MALIBU MEDIA, LLC v. JOHN DOE SUBSCRIBER ASSIGNED IP ADDRESS 69.122.27.123
Filing
17
OPINION fld. Signed by Judge Kevin McNulty on 7/26/16. (sr, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
MALIBU MEDIA, LLC,
No. 15—cv-2250 (KM)(MAH)
Plaintiff,
OPINION
V.
ZENON NOWOBILSKI,
Defendant.
KEVIN MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.:
This matter comes before the Court on the unopposed motion of plaintiff
Malibu Media, LLC, for default judgment against defendant Zenon Nowobilski.
Malibu Media alleges that Mr. Nowobilski infringed on the copyrights owned by
Malibu Media for 132 movies. For the reasons expressed below, I grant in part
and deny in part the motion for default judgment.
BACKGROUND
I.
The plaintiff, Malibu Media, is a California limited liability company that
owns the copyrights to adult films that it makes available on its website.
(Amended Complaint (“Am. Compl.”)
¶J
2, 4, 9; see Exs. A—B (ECF No. 8)) The
defendant, Zenon Nowobilski, is an individual allegedly residing in New Jersey.
(Id.
¶
10)
Malibu Media hired an investigator, IPP International UG, to investigate
unauthorized copies of its works on the BitTorrent file distribution network and
trace the infringing distributors. (Id.
¶J
6—7, 18—24) BitTorrent is a peer-to-peer
file sharing system used for distributing large amount of data, including digital
copies of movies. (Id.
¶
11) To distribute a large file, BitTorrent breaks a file
into many small pieces, referred to as “bits.” (Id.
1
¶
13) These bits are exchanged
among users in the network, and then once the recipient receives all of the bits
of a file, the BitTorrent software will reassemble the bits so that the file can be
opened and used. (Id.
¶J
13-14) Each bit is assigned a unique cryptographic
hash value (“bit hash”) that identifies the bit and ensures that it is properly
routed. (Id.
¶J
15—16) The entire digital file is also given a hash value (“file
hash”), which acts as an identifier and is used by the BitTorrent software to
determine when the file is complete and accurate. (Id.
¶
17)
IPP International allegedly downloaded “one or more bits” at six different
times through a direct connection with internet protocol (“IP”) address
69.122.27.123. (Id. ¶j 18—19, Ex. A) IPP International allegedly downloaded
bits at the following times and from media files with the following file hashes:
Hit Date
File #1
File #2
File #3
File
02/22/20 15
4CBE8879EDEEC66D68 1CC570CD3434B
01:01:07
02/14/2015
20:35:45
02/03/20 15
00:39:40
1CE7788AA
1AC522C5FE1 1B932CFB6C8EE9F 1A2AFEDF8447D2
1AC522C5FE1 1B932CFB6C8EE9F1A2AFEDF8447D2
01/25/2015
05:59:37
08/05/2014
01:4 1:45
File #5
File #6
2F4771020A9701851F7D58DDEC8A77D916B55650
08/05/2014
00:56:48
File #4
1 247492A24A5E4FC9A36EAADE5308C7AFF6C49AF
(Id. at Ex. A,
¶
4186 12CDA0638 19CF12372355DCD2C2573FD0337
24) They then downloaded full copies of each media file
associated with the file hash from BitTorrent and confirmed that each of those
files contained a digital copy of a movie that is Malibu Media’s copyrighted
work. (Id.
¶
23; see Ex. B)
File #1 is a zip folder which contains 127 of Malibu Media’s works. (Id.
