SMITH v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES
Filing
32
OPINION fld. Signed by Judge Jose L. Linares on 3/8/16. (sr, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
MOSES LEE SMITH,
Plaintiff,
V.
ESSEX COUNTY DIVISION OF WELFARE,
NEWARK PUBLIC WELFARE,
Civil Action No.: 15-2511 (iLL)
OPINION
Defendants.
Linares, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court by way of a motion to dismis
s Pro se Plaintiff Moses
Lee Smith’s Amended Complaint, filed by Defendant Essex County
Division of Welfare (the
“Division”). (ECF No. 25). On February 8, 2016, Plaintiff filed
an opposition to the Division’s
motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 28).’ Pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 78, the Court
decides this motion without oral argument. For the reasons stated
herein, the Court grants the
Divison’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed the instant action in New Jersey Superior Court on
or around March 10, 2015,
alleging claims only against the New Jersey Department of
Human Services (the “NJ DHS”).
(ECF No. 1-i). On August 5, 2015, the undersigned issued
an Order dismissing the NJ DHS from
this action as the NJ DHS is not a “person” subject to suit within
the meaning of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.
In its February 16, 2016 Order, this Court noted that while
Plaintiff’s February 8, 2016 submission is labeled as a
“Reply/Objection to allowance of extended time to defense after
their time to answer the complaint has expired,” it
is more properly construed as an opposition to the Division’s
motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 30).
I
(ECF No. 14). The Court permitted Plaintiff the opportuni
ty to amend his Complaint to “name
proper defendants as afforded [to] him by law.” (Id.). Plain
tiff filed the operative Amended
Complaint on August 24, 2015, this time naming Essex Cou
nty Division of Welfare and Newark
Public Welfare as Defendants. (ECF No. 15, Amended Com
plaint, “Compi.”). The Amended
Complaint states, in its entirety:
Plaintiff and his three children were denied Due Process and
Equal protection of law by
defendants which also resulted in Intentional infliction of
Emotional Distress, Fraudulent
Misrepresentation of documents that were used to impe
ded and then deny plaintiff and his
three children state benefits which included Medicaid, gran
t monies and state resource for
homeless.
(Compi. at 1).
On January 25, 2016, the Division filed the instant motion to
dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint on account of Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administ
rative remedies and failure to state
a claim for relief, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedur
e 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), respectively.
(ECF No. 25-2, “Def.’s Mov. Br.” at 1). Plaintiff has oppo
sed this motion. (ECF No. 28, “P1.’s
Opp. Br.”).
LEGAL STANDARD
To withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plain
tiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defe
ndant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility standard is not
akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendan
t has acted unlawfully.” Id. “Threadbare
2
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Id.
When reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint filed by a pro se
litigant, the Court has “a
special obligation to construe his complaint liberally.” See Higgs
v. Atty Gen. ofthe United States,
655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011) (quotations omitted).
That said, even a pro se litigant’s
Complaint is subject to dismissal if a Court, after liberally constru
ing same, finds that the plaintiff
has not met the threshold pleading standards outlined by the Federa
l Rules
of Civil Procedure and
case law, See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989) (“To
the extent that a complaint filed
in forma pauperis which fails to state a claim lacks even an arguab
le basis in law, Rule 1 2(b)(6)
counsel[s] dismissal.”).
Dismissal under Rule 1 2(b)(6) is particularly appropriate where, as
in this case, a plaintiff
fails to exhaust all administrative remedies available to him prior
to filing suit. See Robinson v.
Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1020 (3d Cir. 1997) (“It is abasic tenet
of administrative law that aplaintiff
must exhaust all required administrative remedies before bringin
g a claim for judicial relief.”)
(citing McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969)).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs claims arise out of the Division’s denial of “state benefit
s which included Medic
aid,
grant monies and state resources for the homeless.” (Compi.
at I). Stated differently, Plaintiff
appears to be seeking an appeal of the Division’s denial of state
benefits to which he believes he
is entitled.
