CROSBY v. GOINES et al

Filing 69

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jose L. Linares on 10/1/2018. (sm)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Civil Action No.: 15-2472 (JLL)
LEONARD CROSBY,
OPINION
Plaintiff,
V.

DETECTIVE BOBBY GOINES,
Defendant.

LINARES, Chief District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court by way of Plaintiff Leonard Crosby’s Motion for
Reconsideration of the Court’s June 21, 2018 Opinion and Order granting Defendant Detective
Bobby Goines’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 67). Defendant submitted Opposition,
(ECf No. 68), but Plaintiff did not file a reply in the time provided by the federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Local Civil Rules, (see Docket Sheet). The Court has considered the parties’
submissions and decides this matter without oral argument pursuant to Rule 78 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. for the following reasons, the Court denies Plaintiffs motion.
I.

BACKGROUND

The Court sets forth only those facts necessary for the current motion, as a more thorough
examination of the facts was provided in the Court’s June 21, 2018 Opinion. (See ECF No. 65 at
2-4).

Plaintiff was arrested in connection with a string of gas station armed robberies that

transpired in May of 2011, including two incidents that occurred at the R.P.M gas station in
Irvington, New Jersey. (See generally ECf No. 4). Plaintiffs arrest and indictment was based
solely on the testimony Defendant provided to the grand jury.

(ECf No. 55-4

¶

9).

In his

testimony, Defendant explained that he took a statement from the gas station attendant, Singh, at
the time of the first R.P.M. robbery. (ECF No. 55-4 ¶ 12). Singh told Defendant that he would be
able to identify the robber if he saw the robber again. (Id.). “A later writing seems to indicate that
Singh told police he would not be able to identify the robber.” (ECF No. 65 at 3). Defendant also
testified that Singh was robbed by the same person ten days later, and that Singh had worked with
a sketch artist to assist in identifying the robber. (ECF No. 55-4
Plaintiff’s description, i.e., “a man with a fttll beard

...

¶

13—14). The sketch matched

having a height between 5’7” to 5’8” and

weighing between 200 to 230 pounds.” (ECF No. 65 at 4). According to Defendant, Singh then
picked Plaintiff out of a six-photo array as the man who robbed him on both occasions. (ECF No.
55-4J8).
After the grand jury heard this testimony, the aforementioned indictment was issued for
Plaintiff in connection with the two R.P.M gas station armed robberies. (Id.

¶J

9). However, the

Essex County Prosecutor’s Office later dismissed the indictment against Plaintiff, because Singh
could not be located to testify at trial. (Id.

¶

10). Plaintiff subsequently filed this case on April 7,

2015, alleging a single cause of action for malicious prosecution. (ECF No. 1; see also ECF No.
25 (amended complaint)). On March 28, 201 8, Defendant moved for summary judgment. (ECf
Nos. 55).
On June 21, 2018 the Court granted Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment after
finding that Plaintiff cannot show Defendant initiated proceedings without probable cause as a
matter of law. (ECF No. 65 at 6). The Court explained in its June 21, 2018 Opinion that there is
no evidence “in the record before this Court that shows that Defendant made any fuse statements
or material omissions during his grand jury testimony.” (Id.). Specifically, the Court stated that
“[t]he fact that Singh identified Plaintiff inore than a month after the second robbery and was not

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accompanied by an interpreter during said identification does not rise to the level of material
exculpatory information omitted from Defendant’s grand jury testimony.” (Id.). Based on this
reasoning, the Court concluded that the probable cause underlying Plaintiffs arrest remained
“presumptively valid.” (Id. at 7). Moreover, the Court stated in its June 21, 201 $ Opinion that,
even if Plaintiff could show a claim of malicious prosecution, Defendant would nevertheless be
entitled to qualified immunity, in part because it was reasonable for an officer to gather pertinent
facts and present them to the grand jury, and Defendant did not make any false statements to the
grand jury. (Id. at 8). Accordingly, the Court granted Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
(Id. at 9). Plaintiff now moves for reconsideration. (ECF No. 67).
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) governs motions for reconsideration in this District. It requires a
movant to set forth “the matter or controlling decisions which the party believes the Judge or
Magistrate Judge has overlooked.” L.Civ.R. 7. 1(i). To prevail on a motion for reconsideration,
the rnovant must show at least one of the following: “(1) an
(2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) the need to
manifest injustice.”

intervening change

colTect

in controlling law;

[a] clear error of law or prevent

Thirst v. Thirst, 663 F. App’x 231, 237 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Wieste. Lynch,

710 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 2013)).
The third prong requires “dispositive factual matters or controlling decisions of law” that
were “brought to the court’s attention but not considered.” Mason v. Sebetius, Civil No. 11-2370,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106522, at *5 (D.N.J. July 31, 2012) (quoting P. Schoenfeld Asset Mgmt.
LLC v. Cendant Coip., 161 F. Supp. 2d 349, 353 (D.N.J. 2001)). A motion for reconsideration
cannot be used merely to relitigate old matters or to present evidence that was already available to
the Court during its initial consideration. iVL Indus., Inc. v. Commercicit Union Ins. Co.. 935 F.

