BROWN v. JAMES et al

Filing 3

OPINION. Signed by Judge Kevin McNulty on 7/14/15. (DD, )

UNITE1) STATES I)ISTRICT couwr
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

S’l’EVEN BROWN,
Civ. No. 14-7674 (KM) (MAIl)

Plaintiff.
V.

OPINION

RICARJ)() JAMES, et al.,
I )efendants.

KEVIN MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.
INTROI)UCT1ON

I.

The plaintiff, Steven Brown, is a pretrial detainee at the Passaic County Jail in Paterson,
New Jersey. 1-le is proceeding pro se with a civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§

1983. Mr. Brown’s application to proceed in /àrrnapauperis will be granted based on the
information provided therein.
The Court must now review the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§

1915(e)(2)(B) and

191 5A to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from suit. 1or the reasons set forth below, the complaint will be dismissed, in
part without prejudice and in part with prejudice.
II.

BACKGROUNfl

The allegations of the complaint will be construed as true for purposes of this Opinion.
The complaint names four defendants: (1) Ricardo James; (2) Ryan Andresen; (3) Rachel
Scipio; and (4) Michael Filosa. All four are parole officers with the New Jersey State Parole
l3oard.

Mr. Brown was previously convicted of a sexual offimse and, at the time of the events
alleged in the complaint, was serving a term of parole. The complaint alleges that the defendants
violated his constitutional rights on May 2, 2012 when they illegally searched I3rown’s home and
arrested him without probable cause for violating the terms of his parole. Mr. Brown also alleges
that the defendants illegally seized some items, including computer devices with internet
capabilities, lie seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
III.

LEGAL STANI)ARDS

A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 for certain violations of

his constitutional rights. Section 1 983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to he subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall he liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a
judicial officer fbr an act or omission taken in such officer’s
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable.
Thus, to state a claim for relief under

§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege,

first, the violation of a right

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and second, that the alleged deprivation
was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Harvey v. Plains Twp.

Police Dep 1, 635 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see also West v. Atkins, 487
U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. 104-134,

§

801-8 10, 110 Stat. 132 1-66

to 1321-77 (Apr. 26, 1996) (“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil
actions in which a prisoner is proceeding injàrma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C.

§

191 5(e)(2)(B),

seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C.
claim with respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C.

§

§

1915A(b), or brings a

1997e. ‘l’he PLRA directs district courts

to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may he granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. See 28 U.S.C.

§

l915(e)(2)(13).

“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28
U.S.C.

§

191 5(e)(2)(13)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (per
curiarn) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mite/wi! v. Beard, 492 F.
App’x 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (discussing 42 U.S.C.

§

1997e(c)(l)); (oairtecw v.

United States, 287 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C.

§

1915A(b)). That

standard is set forth in Asheroft v. Iqhal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Th’vombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), as explicated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit. To survive the court’s screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege
“sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible. See Fowler v. UPMC
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempsler, 764
F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “[A] pleading that offers
labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.” Jqhal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Th4’omhly, 550 U.S. at 555).
J)p()

se pleadings, as always, will be liberally construed. flames v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519

(1972). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to

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support a claim.” Mala v. C’rown Bay Marina, inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted).
IV.

A.

DISCUSSION

Statute of Limitations

Mr. Brown’s claims arise out of the search, seizure of property, and arrest, all of which
occurred on May 2, 2012. The complaint alleges that the defendants violated Brown’s
constitutional rights by searching his home without a warrant and without probable cause, and
also that they arrested him without probable cause. These claims will be dismissed without
prejudice because it appears from the face of the complaint that they are barred by the two-year
statute of limitations.
Section 1983 claims are subject to New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations. See
Patak v. Apgar, 511 F. App’x 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (citing Dique v. N.J State

Police, 603 F.3d 181. 185 (3d Cir. 2010)). The date that a cause of action under § 1983 accrues,
however, is a matter of federal law. See Kach v. hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing
Gentry v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 919 (3d Cir. 1991 )). “Under federal law, a cause

of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knew or should
have known of the injury upon which its action is based.” id. (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). “As a general matter, a cause of action accrues at the time of the last event
necessary to complete the tort, usually at the time the plaintiff suffers an injury.” Id. (citing
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 1 20 (1 979)).
A Fourth Amendment claim for unreasonable search (or seizure) accrues, and the statute
of limitations begins to run, at the time of the search (or seizure). See Voneida v. Stoehr, 512 F.
App’x 219, 221 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam); Woodson v. Pay/on, 503 F. App’x 110, 112 (3d Cir.

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2012) (per curiarn); Castro v. Perth Amboy Police Dep ‘1, No. 13-3376, 2014 WL 229301, at 3
n.1 (D.N.J. Jan. 21, 2014). A false arrest claim accrues at the time of the arrest. See Torres

V.

McLaughlin, 163 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 1998); Love v. Schockley, No. 14-7681, 2015 WL

71162, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 6, 2015).
Mr. Brown’s illegal search/seizure and false arrest claims arose on the date of the search
and arrest: May 2, 2012. The two-year statute of limitations began to run on that date, and
expired

Ofl

May 2, 2014. Mr. Brown’s complaint was tiled in November 2014,

Some Six

months

after the statute of limitations presumptively expired.’
I also consider, however, whether the limitations period was suspended or tolled. “State
law, unless inconsistent with federal law, also governs the concomitant issue of whether a
limitations period should be tolled.” McPherson v. United States, 392 F. App’x 938, 944 (3d
Cir. 2010) (quoting Dique, 603 F.3d at 185).
Statutory toiling under New Jersey must be based on one of the enumerated grounds. See,
e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN.

