LEWIS v. UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS LOCAL UNION 464A

Filing 19

OPINION AND ORDER, Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint 16 is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUIDCE. In the interests of justice, the Court will afford Plaintiff an additional opportunity to move for leave to amend her pleadings to expressly identify either the plan and/or plan administrator as defendants. Plaintiff must file any such motion on or before 8/11/2015. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joseph A. Dickson on 7/16/2015. (anr)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CHRISTINE LEWIS, as Executrix of the Civil Action No. 2:14-cv-07467-JLL-JAD
ESTATE OF DIANE DUDEK,
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff,

v.
UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL
WORKERS LOCAL UNION 464A;
HORIZON BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD
OF NEW JERSEY; and THE MAXON
COMPANIES,
Defendants.

JOSEPH A. DICKSON, U.S.M.J.
This matter comes before the Court upon Plaintiff Christine Lewis, as Executrix of the
Estate of Diane Dudek's Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 16).
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78, the Court did not hear oral argument on this matter.
After having carefully considered the parties' submissions, and for the reasons stated below,
Plaintiffs Motion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

I.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Christine Lewis, as Executrix of the Estate of Diane Dudek, originally commenced this

matter by filing a Complaint against United Food and Commercial Workers Local Union 464A
("the Union") on November 25, 2014. (Compl., ECF No. 1). Plaintiff brings a claim, pursuant to
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(l)(B), seeking benefits allegedly due to Dudek under a health benefits plan
governed by ERISA. Plaintiff alleged that Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield denied coverage for

1

Dudek's hospitalization and treatment for lung cancer, (id. at 3, if 8), based on the Union's false
assertion that Dudek's injury was ''work-related'', (llL at 5,

if 15), and therefore the subject of a

worker's compensation claim. (Id. at 3, if 10).
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on December 26, 2014 (ECF No. 4). The Union
filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint on January 15, 2015. (ECF No. 5). In its
motion, the Union argued that a claim pursuant to 29 U.S.C § 1132(a)(l)(B) must be filed against
either the plan or the plan administrator, and that the Union did not qualify as either. (Id. at 3).
Although Plaintiff disputed the Union's assertion, the Hon. Jose L. Linares, U.S.D.J., granted the
Union's motion without prejudice, reasoning that dismissal was appropriate since Plaintiff had not
pied that the Union itself was either the plan or plan administrator and Plaintiff had likewise failed
to allege sufficient facts suggesting that the Union otherwise controlled the administration of
benefits under the plan (i.e. the only other plausible grounds on which the Union itself might be
liable for a claim under Section 502(a)(l)(B) ofERISA). (March 2, 2015, Order, ECF No. 9, at
4). Judge Linares also afforded Plaintiff an opportunity to file a Second Amended Complaint
intended to cure these pleading deficiencies by March 27, 2015. (Id. at 5). Plaintiff did not timely
amend.
On March 30, 2015, the Union filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint with
Prejudice in light of Plaintiffs failure to file an amended pleading in compliance with Judge
Linares's Order. (ECF No. 12). Later the same day, Plaintiff filed a purported Second Amended
Complaint. (ECF No. 13). By order dated April 2, 2015, Judge Linares denied the Union's motion
and also struck Plaintiffs late-filed Second Amended Complaint, giving Plaintiff until April IO,
2015 to move for leave to further amend her pleading. (ECF No. 15).

2

Plaintiff filed a motion seeking leave to amend on April 9, 2015, stating that due to a
clerical error, Plaintiff had previously filed the Second Amended Complaint one business day late.
(ECF No. 16-1). In its opposition, the Union chiefly argued that the Court should deny Plaintiffs
motion because:

(1) Plaintiff failed "to cure the deficiencies identified in the Court's order

dismissing the Amended Complaint"; and (2) since Plaintiff did not expressly seek leave to add
new defendants, "the Second Amended Complaint must be deemed to have been brought against
the same defendants who were named in the complaint" (i.e., the Court should reject Plaintiffs
attempts to substitute parties). (Def. Br., ECF No. 17, at 5-6).
Plaintiff argues that her proposed Second Amended Complaint cures the primary issue that
Judge Linares identified with regard to her previous pleading: that Plaintiff had named the Union,
rather than the plan or plan administrator as the defendant in this lawsuit. (Pl. Br., ECF No. 18, at
3). Plaintiff argues that, because she has now substituted Local 464A United Food & Commercial
Workers Union Welfare Service Benefit Fund (the "Benefit Fund") as a defendant in place of the
Union, the Court should grant her Motion for Leave to File the Second Amended Complaint. (Pl.
Rep. Br. At 2, n. 1, ECF No. 18). The Court notes that this substitution appears to be the only
difference between Plaintiffs now-defunct Amended Complaint and her proposed Second
Amended Complaint. (Compare ECF No. 4 with ECF No. 16-2).