22; see Ex. B) The other files contain a single work each. (Id. Ex. A) Files #2
and #3 have the same file hash, indicating that IPP International downloaded
bits from the same work on different dates. (Id. Ex. A)
2
¶
Malibu Media filed its original complaint on March 3, 2015, essentially
against the IP address, using a fictitious name for the defendant. (ECF No. 1)
To determine in which jurisdiction it should file suit, Malibu Media alleges it
used “proven” geolocation technology to trace the IP address to a physical
address in this district. (Am. Compl. ¶ 6) Malibu Media then moved under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(d)(1) to serve a subpoena on Optimum
Online, the provider of the IP address, to force it to reveal the identity of the
owner of the allegedly infringing IP address. (ECF No. 4) Magistrate Judge
Michael A. Hammer granted limited early discovery, but recognized “that the IP
account holder might not be personally responsible for the alleged
infringement. However, the IP account holder might possess information that
assists in identifying the alleged infringer, and thus that information is
discoverable under the broad scope of Rule 26.” (ECF No. 6)
On October 15, 2015, Malibu Media then filed the amended complaint
naming Mr. Nowobilski as the defendant and owner of the IP address. Malibu
Media alleged one claim for relief against Nowobilski: direct infringement of
Malibu Media’s right to reproduce, redistribute, perform, or display copyrighted
works, in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 106 and 501. (Am. Compi. ¶ 33) Malibu
Media requested a permanent injunction against Mr. Nowobilski from
continuing to infringe its works, an order that Nowobilski delete all digital
media files relating to Malibu Media’s works, an award of statutory damages for
each infringed work, and an award of attorney’s fees and costs. (Id. at 8—9)
A summons was issued and Mr. Nowobilski was served on October 22,
2015. (ECF Nos. 11—12) On December 3, 2015, Malibu Media requested that
the Clerk enter default against Nowobilski. (ECF No. 13) The clerk filed an
entry of default on the same day. (ECF No. 14) Malibu Media filed its motion for
default judgment on December 14, 2015. (ECF No. 15) Malibu Media proposes
that the Court order Nowobilski to pay $99,000 in statutory damages under 17
U.S.C.
§
504(c)(1) and $1,657 in attorney’s fees and costs under 17 U.S.C.
505 for a total of $100,657.00, as well as enjoin further infringement of its
copyrighted works. (Proposed Order (ECF No. 15—6))
3
§
II.
DISCUSSION
Malibu Media is reputedly the biggest filer of copyright litigation in the
country. See Gabe Friedman, The Biggest Filer of Copyright Lawsuits? This
Erotica Web Site, New Yorker, May 14, 2014, available at
www. newyorker. corn/business / currency/the-biggest-filer-of-copyrightlawsuits-this-erotica-web-site. At any rate, it is a prolific filer. In 2014, Malibu
Media filed 1,780 copyright cases, over 41.5% of all copyright suits filed
nationwide. Matthew Sag, IPLitigation in U.S. District Courts: 1994-2014, 101
Iowa L. Rev. 1065, 1078 & n.43 (2016). A search for dockets with “Malibu
Media” as a party revealed over 500 cases filed in this district alone since 2012.
Approximately 39 of these have been assigned to my docket, and about two
thirds of those were closed within six months of being filed. No new cases have
been filed since March 31, 2016.1
As early as 2012, courts around the country were noting “the growing
concern about unscrupulous tactics used by certain plaintiffs, particularly in
the adult films industry, to shake down the owners of specific IP addresses
from which copyrighted adult films were allegedly downloaded.” Malibu Media,
LLC v. Does 1-5, Civ No. 12—2950, 2012 WL 2001968, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 1,
2012); see also, e.g., Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, Civ No. 15—4369, 2015 WL
4092417, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2015) (“In 2012, judges in the Southern
The reason for the lull may be the legal dispute between Malibu Media and
attorney Michael Keith Lipscomb. See Malibu Media, LLC, v. Lipscomb, Eisenberg &
Baker, PL, Civ No. 16—4715 (C.D. Cal. filed June 28, 2016); Lipscomb, Eisenberg &
Baker, PL, et al, v. Malibu Media LLC, 2016—0 14947—CA—U 1 (Fla. Miami-Dade County
Ct. filed June 10, 2016). In Malibu Media’s complaint filed in the United States
District Court for the Central District of California, Lipscomb’s law firm is described as
the “general counsel” of its “entire copyright enforcement program.” Civ No. 16—4715
(ECF No. 1 ¶ 10) (C.D. Cal. June 28, 2016). Malibu Media alleges that Lipscomb’s firm
stopped sending them money gained from the myriad copyright lawsuits it filed or had
others file on Malibu’s behalf. (Id. ¶J 13—15) Lipscomb allegedly wrote in an email that
“Malibu is winding its copyright campaign down because it is no longer profitable.” (Id.
