WILLIAMS v. UNION COUNTY JAIL

Filing 2

OPINION re 1 Complaint Received. Signed by Judge Madeline C. Arleo on 5/12/2015. (nr, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
HAROLD W. WILLIAMS,

Civil Action No. 15-1408

Plaintiff,
v.

OPINION

UNION COUNTY JAIL, ci at.,
Defendants.

ARLEO, United States District Judge:

I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff currently confined at Somerset County Jail, seeks to bring this

§

1983 action in

forma pauperis. Based on his affidavit of indigence, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s application
to proceed in formapauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§

1915(a) and order the Clerk of the Court to

file the complaint. At this time, the Court must review the Complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§

1915(e)(2) and l9l5A, to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Plaintiff alleges that the administration at
Union County Prison miscalculated his aggregate sentence and have held him beyond the
expiration of his sentence. Because it is unclear whether Plaintiff is still serving that allegedly
illegal sentence, which would require him to bring a petition for habeas relief, and because his
claim is barred at this time by fleck v. J-hinzphrei’, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Court will dismiss
Plainti

“

s Complaint without prejudice.

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II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintifl’is currently confined in Somerset County Jail and has brought an action pursuant
to 42 U.S.C.

§

1983 alleging that the administration at Union County Jail miscalculated his

aggregate county sentences, which has resulted in his imprisonment beyond the date on which
his sentence should have expired. Plaintiff’s Complaint is not a model of clarity, but it appears
that he was sentenced in three different counties for three different offenses between August
2013 and October 2013. (No. I at 5-6.) On August 29, 2013, Plaintiff was sentenced to 90 days
in Somerset County. (Id.) On October 25, 2013, was sentenced to 270 days in Union County.
(Id.) On November 20, 2013, a Linden Municipal Court judge sentenced Plaintiff to 180 days.
(Id.) Plaintiff appears to contend that the sentencing courts ordered these sentences to run
concurrently but that Administrators at Union County Jail ran them consecutively. (Id) Plaintiff
also alleges that he received paperwork from a social worker indicating that that his release date
was March 19, 2014, but he was not released on that date.
Plaintiff indicates that he did not seek any formal or informal relief from the appropriate
administrative officials and explains that he did not pursue any administrative remedies because
he “did not know how to go about fil[l]ing out or getting the paper work.” (Id. at 5.) In his
Complaint, however, Plaintiff does indicate that when his expected release date passed, he
complained to the administration and they sent him to the Central Reception and Assignment
Facility (“CRAF”). (Id. at 6.)
It is unclear whether Plaintiff is still serving the sentence or sentences that form the basis
for his

§

1983 claim. In his Complaint, Plaintiff does not indicate whether he was released from

prison after he was sent to CRAF. A search of the New Jersey Department of Corrections,

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Inmate locator database indicates that Plaintiff was released from custody on July 21, 2014.’
However, Plaintiff mailed his Complaint on February 10, 2015 from Somerset County Jail. (Id.)
Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $500,000.00 but does not seek release from Somerset
County Jail, where he is currently confined. (Id. at 6). It is not clear from the Complaint on
what charge or charges Plaintiff is currently incarcerated.
III.

ANALYSIS

A. Standard for Sua Sponte Dismissal under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134,

§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-

66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996) (“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil
actions in which a prisoner is proceeding informa pauperis, see 28 U.S.C.
seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C.
claim with respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B),

§ 1915A(b), or brings a

§ 1997e. The PLRA directs district courts

to sua sponle dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcrofi v. Iqhal, “a pleading that offers
‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.” 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.

V.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007)). To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege
“sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility

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1 New Jersey Department of Corrections, Offender Search Form, available at
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when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc.

V.

Dempster, 764

F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting lqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Moreover, while pro se
pleadings are liberally construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their
complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir.
2013) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
B. Plaintiff’s

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1983 Claim is Not Cognizable at this Time

Here, Plaintiff’s has alleged that prison administration at Union County Jail violated his
constitutional rights by miscalculating his aggregate county sentences, illegally failing to run the
sentences concurrently. Because Plaintiff has not indicated whether he is still serving the
sentence or sentences at issue, it is not clear whether Plaintiff’s claim is properly brought as a
claim under 42 U.S.C.

