O'REILLY v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Filing 14

OPINION. Signed by Judge Susan D. Wigenton on 12/17/2015. (nr, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

LAURA A. O’REILLY

Civil Action No. 14-08099 (SDW)
Plaintiff,

v.

OPINON

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
December 17, 2015

Defendant.

WIGENTON, District Judge.
Before this Court is Plaintiff Laura A. O’Reilly’s (“Plaintiff”) appeal of the final
administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”), with respect
to Administrative Law Judge Elias Feuer’s (“ALJ Feuer”) denial of Plaintiff’s claims for
Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income Benefits (“SSIB”)
under the Social Security Act (the “Act”). This appeal is decided without oral argument pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 405(g). Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). For the reasons set forth below,
this Court finds that ALJ Feuer’s factual findings are supported by substantial credible evidence
and that his legal determinations are correct. Therefore, the Commissioner’s decision must be
AFFIRMED.

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I.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY
A. Procedural History
On August 5, 2011, Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSIB alleging disability as of July 1,

2008 (Tr. 191, 197), due to post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), anxiety, depression and
attention deficit disorder (“ADD”).

(Tr. 234.)

considered concurrently.

Plaintiff’s claims were denied both initially and upon

(Tr. 21.)

Plaintiff’s claims for DIB and SSIB were

reconsideration. (Tr. 70–71, 88–89.) Plaintiff’s subsequent request for a hearing before an
administrative law judge was granted (Tr. 157–61), and a hearing was held before ALJ Feuer on
February 12, 2013. (Tr. 34–69.) Plaintiff appeared and testified at the hearing. (See Tr. 34–69.)
On April 15, 2013, ALJ Feuer issued a decision finding Plaintiff was not disabled and denying
her claims for disability benefits. (Tr. 21–29.) On October 29, 2014, the Appeals Council
denied Plaintiff’s request for review of ALJ Feuer’s April 15, 2013 decision, making it the
Commissioner’s final decision. (Tr. 1–5.) Plaintiff now requests that this Court reverse the
Commissioner’s decision and remand for an award of DIB and SSIB. (Compl. 2.)
B. Factual History
1.

Personal and Employment History

Plaintiff was 52 years old at the time of ALJ Feuer’s decision in 2013. (Tr. 29; Pl.’s Br.
2.) Plaintiff is a college graduate with a master’s degree in social work. (Tr. 38.) She was
previously employed as a social worker and a waitress. (Tr. 38.) Her last relevant employment
period was in 2008 as a social worker performing discharge planning and documenting. (Tr. 34,
208-09.)

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2.

Medical History

The record reflects that Laura Brenner, M.D.’s (“Dr. Brenner”) examination and
treatment notes comprise Plaintiff’s entire medical history with regard to Plaintiff’s claims. (See
Tr. 274–344.) Dr. Brenner examined Plaintiff approximately every two to three months from
February 21, 2008, through December 13, 2012. (See Tr. 307–41.) In addition, Plaintiff testified
about her health during the hearing before ALJ Feuer. (See Tr. 27–69.) The following is a
summary of the medical evidence:
During the course of Plaintiff’s treatment, Dr. Brenner primarily prescribed Geodon and
Ritalin to treat Plaintiff’s symptoms. (See Tr. 307–344.) On April 30, 2009, Plaintiff reported
that the medications were working well, but that she was also stressed due to financial concerns.
(Tr. 308.) Plaintiff continued her medication and tried to stay positive. (Tr. 308.)
On January 19, 2010, Dr. Brenner reported that Plaintiff had lost a total of forty-nine
pounds, and that Plaintiff “looked good.” (Tr. 309.) Plaintiff continued her medication, and on
September 13, 2010, reported feeling “down” due to money issues, and stressed because she was
forced to rely on her friend, Sam Banke (“Mr. Banke”) for financial stability.

(Tr. 315.)