¶ 19) Allegedly, no retainer agreement was ever signed with Lipscomb’s firm before they
set out to flood the nation with copyright actions. (Id. ¶j 11—12, 32.d, 37—39)
1
4
District and across the country began awakening to the danger of copyright
trolls, especially in the context of pornography”) (collecting cases); Malibu
Media, LLC v. John Does 1 through 10, Civ No. 12—3623, 2012 WL 5382304, at
*4 (C.D. Cal. June 27, 2012) (“The federal courts are not cogs in a plaintiffs
copyright-enforcement business model. The Court will not idly watch what is
essentially an extortion scheme....”).
Recently, some courts have stayed or denied these cases at the subpoena
stage. See, e.g., Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, Civ No. 16—1006, 2016 WL 3383830,
at *34 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 2016) (collecting cases). In the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California, Judge William Alsup, who
was assigned all Malibu Media cases in that district, see Order Reassigning
Cases, Malibu Media, LLC, v. Doe, Civ No. 15—4 195 (ECF No. 7) (C.D. Cal. Sept.
29, 2015) stayed a subpoena over “Malibu Media’s failure to include a sworn
record on the reliability of its IP address geolocation methodology” and applied
the ruling to future and pending requests. Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, Civ No.
16-1006, 2016 WL 3383830, at *3_4 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 2016). In the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Magistrate Judge
Steven Locke stayed all of Malibu Media actions in that district pending the
resolution of a motion to quash based on, among other reasons, serious
questions about the method for identifying allegedly infringing users and about
Malibu Media’s abusive litigation practices. E.g., Order Staying Cases, Malibu
Media, LLC v. Doe, Civ No. 15—3504 (ECF No. 12) (E.D.N.Y. October 6, 2015).
A.
Default Judgment Standard
“[T]he entry of a default judgment is left primarily to the discretion of the
district court.” Hritz v. Woma Corp., 732 F.2d 1178, 1180 (3d Cir. 1984) (citing
Tozer v. Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242, 244 (3d Cir. 1951)).
Because the entry of a default judgment prevents the resolution of claims on
the merits, “this court does not favor entry of defaults and default judgments.”
United States v. $55,518.05 in U.S. Currency, 728 F.2d 192, 194 (3d Cir. 1984).
Thus, before entering default judgment, the Court must determine whether the
5
“unchallenged facts constitute a legitimate cause of action” so that default
judgment would be permissible. DirecTV, Inc. v. Asher, Civ No. 03—1969, 2006
WL 680533, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 14, 2006) (citing 1OA Wright, Miller, Kane,
Federal Practice arid Procedure § 2688, at 58—59, 63 (3d ed.)).
“[Djefendants are deemed to have admitted the factual allegations of the
Complaint by virtue of their default, except those factual allegations related to
the amount of damages.” Doe v. Simone, Civ No. 12—5825, 2013 WL 3772532,
at *2 (D.N.J. July 17, 2013) (citing Chanel, Inc. v. Gordashevsky, 558 F. Supp.
2d 532, 536 (D.N.J. 2008)). However, the Court need not defer to a complaint’s
conclusions of law, because “a party in default does not admit mere
conclusions of law.” Asher, 2006 WL 680533, at *1 (quoting 1OA Wright, Miller,
Kane, Federal Practice arid Procedure § 2688, at 63 (3d ed.)); accord Chanel, Inc.
v. Matos, 133 F. Supp. 3d 678, 684 (D.N.J. 2015). Moreover, if a court finds
evidentiary support to be lacking, it may order or permit a plaintiff seeking
default judgment to provide additional evidence in support of the allegations.
