MCKINNIE v. FERRARO et al

Filing 29

OPINION. Signed by Judge Claire C. Cecchi on 2/29/16. (cm )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

DERECK MCKINNIE,
Civil Action No. 15-0452 (CCC)
Plaintiff,
v.

OPINION

HOBOKEN PROSECUTOR SUSAN
FERRARO, et al.,
Defendants.

CECCHI, District Judge.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Pro se Plaintiff Dereck McKinnie (“Plaintiff’) brings this action against Defendants
Hudson County Superior Court Criminal Records, William Conklin, Detective Oderina, and
Hudson County Superior Court (collectively, “Defendants”), pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983,

alleging violations of his constitutional rights. (ECF No. 1.) Present before the Court are three
motions to dismiss, which together address all claims against all Defendants in this case (the
“Motions”). (ECF Nos. 8, 17, 18.) for the reasons stated below, the Court grants the Motions,
and dismisses the Complaint.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

For the purposes of this Opinion, the Court accepts all facts alleged in the Complaint as
true, and in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. The four-page Complaint is inartfully drafied in
that it contains almost no factual allegations to identify, let alone support, Plaintiffs claims. Page
one of the Complaint lists the named Defendants. (ECf No. 1 at 1.) Pages two and three of the

Complaint, titled “Cause of Action DISCOVERY AND EVIDENCE,” appear to contain a list of
exhibits, although most of the listed documents are not attached as exhibits to the Complaint. (Id.
at 2-3.) Page four lists the addresses of certain defendants, and states that the relief sought is “88
Million 61 Thousand dollars.” (Id. at 4.) Page four also contains a laundry list of causes of action
without any factual support. Plaintiff asserts, without explanation, that the Complaint raises claims
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause, the Due
Process Clause, and 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. (Id.) Plaintiff further claims disability discrimination,

breach of trust, and negligence. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. (Id.)
Attached to the Complaint are various exhibits, from which the Court can piece together
some background information. It appears that around March 2014, a criminal matter involving
Plaintiff was filed in the Jersey City Municipal Court. (ECF No. 1-4 at 1-3.) That case was later
transferred to the Hoboken Municipal Court. (Id.) Whatever the charges were, it appears they
were dismissed by the Hoboken Municipal Court. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff then attempted to file an
appeal. (Id.) In one letter to the Hudson County Prosecutor’s Office, Plaintiff asserted he was
being denied the right to file an appeal in the criminal matter. (Id. at 15.) In another letter from
the Hudson County Superior Court to Plaintiff, it appears Plaintiff’s appeal concerned “a change
of venue from Jersey City.” (Id. at 5.) The Superior Court stated in the letter that it “is not the
proper forum to address [Plaintiffs] concern.” (Id.)1

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Plaintiff has also filed with the Court a document titled “Amend Complaint,” which the
Clerk of the Court docketed as an amended complaint. See ECF No. 10 at 1. The purported
“amended complaint” is nothing more than a submission of proofs of service on various
defendants. See id. As such, the Court does not construe the document as an amendment to the
Complaint.
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III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Every complaint must comply with the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
“Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what
the.

.

.

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007)

(citations omitted).
While a complaint
does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs
obligation to provide the “grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do
factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Belt Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted).
In determining the sufficiency of a complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff, the Court must be
mindful to accept its factual allegations as true, see James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 f.3d 675,
679 (3d Cir. 2012), and to construe it liberally in favor of the plaintiff. See Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); United States v. Day, 969 f.2d 39,42 (3d Cir. 1992).
IV.

DISCUSSION

A plaintiff can pursue a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 for certain violations of his

constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory. subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress..
.

42 U.S.C.

.

§ 1983. Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish (1) the

violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, (2) that the alleged
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deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. Am. Mfrs. Mitt.
Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50-51 (1999); Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 166-67 (3d Cir.
2013).
In the Motions, Defendants raise various arguments for dismissal, including,
unsurprisingly given the sparseness of the Complaint, that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. (See ECF No. 8-2 at 25; ECF No. 17-2 at 25; ECF No. 18-3 at 30,
42.) All three Motions construe the basis of Plaintiffs claims in the Complaint as his “inability to
appeal a court order changing the venue of several criminal complaints Plaintiff filed against
several individuals from the Jersey City Municipal Court to Hoboken Municipal Court.” (ECF
No. 8-2 at 7; see also ECF No. 17-2 at 7; ECF No. 18-3 at 9.) This construction of the claims is
supported by the exhibits submitted by Plaintiff himself, and would certainly explain some of the
oddities in the Court’s review of Plaintiffs filings. For example, in the appeals form submitted
by Plaintiff with regard to the criminal matter, Plaintiff listed himself as the plaintiff, and three
other individuals as the defendants. (ECF No. 1-4 at 6.) In federal court, only the government
may initiate criminal proceedings. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (“[T]he
Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a
case.”). However, in New Jersey, any person may file a criminal complaint with a municipal court.
N.J. Ct. R. 3:2-1(a) (“The clerk or deputy clerk, municipal court administrator or deputy court
administrator shall accept for filing any [criminal] complaint made by any person.” (emphasis
added)). The judicial officer then must make a finding whether there is probable cause to believe
that an offense was committed.