§

1983 or as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Federal law provides

two avenues of relief to prisoners: a petition for habeas corpus and a civil rights complaint. See
Muhammadv. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750, 124 S.Ct. 1303, 158 L.Ed.2d 32(2004). In general,
“[c]hallenges to the validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the
province of habeas corpus
[fall within the realm of] a

...

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[while] requests for relief turning on circumstances of confinement
1983 action.” Id. Further, it is well-established that detaining a

prisoner beyond the termination of his or her sentence can amount to cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment and thus form the basis for a claim under

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1983. See Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1108 (3d Cir. 1989).
As explained below, if Plaintiff is still serving the sentence at issue, his relief is in the
form of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which requires him to first exhaust his
administrative remedies. If his is no longer serving the sentence at issue, his claim is barred until

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such time that he meets the favorable termination requirement of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477 (1994).
I. If Plaintiff is Still Serving the Allegedly Illegal Sentence, His Relief is in the
Form of a Habeas Petition Not an Action Under Section § 1983

If Plaintiff is still serving the sentence that is the basis for his

§

1983 claim, his

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1983

claim is not cognizable and he “must seek federal habeas corpus relief (or appropriate state
relief) instead.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005) (jurisprudence requires that “state
prisoners use only habeas corpus (or similar state) remedies when they seek to invalidate the
duration of their confinement

—

either directly through an injunction compelling speedier release

or indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily implies the unlawfulness of the
State’s custody”); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439
(1973)(”[W]hen a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical
confinement

[...] his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.”; Coady v.

Vaughn, 251 F.3d

480 (3d Cir. 2001) (state prisoner’s challenge to denial of parole or challenge to the legality of
continued state custody must be brought under

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2254 which requires the exhaustion of state

court remedies); Brown v. Fauver, 819 F.2d 395 (3d Cir. 1987) (inmate’s civil rights action
seeking restoration of good time credits was in essence an action seeking habeas corpus relief
which is not cognizable under

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1983).

Here, Plaintiff does not seek release from Somerset County Jail in his Complaint and
public records indicate that his sentence expired and he was released on July 21, 2014. If this is
not the case, however, and Plaintiff is still serving the sentence that forms the basis of his

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§

1983

claim, he could seek habeas relief in federal court after he properly exhausts his state court
administrative remedies.
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2. Plaintiff’s

§

1983 Claim is Currently Barred by Heck v. Humphrey

To the extent Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated, the Court construes Plaintiff’s Complaint
as a claim for incarceration beyond the expiration of his sentence. Detaining a prisoner beyond
the termination of his or her sentence can amount to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. Sample, 885 F.2d at 1108; see also Edwards v. Power, et a!., No. 07—
4121, 2014 WL 5092916, at 5 (D.N.J. Oct. 10, 2014).
To state a Section 1983 claim for incarceration beyond the expiration of a prisoner’s
sentence, a prisoner must establish that: (1) a prison official “had knowledge of the prisoner’s
problem and thus of the risk that unwarranted punishment was being, or would be, inflicted”; (2)
the prison official “either failed to act or took only ineffectual action under the circumstances,
indicating that his response to the problem was a product of deliberate indifference to the
prisoner’s plight”; and (3) a causal connection exists between the prison official’s response to the
problem and the unjustified detention.” Moore v. Tartler, 986 F .2d 682, 686 (3d Cir. 1993).

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Plaintiff states in his Complaint that he has not exhausted administrative remedies at the state
level. A state prisoner must exhaust available state remedies before filing a petition for habeas
corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). This requirement serves the interests of
comity between the federal and state systems by allowing the state an initial opportunity to
determine and correct any violations of a prisoner’s federal rights. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526
U.S. 838, 844, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1(1999) (“Comity dictates that when a prisoner
alleges that his continued confinement for a state court conviction violates federal law, the state
courts should have the first opportunity to review this claim and provide any necessary relief.”).
“The exhaustion rule also serves the secondary purpose of facilitating the creation of a complete
factual record to aid the federal courts in their review.” Walker v. Vaughn, 53 F.3d 609, 614 (3d
Cir. 1995).
...