Simone, 2013 WL 3772532, at *2.
B.
Prerequisites for Entry of Default Judgment
Before a court may enter default judgment against a defendant, the
plaintiff must have properly served the summons and complaint, and the
defendant must have failed to file an answer or otherwise respond to the
complaint within the time provided by the Federal Rules, which is twenty-one
days. See Gold Kist, Inc. v. Laurinburg Oil Co., Inc., 756 F.2d 14, 18—19 (3d Cir.
1985); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a).
Service of an individual may be made by personal service, leaving a copy
of the summons and complaint at the individual’s dwelling or usual place of
abode with a person of suitable age and discretion, delivering a copy of the
summons and complaint to an agent for service of process, or following state
law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of general
jurisdiction where the district court is located or where service is made. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 4(e).
6
Here, the prerequisites for default judgment have been met. The
Amended Complaint was filed on October 15, 2015. Malibu Media served Mr.
Nowobilski personally on October 22, 2015. (ECF no. 12) Mr. Nowobilski failed
to file an answer or otherwise respond to the complaint within twenty-one days
of service pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a). The clerk entered default against
Nowobilski on December 03, 2015. (ECF no. 14) Accordingly, I am satisfied that
the prerequisites to filing a default judgment are met. See Gold Kist, 756 F.2d
at 18—19.
C.
Three Factor Analysis
After the prerequisites have been satisfied, a court must evaluate the
following three factors: “(1) whether the party subject to default has a
meritorious defense, (2) the prejudice suffered by the party seeking default, and
(3) the culpability of the party subject to default.” Doug Brady, Inc. v. N.J. Bldg.
Laborers Statewide Funds, 250 F.R.D. 171, 177 (D.N.J. 2008) (citing Emcasco
Ins. Co. v. Sambrick, 834 F.2d 71, 74 (3d Cir. 1987)). Those factors, considered
in light of the record of this case, weigh in favor of entry of a partial default
judgment.
1.
Factor 1: Meritorious Defense
As to the first factor, I am of course confined to the skimpy record that is
before me. See Coach, Inc. v. Bags & Accessories, Civ No. 10—2555, 2011 WL
1882403, at *6 (D.N.J. May 17, 2011) (“Because the Defendants did not
respond, the Court cannot determine whether the Defendants had meritorious
defenses that are not reflected in the record.”). Because thousands of similar
cases have been filed, we know there are a number of meritorious defenses that
defendants may assert. Those defenses, however, largely depend on the facts of
the case and require knowledge specific to the defendant. I cannot simply
speculate that there may be facts that a defendant could use to defend himself
from this complaint. Instead I will review the complaint to assess whether the
factual allegations, taken as true, suffice to plead copyright infringement. See
Chanel, Inc. v. Matos, 133 F. Supp. 3d 678, 683 (D.N.J. 2015) (“prior to
7
(2) whether the
entering a judgment of default, a court must determine:
unchallenged facts present a legitimate cause of action”) My independent
...
review of the record, accepting the factual allegations as true, suggests that the
defendant could mount a meritorious defense as to at least some of the
allegedly infringed works.
The amended complaint asserts a cause of action for direct copyright
infringement, in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 106 and 501. (Am. Compi. ¶ 33) To
establish a claim for copyright infringement, a plaintiff must show (1) that he
owns a valid copyright; and (2) original elements of its work were copied
without authorization. Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs., Inc. v. Grace
Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197, 206 (3d Cir. 2002). Malibu Media sufficiently
alleges that it owns valid copyrights as to all 132 videos. (See Am. Compi. Ex.
B) As to the second element, Malibu Media’s allegations are sufficient to
establish that Nowobilski had unauthorized copies of the single movies in each
of files #2—6, but not the 127 movies in file #1.