However, Plaintiff also stated that she was working three days per week as a waitress at a diner.
(Tr. 315.)
On January 29, 2011, Dr. Brenner noted that Plaintiff still worked at the diner but
continued experiencing financial issues. (Tr. 315.) Plaintiff also stated, on that date, that her
continued use of Geodon and Ritalin helped manage her symptoms. (Tr. 315.) Thereafter, on
June 22, 2011, Plaintiff told Dr. Brenner that she was only able to work one, four-hour waitress
shift per week, and she was trying to apply for assistance to be less dependent on Mr. Banke.
(Tr. 323.) During the June 22, 2011 visit, Plaintiff requested that Dr. Brenner aid Plaintiff in

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completing an assistance request form. (Tr. 323.) Plaintiff also stated that she was “getting by”
on the prescribed medications. (Tr. 323.)
Dr. Brenner’s July 17, 2011 notes indicate that Plaintiff intended, on that date, to apply
for DIB based on depression and PTSD, and that Plaintiff scheduled an interview with the Social
Security Administration (the “Administration”) for August 5. (Tr. 323.) On August 2, 2011, Dr.
Brenner reviewed Plaintiff’s disability questionnaire and noted that Plaintiff did not work,
struggled handling crowds, and experienced money issues. (Tr. 323.)
Plaintiff visited Dr. Brenner again on October 26, 2011. (Tr. 334.) Dr. Brenner noted
that Plaintiff was not well groomed, and felt discouraged, down, and fearful. (Tr. 334.) Plaintiff
further indicated that the medications were the only thing keeping her from “dropping out.” (Tr.
334.)
Dr. Brenner noted during Plaintiff’s November 16, 2011 visit that Plaintiff again looked
down and was not “well groomed.” (Tr. 334.) Plaintiff additionally expressed concerns about
her son’s alcohol abuse and sought a way to help him. (Tr. 334.) During a December 7, 2011
visit, Plaintiff reported still feeling very down, and had been unable to complete the disability
report for her attorney. (Tr. 334.) Dr. Brenner urged Plaintiff to complete the report so Plaintiff
could focus on her “ability” and not her “disability.” (Tr. 334.)
On January 18, 2012, Dr. Brenner again noted that Plaintiff was poorly groomed and that
Plaintiff continued her relationship with Mr. Banke. (Tr. 334.) On April 4, 2012, Dr. Brenner
noted that Plaintiff appeared disheveled and panicked. (Tr. 329.) In addition, Plaintiff claimed
she was now “totally dependent” on Mr. Banke after receiving her second Social Security benefit
denial letter. (Tr. 329.) On June 13, 2012, Plaintiff again presented to Dr. Brenner as poorly
groomed and depressed. (Tr. 335.) Plaintiff noted that the medications helped her keep her

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“head above water.” (Tr. 335.) Moreover, the June 29, 2012 notes show that Dr. Brenner
believed Plaintiff suffered “major depression.” (Tr. 335.)
Dr. Brenner’s notes also show that Plaintiff met with Dr. Brenner on July 11, 2012, to
discuss Plaintiff’s disability claim paperwork. (Tr. 342.) Dr. Brenner noted at this time that
Plaintiff had not showered since February and showed no response to the newly prescribed
medication, Celexa. (Tr. 342.) Thereafter, on August 10, 2012, Plaintiff again stated that
financial issues caused her much stress and that she did not feel disability payments could
support her. (Tr. 343.) During the final visit on January 14, 2013, Dr. Brenner indicated that
Plaintiff was “down” for several days, and was “much worse over the weekend.” (Tr. 334.)
3.

Form Reports

In addition to detailed medical history notes, Dr. Brenner completed a series of form
reports regarding Plaintiff’s medical conditions throughout Plaintiff’s treatment. (See Tr. 274–
341.)
On June 22, 2011, Dr. Brenner completed an examination report diagnosing Plaintiff with
PTSD and depression with an onset date of October, 2000. (Tr. 274.) Dr. Brenner found that
Plaintiff’s psychiatric/psychological disability stemmed from an anxiety disorder and depression,
and that Plaintiff had no history of alcohol or substance abuse. (Tr. 274.) Dr. Brenner opined
that Plaintiff could not work a full eight-hour workday and that Plaintiff’s disability would
persist for twelve months or more. (Tr. 275)
On August 17, 2011, Dr. Brenner completed a Social Security Disability Psychiatric
Report (“Psychiatric Report”). (See Tr. 277–81.) In the Psychiatric Report, Dr. Brenner stated
that Plaintiff suffered from PTSD and depression exhibited by “anxiety, poor focus, poor
concentration, depressed mood, nightmares, [and] fear.” (Tr. 277.) Dr. Brenner also noted that

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Plaintiff had five psychiatric hospitalizations prior to Dr. Brenner’s treatment, but Plaintiff had
no hospitalizations since treatment commenced. (Tr. 277.) Furthermore, the Psychiatric Report
states that Plaintiff had no limitations regarding understanding, memory, or adaptation, but that
Plaintiff did have limitations regarding concentration, persistence, and social interactions. (Tr.
280.)
Dr. Brenner filled out additional examination reports on April 11, 2012, and December
13, 2012. (Tr. 338, 340.) In both reports Dr. Brenner listed her diagnosis as PTSD and major
depression, presenting with symptoms of anxiety disorder and depression.

