ROSADO v. THE HUDSON COUNTY COURT et al
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge Claire C. Cecchi on 5/24/2018. (sm)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CARLOS R. ROSADO,
$
Civil Action No. 1 5-1412 (CCC)
:
OPINION
Plaintiff,
v.
THE HUDSON COUNTY COURT, et al.,
Defendants.
CECCHI. District Judge:
Plaintiff Carlos R. Rosado (“Plaintiff’), a convicted state prisoner confined at Southern
State Correctional Facility in Delmont, New Jersey, filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging that his constitutional rights have been violated by Defendants’ failure to protect
him from harm, which resulted in Plaintiff being assaulted by unnamed individuals. Plaintiff also
alleges that he was denied proper medical care for his injuries suffered in the assault. Because
Plaintiff is proceeding under in forma pauperis status, at this time, the Court must review the
Complaint to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C.
28 U.S.C.
U.S.C.
§ 191 5(e)(2) (in forma pauperis actions);
§ 1915A (actions in which prisoner seeks redress from a governmental defendant); 42
§ 1997e (prisoner actions brought with respect to prison conditions). For reasons stated
below, the Court dismisses all named defendants, but will allow Plaintiff to amend the Complaint.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Complaint is sparse and contains very few factual allegations; therefore, it is
difficult for the Court to discern the details of his allegations. It appears from the Complaint that
at some point while Plaintiff was incarcerated by the State of New Jersey, he was mistakenly
transferred to the Ann Klein Forensic Center (“AKFC”). (ECF No. 1-3 at 8.) Plaintiff alleges that
he notified his attorney, Raymond Beam, Jr., but was told that he should stay at AKFC at that time.
(ECF No. 1 at 4.) According to Plaintiff, he also contacted the court clerk for one Judge Venable,
who allegedly had cancelled the order to send Plaintiff to the AKFC, but that cancellation order
was never entered by the clerk. (ECF No. 1-3 at 15.) Finally, Plaintiff asserts that he contacted
the Hudson County Public Defender’s Office to inform them of his allegedly erroneous transfer,
but received no response. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) According to Plaintiff, he was assaulted while at the
AKFC, and suffered significant injuries. Id. at 5. Plaintiff further alleges that he did not receive
proper medical care for his injuries. Id. at 7.
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed the instant suit against defendants the Hudson County Court, the
Hudson County Public Defender’s Office, Raymond Beam, Jr., the clerk for Judge Venable, the
AKFC, and the Hudson County Corrections Medical Department.
The Court construes the
Complaint as alleging that defendants failed to adequately protect Plaintiff while he was at the
AKFC, and that Plaintiff was deprived of proper medical care, both in violation of Plaintiffs
Eighth Amendment rights.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Every complaint must comply with the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need
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only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the.. claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted).
While a complaint
does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs
obligation to provide the “grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do
Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted).
That is, a complaint must assert “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The
determination of whether the factual allegations plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief is “a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.” Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Thus, a
court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” and
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted).
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the Court must accept its factual
allegations as true, see James v. City of Wilkes—Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 2012), and to
construe it liberally in favor of the plaintiff. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520—2 1 (1972);
US. v. Day, 969 f.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992).
In general, when a complaint subject to statutory screening can be remedied by amendment,
a district court should not dismiss the complaint with prejudice, but should permit the amendment.
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992); Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103,
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108 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that leave to amend should be granted “in the absence of undue delay,
bad faith, dilatory motive, unfair prejudice, or futility of amendment”).
III.
DISCUSSION
The Complaint does not name any individual who was directly involved in the alleged
constitutional violations; Plaintiff does not name any prison officials who allegedly failed to
provide adequate protection for Plaintiff, or any medical staff who allegedly failed to provide
proper medical treatment. Instead, all of the named defendants are either immune from
claims, or not “persons” subject to liability under
§ 1983
§ 1983. The Court addresses each of them
separately below.
A. The Hudson County Court, the Ann Klein Forensic Center, the Hudson County
Public Defender’s Office, and the Hudson County Corrections Medical
Department
Plaintiff names “the Hudson County Court,” the AKFC, the Hudson County Public
Defender’s Office, and the Hudson County Corrections Medical Department as defendants. The
Court construes “the Hudson County Court” as referring to the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Hudson County.
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that, “[tJhe Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. As such, the Eleventh Amendment
protects states and their agencies and departments from suit in federal court regardless of the type
of relief sought. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.
V.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). Section
1983 does not override a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332,
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338 (1979). New Jersey state courts are immune from
§ 1983 claims pursuant to the Eleventh
Amendment. Carroway v. New Jersey, 202 F. App’x 564, 565 (3d Cir. 2006).