Supp. 513, 516 (D.N.J. 1996) (citing Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil
2d

§ 2810.1). Furthermore, “[t]he fact that an issue was not explicitly mentioned by the court does

not on its own entail that the court overlooked the matter in its initial consideration.” Morton v.
Fauver, Civil No. 97-5127, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85805, at *19 (D.N.J. July 21, 2011) (citing
Ashton v. AT&T Coip., Civil No. 03-3158, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4787, at *4_5 (D.N.J. Feb. 2,

2006)).
In other words, reconsideration is not warranted where “(1) the movant simply repeats the
cases and arguments previously analyzed by the court; or (2) the movant has filed the motion
merely to disagree with or relitigate the court’s initial decision.” CPS MedManagement LLC v.
Bergen Reg’l Med. Ctr., L.P., 940 F. Supp. 2d 141, 167—68 (D.N.J. 2013) (internal citations and
quotations omitted). A motion for reconsideration is generally futile “[u]nless a court has truly
failed to consider pertinent authorities or evidence that could not with reasonable diligence have
been presented earlier.” Id. at 168.
III.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff does not argue that there was any intervening change in law or new evidence. (See
ECF No. 67-1). Rather, Plaintiff claims that the Court overlooked “dispositive factual matters
pertaining to the finding of probable cause that exist in the reconstructed affidavit [of Defendant].”
(Id. at 10). Specifically, Plaintiff claims that the Court did not consider that Defendant oversold
to the jury how confident his sole witness—Singh——was that he could identify the robber, as
Defendant did not inform the grand jury that Singh supposedly indicated on one occasion that he
would not be able to identify the robber. (Id. at 10—13). Plaintiff further argues that the Court
overlooked Defendant’s oniission in his grand jury testimony that his investigation into Plaintiff
as a potential suspect was based on more than just Singh’s sketch. (Id. at 14). Rather, Plaintiff

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claims that Defendant

only

suspected Plaintiff after “a K-9 sniff trail was lost” in connection with

a separate but similar robbery and Defendant was directed by witnesses to Plaintiffs location.
(Id.). Finally, Plaintiff contends that, based on the supposed omissions in the Court’s June 21,
201$ Opinion, there is also a material dispute of fact as to whether Defendant is entitled to qualified
immunity. (Id. at 1 5).
Contrary to Plaintiffs arguments, the June 21, 201$ Opinion specifically analyzed any
alleged omissions made by Defendant in his grand jury testimony. In its June 2 1, 201 $ Opinion,
the Court included the fact that “[a] later writing seems to indicate that Singh told police he would
not be able to identify the robber.” (ECF No. 65 at 3). The Court also stated in its June 21, 201$
Opinion that the sketch provided by Singh was one of the factors that led Defendant to investigate
Plaintiff as a potential stispect. (See id.). The Court referenced other evidence Defendant relied
on in identifying Plaintiff, such as “Defendant’s review of a surveillance video from the R.P.M.
gas station” (Id.). The Court explained in its June 21, 201 $ Opinion that any details in the record
that Defendant may have omitted fiom his grand jury testimony “[did] not rise to the level of

material exculpatory information.” (Id. at 6 (emphasis added)). Based on this analysis, the Court
found that “Plaintiff cannot show that Defendant initiated the criminal proceedings against
Plaintiff without probable cause.” (Id. at 7).’
As shown above, the Court did not overlook any of Plaintiffs arguments in its June 21,
201$ Opinion. In fact, the arguments and evidence relied on by Plaintiff were previously available
to, and considered by, the Court, as Plaintiff initially raised same in his opposition to Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment. (See ECF No. 59 at 16—18, 22—23, 30). To the extent the Court

The Court also rejects Plaintiffs final argument regarding qualified immunity. (ECf No. 67-I at 15). The Court
agrees with Defendant that said argument does not raise an independent ground for reconsideration separate from
Plaintiffs other conteiflions. (ECF No. 68 at 5—6), which the Court has already rejected.
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did not specifically mention any arguments or facts asserted by Plaintiff, said fact “does not on its

own entail that the court overlooked the matter in its initial consideration.” Morton, 2011 U.s.
Dist. LEXIS $5805, at *19 (citing Ashton, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4787, at *4_5). Rather, the

Court frilly considered same in forming its June 21, 2018 Opinion, and decided these facts and
arguments were not sufficient for Plaintiff to survive summary judgment in light of the other
evidence in the record. (See generally ECF No. 65). Instead of pointing to contradictory evidence
that the Court may have overlooked, Plaintiff relies on his previous arguments “merely to disagiee
with or relitigate the cotirt’s initial decision,” which is not enough to carry its burden on a motion
for reconsideration. PS MedManagement LLC, 940 F. Supp. 2d at 167—68. Accordingly, the
Court must deny Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Based on the aforementioned reasons, the Court hereby denies Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration. An appropriate Order follows this Opinion.

Dated:

/‘2018.

United States District Judge

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