Malibu Media alleges that its investigator, IPP International, identified
the allegedly infringing files through establishing a direct connection with
Nowobilski’s IP address and downloading “one or more bits” of the six files at
six different times. (Id. ¶J 18—19, Ex. A) Malibu Media does not explain IPP
International’s process for determining that the downloaded bits came from a
specific file. Malibu Media alleges that the bits have bit hashes to identify them
and that when the bits are assembled into a file there are file hashes to identify
the complete digital media file. (Am. Compi. ¶J 15—17) But how they identify
the file origin of the few bits they downloaded from Nowobilski is not explicitly
pleaded. That said, it is simple to imagine that a downloaded bit can be
matched to one work as it contains information taken from that work. Thus,
the allegations that IPP International downloaded one bit each from files #2—6,
which each contain a single copyrighted movie, and identified that bit as part of
an unauthorized copy of their copyrighted work suffices to establish a plausible
claim of copyright infringement as to those works.
8
But the allegation that the same size bit also establishes that 127
separate unauthorized copies were on Nowobilski’s computer within file #1
requires more factual allegations to explain how one bit can identify separate
works. It has not been alleged whether the bit that Malibu Media alleges
identifies 127 works is a piece of any one work or pieces of all 127 (or if there is
some other method of identification).
The confusion as to how this process identified 127 videos is heightened
by Malibu Media’s Exhibit B to the complaint, which lists all 132 movies. (Am.
Compi. Ex. B) The exhibit has columns including the title of the movies, the
copyright registration numbers and the “Most Recent Hit UTC.” For files #2—6,
the “Most Recent Hit UTC” column corresponds with the “Hit Date UTC”
column in Exhibit A. (Id. Exs. A, B at 6) These columns refer to the most recent
time IPP International allegedly connected with Nowobilski’s IP address to
download bits from these videos. (Id.
¶J 18—19, 24) For the 127 videos allegedly
in file #1, 124 share the same most recent hit date, but three have different
dates. (Id. Ex. B at 6) This suggests that it is possible for a downloaded bit to
identify fewer movies than the 127 allegedly in the file at one download, or that
the file contains different numbers of movies at different times. Either option
would refute other factual allegations necessary for Malibu Media to support its
claim, namely that a file hash is unique to an entire media file and that these
file hashes can be used to extrapolate from one downloaded bit that a person
has a full unauthorized copy of a copyrighted work. (Id. ¶{ 17, 21)
As to these 127 videos, I am not satisfied that the complaint establishes
that Malibu Media is entitled to judgment.
Factors 2 and 3: Prejudice to Plaintiffs and Culpability of the
Defendants
The second and third factors generally, if not strongly, weigh in favor of
default. Nowobilski was properly served on October 22, 2015, but has failed to
2.
appear and defend himself. As a result, Malibu Media has been “prevented
from prosecuting [its] case, engaging in discovery, and seeking relief in the
9
normal fashion.” See Teamsters Pension Fund of Phila. & Vicinity v. Am. Helper,
Inc., No. CIV. 11-624, 2011 WL4729023, at*4 (D.N.J. Oct. 5,2011).
Absent any evidence to the contrary, it is generally true that “the
Defendant’s failure to answer evinces the Defendant’s culpability in [the]
default.” Id. Here, there is some doubt as to whether the person named as
defendant is indeed the culpable party. He is identified essentially as the
person who corresponds to a certain IP address. Electronically, of course, an IP
address connects to a device, not a person, and it is impossible to tell from
subscriber information who the device user was. It could be, for example, that
someone else in the household (or for that matter someone pirating wireless
service) is the actual infringer. That said, there seems to be a good faith basis
for naming the particular individual, and the limited knowledge possessed by
the plaintiff corresponds to the balanced, carefully limited discovery permitted
by Magistrate Judge Hammer. (ECF no. 6) The named defendant could have
responded with a denial, but defaulted instead.
