WARD v. HUDSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al

Filing 8

OPINION. Signed by Judge Madeline C. Arleo on 10/30/15. (cm )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CHARLES WARD,

Civil Action No. 15-652 (MCA)

Plaintiff,
V.

OPINION
HUDSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants.

ARLEO, United States District Judge:
I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, Charles Ward, then incarcerated at South Wood State Prison (“SWSP”), filed a

Complaint against The Hudson County Department of Corrections (“Hudson County DOC”),
CFG Health Systems (“CFG”), and employees of Hudson County DOC and CFG, alleging that
the Defendants violated his constitutional rights and the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”) by refusing treat his ear infections, hearing loss, and vertigo and for refusing to provide
him with hearing aids. Plaintiff additionally alleges that a senior counselor at Hudson County
Correctional Center retaliated against Plaintiff for his filing of a different lawsuit by failing to
process his grievances, deleting data from an electronic Kiosk, refusing to turn over medical
records requested by Plaintiff, and acting as a “liaison” for the county attorney assigned to
Plaintiff’s other lawsuit. The Court previously granted Plaintiff application to proceed injbrnia
pauperis (“IFP”). At this time, the Court must review the Complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§

191 5(e)(2)(B) and 191 5A to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious,
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for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
or because it seeks monetary relief
--fonidefendntwhois

in the letter accompanying his Complaint that his claim are time
barred, and he offers no facts to
warrant tolling of the two-year statute of limitations. As such
the Court dismisses Plaintiffs
Complaint as untimely.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Court recounts only those facts necessary to this Opinion.
Plaintiff signed his

Complaint on January 21, 2015, and it was docketed with
this Court on January 29, 2015.’ (ECF
No. I.) In his Complaint, Plaintiffs alleges that Defendants
denied him medical treatment for
his ear infections, hearing loss, and vertigo during the period
from June 22, 2011 through
October 2, 2011, while he was incarcerated at Hudson County
Correctional Center (“HCCC”).
(Id.) Plaintiffs IFP application indicates that he was incarcerated
at Hudson County
Correctional Facility from June 22, 2011 through October 2,
2012. He was subsequently
incarcerated at SWSP, beginning on October 11,2012.2 (ECF
No. 1-2, IFP application at 2.)
Plaintiff states in his Complaint that he received medical treatm
ent “immediately upon the arrival
at South Woods State Prison” and “has been given hearing aids
for both of his ears.” (ECF No.
1, Compi. at 7.) Plaintiff further states that he “can now hear,
have conversation, watch
television, use the phone, and effectively communicate with
others.” (Id.)
Plaintiff also alleges that Gheya Calhoun-Butler, a Senior
Counselor at HCCC, engaged
in acts of retaliation in response to Plaintiffs filing of anothe
r lawsuit in 2011 against the County
Pursuant to the prisoner mailbox rule, the Court will assume
for purposes of this Opinion only
that Plaintiff mailed his Complaint on January 21, 2015.
2

On September 24, 2015, Plaintiff informed the Court that he
had been released from SWSP and
was residing in a residential placement facility in Newark,
New Jersey. (ECF No. 7.)
2

and its employees. (Id., Compi. at 7; see also ECF No. 11-6252.) That law suit is currently

Plaintiff in the law library on January 11, 2012, concerning a grievance he had written” and told
him she would be handling his grievances, which she described as “complaints not grievances.”
(Id.) It is not clear whether the grievances Defendant Calhoun-Butler would be handling related
to his medical issues and/or the use of the law library, which is a subject of Plaintiffs other
pending law suit. (See Civ. Act. No. 11-6252.) Plaintiff alleges, however, that Defendant
Calhoun-Butler failed to respond to Plaintiff’s grievances related to his medical care (Id., Compi.
at 8, 9), and has attached to his Complaint several inmate Request/Grievance Forms, dated
November 30, 2011, July 25, 2012, August 16, 2012, September 3,2012. (Id. at 1-1, 5-9.) The
request dated August 16, 2012 states “Forward Ms. Calhoun-Butler” on the reply line. (Id.)
He has also attached what appears to be an email from Defendant Calhoun-Butler sent on
January 11, 2012, in which she indicates that Plaintiffs “issue” was addressed on December 30,
2012, and that “it was a non-grievable issue, which was invalid.” (Id. at 10.) In the email,
Defendant Calhoun-Butler also states that Plaintiff “is actively being seen for ongoing Mental
Health issues.” (Id.) According to his Complaint, Plaintiff received the January 11, 2012 email
described above in a discovery package from Michael Dermody, County Counsel assigned to his
other lawsuit, i.e., Civil Action No. 11-6252. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Calhoun-Butler
“began assisting the County Attorney by gathering documents, speaking to staff, destroying
evidence (by deleting electronic data from the computer Kiosk)

[]

stalling and stonewalling

Plaintiff by not turning over requested medical data stored on the computer Kiosk.” (Id.)
Plaintiff further states that Defendant Calhoun-Butler “acted as a liaison to County Counsel and

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these acts were in retaliation for plaintiff filing a lawsuit against the County and its employees.”