II.

LEGAL DISCUSSION
A.

General Standards Applicable on a Motion for Leave to Amend

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) governs requests for leave to amend, allowing a party
to amend its pleadings after obtaining the Court's leave or the written consent of its adversary.
Under this liberal rule, the Court must "freely give leave when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ.
P. 15(a)(2); see also Wright & Miller section 1484, at 676 ("Subdivision a(2) encourages the court

3

to look favorably on requests to amend"). This lenient standard ensures that "a particular claim
will be decided on the merits rather than on technicalities." Dole v. Arco Chem Co., 921 F.2d 484,
487 (3d Cir. 1990) (internal citation omitted); see also Sabatino v. Union Twp., No. 11-cv-1656JLL-MAH, 2013 WL 1622306, at *6 (D.N.J. 2013) (internal citation omitted) (discussing that "if
the underlying facts relied upon by a party might be a proper subject of relief, that party should
have the opportunity to tests its claims on the merits").
The decision to grant or deny leave to amend under Rule 15(a) is "committed to the sound
discretion of the court." Arab African Int'l Bank v. Epstein, 10 F.3d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 1993).
While courts have broad discretion to decide motions to amend, they must "heed Rule 15(a)'s
mandate that amendments are to be granted freely in the interests of justice." Violas et al. v.
General Motors Com., et al., 173 F.R.D. 389, 396 (D.N.J. 1997) (internal citations and quotations
omitted). In the absence of unfair prejudice, futility of amendment, undue delay, bad faith, or
dilatory motive, the court must grant a request for leave to amend. Grayson v. Mavview State
Hosp., 292 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434 F.3d 196, 204 (3d
Cir. 2006) (stating that generally, leave to amend should be granted "unless equitable
considerations render it otherwise unjust").
Here, the Union challenges Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend, asserting that "the
Second Amended Complaint is futile" such that "leave to file it should not be granted." (Def. Br.
at 5, ECF No. 17). A proposed amendment "is futile ifthe amended complaint would not survive
a motion to dismiss." Cnty. of Hudson v. Janiszewski, 351 F. App'x 662, 666 (3d Cir. 2009)
(quoting Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 121 (3d Cir. 2000)); see also In re NAHC, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
306 F.3d 1314, 1332 (3d Cir. 2002) ("an amendment would be futile when 'the complaint, as
amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted"') (internal citation

4

omitted). Therefore, "[t]he futility analysis on a motion to amend is essentially the same as a Rule
12(b)(6) motion." Marjam Supply Co. v. Firestone Bldg. Pros. Co., LLC, No. 11-7119-WJM,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46572, at *9-10 (D.N.J. 2014). In order to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face."' Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). Under Iqbal, a claim is plausible on its face "when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.
The Court notes that the Union bears the burden of establishing that Plaintiffs proposed
amendments are futile, and that, "given the liberal standard applied to the amendment of
pleadings," that burden is a "heavy" one. Pharmaceutical Sales & Consulting Corp. v. J.W.S.
Delavau Co., 106 F. Supp. 2d 761, 764 (D.N.J. 2000); accord Marjam, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
46572, at * 10. Provided this heavy burden of establishing futility, "[ i]f a proposed amendment is
not clearly futile, then denial ofleave to amend is improper." Schiano v. MBNA, No. 05-cv-1771JLL-MAH, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81440, *45 (D.N.J. 2013) (internal citations omitted). Against
this backdrop, the Court will consider the Union's challenges to Plaintiffs proposed Second
Amended Complaint.
B.