Moreover, state courts are not “persons” subject to liability under
§ 1983. Id.; Ray v. New
Jersey, 219 F. App’x 121, 124 (3d Cir. 2007). This Court has also held that the AKFC is both
immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment and not a “person” subject to liability under
§ 1983. Hobson v. Tremmel, No. 11-4590, 2013 WL 3930132, at *4 (D.N.J. July 30, 2013).
Additionally, a public defender’s office is not is a “person” liable under
§ 1983. Crisostomo v.
State ofN.J Pub. Defender Office Passaic Cnty., No. 14-4756, 2014 WL 4094793, at *2 (D.N.J.
Aug. 18, 2014); Santos v. Smith, No. 08-3846, 2008 WL 4922207, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 12, 2008).
Lastly, a prison’s medical department itself is not a “person” under
§ 1983. Ruffv. Health Care
Adm ‘r, 441 F. App’x 843, 845-46 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d
Cir. 1973)); Howard v. Mercer Cty. Jail Med. Dep ‘t, No. 14-214, 2014 WL 4626857, at *2 (D.N.J.
Sept. 15, 2014).
Because both the Hudson County Court and the AKFC are arms of the state immune from
§ 1983 suits, and because they, the Hudson County Public Defender’s Office, and the Hudson
County Corrections Medical Department are not “persons” subject to liability under
§ 1983, all
claims against the Hudson County Court, the AKFC, the Hudson County Public Defender’s Office,
and the Hudson County Corrections Medical Department will be dismissed.
B. Raymond Beam, Jr.
Next, Plaintiff names Raymond Beam, Jr, a private attorney, as a defendant. Plaintiff
alleges that Mr. Beam, Jr. instructed him to stay at AKFC. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) It appears Plaintiffs
argument is that had he not stayed at the AKFC per Mr. Beam. Jr.’s advice, he would not have
been assaulted. However,
§ 1983 claims are actionable only against persons who have committed
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constitutional violations under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Here, Mr. Beam, Jr. has
not acted under the color of law; a private attorney cannot be considered as a person acting under
the color of law for the purposes of § 1983. See Jackson v. City ofErie Police Dep ‘t, 570 F. App’x
112, 113 (3d Cir. 2014) (“{P]rivate defense attorney cannot be construed as a person acting under
the ‘color of state law’ within the meaning of 1983.” (citing Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312,
3 17-25 (1981))); Bullock v. Sloane Toyota, Inc., 415 F. App’x 386, 389 (3d Cir. 2011) (private
attorney not liable under
§ 1983 because plaintiff has not set forth any facts to demonstrate that
her attorney was a state actor or acted under color of state law). Accordingly, all claims against
Raymond Beam, Jr. will be dismissed.
C. Clerk for Judge Venable
Lastly, Plaintiff names the clerk for Judge Venable as a defendant. Plaintiff alleges that
the clerk violated his constitutional rights by not entering Judge Venable’s cancellation of a court
order that directed Plaintiff to be transferred to AKFC. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Judicial staff are entitled
to quasi-judicial immunity from
§ 1983 claims so long as they did not act outside their discretion,
outside the scope of their duties, or contrary to the direction of a judicial officer. Kutesa v. Rex,
519 F. App’x 743, 746 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Gallas v. Sup. Ct. ofPa., 211 F.3d 760, 772-73 (3d
Cir. 2000)); Lusick v. City ofPhila., 549 F. App’x 56, 58 (3d Cir. 2013). Here, Plaintiff makes no
allegations that the clerk for Judge Venable acted outside the scope of his or her duties or
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discretion, or that he or she acted contrary to the direction of a judicial officer.’ Therefore, all
claims against the clerk for Judge Venable will be dismissed.2
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, all claims against all named defendants are DISMISSED.
The Court will allow Plaintiff 30 days from the date of entry of the accompanying Order to amend
the Complaint consistent with the holdings of this Opinion.
Claire C. Cecchi, U.S.D.J.
Dated:
‘
‘
To the extent the clerk is not protected by quasi-judicial immunity, Plaintiff does not
plausibly allege that the failure to enter the cancellation order was “the result of anything but mere
negligence.” Newton v. City of Wilmington, 676 F. App’x 106, 108 (3d Cir.). Negligence is
insufficient to state a constitutional claim for the denial of due process. Id. Therefore, any claim
against the clerk not protected by quasi-judicial immunity is nevertheless subject to dismissal
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See Id.
2
Because the Court is dismissing all defendants from the Complaint, Plaintiffs Application
for Pro Bono Counsel is premature at this juncture, as there are currently no valid claims for
Plaintiff to pursue. As such, the Court dismisses the Application without prejudice. Plaintiff may
refile the application after amending the Complaint.
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