Plaintiff submitted a letter with his Complaint asking for leave to file his Complaint with
the Court “in light of the fact that the 2 year [sic] statute of limitation [sic] pursuant to NJ [sic]
law (NJSA 2A: 14-2) has already expired on October 2, 2014. (ECF No. 1, Letter at 1.) Plaintiff
stated in the letter that at the time he filed his Complaint, he was writing a motion pursuant to
Federal Rule Civil Procedure 6 to “[e]xtend time’ for filing this action.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends
that the Complaint was completed on “December 14, 2014, making the filing of these claims
approximately 82 days late.” (Id.) Plaintiff attributes the “remaining delay from December 22,
2014 until the date of this writing, January, 21, 2015 (30 days)” to his “inability to finish the
Rule 6 motion to Extend time.” (Id.) Plaintiff further explains that he has “experienced several
delays caused by my incarceration in South Woods State Prison, which are the direct and
proximate causes for the missed filing date on October 2, 2014.” (Id.)
III.

DISCUSSION
a. Standard for Sua Sponte Dismissal
Under the PLRA, district courts must review complaints in those civil actions in which a

prisoner is proceeding in formapauperis, see 28 U.S.C.
governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C.
prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C.

§

§

§

1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress against a

1915A(b), or brings a claim with respect to

I 997e. The PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte dismiss

any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C.
U.S.C.

§

§

l9l5A(b) and 42

I 997e. According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, “a pleading

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that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action

555 (2007)). To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must
3
allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempsier, 764
F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
b. Plaintiff’s Claims are Time-Barred
A court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim, based on a time-bar, where
“the time alleged in the statement of a claim shows that the cause of action has not been brought
within the statute of limitations.” Lasane v. Corzine, No. CIV.A. 08-4656 MLC, 2008 WL
4534078, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2008) citing Bethel v. Jendoco Constr. Corp., 570 F .2d 1168,
ii 74 (3d Cir. 1978)). Although the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that may be
waived by a defendant, the Court may dismiss sua sponte a pro se civil rights claim under 28
U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2) where untimeliness is apparent from the complaint. See Hunterson v.

Disabato, 244 F. App’x. 455, 457 (3d Cir. 2007); Johnstone v. United States, 980 F. Supp. 148
(E.D. Pa. 1997); Jones v. Bock, 127 S.Ct. 910 (2007) (if allegations of prisoner civil rights
complaint establish relief is barred by affirmative defense, such as statute of limitations or

“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ l915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing
Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x 230, 232
(3d Cir. 2012) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(l)); Courteau v. United States, 287 F. App’x
159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).
-

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exhaustion requirement, it may be dismissed for failure
to state claim); see also Hall v. Minner,
ADA
where statute of limitations defense apparent from the face
of the Complaint). The requirement
that federal courts review and dismiss any complaint that fails
to state a claim, contained in both
28 U.S.C.

§

1915A (which governs civil actions in which a prisoner seeks
redress from a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental
entity) and 42 U.S.C.

§

I 997e

(which governs actions brought as to prison conditions), paralle
ls the provision in 28 U.S.C.

§

1915(e).
Civil rights claims are best characterized as personal injury
actions and are governed by
the applicable state’s statute of limitations. See Wilson v.
Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985).
Likewise, “the statute of limitations applicable to claims
under Title 11 of the ADA

...

is the

statute of limitations for personal injury actions in the state
in which the trial court sits.”
Disabled in Action v. SEPTA, 539 F.3d 199, 208 (3d Cir.
2008); see also Muhammad v. Dep’t of
Corr., 645 F. Supp. 2d 299, 309 (D.N.J. 2008), aff’d sub
nom., Muhammad v. NJDep’t of Corr.,
396 F Appc 789 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing McGrogan v. Till,
327 N.J. Super. 595, 603 (App. Div.
2000) (“A medical-malpractice action

...

is governed by the two-year [limitations] period.”)).

