BROWN v. SCHRECK

Filing 2

OPINION. Signed by Judge Kevin McNulty on 7/14/15. (cm )

UNITED STATES I)ISTR1CT COURT
I)ISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

STEVEN I3ROWN,
Civ. No. 14-7335 (1(M) (JBC)

Plaintiff
V

OPINION

LAURA SCNRECK,
I)efendant.

KEVIN MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.
INTRO1)UCTION

I.

The plaintiff, Steven Brown, is a pretrial detainee at the Passaic County Jail in Paterson,
New Jersey. lie is proceeding pro se with a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§

1983.

Mr. Brown’s application to proceed in jàrrna pauperis will he granted based on the infhrmation
provided therein.
The Court must now review the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§

l915(e)(2)(B) and

1915A to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from suit. For the reasons set forth below, the complaint will be dismissed, in
part without prejudice and in part with prejudice.
II.

BACKGROUND

The allegations of the complaint are construed as true for purposes of this Opinion. Mr.
Brown names Laura Schreck

Parole Officer as the sole defendant in this action.

Mr. Brown claims that Ms. Schreck, his parole officer, violated his constitutional rights
on May 2, 2012 when she conspired to illegally search his home and to arrest him without a

warrant or probable cause fir possession of’ computer equipment in violation of his parole
conditions. I3rown also claims that Schreck willfully provided false testimony against him before
the grand jury on March 13, 2013. He seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
III.

LEGAL STANDARI)S

A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 for certain violations of

his constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to he subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable.
Thus, to state a claim for relief under

§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a right

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and second, that the alleged deprivation
was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Harvey v. Plains Twp.
Police Dep’i, 635 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see also West v. Atkins, 487
U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. 104-134,

§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66

to 1321-77 (Apr. 26, 1996) (“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil
actions in which a prisoner is proceeding injbrma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C.
seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C.
claim with respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C.

§ 19l5(e)(2)(B),

§ 1915A(b), or brings a

§ 1 997e. The PLRA directs district courts

to szia sponie dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
2

relief may he granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. See 28 USC,

§ 19l5(e)(2)(B).

“l’he legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28
U.S.C.

§ 191 5(e)(2)(13)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(6).” Schreune v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (per
curiam) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F.
App’x 230, 232 (3(1 Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (discussing 42 U.S.C.

§ I 997e(c)( 1)); Courteun v.

United Siates, 287 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(h)). ‘I’hat

standard is set forth in Ashcro/t v. Jqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp.

i’.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), as explicated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit. To survive the court’s screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege
“sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible. See Fmvler v. UPMC
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764
F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqhal, 556 U.S. at 678). “[Al pleading that offers
‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.” Jqhul, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Prose pleadings, as always, will be liberally construed. Ilaines
(1972). Nevertheless, ‘pro

se

1’.

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519

litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to

support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).

3

IV.

DISCUSSION

Mr. Brown’s allegations arise out of(l) the search and arrest on May 2, 2012; and (2) the
allegedly false grand jury testimony on March 13, 2013.
A. May 2, 2012 Arrest
Mr. Brown first alleges that Ms. Schreck violated his constitutional rights via her role in
the search of his home and his arrest for a parole violation on May 2, 2012. That illegal
search/false arrest claim will he dismissed without prejudice because it appears from the face of
the complaint that it is barred by the statute of limitations.
Section 1983 claims are subject to New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations. See
Palyrak v. Apgar, 511 F. App’x 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (citing Dique v. Ni State

Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010)). The date when a cause of action under

§

1983 accrues,

however, is a matter of federal law. See Kach v. hose, 589 F,3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing
Gentry v. Resolution &ust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 919 (3d Cir. 1991)). “Under federal law, a cause
of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knew or should
have known of the injury upon which its action is based.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). “As a general matter, a cause of action accrues at the time of the last event
necessary to complete the tort, usually at the time the plaintiff suffers an injury.” Id (citing
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 120 (1979)).
A Fourth Amendment claim for unreasonable search accrues, and the statute of
limitations begins to run, at the time of the search. See Voneida v. Stoehr, 512 F. App’x 219, 221
(3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam); Woodson v. Pay/on, 503 F. App’x 110, 112 (3d Cir. 2012); Castro v.
PerihAmboy Police Dep’t, No. 13-3376, 2014 WL 229301, at 3 n.l (D.N.J. Jan. 21, 2014). A

4

false arrest claim accrues at the time of the arrest. See Thrres v. McLaughlin, 163 F.3d 169, 176
(3d Cir. 1998); Love v. Schockley, No. 14-7681, 2015 WL 71162, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 6,2015).
Mr. Brown’s illegal search and false arrest claims arose on the date of the search and
arrest: May 2, 2012. The two-year statute of limitations began to run on that date, and expired on
May 2, 2014. Mr. Brown filed his original complaint in November, 2014, some six months after
the statute of limitations presumptively expired.
I also consider, however, whether the limitations period was suspended or tolled. “State
law, unless inconsistent with federal law, also governs the concomitant issue of whether a
limitations period should be tolled.” McPherson v. United Stales, 392 F. App’x 938, 944 (3d
Cir. 2010) (quoting J)ique, 603 F.3d at 185).
Statutory tolling under New Jersey law must be based on one of the enumerated grounds.
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN.