Weighing the factors, I find that Malibu Media has sufficiently alleged
copyright infringement as to files #2—6, and failed to sufficiently allege
copyright infringement as to file #1. 1 will, therefore, grant in part and deny in
part the motion for default judgment against Nowobilski.
D.
Judgment
1.
Statutory Damages
Malibu Media elects statutory damages under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1).
(MDJ Br. 8 (ECF No. 15—1)) That section provides:
Except as provided by clause (2) of this subsection, the copyright
owner may elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered, to
recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of
statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action, with
respect to any one work, for which any one infringer is liable
individually, or for which any two or more infringers are liable
jointly and severally, in a sum of not less than $750 or more than
$30,000 as the court considers just. For the purposes of this
subsection, all the parts of a compilation or derivative work
constitute one work.
10
17 U.S.C.
§ 504(c)(l). The Third Circuit has yet to address it, but other United
States Courts of Appeals across the country have held or cited approvingly “the
general principle that the total number of awards of statutory damages that a
plaintiff may recover in any given action depends on the number of works that
are infringed and the number of individually liable infringers, regardless of the
number of infringements of those works.” WB Music Corp. v. RTV Commc’n Grp.,
Inc., 445 F.3d 538, 540 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted) (collecting cases from the 1st, 2nd, 5th, and DC Circuits); accord MCA
Television Ltd. v. Feltner, 89 F.3d 766, 770 (11th Cir. 1996). Thus, I will grant
only four awards for files #2—6 because files #2 and #3 contain duplicates of
the same copyrighted work.
Malibu Media asks for the minimum of $750.00 per work in damages,
multiplied by 132 works, for a requested total of $99,000. (MDJ Br. 10) The
minimum statutory award is appropriate here. “Courts considering similar
infringement actions regarding unauthorized online distribution of copyrighted
material have found statutory damages between $750.00 and $2,250.00 per
infringing work to be reasonable.” Malibu Media, LLC v. Tsao, Civ No. 15—6672,
2016 WL 3450815, at *4 (D.N.J. June 20, 2016) (collecting cases). Further,
“[clourts routinely award minimum statutory damages as part of default
judgments in copyright infringement actions.” Arista Records, LLC v. Callie, Civ
No. 07—712, 2007 WL 1746252, at *2 (D.N.J. June 15, 2007)1 have already
detailed Malibu Media’s unscrupulous use of the courts as a profit generating
business. See, e.g., Malibu Media, LLC v. Powell, Civ No. 15—1211, 2016 WL
26068, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2016) (noting “the troubling trend of copyright
trolls in this particular film industry, who file mass infringement lawsuits
against Doe defendants not to be made whole, but rather as a primary or
secondary revenue stream” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
Courts throughout the country have granted Malibu Media the minimum
statutory damages even when it has requested more. See, e.g., Malibu Media,
*34 (D. Md. July 11,
LLC v. Redacted, Civ No. 15—0750, 2016 WL 3668034, at
11
2016) (collecting cases); Malibu Media, LLC v. Ftznderburg, Civ No. 13—026 14,
2015 WL 1887754, at *34 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2015) ($2,250 requested); Malibu
*4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 24,
Media, LLC v. Cui, Civ No. 13—5897, 2014 WL 5410170, at
2014) (same); Malibu Media, LLC v. Schelling, 31 F. Supp. 3d 910, 912 (E.D.
Mich. 2014) (same). Thus I will not grant them any more money than the
statute mandates. Malibu Media is awarded statutory damages of $750 for
each of four infringed works, totaling $3,000.
2.
Injunctive Relief
Malibu Media requests a permanent injunction against Mr. Nowobilski
from continuing to infringe its works and an order that Nowobilski delete all
digital media files relating to Malibu Media’s works. (MDJ Br. 11)
“[T]he Copyright Act provides that courts ‘may’ grant injunctive relief ‘on
such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a
copyright.’” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392, 126 S. Ct.
1837 (2006) (quoting 17 U.S.C.
