ROUSE v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES et al
Filing
21
OPINION fld. Signed by Judge Jose L. Linares on 10/13/15. (sr, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Civil Action No.: 15-01511 (JLL)
ANDREA ROUSE,
•
OPINION
.
Plaintiff,
V.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, HUDSON
COLTNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY
SERVICES, HUDSON COUNTY
PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE, and HANY
HANNA,
Defendants.
LINARES, District Judge.
Plaintiff Andrea Rouse brings claims against the above-named Defendants for violation of
her constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and various state law causes of action, based on
the Defendants’ allegedly wrongful prosecution of Plaintiff for welfare benefits fraud. (See ECF
No, 1, “Compl.”). The New Jersey Department of Health, the New Jersey Department of Human
Services (improperly plead as a single entity),’ and the Hudson County Prosecutor’s Office
(“HCPO”) (collectively “the Moving Defendants”) now move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint
based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 1 2(b)( I) and 1 2(b)(6), respectively. (ECF No. 8). Because this Court finds that it lacks
See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:1A-2 (“There is hereby established in the Executive Branch of the
State Government a
principle department which shall be known as the State Department of Health.”); N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 30: 1-2 (“The
Department of Human Services.. is hereby constituted a principal department in the Executive
Branch of the State
Government.”).
.
1
the requisite subject matter jurisdiction over the Moving Defendants, it need not opine on whethe
r
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a Jersey City resident who received welfare benefits from 2008 throug
h
November 2012. (Compl. at ¶J 3, 10). Plaintiff alleges that, in retaliation of an assault compl
aint
she filed against a Department of Family Services (“DFS”) caseworker in May of 2012,
the DFS
assigned Defendant Hany Hanna to investigate Plaintiff for welfare benefits fraud. (Id.
at
¶J 14,
17). According to Plaintiff, Mr. Hanna engaged in an unlawful investigation which culmin
ated in
his filing of a false report in which he accused Plaintiff of welfare fraud. (Id. at
¶J 18-26). During
the course of his investigation, Plaintiff filed a harassment complaint against Mr. Hanna
. (Id. at ¶
22). Thus, Plaintiff alleges that her filing of a harassment complaint against Mr. Hanna
created a
clear conflict of interest, and as such, it was unlawful for the DFS to permit Mr. Hanna
to continue
his investigation and for the HCPO to subsequently charge Plaintiff with “theft by decept
ion.” (Id.
at ¶J 22-24).
Plaintiff now brings claims of section 1983 and various state law causes of action
against
the Defendants.
The Moving Defendants argue that dismissal is warranted based upon the
Eleventh Amendment doctrine of sovereign immunity. For the reasons stated below,
this Court
agrees.
LEGAL STANDARD
The well-recognized doctrine of sovereign immunity, embodied in the
Eleventh
Amendment to the United States Constitution, provides that the States are immun
e from suit in
federal court. See, e.g., Will v. Mich. Dep ‘t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70—71
(1989); Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712—13, (1999). In fact, federal courts lack jurisdiction
even over pendent
2
state law claims. Raygor v. Regents of Univ. ofMinn., 534 U.S. 533, 541-42 (2002)
(“[Section]
1367(a)’s grant ofjurisdiction does not extend to claims against nonconsenting state defend
ants.”)
.
So protective is this doctrine that a State’s sovereign immunity may only be waived
where
the State itself has “unequivocally express[ed] consent to suit in federal court,” Pennh
urst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. flalderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984), or alternatively, where Congress “autho
rize[s]
such a suit in the exercise of its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.” Colleg
e Say. Bank
v. F/a. Frepaid PostsecondaryEduc. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999).
Notably, sovereign immunity is not limited to the State itse1t but rather extends to state
agencies and state officers who act on behalf of the State. Regents ofthe Univ. of Cal.
v. Doe, 519
U.S. 425,429 (1997). In the seminal case ofFitchikv. N.J Transit Rail Operations, Inc., the Third
Circuit has outlined the following three factors “[i]n determining whether an entity
is an arm of
the state, and therefore entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.
.
.
: (1) whether payment of a
judgment resulting from the suit would come from the state treasury, (2) the status
of the entity
under state law, and(3) the entity’s degree of autonomy.” Chisoim v. McManimon
, 275 F.3d 315,
323 (3d Cir. 2001) (citingFitchikv. NJ Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d
655, 659 (3d Cir.
1989)).
ANALYSIS
The Moving Defendants contend that they are “arms of the state” for Eleventh Amend
ment
purposes, and are therefore immune from suit in federal court. (Defs.’ Br. at
6-1 1). Plaintiff
responds that the Defendants are subject to suit under the New Jersey Tort Claims
Act (“NJTCA”),
which provides that “[a] public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by
an act or omission
of a public employee within the scope of his employment in the manner and to the
same extent as
a private individual.” (P1’s. Br. at 6) (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann.