Here, New Jersey’s two-year limitations period on personal
injury actions, N.J.S.A.

§ 2A:14-2,

governs Plaintiff’s claims. See Montgomery v. DeSimone,
159 F.3d 120, 126 & n. 4 (3d Cir.
l998) (‘ito v. Bridgewater Twp. Police Dep’!, 892 F.2d 23,2
5 (3d Cir. 1989). Under N.J.S.A.

§

2A: 14-2, an action for an injury to the person caused by wrong
a
ful act, neglect, or default must
be commenced within two years of accrual of the cause of
action. Cito, 892 F.2d at 25; accord
Brown v. Foley, 810 F.2d 55,56 (3d Cir.1987).

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New Jersey law permits “statutory tolling” under limited circumstances
. See, e.g.,

(detailing tolling due to nonresidency of persons liable). New Jersey
law also permits “equitable
tolling” where “the complainant has been induced or tricked by
his adversary’s misconduct into
allowing the filing deadline to pass,” or where a plaintiff has “in some
extraordinary way” been
prevented from asserting rights, or has timely asserted rights mistak
enly either by defective
pleading or in the wrong forum. See Freeman v. State, 347 N.J. Super.
11, 31 (App. Div.), cerif
denied, 172 N.J. 178 (2002). “However, absent a showing of intenti
onal inducement or trickery
by a defendant, the doctrine of equitable tolling should be applied sparing
ly and only in the rare
situation where it is demanded by sound legal principles as well
as the interests ofjustice.” id.
When state tolling rules contradict federal law or policy, federal courts
can turn to federal tolling
doctrine. See Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 370 (3d Cir. 2000). Under
federal law, equitable
tolling is appropriate in three general scenarios: (1) where a defend
ant actively misleads a
plaintiff with respect to her cause of action; (2) where the plaintiff
has been prevented from
asserting her claim as a result of other extraordinary circumstances
; or (3) where the plaintiff
asserts her claims in a timely manner but has done so in the wrong
forum. Id. n. 9.
Here, the Court need not determine whether Plaintiff states any claims
for relief against
any of the Defendants because Plaintiff acknowledges in the letter
attached to his Complaint that
the allegations in his Complaint are time barred. Indeed, the Court’
s own review of Plaintiff’s
Complaint confirms that conduct alleged occurred outside the two-ye
ar statute of limitations, and
Plaintiff has provided no facts or extraordinary circumstances in his
Complaint that would permit
statutory or equitable tolling under either New Jersey or federal law.
Plaintiff states only that he
has “experienced several delays caused by my incarceration in South
Woods State Prison, which

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are the direct and proximate causes for the missed filing date on October 2, 2014.” The
Court
—

—

4nds-th4-vague statement
Complaint as time-barred. To the extent Plaintiff has any valid basis for tolling, he may move
to
reopen the case within 30 days and provide factual support for his tolling arguments.
4

Madeline Cox Arleo, U.S.D.J.
Date:

,2015

In this regard, the Court notes that Plaintiff relies on Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 to “extend time” for
the
filing of this action. Plaintiff’s reliance on this Rule is misplaced. See, generally, Joint Council
Dining Car Employees v. Delaware, L. & W.R. Co., 157 F.2d 417, 420 (2d Cir. 1946) (“Rule
6(a) is a rule of procedure relating to acts done or proceedings had after the commenceme
nt of
action and to any statutes expressly applicable to such proceedings. It is not intended to modify
and change existing statutes of limitations.”) (emphasis added). To the extent Rule 6(a) extends
the statute of limitations in Section 1983 cases, it applies to the calculation of the final day
of the
limitations period, see, e.g. 4B Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. 1163 (4th ed.) (“The applicability
§
of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6 to federal statutes of limitations often comes into question
when the final day allowed by a federal statute of limitations falls on a Saturday, Sunday,
or
legal holiday.”); Edwards v. Media Borough Council, 430 F. Supp. 2d 445 (E.D. Pa. 2006)
(“Plaintiffs claims under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 and 1985 were subject to Pennsylvania’s two-ye
ar
statute of limitations governing personal injury actions, which was computed accord
ing to Rule
6. The last day fell on a Saturday, so the limitations period was extended to the follow
ing
Monday.”); see also Mondragon V. Thompson, 519 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 2008) (statute
of
limitations for action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 expired on Sunday, so plaintiffs filing
on
subsequent Monday is timely). Rule 6, however, does not provide a basis for tolling the statute
of limitations.
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