(Tr. 338.) Dr.

Brenner also repeatedly noted that Plaintiff was ambulatory, Plaintiff was unable to work an
eight-hour workday, and Plaintiff’s disability would last for a period of more than twelve
months. (Tr. 338–341.)
On July 12, 2012, Dr. Brenner completed a Medical Source Statement (the “Statement”)
regarding Plaintiff’s disability claim. (See Tr. 296–301.) Dr. Brenner noted that she treated
Plaintiff as needed since October 2, 2000. (Tr. 296.) In the Statement, Dr. Brenner diagnosed
Plaintiff with PTSD, major depression, bipolar disorder, and obesity. (Tr. 296.) Dr. Brenner
also stated that Plaintiff suffered very high stress and had no social or family connection. (Tr.
296.) In addition, Dr. Brenner indicated that Plaintiff’s medications are expected to have some
side effects, but will “only be mildly troublesome,” resulting in difficulty concentrating and
focusing for 6% to 33% of an eight-hour workday. (Tr. 296.) The Statement shows Plaintiff’s
impairments could be expected to last at least twelve months and Plaintiff was “very guarded.”
(Tr. 297.) Dr. Brenner further reported that Plaintiff suffered extreme restrictions of activities of
daily living, extreme difficulties maintaining social functioning, extreme deficiencies of
concentration, persistence or pace, and four or more “[r]epeated episodes of decompensation

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within [a twelve] month period, each of at least two weeks duration.” (Tr. 300.) In addition to a
medically documented history of a chronic mental disorder of at least two years’ duration, Dr.
Brenner stated Plaintiff had a “residual disease process that has resulted in such marginal
adjustment that even a minimal increase in mental demands or change in the environment would
be predicted to cause the individual to decompensate,” and “[a]n anxiety-related disorder and
complete inability to function independently outside the area of [Plaintiff’s] home.” (Tr. 300.)
Dr. Brenner additionally submitted Supplemental Questionnaires along with the
Statement. (See Tr. 302–03.) In the Questionnaires Dr. Brenner reported that Plaintiff suffers
profound and intractable fatigue that “virtually incapacitates [Plaintiff].” (Tr. 302.) In addition,
Dr. Brenner stated that, if employed, Plaintiff would likely require more than four absent days
per month from work as a result of Plaintiff’s impairments. (Tr. 303.)
4.

Third-Party Letter

Plaintiff’s friend, Sam Banke, wrote and submitted an undated letter to Plaintiff’s
attorney describing Plaintiff’s issues/impairments. (See Tr. 266–68.) Mr. Banke stated that
Plaintiff experienced ongoing “difficulty with the stress of everyday life,” and that Plaintiff selfharmed and attempted suicide multiple times in the past. (Tr. 266.) Mr. Banke further wrote that
Plaintiff was unable to deal with any amount of stress. (Tr. 266.) According to Mr. Banke,
Plaintiff began avoiding people and public places after she suffered an assault and attempted
rape. (Tr. 267.) Plaintiff then began working, and was fired from every job due to difficulty
with authority stemming from an inability to follow instructions. (Tr. 267.) Lastly, Mr. Banke
stated that he takes care of Plaintiff and assists in Plaintiff’s daily living, including making sure
Plaintiff changes clothes and eats. (Tr. 267–68.)

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5.

Hearing Testimony

At the hearing before ALJ Feuer on February 12, 2013, Plaintiff testified about her
previous employment, daily activities, debilitating conditions, and medication/treatment. (See
Tr. 36–69.) Plaintiff testified that she received a graduate degree in social work and was
previously employed as a social worker primarily conducting discharge planning. (Tr. 39.)
However, Plaintiff also testified that she was fired due to excessive absenteeism resulting from
her depression as well as failing to “get along with” her supervisors. (Tr. 40–48.) Plaintiff also
testified about her history of suicide attempts and consequent hospitalizations. (Tr. 51–52.)
Lastly, Plaintiff testified about her inability to conduct daily activities due to immense stress, her
reliance on Mr. Banke, and her difficulty lifting more than approximately ten pounds. (Tr. 58–
67.)
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
A. Standard of Review
In Social Security appeals, this Court has plenary review of the legal issues decided by

the Commissioner. Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000). Yet, this Court’s review of
the ALJ’s factual findings is limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence to
support those conclusions. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999).
Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but
rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (internal citation and quotations
omitted). Thus, substantial evidence is “less than a preponderance of the evidence, but ‘more
than a mere scintilla.’” Bailey v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 354 F. App’x. 613, 616 (3d Cir. 2009)
(quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). Importantly, “[t]his standard is not

