ESTATE OF PETER LEE WILLIAMS v. PONIK et al
Filing
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OPINION fld. Signed by Judge Claire C. Cecchi on 12/10/15. (sr, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JAMIE WILLIAMS, individually, and as
Administratix ad Prosquendum for the
ESTATE OF PETER LEE WILLIAMS,
deceased, and as a guardian ad litem for
M.W., a minor,
Civil Action No.: 15-1050 (CCC-JBC)
OPINION
Plaintiffs,
v.
GEORGE PONIK, BAYONNE POLICE
CHIEF DREW NIEKRASZ, BAYONNE
POLICE DEPARTMENT, CITY OF
BAYONNE, JOHN DOE POLICE
OFFICERS 1-10, JOHN DOE, individually
andlor in their official capacities, jointly,
severally, and/or in the alternative,
Defendants.
CECCHI, District Judge.
I.
INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Court on a motion of Plaintiffs pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(f) to strike affirmative defenses set forth in Defendants’ Answer. Defendants
did not file an opposition to this motion. This matter is decided without oral argument pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7$.
II.
BACKGROUND
On June 10, 2014, Peter Lee Williams died at the age of 51.1 (Compl. ¶ 1.) At the time of
his death, he was allegedly in the custody of the Bayonne Police Department.
(Id.)
Plaintiff
‘For purposes of simplicity, Mr. Williams’s death on June 10, 2014 will be referred to as the
“alleged incident.”
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Jamie Williams is Peter Lee Williams’s widow and the Administratix ad Prosequendum of Peter
Lee Williams’s estate.
On July 9, 2014—less than one month after the alleged incident—Plaintiffs served on
Defendants a letter purporting to be a Tort Claim Notice pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:1-1. (ECF
Nos. 10-4 and 10-5.) About a week later, Plaintiff received a response to the July 9, 2014 letter
from Robert Sloan, the City Clerk for the City of Bayonne. (ECF No. 10-6.) Mr. Sloan’s letter
was dated July 14, 2014 and stated:
I have received a notice of tort claim you forwarded on July 9, 2014.
I have placed the notice in our files and have forwarded it to our
claims processors. Enclosed is a form of tort claim notice which has
been adopted by the City of Bayonne pursuant to the Tort Claims
Act. You must file the enclosed form in order to perfect your claim.
(ECF No. 10-6.)
On August 28, 2014—within the 90-day limit—Plaintiff responded to the
July 14, 2014 request with information answering each question in the Tort Claims Act form. (See
ECF No. 10-7.) Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this action on february 8, 2014—approximately
eight (8) months after the alleged incident. (ECF No. 1.)
Defendants filed an Answer to the Complaint on April 28, 2015. (ECF No. 7.) Defendants
have set forth a series of affirmative defenses, including defenses based on the statute of limitations
(Second Affirmative Defense), laches (Fourth Affirmative Defense), lack of notice under New
Jersey’s Tort Claims Act (Eighth Affirmative Defense), and a request for relief not authorized by
law (Sixth Affirmative Defense). (Id.) On May 15, 2015, Plaintiff moved to strike these defenses.
(ECFN0. 9.)
III.
LEGAL STANDARD
federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) states:
(f) Motion to Strike. The court may strike from a pleading an
insufficient defense or any redundant material, impertinent, or
scandalous matter. The court may act:
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(1) on its own; or
(2) on motion made by a party either before responding to the
pleading or, if a response is not allowed, within 21 days after being
served with the pleading.
fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “As a general matter, motions to strike under Rule 12(f) are highly
disfavored.” FTC v. Hope Now ModUlcations, LLC, No. 09-1204, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24657,
at *4..5, (D.N.J. Mar. 10, 2011). “The successful motion to strike is granted to ‘save time and
expense’ by clearing away pleadings ‘which will not have any possible bearing on the outcome of
the litigation.” Id. (citing Garlanger v. Verbeke, 223 F. Supp. 2d 596, 609 (D.N.J. 2002)).
Additionally, “even where the challenged material is redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or
scandalous, a motion to strike should not be granted unless the presence of the surplusage will
prejudice the adverse party.” Id. (citing Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 609 F. Supp.
2d 353, 359 (D. Del. 2009)).
The Third Circuit has cautioned, that “a court should not grant a motion to strike unless the
insufficiency of the defense is clearly apparent.” Czpollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181,
188 (3d Cir. 1986). District courts in the Third Circuit have required that the insufficiency of the
defense be “clearly apparent” on the face of the pleading. See, e.g., Newborn Bros. Co. v. Albion
Eng’g Co., 299 F.R.D. 90, 98 (D.N.J. 2014); United States Bank v. Rosenberg, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9536,
*$
(E.D. Pa. Jan.24, 2013);Hope Now Modflcations, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24657,
at *5 (“Thus, on the basis of the pleadings alone, an affirmative defense can be stricken.
IV.
.
.