§ 2A:14—21 (minority or insanity); N.J. STAT. Ai’. § 2A:14—22 (non

residency of persons liable). Nothing in the complaint, however, supports any of the statutory
bases for tolling.
Equitable tolling under New Jersey law may arise “where ‘the complainant has been
induced or tricked by his adversary’s misconduct into allowing the deadline to pass,’ or where a
plaintiff has ‘in some extraordinary way’ been prevented from asserting his rights, or where a
plaintiff has timely asserted his rights mistakenly by either defective pleading or in the wrong
fonim.” Cason v. Arie Street Police Dep’t, No. 10—0497, 2010 WL 2674399, at *5 n.4 (D.N.J.

I have taken the date olthe complaint as the date of filing, to give plaintiff the maximum benefit
of the prisoner “mailbox rule.” See Houston v. Lack. 487 U.S. 266, 270-71 (1988).
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June 29, 2010) (citing Freeman v. Stale, 347 N.J. Super. 1 1, 31, 788 A.2d 867 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. 1)iv. 2002). Again, the complaint does not articulate any basis for equitable tolling.
It is therefore apparent from the face of the complaint that the unreasonable
searchlseizure and False arrest claims are barred by the statute of limitations, and must he
dismissed. See Ostuni v. Wa Wa’s Mart, 532 F. App’x 110, 111—12 (3d Cir.201 3) (per curiarn)
(‘Although the running of the statute of limitations is ordinarily an affirmative defense, where
that defense is obvious from the face of the complaint and no development of the record is
necessary, a court may dismiss a time-barred complaint sua sponte under

§

28 U.s.c.

§

1915(e)(2)(T3)(ii) for Failure to state a claim.”) (citing Fogle v. Peirson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258
(10th Cir.2006)); Flunterson v. Disabato, 244 F. App’x 455, 457 (3d Cir.2007) (per curiam) (“[Al
district court may sua spume dismiss a claim as time-barred under 28 U.S.C.

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1915A(b)(l)

where it is apparent from the complaint that the applicable statute of limitations has run.”).
It is possible, however, that the plaintiff may be able to plead facts to support an
argument for tolling of the limitations period. Thus, the unreasonable search and false arrest
claims are therefore dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a proposed amended complaint.
I raise one other matter to guide this pro se plaintiff in the event he opts to file an
amended complaint. It is possible for a claim of false imprisonment to be timely, even if a related

claim of false arrest is not. A false imprisonment claim requires an allegation that the plaintiff
was arrested without probable cause and that he was detained pursuant to that arrest. See
Simpson v. Owner ofDollar Tree Store, No. 09-6 162, 2010 WL 3364200, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
23, 2010) (quoting Groman v. Twp. OfManulapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing

Thomas v. Kippermann, 846 F.2d 1009, 1011(5th Cir. 1988))).

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Thus detention without legal process, if it continues, may extend the accrual period until
“that person is held pursuant to legal process, such as when a person is bound over by a
magistrate or arraigned

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charges.” LeBlanc v. Snavely, 453 F. App’x 140, 142 (3d Cir. 2011)

(per curiain) (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389—90 (2007)); see also Yagla v. Simon, NC).
14-0181, 2015 WL 1326341, at *16 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 24. 2015); Wimbush v. Jenkins, No. 134654, 2014 WI. 1607354, at *9 (D.N.J. Apr. 22, 2014). If he opts to submit an amended
complaint, Mr. Brown may wish to consider whether he can factually allege a false
imprisonment claim that is not barred by the two-year statute of limitations.
Mr. Brown’s claims arising from the search and arrest on May 2,2012, are dismissed.
That dismissal, however, is without prejudice to the filing of an amended complaint that asserts a
claim that falls within the two-year statute of limitations. Any such amended complaint should
be filed within 30 days after the date of ihis Opinion and accompanying Order.
B. Deprivation of Property/Due Process
Mr. Brown may have intended to assert a

§

1983 claim that the defendants deprived him

of his computer equipment without due process. The complaint, even construed liberally, fails to

state a viable due process claim.
Routine claims of property deprivation or damage, even at the hands of a State actor, are
not automatically constitutional claims:
An unauthorized deprivation of property by a state actor, whether
intentional or negligent, does not constitute a violation of the
procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy
for the loss is available. Hudson v Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530—36,
104 S. Ct, 3194,82 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1984); Parruttv. Taylor, 451
U.S. 527, 543—44, 101 S. Ct. 1908,68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981),
overruled in part on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.
327, 328. 106 S. Ct. 662,88 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1986). In Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435—36, 102 S. Ct. 1148, 71
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_

L. Ed. 2d 265 (1982), the Supreme Court explained, however, that
post-deprivation remedies do not satisfy the I)ue Process Clause if
the deprivation of property is accomplished pursuant to established
state procedure rather than through random, unauthorized action.
Stokes v. Lanigan, NC). 12-1478, 2012 WE 4662487, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 2,2012).
First, there is a post-deprivation remedy available to Mr. Brown. New Jersey provides
such a remedy through the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J. STAT. ANN.

§

59:1-1 etseq.

Second, this claim is seemingly not addressed to an “established state procedure,” but rather to a
one-shot seizure. The complaint fails to state a legally sufficient due process claim; any

§

1983

claim for deprivation of property without due process will be dismissed with prejudice.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the false arrest and unreasonable searchlseizure claims are
dismissed without prejudice because they are barred by the statute of limitations. Any claim that
defendants deprived Mr. l3rown of his property without due process is dismissed with prejudice
fir failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. An appropriate Order will he
entered.
Dated: July 14 2015

///
KEVIN MCNULTY
United Slates District Judge

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