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met if the Commissioner ‘ignores, or fails to resolve, a conflict created by countervailing
evidence.’” Bailey, 354 F. App’x. at 616 (quoting Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir.
1983)). However, if the factual record is adequately developed, “the possibility of drawing two
inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding
from being supported by substantial evidence.” Daniels v. Astrue, No. 4:08-cv-1676, 2009 WL
1011587, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 2009) (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607,
620 (1966) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “The ALJ’s decision may not be set aside
merely because [a reviewing court] would have reached a different decision.” Cruz v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 244 F. App’x. 475, 479 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Hartranft, 181 F.3d at 360). This
Court is required to give substantial weight and deference to the ALJ’s findings. See Scott v.
Astrue, 297 F. App’x. 126, 128 (3d Cir. 2008).

Nonetheless, “where there is conflicting

evidence, the ALJ must explain which evidence he accepts and which he rejects, and the reasons
for that determination.” Cruz, 244 F. App’x. at 479 (citing Hargenrader v. Califano, 575 F.2d
434, 437 (3d Cir. 1978)).
In considering an appeal from a denial of benefits, remand is appropriate “where relevant,
probative and available evidence was not explicitly weighed in arriving at a decision on the
plaintiff’s claim for disability benefits.” Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 407 (3d Cir.
1979) (quoting Saldana v. Weinberger, 421 F. Supp. 1127, 1131 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Indeed, a decision to “award benefits should be made only when the
administrative record of the case has been fully developed and when substantial evidence on the
record as a whole indicates that the claimant is disabled and entitled to benefits.” Podedworny v.
Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 221–22 (3d Cir. 1984) (citations omitted).

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B. The Five–Step Disability Test
A claimant’s eligibility for social security benefits is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1382. An
individual will be considered disabled under the Act if the claimant is unable “to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment” lasting continuously for at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The
impairment must be severe enough to render the individual “not only unable to do his previous
work but [unable], considering his age, education, and work experience, [to] engage in any kind
of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). A
claimant must show that the “medical signs and findings” related to his or her ailment have been
“established by medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques, which show
the existence of a medical impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or
psychological abnormalities which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other
symptoms alleged . . . . ” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A).
To make a disability determination, the ALJ follows a five-step sequential analysis. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a); see also Cruz, 244 F. App’x at 480. If the ALJ determines at
any step that the claimant is or is not disabled, the ALJ does not proceed to the next step. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).
Step one requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant is engaging in substantial
gainful activity (“SGA”). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). SGA is defined as
work that “[i]nvolves doing significant and productive physical or mental duties . . . for pay or
profit.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1510, 416.910. If the claimant engages in SGA, the claimant is not
disabled for purposes of receiving social security benefits regardless of the severity of the
claimant’s impairments. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If the individual

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is not engaging in SGA, the ALJ proceeds to step two.
Under step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant suffers from a severe
impairment or combination of impairments that meets the duration requirement found in Sections
404.1509 and 416.909. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). An impairment or a
combination of impairments is not severe when medical and other evidence establishes only a
slight abnormality or combination of abnormalities that would have a minimal effect on an
individual’s ability to work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521, 416.921; Social Security Rule (“SSR”) 8528, 96-3p, 96-4p.

An impairment or a combination of impairments is severe when it

significantly limits the claimant’s “physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If a severe impairment or combination of impairments is not
found, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the
ALJ finds a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the ALJ then proceeds to step
three.
Under step three, the ALJ determines whether the claimant’s impairment or combination
of impairments is equal to, or exceeds, one of those included in the Listing of Impairments in 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If
an impairment or combination of impairments meets the statutory criteria of a listed impairment
as well as the duration requirement, the claimant is disabled and entitled to benefits. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d).

If, however, the claimant’s impairment or combination of

impairments does not meet the severity of the listed impairment, or if the duration is insufficient,
the ALJ proceeds to the next step.
Before undergoing the analysis in step four, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s
residual functional capacity (“RFC”).

