
2

2

is Derek Fentey Dey-El?” (Dkt. No. 1, Ex. 2). On September 16, 2014, Plaintiff asserted, inter
alia, abuse of power and libel counterclaims against Defendants, for which he demanded a
$150,000 settlement. (Id., Ex. 3.) On September 17, 2014, Plaintiff sent a letter notifying
Defendants of their alleged default on his settlement demand. (Id., Ex. 4.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants did not respond to the letters. (Dkt. No 1, 1.) On
November 10, 2014, Plaintiff filed his Complaint requesting “a default judgment” against
Defendants in their official and “private capacity” for “failure to respond [to] or otherwise defend”
against the assertions in his letters. 4

(Dkt. No. 1.) The Complaint includes demands for

compensatory and punitive damages. (Dkt. No. 1, Ex. 1.)
On December 19, 2014, the State of New Jersey, on behalf of Judge Rosenberg and the
Judicial Officers, filed its Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim and lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. (Dkt. No. 4.) On May 28, 2015, Plaintiff filed a reply. (Dkt. No. 11.)
LEGAL STANDARD
An adequate complaint must be “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). This Rule “requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]” Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted); see also Phillips v.
County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating that Rule 8 “requires a ‘showing,’
rather than a blanket assertion, of an entitlement to relief”).

4

Plaintiff makes various other claims relating to the alleged fully or quasi-sovereign Moorish-American Zodiac
Constitution. (Dkt. No. 1, 2.) Other courts have been presented with similar arguments and claims. See, e.g., Ali v.
New Jersey, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150195 (D.N.J. Oct. 17, 2012).

3

In considering a Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the
Court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff
may be entitled to relief.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231. However, “the tenet that a court must accept
as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.
Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Determining whether the allegations
in a complaint are plausible is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on
its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. If the “well-pleaded facts do
not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” the complaint should
be dismissed for failing to “show[] that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required by Rule 8(a)(2).
(Id.)
DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 4, 17-18.) In the alternative,
Defendants argue that they are entitled to immunity pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1). (Dkt. No. 4, 1, 7-16.)
Failure to State a Claim
Plaintiff’s Complaint is not clear or specific as to a cause of action or cognizable claim.
As the Supreme Court has noted, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action
supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Here, Plaintiff
seemingly claims that Defendants’ lack of response to his various communications regarding the
2014 Order violate his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. (See Dkt. No. 1, Ex. 2, 4 (“Probation

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Division, Child Support Enforcement on a Natural Person is Unconstitutional”).) The Complaint
does not include facts establishing or supporting a cause of action. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
Complaint—with respect to all Defendants—is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 5
Immunity
With respect to Judge Rosenberg, judicial immunity alternatively bars Plaintiff’s suit for
money damages. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 10 (1991) (per curiam) (a judge “shall be free to
act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself”)
(quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 347 (1872)). A plaintiff can overcome judicial immunity
only when the judge takes an action outside of the judge’s judicial capacity or in the complete
absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12. Judicial immunity is a well-established,
high bar to overcome. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, (1988); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474
U.S. 193 (1985); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980). In deciding whether an act is entitled to
judicial immunity, the relevant inquiry is whether the nature and function of the act was judicial.
Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13.
In the instant matter, Plaintiff’s Complaint arises from Judge Rosenberg’s order for child
support arrears. (Dkt. No. 1, Ex. 2, 4) (“Probation Division, Child Support Enforcement on a
Natural Person is Unconstitutional”). Judges are entitled to judicial immunity unless they act
outside of their judicial capacity or in the complete absence of jurisdiction. See Mireles, 502 U.S.

5

The Court notes that Defendants Michael Gaus and James Lubrich have not answered the Complaint. Since Plaintiff
has merely listed them as Defendants without specifying any involvement or facts to support a claim against them, the
Complaint’s pleading deficiencies apply to those Defendants as well. This Court, sua sponte, dismisses Plaintiff’s
claims against Michael Gaus and James Lubrich pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Ray v. Kertes,
285 F.3d 287, 297 (3d Cir. 2002) (sua sponte dismissal appropriate if the basis for dismissal is “apparent from the
face of the complaint”).

5

at 11-12. As Judge Rosenberg is a family court judge, he acted within his judicial capacity by
issuing the order for child support arrears. As such, this Court finds that Judge Rosenberg’s
absolute judicial immunity bars suit against him in this matter.
As officers of the Superior Court of New Jersey, the remaining Defendants are entitled to
quasi-judicial immunity. Dotzel v. Ashbridge, 438 F.3d 320, 325 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (“Quasi-judicial absolute immunity attaches when a public official’s role is
functionally comparable to that of a judge.”); Pell v. Ross, No. A-4799-03T5, 2006 WL 572339,
at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 28, 2006) (finding quasi-judicial immunity for a probation
officer who performed duties as required by court order compelling child support obligor’s
incarceration). The factors to determine whether an official is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity
include: (1) whether the official performs a traditional adjudicatory function such as deciding facts,
applying law, and otherwise resolving disputes on the merits; (2) whether the official decides cases
sufficiently controversial that, in absence of absolute immunity, the official would be subject to
numerous damages actions; and (3) whether the official adjudicates disputes against the backdrop
of multiple safeguards designed to protect parties’ constitutional rights. Dotzel, 438 F.3d at 325.
Here, all the remaining Defendants, as judicial officers, are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity
given their functions with the court.
Even if the Judicial Officers were not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, the Eleventh
Amendment bars suit. The Eleventh Amendment provides: “The Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State.” (U.S. CONST. amend. XI.)

6

With few exceptions, sovereign immunity bars suit against a state in both federal and state
courts even by the state’s own citizens. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
Sovereign immunity has been extended to state officers because the state is the real party in
interest. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997). Exceptions to
Eleventh Amendment immunity may arise in cases of congressional abrogation of sovereign
immunity, waiver by the state, or suits against individual state officers for prospective injunctive
and declaratory relief to end an ongoing violation of federal law.

Pennsylvania Fed’n of

Sportsmen’s Clubs, Inc. v. Hess, 297 F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir. 2002).
The Superior Court is an entity of the State of New Jersey, and thus, Defendants are all
agents of the State of New Jersey. (Dkt. No. 4, 8.) As set forth in Plaintiff’s Complaint and
exhibits, Defendants did not act outside of the scope of their duties and are entitled to immunity.
(See generally Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff has not asserted an exception to Eleventh Amendment
immunity or requested some form of prospective injunctive or declaratory relief to end an ongoing
violation of federal law. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 1, 11.) Thus, the State’s sovereign immunity
applies. 6
Moreover, even if Plaintiff clarified the allegations in his Complaint, Defendants are
entitled to immunity. See Bootay v. KBR, Inc., 437 Fed. Appx. 140, 147 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (“Among the grounds that could justify a denial of leave to amend [is]
[. . .] futility.”).

6

The Judicial Officers may also be entitled to qualified immunity, but this Court does not address the arguments
presented by Defendants regarding qualified immunity in detail as the Court will dismiss this matter on other grounds.
See generally Pearson v. Callahan, 55 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (“Qualified immunity balances two important interests—
the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials
from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.”).

7

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Motion is GRANTED. The claims against Michael
Gaus and James Lubrich are also DISMISSED. An appropriate order follows.

s/ Susan D. Wigenton, U.S.D.J.

Orig:
cc:

Clerk
Steven C. Mannion, U.S.M.J.
Parties

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