3
§ 59:2-2(a)). Plaintiff also argues
that the Defendants are liable under the seminal case of Monell v. Dep ‘t of Social Servs.,
as the
alleged constitutional violation was committed by an employee of Defendants and
said violation
“fiow[edl from a policy, practice, or custom of such violations.” (P1’s. Br. at 6) (citing to Monell,
436 U.S. 658 (1978)).
This Court finds that each of the Moving Defendants are arms of the state entitle
d to
Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Department
of Health
are
The State Department of Human Services and the State
“principal
department[s]”
within
the
State’s
“Executive
Branch.” N.J.S.A. 30:1-2 (establishing the Department of Health); N.J.S.A. 26: lA-2 (establ
ishing
the Department of Human Services). As such, both Departments are indisputably
“arms of the
state.” See Aerated Products Co. v. Dep ‘t ofHealth ofN.i, 159 F.2d 851, 853-54 (3d Cir.
1947)
(“[T]he Department [of Health] is part of the executive branch of the New Jersey Govern
ment...
Consequently, we agree
.
.
.
that plaintiff’s suit against the Department is protected by the
Eleventh Amendment.”).
Moreover, because both Departments are funded by the State treasury, any damages agains
t
these Defendants would come from the State itself. N.J.S.A.
§ 52:1 8A-42 (“[T]he State Treasurer,
with the approval of the Governor, may make transfers of appropriations, in whole
or in part,
available and to become available to any department, officer, or agency affecte
d by the provisions
of this act.”). Accordingly, this Court agrees with the majority of courts in this
District that have
found that the State Department of Health and the State Department of Human Servic
es are “arms
of the state” entitled to sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Aerated Products Co. v. Dep
‘t ofHealth of
NJ, 159 F.2d 851, 853-54 (3d Cir. 1947) (finding that the Department of Health
is entitled to
sovereign immunity); Rahman v. Taylor, 10-cv-367, 2010 WL 2178938, *6 (D.N.J
. May 27, 2010)
(Simandle, J.) (same); Banda v. ]‘LJ. Dep ‘t ofMental Health Servs, et. al., 5-cv-2
622, 2005 WL
4
2129296, *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2005) (Martini, J.) (dismissing claims against the
New Jersey
Department of Human Services on Eleventh Amendment grounds); Cole v. New Jersey
Dep ‘t of
Human Services, 13-cv-3987, 2014 WL 2208142, *1 (D.N.J. 2012) (Wolfson, J.)
(same); Fladger
v. Trenton Psychiatric East 2 Treatment Team, 12-cv-5982, 2013 WL 3271018, *7
(D.N.J. June
27, 2013) (Wolfson, J) (same, collecting cases).
Applying the Third Circuit’s Fitchik factors, this Court also finds that the HCPO is an “arm
of the state” entitled to sovereign immunity. First, a judgment against the HCPO for
the claims
alleged would come from the State treasury. Fitchik, 873 F.3d at 659. In the semina
l case of
Wright v. State, the New Jersey Supreme Court explained that “when county prosec
utors.
.
.
act
in their law enforcement/investigatory capacity, they act as ‘agents and ‘officers’ of the
State”
such that “the State should be made to ‘respond to damages.” Wright, 169 N.J. 422 at 452
(2001)
(citing N.J.S.A. 59:1-3). Here, Plaintiff alleges claims against the HCPO for 1983 violati
ons, false
arrest, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Comp
i.
¶ 31,
42,
46, 62). The gravamen of these allegations is that the HCPO chose to prosecute Plainti
ff despite
what she alleges to be a clear conflict of interest on the part of Mr. Hanna, the DFS investi
gator
handling her case. (Compi. ¶ 34-3 5). Decisions such as whether to bring charges are clearly
within
the “law enforcement function[sj
prosecutors.”
.
.
.
that the Legislature has delegated to the county
Wright, 169 N.J. at 451; N.J.S.A. 2A:158-4 (“The criminal business of the State
shall be prosecuted by the Attorney General and the county prosecutors.”). Thus,
any damages
Plaintiff seeks against the HCPO would be paid from the State’s treasury.
Additionally, the status of the HCPO as a “constitutionally established office” satisfie
s the
second Fitchik factor which considers the status of an defendant for sovere
ign immunity
purposes. Wright, 169 N.J. at 437 (citing Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491, 1500 (3d Cir.
1996) and
5
N.J. Const. Art. VII,
§ 2, ¶ 1). Finally, the third Fitchik factor is satisfied here, where a county
prosecutor acting with prosecutorial authority is not an autonomous entity separa
te from the State.
See Wright, 169 N.J. at 455; see also Briggs v. Moore, 251 Fed. App’x 77, 70
(3d Cir. 2007)
(unpublished) (“[Tjhe Monmouth County Prosecutor’s Office is not a separate
entity that can be
sued under
§ 1983.”). As the Wright Court stated:
A prosecutor whose actions do involve the enforcement of the criminal laws does
not enjoy
a comparable degree of autonomy from the State government. Thus, the Attorn
ey General
has the ultimate responsibility in matters related to the enforcement of the State’s
criminal
laws that have been legislatively delegated to county prosecutors.
Id. (citing N.J.S.A. 52:17B-98; N.J.S.A. 52:17B-103).