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 404.1520(e), 416.920(a),

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416.920(e). An individual’s RFC is the individual’s ability to do physical and mental work
activities on a sustained basis despite limitations from his or her impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1545, 416.945. The ALJ considers all impairments in this analysis, not just those deemed to
be severe.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(2), 416.945(a)(2); SSR 96-8p.

After determining a

claimant’s RFC, step four then requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant has the RFC
to perform the requirements of his or her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e)-(f),
416.920(e)-(f). If the claimant is able to perform his or her past relevant work, he or she will not
be found disabled under the Act. 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1520(f),

416.920(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(f). If the claimant is unable to resume his or her past work, the
disability evaluation proceeds to the fifth and final step.
At step five, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is able to do any other work,
considering his or her RFC, age, education, and work experience.

20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). Unlike in the first four steps of the analysis where the
claimant bears the burden of persuasion, the burden shifts to the ALJ at step five to determine
whether the claimant is capable of performing an alternative SGA present in the national
economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g)(1) (citing 404.1560(c)), 416.920(g)(1) (citing 416.960(c));
Kangas v. Bowen, 823 F.2d 775, 777 (3d Cir. 1987). At this point in the analysis, the Social
Security Administration (“SSA”) is “responsible for providing evidence that demonstrates that
other work exists in significant numbers in the national economy that [the claimant] can do,
given [the claimant’s RFC] and vocational factors.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(c)(2), 416.960(c)(2).
If the claimant is unable to do any other SGA, he or she is disabled.
404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v).

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20 C.F.R. §§

III.

DISCUSSION
ALJ Feuer applied the Five-Step Disability Test to the facts comprising Plaintiff’s

application for benefits and determined that Plaintiff was not disabled under the relevant portions
of the Act. (See Tr. 21–29.) Specifically, ALJ Feuer determined that Plaintiff “does not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of
the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1” and that “there are jobs that
exist in significant numbers in the national economy that [Plaintiff] can perform.” (Tr. 24, 27
(citations omitted).) These findings are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record
and are based on proper legal analysis. Therefore, this Court affirms ALJ Feuer’s denial of DIB
and SSIB. The following is an outline of ALJ Feuer’s five-step analysis:
At step one of the disability analysis, ALJ Feuer properly found that Plaintiff had not
engaged in SGA since July 1, 2008, the alleged onset date of Plaintiff’s disability. (Tr. 23); see
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 404.1571 et seq. ALJ Feuer accordingly proceeded to step two
to determine what, if any, severe impairments Plaintiff suffered.

See C.F.R. §§

404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 404.1520(c).
At step two, ALJ Feuer properly considered the entire medical record in finding Plaintiff
suffered from the following severe impairments: “depression and anxiety.” (Tr. 23); see 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(c).

ALJ Feuer found that these severe impairments “significantly limit

[Plaintiff’s] mental and physical abilities to do one or more basic work activities. In addition,
[Plaintiff’s] impairments have lasted at a ‘severe’ level for a continuous period of more than 12
months.” (Tr. 23–24.) ALJ Feuer’s findings of severe impairments are supported by substantial
credible evidence in the record. Once ALJ Feuer determined which of Plaintiff’s impairments
qualified as “severe,” ALJ Feuer considered, under step three, whether Plaintiff’s severe

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impairments equal or exceed those in the Listing of Impairments in the Act. See C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(iii).
At step three, ALJ Feuer properly determined that Plaintiff’s impairments did not equal
or exceed the impairments included in the Listing of Impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart
P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).
(Tr. 24.) Specifically, ALJ Feuer found that Plaintiff’s mental impairments did not meet or
medically equal the severity requirements set forth in listings 12.04 and 12.06. (Tr. 24.) ALJ
Feuer was correct that the Paragraph B requirements were not satisfied because Plaintiff’s mental
impairments do not cause at least two “marked” limitations or one “marked” limitation and
“repeated” episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration. (Tr. 24); see 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(d). In reaching this conclusion, ALJ Feuer properly found that Plaintiff only had
moderate restriction in activities of daily living. (Tr. 24.) In support of this finding, ALJ Feuer
cited to evidence and stated that Plaintiff “has some difficulties engaging in activities of daily
living in an appropriate and effective manner, on an independent and sustained basis.” (Tr. 24.)
Although Plaintiff received some help with chores, she is able to independently care for herself
and perform simple tasks. (Tr. 24.) ALJ Feuer also found that Plaintiff only has mild difficulties
in social functioning, and cited Plaintiff’s testimony and the record that Plaintiff “is, for the most
part, capable of interacting independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis
with other individuals,” and that Plaintiff socializes with her son and Mr. Banke. (Tr. 24.) Next,
ALJ Feuer found that Plaintiff only has moderate difficulties with regard to concentration,
persistence or pace. (Tr. 24.) Lastly, ALJ Feuer properly found that the record evidence reflects
that Plaintiff has not experienced any episodes of decompensation lasting for an extended
duration. (Tr. 24.) ALJ Feuer also found that the evidence failed to establish the presence of the