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Even assuming Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded the elements of an Eighth Amendment
claim, his claim is not cognizable at this time due to the favorable termination rule in Heck V.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The Supreme Court held in Heck that an action under

§

1983

seeking “damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm
caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid” is not
cognizable under

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1983 unless “the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,

expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such
determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-7.
The Third Circuit applies Heck’s favorable termination rule to Eighth Amendment claims
based on incarceration beyond the original sentence. See Glenn v. Pennsylvania Bd. of
Probation and Parole, 410 F. App’x 424 (3d Cir. 2011). As the Third Circuit explained, “[w]ere
we to agree with [Plaintifti that he has been imprisoned beyond the expiration of his sentence,
that would necessarily imply that the Parole Board has incorrectly determined his release date or
has lailed to timely release him. Because no court has so held, [Plaintiff’sj action is barred by
Heck.” Id. at 426.
The Third Circuit also applies Heck’s favorable termination requirement where the
prisoner has finished serving his sentence and thus it is no longer possible to meet the “favorable
termination” requirement of Heck by obtaining habeas corpus relief. See Deemer v. Beard, 557
F. App’x 162, 163-167 (3d Cir. Feb. 27, 2014); see also Williams v.

Consovoy,

453 F.3d 173,

1 77-78 (3d Cir. 2006) (declining to hold that Heck’s favorable termination rule does not apply to
defendants who are no longer in custody absent clear direction from the Supreme Court). In
Dee,ner, the Plaintiff was paroled from a Pennsylvania prison with 489 days left on his sentence

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and was required to enter a drug rehabilitation program. Id. When he failed to report for the
program, a detainer warrant was issued for his arrest and he remained a fugitive until he was
arrested in Warren County, New Jersey for an unrelated crime. Id. For 366 days, until the
charges against him were dismissed, Plaintiff was detained in Warren County without bail. Id,
After serving time on an unrelated conviction in Bergen County, Plaintiff was returned to
Pennsylvania and incarcerated at SC! Mahanoy. Id. The Parole Board determined that Plaintiff
must serve the entire 489 days remaining on his sentence and rejected Plaintiffs contention that
he should receive credit for the 366 days of custody in Warren County. Id. While still in prison,
Plaintiff challenged the Board’s determination through several administrative and judicial
avenues but did not obtain relief. Id. He filed his

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1983 claim after he was released, alleging

that the Board had failed to credit the 366 days spent in Warren County against his remaining
sentence, which resulted in his incarceration beyond the maximum sentence. Id. The District
Court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss relying on Heck. The Third Circuit upheld the
dismissal, finding that Heck’s favorable termination requirement was universal and applied even
where the plaintiff was no longer in custody and thus federal habeas relief was unavailable. Id.
at l6566.
Because Heck’s favorable termination requirement applies to Plaintiffs claim that he was
unlawfully held beyond the date his sentence expired, and because Plaintiff does not allege any
facts showing that he has met the favorable termination requirement of Heck, Plaintiff may not
seek relief under

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1983 at this time. Plaintiff may file a new

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1983 complaint for damages for

injury caused by the allegedly unconstitutional imprisonment if his confinement is invalidated by
state authorities or called into question by issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
2254. Because his federal claims for damages and injunctive relief are not cognizable under

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§

§

1983 at this time, however, the Court will dismiss them without prejudice. See United States v.
Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 652 n. 7 (3d Cir. 1999) (“When a plaintiff files a

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1983 action that cannot

be resolved without inquiring into the validity of confinement, the court should dismiss the suit
without prejudice”).
3. CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed herein, Plaintiff’s Complaint dismissed without prejudice. An
appropriate Order follows.

Made1Ke ox Arleo, District Judge
United States District Court

Date:

ty

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