BANDA v. ADAMS et al

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Esther Salas on 3/1/2016. (seb)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JOHN BANDA,
Civil Action No. 15-1887 (ES)
Plaintiff,
v.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

S. ADAMS, Ct al.,
Defendants.

IT APPEARING THAT:
1. On March 7, 2015, PlaintiffJohn Banda (“Plaintiff’), an involuntarily committed person
pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act (“SVPA”), N.J.S.A. 30:4—27.24, et seq., filed this
civil rights action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§

1983, against Defendants S. Adams; M. Main; Y.

Comiel; K. Stankiewicz; P. Dudek; D. Stanzione; L. Chiapetta; M. Levi; and D. Rodriguez. (D.E.
No. 1, Complaint (“Compl.”)).
2. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that “out of spiteful malice, Unit Director Adams
used her job to assert her personal agenda by failing to provide this Plaintiff with the necessary,
meaningful and adequate mental health care non-convicted sex offender treatment and the
opportunity for release, to which violated this Plaintiff [sic] constitutionally protected rights.” (Id.

¶ 4(b)).

Plaintiff repeated these allegations against Defendants Main, Corniel, Chiapetta, Levi and

Rodriguez.

(Id.

¶

4(c)-(d), (g)-(i)).

Plaintiff additionally alleged that Defendants Corniel,

Chiapetta, Levi and Rodriguez, “out of spiteful malice
Comprehensive Treatment Plan Review report.”

(Id.

¶

.

.

.

[are] in agreement with the

4(d), (g)-(i)).

Against Defendant

Stankiewicz, Plaintiff alleged that “out of spiteful malice, [he] used his job to assert his personal
agenda by submitting an annual review report in making his diagnosis of this pro se Plaintiff in
which he failed to recommend the proper, necessary, meaningful and adequate mental health care
non-convicted sex offender treatment and the opportunity for relief, to which violated this Plaintiff
[sic] constitutional protected rights.” (Id.
Defendants Dudek and Stanzione.
injunctive relief. (Id.

(Id.

¶

¶ 4(d)).

Plaintiff made identical allegations against

4(e)-(f)).

Plaintiff sought monetary damages and

¶ 7).

3. On May 26, 2015, the Court entered an Opinion and Order dismissing Plaintiffs
Complaint without prejudice. (D.E. Nos. 3-4, May 26 Opinion and Order (“May 26 Opinion”)).
The Court found that Plaintiff was ultimately challenging the determination by the Defendants that
he must engage in sex-offender treatment to be released and any challenge to his civil commitment
under the SVPA must be raised in a habeas proceeding. (Id. at 6 (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 475 (1973))). The Court further found that Plaintiff’s claims for damages are not cognizable
under Section 1983 because a favorable outcome would necessarily imply the invalidity of his
confinement and Plaintiff does not contend that his involuntary commitment has been invalidated.
(Id. at 7 (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994))).
4. On May 29, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration (D.E. No. 5, Motion for
Reconsideration (“Mot.”)). The Motion essentially re-asserts the allegations of his Complaint:
Pro Se Plaintiff filed His complaint to address the “Treatment” that
He has Not been getting for the past 11 years, For the listed
Defendants has [sic] had enough time to provide such “Non
convicted sex offender Treatment” for Him that would have met His
psychiatric needs of such “Non-Convicted sex offender Treatment”.

As stated in this Pro Se Plaintiffs complaint, Pro se Plaintiff has
never been convicted of a sexually Violent offense, and therefore
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He should Not be subjected to the sex offender Treatment that is
being provided at this special Treatment unit

Pro Se Plaintiff filed His Complaint to show that the listed
Defendants of the Division of Mental Health services in the
Department of Human services has failed to provide the appropriate,
meaning opportunity for a cure “Non-Convicted Sex Offender
Treatment” to Him. which is in violation of this Pro Se Plaintiffs
constitutional protected right under the Eighth Amendment within
the concept of Deliberate Indifference, which delayed His potential
opportunity of a meaningful awareness towards a cure in working
towards a Release.

(Mot. 1-2).
5. A motion for reconsideration is a limited device. Woodson v. Unknown Agents of
Unknown Agency, No. 14-7033, 2015 WL 71156, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 6, 2015). “The purpose of a
motion for reconsideration.

.

.

is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly

discovered evidence.” Max Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677

(3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Harsco Corp. v. Ziotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). As such, a motion for reconsideration may be granted only upon the
showing of one of the following grounds: “(1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2)
the availability of new evidence that was not available when the court granted the motion.

.

.

; or

(3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.” Id. “To support
reargument, a moving party must show that dispositive factual matters or controlling decisions of
law were overlooked by the court in reaching its prior decision.” Assisted Living Assocs. of
Moorestown, LLC v. Moorestown Twp., 996 F. Supp. 409, 442 (D.N.J. 1998). By contrast, mere
disagreement with the district court’s decision is not an appropriate ground for a motion for
reconsideration; such disagreement should be raised through the appellate process. Id. (citing

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Bermingham v. Sony Corp. of Am., Inc., 820 F. Supp. 834, 859 n.8 (D.N.J. 1992)); see also
Drysdale v. Woerth, 153 F. Supp. 2d 678, 682 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (holding that a motion for
reconsideration may not be used to reargue matters already argued and disposed of by the court).
6. Here, there has been no intervening change in the controlling law; there is no new
evidence that was not available when the court granted the motion; and there is no need to correct
a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice. Instead, Plaintiffmerely disagrees with
the Court’s previous holding, which is not a ground for reconsideration. Assisted Living Assocs.
ofMoorestown, L.L.C., 996 F. Supp. at 442. As stated in the previous Opinion, Plaintiff is being
offered psychiatric treatment, but he is specifically seeking non-sex offender treatment. He claims
that the denial of said treatment is affecting his ability to be released. Plaintiff has repeatedly
challenged his civil commitment as a sex offender and, while differently worded, this appears to
be another attack on that commitment because he claims he should not be subjected to sex offender
based treatment in order to be released. For the reasons stated in the Court’s May 26 Opinion and
Order, that claim, and any accompanying claim for damages, must be dismissed.’

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Even if Plaintiff’s claims were not barred by Preiser andlor Heck, Plaintiff has failed to establish
a violation of his constitutional rights. The Fourteenth Amendment affords pretrial detainees and
civilly committed individuals, such as Plaintiff protections that are “at least as great as the Eighth
Amendment protections afforded to a convicted prisoner.” Natale v. Camden County Corr.
Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting City ofRevere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp.,
463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983)). To state a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need
in violation of the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must show (1) deliberate indifference by prison
officials to (2) the prisoner’s serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
(1976). Here, Plaintiff is clearly being offered in-depth and comprehensive psychiatric treatment,
but he is refusing said therapy because he does not believe he is a sex offender. However, “mere
disagreement as to the proper medical treatment” does not violate a prisoner’s constitutional rights.
Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Monmouth Cly. Corr. Inst. Inmates v.
Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987)). Therefore, even if not barred by Preiser and/or Heck,
Plaintiff cannot state a claim for denial of medical treatment.
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7. For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

Sa s, U. .D.J.
L/fther

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