DISCUSSION
A. Statute of Limitations Defense (Second Affirmative Defense)
It is “clearly apparent” from the face of the pleadings that Defendants’ affirmative defenses
based on the statute of limitations should be stricken. Under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act,
claims against the State of New Jersey and local public entities must be filed within two years from
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the date the cause of action arose. N.J.S.A § 59:8-8. Additionally, this is a claim for relief pursuant
to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, which carries with it the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions.
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985); see also Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989). New
Jersey has a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions under N.J.S.A.
which applies to claims brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 2A:14-2,
§ 1983 in the District of New Jersey. Cito v.
Bridgewater Township Police Dep’t, $92 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1989).
There is no allegation that any event relating to this case occurred prior to June 10, 2014.
Accordingly, the earliest that the two-year statute of limitations could run is June 10, 2016. There
is simply no fact that could arise in discovery that would allow Defendants to prove that the statute
of limitations has run.
B. Laches Defense (Fourth Affirmative Defense)
For substantially the same reason as the statute of limitations defense, Defendants’ laches
defense should be stricken. The doctrine of laches bars an action where two elements are met: (1)
the plaintiff unreasonably delayed in bringing suit; and (2) the delay prejudiced the defendant. See
Iwanowa v. Ford Motor C’o., 67 F. Supp 2d 424 (D.N.J 1999) (citing Claussen v. Mene Grande
Oil Co., 275 F.2d 198, 211 (3d Cir. 1960)). furthermore, under New Jersey law, “[l]aches, as a
defense is generally unavailable where there is an applicable statute of limitations.” Flexco
Microwave, Inc. v. MegaPhase LLC, No. 14-6947, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112033, *14 (D.N.J.
Aug. 24, 2015) (citing Fox v. Miliman, 210 N.J. 401 (2012)).
It is clearly apparent from the pleadings that the Complaint was filed well within the statute
of limitations. Moreover, there is no set of facts that could arise through discovery that would
allow Defendants to prove that Plaintiffs delay of approximately eight months was unreasonable
or that such a delay prejudiced Defendants in a case involving only a request for damages. The
Court will therefore strike the laches defense.
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C. New Jersey Tort Claims Act (Eighth Affirmative Defense)
The New Jersey Tort Claims Act requires that, prior to filing suit against a public entity or
public employee, a plaintiff must provide notice of the claim. N.J.S.A § 59:1-1, et seq. The statute
provides a list of required information and mandates that notice be provided within 90 days of the
alleged incident giving rise to the lawsuit. N.J.S.A
§ 59:8-8. In their Answer, Defendants assert
as an affirmative defense that Plaintiff failed to provide notice as required by the New Jersey Tort
Claims Act.
In her motion to strike, Plaintiff contends that because she was ostensibly in compliance
with the Tort Claims Act, the defense should be stricken under Rule 12(f). However, Plaintiff asks
this Court to consider numerous documents outside the pleadings in order to make that
determination.
Such consideration is inappropriate under Rule 12(f).
See, Hope Now
Modifications, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24657, at *5; Newborn Bros., 299 F.R.D. at 98.
The Court takes notice that the documents submitted in support of the motion to strike are
illustrative of the weakness of the Tort Claims Act defense. The Court also recognizes that
Defendants had an opportunity to respond to the instant motion and did not do so. However, in
light of the directive that motions to strike are “highly disfavored,” the Court finds that Defendants
should be given the opportunity to take discovery with respect to the Tort Claims Act defense (to
determine, for example, whether the notice provided was adequate, etc.) Therefore, the Court will
not strike this defense from the record.
D. Relief not authorized under applicable law (Sixth Affirmative Defense)
Plaintiff moves to strike Defendants’ affirmative defense that Plaintiff has requested
improper relief not authorized under applicable law. Plaintiffs argument rests largely on the
theory that she has requested only compensatory damages, costs, expenses, attorney’s fees, and
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punitive damages, all of which Plaintiff argues are authorized by law. (ECF No. 9-1 1 at 6-7; see
also ECF No. 1.)
Notwithstanding the proposition that the types of relief Plaintiff requests are authorized by
law in a general sense, at this stage in the proceedings the Court will not hold Defendants’ to such
a narrow interpretation of their affirmative defenses. This particular affirmative defense can be
construed to include Defendants’ intention to prove that the relief requested by Plaintiff is not
authorized by law under the facts of this case. The Court will not use its discretionary power under
Rule 12(f) to preclude Defendants from making such arguments. Moreover, as there is no reason
to believe that Plaintiff will be prejudiced by this affirmative defense, it would be inappropriate
for the Court to strike it. See Hope Now ModifIcations, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24657, at *4..5•
V.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Plaintiffs motion
to strike. Defendants’ second affirmative defense (statute of limitations) and fourth affirmative
defense (laches) will be stricken. Defendants’ sixth affirmative defense (relief not authorized by
law) and eighth affirmative defense (failure to give notice under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act)
will not be stricken.
Dated: December 10, 2015
CLAIRE C. CECCHI, U.S.D.J.
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