In New Jersey, “whenever under statute or agency rule there is
a mode of administrative review
within an agency, such review shall remain unimpaired and
any judicial review shall be from the
final action of the agency.” N.J.S.A. 52:14B-12. However,
“an agency action does not become
3
final until all avenues of internal administrative review of have been
exhausted.” Bouie v. N.J
Dept of Community Affairs, 407 N.J. Super 518, 527 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2009); see also
R. 2:2-3(a)(2) (providing that all final state administrative agency’s decisio
ns are appealable as of
right).
The administrative review regulations with respect to public assista
nce programs in New
Jersey are outlined in the New Jersey Administrative Code. N.J.A.
C.
§ 10:90-9.1 to 9.17.
Specifically, an applicant of welfare benefits who has been denied
same “by an action of a county
agency [is] to be afforded a fair hearing in a manner established by
the rules in this subcha
pter”
before an impartial Administrative Law Judge. N.J.A.C.
§ 10:90-9.3. The Director of the Division
of Family Services then reviews the AU’s decision and issues a final
agency decision. N.J.A.C.
10:90-9.16. Only after a public welfare applicant has secured
the Director’s final decision may
the applicant seek redress from a Court. However, the proper
avenue for appeal of final agency
decisions is the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court.
R. 2:2-3(a)(2).
Despite the numerous review opportunities that the State of New
Jersey has provided for state
benefit applicants, Plaintiffs Complaint is barren of any eviden
ce that he attempted to appeal the
Division’s denial of certain benefits. Accordingly, this matter
is properly disposed of on account
of Plaintiffs failure to exhaust his administrative remedies at the
State level.
Moreover, Plaintiff cannot escape the exhaustion requirement
by attempting to plead a
constitutional violation—namely, that the denial of benefits
violated his family’s rights to “due
process and equal protection.” (Compi. at 1). Indeed, “[t]he
mere allegation that a constitutional
issue is involved does not relieve plaintiffs of the exhaus
tion requirement.
To avoid this
requirement, plaintiff must demonstrate not only that the constit
utional question is colorable, but
that the matter contains no factual questions which require admini
strative determination.” Brunetti
4
v. Borough of New Milford, 68 NJ. 576, 590 (1975). Plaintiff
has demonstrated neither of these
requirements. Therefore—and particularly where it appears
that Plaintiff is merely seeking to
appeal the Division’s denial of benefits—Dismissal of Plaintiffs
Complaint is warranted.
Even if Plaintiff could demonstrate that he is not required
to exhaust the administrative
remedies he is entitled to under the laws and regulations of the
State of New Jersey, this Court
would dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint for failure to state a claim.
As Plaintiff alleges violations of
“due process and equal protection of law,” the Court wou
ld construe Plaintiffs Complaint as
seeking relief under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. To assert a claim under the statute, a plaintiff must show
that he was a deprived of a federal constitutional or statutory
right by a state actor. Woodyard v.
Cnt. OfEssex, 514 F. App’x 177, 180 (3d Cir. 2013). When evalu
ating the merits of a Section
1983 claim, the Court must identify the contours of the unde
rlying right Plaintiff claims was
violated and determine whether Plaintiff has properly alleg
ed a violation of that right. Nicini v.
Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (3d Cir. 2000).
The Court agrees with the Division that Plaintiffs one-sente
nce Complaint, recited above,
“patently fail[sj to provide any facts to support a plausible
claim that a state actor, acting under
color of state law deprived plaintiff of any rights secured
by the United States Constitution or
federal law or that such a denial was made in contravention
of any state law or entitlement.”
(Def.’s Mov. Br. at 6).
For these reasons, the Court will grant the Division’s moti
on to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and failure
to state a claim.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court grants the Divi
sion’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs
Amended Complaint. An appropriate Order accompanies
this Opinion.
5
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:
March ,2016
STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?