§ 502(a)). A plaintiff seeking a permanent
injunction must demonstrate:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies
available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to
compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity
is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be
disserved by a permanent injunction.
Id. at 391; accord Coffelt v. Fawkes, 765 F.3d 197, 201 (3d Cir. 2014).
Malibu Media has demonstrated all four prongs of the test. They have
suffered copyright infringement of their works that will continue until
Nowobilski purges the infringing works from his possession. Further, there are
no hardships to Nowobilski in preventing him from committing copyright
infringement. Finally, preventing copyright infringement would not disserve the
public interest. Thus, a permanent injunction is proper and Nowobilski is
ordered to destroy all unauthorized copies of Malibu Media’s works in his
possession.
12
3.
Attorney’s Fees and Costs
Malibu Media requests an award of attorney’s fees and costs of $1,657.
(MDJ Br. 14) $400 of that amount is for a filing fee and $75 is for process
server fees. (Declaration of Patrick J. Cerillo (“Cerillo Decl.”) ¶ 8 (ECF No. 15—5))
The remaining $1,182 consists of 1.9 attorney hours billed at $300 per hour
and 7.2 paralegal hours billed at $85 per hour. (Cerillo Decl.
¶
9)
The Copyright Act allows the prevailing party to recover costs and
attorney’s fees at the court’s discretion. 17 U.S.C.
§
505. Some courts
addressing Malibu Media as a plaintiff have pointed out that their “case is one
across the country, using nearly identical complaints and
of hundreds filed
...
motions for default judgment” and reduced or denied the requested attorney’s
fees. Schelling, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 912 (reducing attorney’s fees to $555); see
also Malibu Media, LLC v. Lara Dupuis, Civ No. 13-11435 (ECF No. 14) (E.D.
Mich. Oct. 17, 2013); Malibu Media, LLC v. Johnson, Civ No. 12—1117, 2013 WL
3895265, at *2 (S.D. md. July 29, 2013).
Reviewing the itemized bill of plaintiff’s counsel, I note two catchall
miscellaneous categories, one each for the attorney and the paralegals. The
itemized statement block-bills 1 hour of “Case management, managing
paralegals and reviewing approximately 10 e-mails; miscellaneous” by the
attorney, over a 9-month period. It also lists 2.1 hours of “Case tracking and
management; miscellaneous” by paralegals, over the same 9-month period. It
appears that this itemized chart, down to the tenths of hours and descriptions
of the work, was simply copied from another case. Except for the dates, it is
precisely identical to one filed by a different attorney in an entirely different
Malibu Media case in Indiana. See Declaration of Paul J. Nicoletti, Malibu
Media, LLC v. Saari, Civ No. 14-860 (ECF No. 33—4 ¶ 9) (S.D. md. July 14,
2015). The only possibilities seem to be (a) copying or (b) a truly remarkable
coincidence. There is reason to be skeptical that these numbers reflect
anything that happened in this case.
I will not—in this case—act on that skepticism and call the attorney in to
testify under oath. Further such coincidences may strain credulity to the
13
breaking point and persuade me to do so. For now, I will disallow the blockbilling and reduce the request by 1 hour of attorney time and 2.1 hours of
paralegal time, totaling $478.50. See Malibu Media, LLC v. Saari, Civ No. 14—
860, 2015 WL 5056887, at *4 (S.D. md. Aug. 26, 2015). Attorney’s fees of
$703.50 are awarded. With costs of $475, the total is $1,178.50.
III.
CONCLUSION
The motion for default judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in
part. Statutory damages of $3,000 are awarded as well as attorney’s fees and
costs of $1,178.50 for a total of $4, 178.50. Nowobilski is enjoined from
infringing Malibu Media’s copyrights and ordered to destroy all unauthorized
copies of Malibu Media’s works in his possession. An appropriate order will
issue.
Dated: July 26, 2016
Hon. Kevin McNulty
7
United States District Jude
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