EMPIRE UNITED LINES CO., INC. et al v. BALTIC AUTO SHIPPING, INC.

Filing 8

OPINION AND ORDER ; Plaintiff's request for temporary restraints 5 is DENIED. The Order to Show Cause is DENIED. Signed by Judge Claire C. Cecchi on 1/23/2015. (anr)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
EMPIRE UNITED LINES and MICHAEL
HITRINOV.

Civil Action No.: 15-cv-355

Plaintiffs.
v.

OPINION AND ORDER
I

BALTIC AUTO SHIPPING, INC.,
Defendant.

CECCHI, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on the Order to Show Cause filed by Plainti
ffs Empire
United Lines Co., Inc. (“EUL”) and EUL’s President, Michael Hitrino
v (“Hitrinov,” and
collectively, “Plaintiffs”), requesting that this Court enter a Temporary Restra
ining Order and a
Preliminary Injunction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65
against Defendant Baltic
Auto Shipping, Inc. (“Defendant”). ECF No. 5.
Plaintiffs state that on November 26, 2014, Defendant commenced a suit
against Plaintiffs
before the Federal Maritime Commission (“FMC”), allegedly in violati
on of a settlement
agreement between the parties. which had resolved a prior suit in this Court
over three years ago.
Pis,’ Br. 2, On January 20. 20i 5. Plaintiffs filed the instant action in this Court.
seeking damages
stemming from Defendant’s alleged breach of the settlement agreement and
specific performance
of the settlement agreement. including an injunction prohibiting Defendant
from proceeding with
its claims before the FMC. Compi. ¶J 2334. Along with the Complaint,
on January 20. 2015.
Plaintiffs filed an Order to Show Cause seeking temporary restraints and, eventu
ally, a preliminary

injunction enjoining Defendant from proceeding with its claims
before the FMC. Pls.’ Br, 9.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 permits District Courts
to grant temporary restraining
orders. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). Granting injunctive relie
f is “an extraordinary remedy.

.

.

which

should be granted only in limited circumstances.” AT&T v.
Winback and Conserve Program, Inc.,
42 F.3d 1421, 1426-27 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation
and citation omitted). For a court to grant
injunctive relief, a party must show: “(1) a likelihood of succ
ess on the merits; (2) that it will suffer
irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that gran
ting preliminary relief will not result in
even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) that the
public interest favors such relief.” Kos
Pharms., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir.
2004). The party seeking injunctive
relief bears the burden of showing that all four factors weig
h in favor of preliminary relief. AT&T,
42 F.3d at 1427. Further, the Supreme Court has stated that
“the basis of injunctive relief in the
federal courts has always been irreparable harm and inad
equacy of legal remedies.” Sampson v.
Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 88 (1974) (quoting Beacon Theaters,
Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 50607 (1959)); see also I IA Charles Alan Wright et al., Fede
ral Practice and Procedure § 2948.1 (3d
ed.) (“Only when the threatened harm would impair the court’s
ability to grant an effective remedy
is there really a need for preliminary relief.”).
As to Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success, there is a dispute betw
een Plaintiffs and Defendant
over whether the release contained in the parties’ earlier
settlement agreement applies to the FMC
proceedings. Plaintiffs argue that the release was
a general release that clearly prohibits
Defendant’s commencement of FMC proceedings. Defendan
t argues. among other things, that the
release applied only to shipping charges related to specific
containers identified in Exhibits A and
B of the settlement agreement. Thus. given the differing poss
ible interpretations, this factor does
not weigh strongly in favor of or against granting injunctive
relief.

More importantly, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they will suffer irrepar
able harm
in the absence of injunctive relief Plaintiffs argue that they will suffer irreparable
harm “that
cannot be redressed adequately by monetary damages.” Pis. Br. 5-6. The harms
Plaintiffs specify
are litigation costs, ongoing reputational damage and the risk of multiple and incons
istent decisions
from this Court and the FMC. Id at 6. First, litigation costs can be compensated
by monetary
damages, and thus do not support a finding of irreparable harm.

Kos Pharms., 369 F.3d at 728

(“Mere injuries, however substantial, in terms of money, time and energy necessarily
expended in
the absence of a stay, are not enough [to constitute irreparable harmj.”) (quotin
g Sampson v.
Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974)).
Second, the reputational injury complained of by Plaintiffs already occurred
when the
commencement of the FMC action was published in the Federal Register.

See Pls.’ Br. 2.

Moreover, the Federal Register merely indicates that Defendant filed a compl
aint against Plaintiffs
with the FMC; it characterizes the contents of the complaint as allegations, not facts,
and provides
dates by which the matter will be decided by the FMC.

Hitrinov Cert., Ex. I.

Plaintiffs

submit the speculative assertions that EUL will continue to suffer reputational
harm from the
ongoing proceedings before the FMC, in addition to the risk of multiple incons
istent decisions on
the scope of the release. Hitrinov Cert,

¶ 16; see also Pls.’ Reply at 7 (arguing that Plaintiffs are

at risk of “irreparable hann due to the potential for multiple and inconsistent decisio
ns”). Plaintiffs
do not explain why the speculative risk of multiple and inconsistent decisions
would constitute
immediate harm to them, apart from litigation costs (compensable by
monetary damages)
associated with pursuing their dispute in multiple fora.
Plaintiffs do not contest that they may raise their claims that the Defendant has
breached
the settlement agreement before the FMC. PIs,’ Reply 4-5 (“It is precisely becaus
e plaintiffs may

move to dismiss the FMC matter on the same grou
nds which plaintiffs are relying upon to support
their cause of action in this case for breach of the
settlement agreement, that plaintiffs are exposed
to the risk of multiple and inconsistent decisions
.”). Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief thus
boils down to their preference for this Court as
a forum in lieu of the FMC. Id. at 5 (“When the
parties settled the 2011 Baltic Lawsuit, they spec
ifically negotiated for and contracted for this
Court to retain jurisdiction over enforcement of
the settlement agreement....”). However, Judg
e
Hochberg’s order dated January 16, 2015, denying
Plaintiffs’ application for injunctive relief filed
in the earlier case that was settled, indicated that
this Court did not retain jurisdiction over the
matter to enforce the settlement agreement. See ECF
No. 9, Civil Action No. 11-6908. The specter
of any remaining issues concerning concurrent
litigation does not justify injunctive relief at
this
time. Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy their burd
en as to irreparable harm.
Finally, Plaintiffs’ arguments regarding the public
interest do not outweigh the absence of
irreparable harm, and Plaintiffs have not suffi
ciently demonstrated that the balancing of
the
hardships between the parties weighs in Plaintiffs’
favor.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Plain
tiffs’ request for temporary restraints.
Accordingly,
IT IS on this 23rd day of January, 2015,

4

ORDERED THAT:
I. Plaintiffs’ request for temporary restraints
(ECF No. 5) is DENIED.
2. The Order to Show Cause is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
7

/
1
-.

CLAIRE C. CECCHI, U.S.D.J.