Plaintiff's Proposed Amendment Would Be Futile

In opposing Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File the Second Amended Complaint, the

Union argues that Plaintiffs proposed amendment fails on two grounds: (1) Plaintiff failed "to
cure the deficiencies" that Judge Linares identified when dismissing Plaintiffs Amended
Complaint; and (2) since Judge Linares did not expressly direct Plaintiff to add any new parties,
and because Plaintiff did not move to join new parties to this action, the Court should reject

5

Plaintiffs attempt to substitute the Benefit Fund in place of the Union. (Def. Br., ECF No. 17, at
5-6). The Court will address these arguments in reverse order.
As Judge Linares expressed in his Order (ECF No. 9), "the Third Circuit has expressly held
that 'in a § 1132(a)(l)(B) claim, the defendant is the plan itself (or plan administrators in their
official capacities only)."' (ECF No. 9, at 3) (quoting Graden v. Conexant Sys. Inc., 496 F.3d 291,
301 (3d Cir. 2007). As Plaintiff did not expressly plead that the Union was either the "plan" itself
or the designated plan administrator, and failed to allege facts establishing that the Union otherwise
controlled the administration of plan benefits, Judge Linares dismissed Plaintiffs Amended
Complaint in its entirety, but without prejudice to Plaintiffs right to file an amended pleading that
addressed these deficiencies. Judge Linares did not place any limits on how Plaintiff might do so.
Plaintiff could have sought to cure her pleading deficiencies by adding claims against the plan/plan
administrator, fleshing out her existing claims against the Union with additional facts, or both.
Plaintiff opted to substitute the Benefit Fund in place of the Union. (See Pl. Rep Br. at 2-3, ECF
No. 18). Nothing in either Judge Linares's Order or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 suggests
that Plaintiff should be foreclosed from adding or substituting parties via amendment, and the
Court rejects Defendant's argument on this point.
Despite that substitution, however, Plaintiffs proposed amended pleading fails for the
same reasons set forth in Judge Linares's March 2, 2015 Order. As noted above, Plaintiffs
proposed Second Amended Complaint is all but identical to her now-defunct Amended Complaint.
The only difference between the two pleadings is that, in her proposed Second Amended
Complaint, Plaintiff has substituted the Benefit Fund in place of the Union. (Compare Am.
Compl., ECF No. 4, ,-i 2 with Proposed Sec. Am. Compl., ECF No. 16-2, ,-i 2). That substitution
does not address the shortcomings that Judge Linares identified in His Honor's previous Order.

6

Plaintiff does not allege that the Benefit Fund is either the "plan" itself or "plan administrator" for
Plaintiff's health benefits. (See generally, Proposed Sec. Am. Compl., ECF No. 16-2). Instead,
in what appears to be a holdover from previous versions of her pleading, Plaintiff alleges that the
Benefit Fund "is a local union" based in Little Falls, New Jersey. (Id.

~2).

While Plaintiff's

counsel argues, in a reply submission, that the Benefit Fund is the relevant plan administrator (ECF
No. 18 at 2, n.1), that information is not pied in the Proposed Second Amended Complaint. 1
Indeed, Plaintiff expressly alleges that Defendant Maxon Companies served as the administrator
for Plaintiffs health benefits plan. (ECF No. 16-2, ~ 4).
Absent an express allegation that the Benefit Fund served as the relevant plan
administrator, Plaintiff's claims against that entity fail. Judge Linares has already determined that
Plaintiff's factual allegations regarding the Benefit Fund's role vis-a-vis Plaintiff's plan benefits
are insufficient to establish that the Benefit Fund acted as a de facto plan administrator sufficient
to trigger potential liability under 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(l)(B). (March 2, 2015 Order, ECF No. 9,
at 3-4) (evaluating identical factual allegations regarding the Union). In short, Plaintiff's Proposed
Second Amended Complaint fails for the same reasons articulated in Judge Linares's March 2,
2015 Order and the Court must deny Plaintiff's motion.

III.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint

is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. In the interests of justice, the Court will afford Plaintiff
an additional opportunity to move for leave to amend her pleadings to expressly identify either the

The Court notes that, in His Honor's March 2, 2015 Order, Judge Linares already explained that
a plaintiff may not amend his or her complaint by way of briefing submitted in connection with a
motion. All necessary allegations must be set forth in the pleading itself. (March 2, 2015 Order,
ECF No. 9, at 4).
1

7

plan and/or plan administrator as defendants. Plaintiff must file any such motion on or before
August 11, 2015.

cc. Honorable Jose L. Linares, U.S.D.J.

8