R. 3:3-1(d). If the officer determines there is probable cause

for the complaint, a warrant or a summons will be issued. Id. If the officer determines there is no
probable cause, the complaint will be dismissed. Id. The fact that Plaintiff was the individual who

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initiated the criminal matter would explain both why he listed himself as the plaintiff in the
criminal matter, as well as why he sought to appeal the dismissal of the matter.
Since the alleged criminal matter was one Plaintiff initiated by filing a private criminal
complaint, Plaintiff does not state a cognizable claim for his inability to appeal, because Plaintiff
had no right to appeal in the first instance. A private citizen may file a criminal complaint in the
hopes that the government will proceed to prosecute those complained of, but if the government
decides not to initiate prosecution, that is the end of the matter. See Linda KS. v. Richard D., 410
U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“[A] citizen lacks standing to contest the policies of the prosecuting
authority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution.”); Fuchs v.
Mercer Cnly., 260 fed. App’x 472, 475 (3d Cir. 200$) (“[G]enerally, there is no statutory or
common law right, much less a constitutional right, to an

[] investigation [of a private criminal

complaint.]” (citations and quotations omitted)). Even if prosecution was initiated, only a party
aggrieved by the final judgment itself, not by the underlying conduct that gave rise to prosecution,
may appeal. See Mitchell Partners, L.P. v. Irex Corp., 656 F.3d 201, 208 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011);
N.J. Ct. R. 2:3-2 (“In any criminal action, any defendant.. or other person aggrieved by the final
.

judgment of conviction

.

.

.

may appeal[.]” (emphasis added)). Indeed, a New Jersey state court

has held that a private citizen “lack[s] standing to appeal the dismissal of his complaint by the
municipal court judge after a determination of ‘no probable cause.” State v. Preto, No. 09-05,
2006 WL 66475, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 13, 2006). As such, there can be no
cognizable claim for a violation of Plaintiffs rights due to his inability to appeal, when Plaintiff
enjoys no right to appeal in the first instance. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Complaint has
failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted under 42 U.S.C.

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§ 1983.

To the extent that Plaintiff asserts other claims under state law, the Court declines
supplemental jurisdiction. “The power of the court to exercise pendent jurisdiction, though largely
unrestricted, requires, at a minimum, a federal claim of sufficient substance to confer subject
matter jurisdiction on the court.” City of Pittsburgh Comm ‘n on Human Relations v. Key Bank
USA, 163 Fed. App’x 163, 166 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 540 f.2d
187, 195 (3d Cir. 1976)). “[I]f it appears that all federal claims are subject to dismissal, the court
should not exercise jurisdiction over remaining claims unless ‘extraordinary circumstances’ exist.”
Id. “[W]here the claim over which the district court has original jurisdiction is dismissed before
trial, the district court must decline to decide the pendent state claims unless considerations of
judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification for
doing so.” Id. (quoting Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000)). In light of the fact
that this case is still in the pretrial phase, that the Court has dismissed all of Plaintiffs federal
claims, and that no extraordinary circumstances exist to compel the Court to exercise jurisdiction,
the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims.
Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Complaint in its entirety.
Lastly, given that the Complaint is grossly under-pleaded, and the difficulties encountered
by the Court to simply identify Plaintiffs claims, the Court is mindful that it may not have
sufficiently identified all of the potential claims that Plaintiff is attempting to raise. As such, the
Court will allow Plaintiff to amend the Complaint. Within thirty (30) days from the date of entry
of the accompanying Order, Plaintiff may submit to the Court an amended complaint that is

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consistent with the holdings of this Opinion, and one that satisfies the pleading requirements under
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Belt Ati. Corp., 550 U.S. at

2

5552

The Court notes that to the extent Plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief in the form of an
order directing the state court to accept Plaintiff’s appeal, the Court lacks authority to issue such
an order. See In re Brown, 382 Fed. App’x 150, 150-5 1 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]o the extent that
Brown seeks an order directing state courts or state officials to take action, the request lies outside
the bounds of our mandamus jurisdiction as a federal court.”). Plaintiff should not seek such
injunctive relief in his Amended Complaint.
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V.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motions to dismiss (ECF Nos. 8, 17, 18) are
GRANTED, and the Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff shall have
thirty (30) days from the date of entry of the accompanying Order to amend the Complaint.

(A
Claire C. C1i, U.S.D.J.

Dated:

2_LI

Zx.

C-

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