Based upon the above application of the Fitchik factors to the facts of the case at
bar, this
Court finds that the HCPO is an “arm of the state” entitled to sovereign immun
ity. Other courts
in this district have held the same. Woodyard v. County ofEssex, 514 Fed. App’x
177 (3d Cir.
2013) (unpublished) (applying the Fitchik factors in finding that the Essex
County Prosecutors
Office is entitled to sovereign immunity against claims that the office arreste
d and detained
plaintiff without probable cause); Beightier v. Office ofEssex County Prosec
utor, 342 Fed. App’x.
829, 2009 WL 2562717 (3d Cir. 2009) (unpublished); In re Camden Police
C’ases, 2011 WL
3651318 (D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2011) (Kugler, J.) (finding, upon application of the
Fitchik factors, that
the Camden County Prosecutor’s Office is immune from suit); Kandil v.
Yurkovic, 6-cv-470l,
2007 WL 4547365, *4 (D.N.J. 2007) (Greenaway, J.) (“[T]he Distric
t of New Jersey has
consistently held that New Jersey county prosecutors’ offices are entitled to Eleven
th Amendment
immunity from suits arising out of the exercise of prosecutorial powers.”);
Paez v. Lynch, 7-cv5036, 2009 WL 5171858, *4 (D.N.J. Dee. 23, 2009) (Cavanaugh, J.) (findin
g that the HCPO is an
“arm of the state,” for Eleventh Amendment purposes); Mikhaeil v. Santos,
lO-cv-3 876, 2011 WL
6
24293 13, *4 (D.N.J. June 13, 2011) (Martini, J.) (barring, on Eleventh Amendment
grounds, all
section 1983 claims brought against the State ofNew Jersey and its agencies, includ
ing the HCPO).
Moreover, contrary to Plaintiffs assertions, neither the State of New Jersey nor Congr
ess
has abrogated the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity as to Plaintiffs section 1983
or state
tort claims. While the NJTCA expressly waives the State’s sovereign immunity
as to certain
claims, it does not reflect the State’s “express[] consent to suit in federal courts and thus
is not an
Eleventh Amendment waiver.” Hyatt v. County of Passaic, 340 Fed. App’x 833, 837
(3d Cir.
2009) (unpublished); see also Lawson v. K2 Sports USA, 8-cv-6330, 2009 WL 995180, *3
(D.N.J.
Apr. 13, 2009) (Brown, C.J.) (dismissing certain state tort claims against the New
Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection where “there is no provision in the [NJTCA] that
waives
sovereign immunity or consents to suit in federal court” for those torts); Paez v. Lynch
, 7-cv-5036,
2009 WL 5171858, *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 23, 2009) (Cavanaugh, J.) (stating that the NJTCA
does not
waive the RCPO’s sovereign immunity).
Similarly, while “section 1983 provides a federal forum to remedy many depriv
ations of
civil liberties,
[] it does not provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a remedy against a
State” for same. Will v. Mich. Dep ‘t ofState Police, 491 U.S. 48, 66 (1989);
see also Banda v.
N.J Dept of Mental Health Servs, et. al., 5-cv-2622, 2005 WL 2129296, *5 (D.N.J
. Aug. 31,
2005) (“Section 1983 does not override a State’s Eleventh Amendment Immun
ity.”).
Moreover, a Plaintiff cannot circumvent the State’s sovereign immunity by allegin
g Monell
liability under section 1983. Specifically, Monell liability only attaches to local
governments, and
does not attach to the State or its agencies. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 (“Cong
ress did intend
municipalities and other local government units to be included among those
persons to whom
§
1983 applies.”) (emphasis added); see also Will v. Michigan Dep ‘t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58,
7
70 (holding that Monell is not applicable to “States or governmental entities that are
considered
‘arms of the state’ for Eleventh Amendment purposes”). As such, having found that
the New
Jersey Departments of Health and Human Services and the Hudson County Prosecutors
Office are
“arms of the state” for Eleventh Amendment purposes, this Court need not analyz
e whether
Plaintiff has sufficiently plead a claim of Monell liability as against these Defend
ants. See Briggs
V.
A’foore, 251 Fed. App’x 77, 70 (3d Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (“[Tjhe Monm
outh County
Prosecutor’s Office is not a separate entity that can be sued under
§ 1983. Even if it were, Plaintiff
did not claim that his allegedly unconstitutional arrest was the result of a municipal
custom or
policy.”) (emphasis added).
In summary, this Court holds that the Moving Defendants are arms of the state subjec
t to
Eleventh Amendment immunity, and neither the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, nor
42 U.S.C.
§
1983 serve to abrogate the State’s immunity from suit in federal court.
CONCLUSIONS
Having thoroughly reviewed the papers submitted in support of and in opposi
tion to the
instant motion, and for the reasons stated above, this Court hereby dismisses the
Complaint as
against the Moving Defendants the New Jersey Department of Health, the New
Jersey Department
of Human Services, and the Hudson County Prosecutor’s Office.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.
DATED:October
j, ,2015
en..
JOS4/ LINARES
UNIED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
8
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?