§

2A:14—21 (minority or insanity); N.J. STAT. ANN.

§

2A:14—22 (non

residency of persons liable). Nothing in the complaint, however, supports any of the statutory
bases fir tolling.
Equitable tolling under New Jersey law may arise “where ‘the complainant has been
induced or tricked by his adversary’s misconduct into allowing the deadline to pass,’ or where a
plaintiff has ‘in some extraordinary way’ been prevented from asserting his rights, or where a
plaintiff has timely asserted his rights mistakenly by either defective pleading or in the wrong
forum.” Cason v. Arie Street Police Dep’t, No. 10—0497, 2010 WL 2674399, at *5 n.4 (D.N.J.
June 29, 2010) (citing Freeman v. Stale, 347 N.J. Super. 11,31,788 A.2d 867 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2002)). Again, the complaint does not articulate any basis for equitable tolling.
It is therefore apparent from the face of the complaint that the

§

1983 unreasonable

search and false arrest claims are barred by the statute of limitations, and must be dismissed. See

5

Osiuni v. Wa Was Mart, 532 F. App’x 110, 111—12 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“Although the

nmning of the statute of limitations is ordinarily an affirmative defense, where that defense is
obvious from the lace of the complaint and no development of the record is necessary, a court
may dismiss a lime-barred complaint sua sponte under

§ 28 U.S.C. § 191 5(e)(2)(13)(ii) for failure

to state a claim.”) (citing Fogle v. Peirson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006)); Ilunterson

V.

Disabato, 244 F. Appx 455, 457 (3d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (“[Al district court may sua sponte

dismiss a claim as time-barred under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b)(1) where it is apparent from the

complaint that the applicable statute ol limitations has run.”).
It is possible, however, that the plaintiff may be able to plead facts to support an
argument for tolling of the limitations period. The unreasonable search and false arrest claims are
therefore dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a proposed amended complaint.
I raise one other matter to guide this pro se plaintiff in the event he opts to file an
amended complaint. It is possible for a claim of false imprisonment to be timely, even if a related
claim of false arrest is not. A false imprisonment claim requires an allegation that the plaintiff
was arrested without probable cause and that he was detained pursuant to that arrest. See
Simpson v. Owner of Dollar Tree Store, No. 09-6162, 2010 WL 3364200, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
23, 2010) (quoting Groman v. Twp. OfManalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing
Thomas v. Kippermann, 846 F.2d 1009, 1011(5th Cir. 1 988))).
Thus detention without legal process, if it continues, may extend the accrual period until
“that person is held pursuant to legal process, such as when a person is bound over by a
magistrate or arraigned on charges.” LeBlanc v. Snavel, 453 F. App’x 140, 142 (3d Cir. 2011)
(per curiam) (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389—90, 127 S. Ct. 1091 (2007)); see also
Yagla v. Simon, No. 14-0181, 2015 WL 1326341, at *16 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2015); Wiinhush v.

6

Jenkins, No. 13-4654, 2014 WL 1607354, at *9 (D.N.J. Apr. 22, 2014). If he opts to submit an
amended complaint, Mr. Brown may wish to consider whether he can factually allege a false
imprisonment claim that is not barred by the two-year statute of limitations.
Mr. Brown’s claims arising from the search and arrest on May 2, 2012, are dismissed.
That dismissal, however, is without prejudice to the filing of an amended complaint that asserts a
claim that falls within the two-year statute of limitations. Any such amended complaint shall be
filed within 30 days after the date of this order and opinion.
B. March 13, 2013 Grand Jury Testimony
Mr. Brown also asserts that his constitutional rights were violated when Ms. Schreck
allegedly testified falsely before the grand jury on March 13, 2013. In Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S.
Ct. 1497 (2012), the Supreme Court held that “grand jury witnesses should enjoy the same
immunity as witnesses at trial. This means that a grand jury witness has absolute immunity from
any

§ 1983 claim based on the witness’ testimony.” id. at 1506. Thus the claims arising from

Schreck’s testimony before the grand jury will be dismissed with prejudice, because she is
immune from suit.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the thregoing reasons, Mr. Brown’s false arrest and unreasonable search claims are
dismissed without prejudice because they are barred by the statute of limitations. His claims
arising from Ms. Schreck’s grand jury testimony are dismissed with prejudice because she is
immune from suit. An appropriate Order will be entered.
Dated: July 14, 2015
K VfNMCNULTY
United States District Judge

7