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Paragraph C criteria. (Tr. 24.) Therefore, ALJ Feuer properly found that Plaintiff’s impairments
did not equal or exceed the impairments in the Listing of Impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1. Accordingly, Plaintiff was not disabled under step three analysis,
leading ALJ Feuer to step four to determine whether Plaintiff can perform any of her past
relevant work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1520(e).
Before undergoing the analysis in step four, ALJ Feuer determined Plaintiff’s RFC. (Tr.
25–27); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545. ALJ Feuer properly concluded that Plaintiff
has the RFC to perform a full range of work. (Tr. 25.) After extensive review of the record, ALJ
Feuer found that, “[Plaintiff] has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work
at all exertional levels but with the following non-exertional limitations: [Plaintiff] is limited to
performing routine tasks.” (Tr. 25.) In making this determination, ALJ Feuer considered both
objective medical evidence and other evidence, based on the requirements of 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1529, 416.929 and SSRs 96-4p and 96-7p. (Tr. 25.) He also considered opinion evidence in
accordance with the requirements of 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.927 and SSRs 96-2p, 96-5p,
96-6p, and 06-3p. (Tr. 25.) In support of his finding, ALJ Feuer cited extensively to Plaintiff’s
testimony and Dr. Brenner’s treatment and evaluative records. (See Tr. 25–27.) In light of the
substantial evidence reviewed by ALJ Feuer, this Court finds that ALJ Feuer properly
determined Plaintiff’s RFC.
After determining Plaintiff’s RFC, at step four ALJ Feuer properly found that Plaintiff
cannot perform her past relevant work under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1565 and § 416.965. (Tr. 27); see
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv).

ALJ Feuer noted that Plaintiff’s past relevant work was

performed at the semi-skilled level, and based on Plaintiff’s RFC limitation to performing
routine tasks, Plaintiff is unable to work as a social worker or as a waitress. (Tr. 27.) Because

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ALJ Feuer determined that Plaintiff cannot perform any of her past relevant work, ALJ Feuer
continued to step five to determine whether there exists work in the national economy Plaintiff
could perform.

(See Tr. 27–28); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 404.1520(f),

404.1520(g)(1).
At step five, ALJ Feuer properly found that Plaintiff can perform work that exists in
significant numbers in the national economy. (Tr. 27–28); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v),
404.1569, 404.1569a. ALJ Feuer considered Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience and
RFC in connection with 20 C.F.R. Part 404 Subpart P, Appendix 2. (Tr. 27.) ALJ Feuer did not
require the testimony of a vocational expert, and properly used section 204.00 in the MedicalVocational Guidelines (“Section 204.00”) as a framework for decision-making because
Plaintiff’s ability to perform work at all exertional levels is compromised solely by nonexertional limitations.

(Tr. 27–28); see SSR 85-15.

Furthermore, ALJ Feuer noted that

Plaintiff’s limitations “have little or no effect on the occupational base of unskilled work at all
exertional levels.” (Tr. 28.) Therefore, ALJ Feuer correctly determined that Plaintiff is “not
disabled” under the framework of Section 204.00 in accordance with SSR 85-15. (Tr. 28.) In
ALJ Feuer’s decision, he concluded that although Plaintiff is limited to performing routine tasks,
Plaintiff retains the ability to perform unskilled work outlined in SSR 85-15. (Tr. 28.) Thus,
ALJ Feuer’s factual finding that Plaintiff is capable of performing work that exists in significant
numbers in the national economy is supported by substantial credible evidence. Accordingly,
ALJ Feuer was correct in determining that Plaintiff is not disabled under sections 216(i), 223(d),
and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act. (Tr. 28–29); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v).

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CONCLUSION
Because this Court finds that ALJ Feuer’s factual findings were supported by substantial
credible evidence in the record and that ALJ Feuer’s legal conclusions were correct, the
Commissioner’s determination is AFFIRMED.
s/ Susan D. Wigenton
SUSAN D. WIGENTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Orig: Clerk
cc:
Parties

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