BRADLEY v. RODRIGUEZ

Filing 83

OPINION AND ORDER denying 71 Motion to Amend/Correct First Amended Complaint. Signed by Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion on 2/28/2018. (ld, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BRADLEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
RODRIGUEZ,
Defendants.

Civil Action No.
2:15-CV-2603-SDW-SCM
OPINION AND ORDER ON
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
[D.E. 71]

STEVEN C. MANNION, United States Magistrate Judge.
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint.1 Defendant
opposed the motion,2 and Plaintiff replied.3 The Court has reviewed the parties’ respective
submissions, and heard oral argument on February 13, 2018.4 For the reasons set forth herein,
Plaintiff’s motion is denied.

1

(ECF Docket Entry (“D.E.”) 71, Mot. to Am.).

2

(D.E. 72, Def.’s Opp’n).

3

(D.E. 78, Pl.’s Reply).

4

Fed. R. Civ. P. 78.

I.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY5
Terrence Bradley (“Mr. Bradley”), now deceased, filed the original Complaint in this case

on April 10, 2015 as a pro se plaintiff.6 The Complaint asserted a malicious prosecution claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Alex Rodriguez (“Mr. Rodriguez”) in both his individual and
official capacities.7 After a required sua sponte screening, the District Court issued an Order on
May 7, 2015, which allowed Mr. Bradley to proceed with his individual capacity claim, but
dismissed the official capacity claim.8 The District Court, citing Monell, noted that, “[a] suit
against a police officer in his official capacity represents only an alternative means by which to
raise a claim against the entity of which the officer is an agent.” 9 It then elaborated that since “a
municipality, such as the City of Newark, may not be sued under a respondeat superior theory of
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that the municipality itself has
committed a violation of federal law.”10 Again citing Monell, the District Court further explained
that “to plead a claim for relief against a municipality under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the
municipality implemented a policy, ordinance, regulation, or custom which caused the deprivation
of that plaintiff’s rights.”11 Finally, the District Court concluded that, “Plaintiff has not pled that

5

The allegations set forth within the pleadings and motion record are relied upon for purposes of
this motion only. The Court has made no findings as to the veracity of the parties’ allegations.
6

(D.E. 1, Compl.).

7

Id.; (D.E. 5, Order, May 7, 2015, 1).

8

(D.E. 5, Order, May 7, 2015, 1).

9

Id. (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55 (1978)).

10

Id. (citing Los Angeles Cnty. v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 35-36 (2010)).

11

(D.E. 5, Order, May 7, 2015, 2) (citing Humphries, 562 U.S. at 35-36 and Monell, 436 U.S. at
690-91).
2

there was a municipal custom, policy, or ordinance which resulted in the alleged malicious
prosecution by Defendant, and thus has not pled a proper Monell claim against the municipality
(the City of Newark) of which Defendant is an agent.”12 On June 8, 2015, Mr. Bradley filed an
Amended Complaint, which asserted only the individual capacity claim against Mr. Rodriguez.13
After a delay due to Mr. Bradley having served the wrong person and failing to serve Mr.
Rodriquez,14 Mr. Rodriquez filed a motion to dismiss on April 13, 2016,15 which was denied.16
On November 10, 2016, the Court entered a Scheduling Order, which set a discovery end
date of May 12, 2017, and a deadline for seeking leave to amend of March 10, 2017. 17 The
Scheduling Order also stated that interrogatories and document requests were to be served by
December 9, 2016.18 On December 8, 2016, Mr. Bradley asked for an extension of time to serve
his documents requests,19 which the Court granted.20 After the Court granted that extention, there

12

(D.E. 5, Order, May 7, 2015, 2).

13

(D.E. 9, Am. Compl.).

14

(D.E. 18); (D.E. 24-3, Sec. Mot. to Vacate, Def.’s Cert., ¶¶ 3-4).

15

(D.E. 26, Mot. to Dismiss).

16

(D.E. 35, Order, Aug. 1, 2016).

17

(D.E. 43, Sched. Order, Nov. 10, 2016).

18

Id.

19

(D.E. 46, Pl.’s Ltr., Dec. 8, 2016).

20

(D.E. 47, Order, Dec. 14, 2016).
3

was no further activity on the docket until April 7, 2017, when the Court issued an order scheduling
a video conference.21 This order was returned to the Court as undeliverable on May 8, 2017.22
On May 11, 2017, defense counsel submitted a letter requesting leave to file a motion to
dismiss for Mr. Bradley’s failure to provide discovery.23 The letter stated, among other things, that
Mr. Bradley had not responded to interrogatories or document requests, that he failed to appear
twice for depositions, and that he was no longer incarcerated.24 The letter notified the Court of Mr.
Bradley’s new address, something Mr. Bradley failed to do in violation of this District’s local
rules.25 (Mr. Bradley had previously filed three notices of changes to his address in this case.26)
The letter also conceded that the defense had served its document requests and interrogatories at
the end of February, approximately two months after the December 19, 2016 deadline. 27
On May 12, 2017, the Court issued an order to show cause to Mr. Bradley for his failure to
notify the Court of his change in address.28 The order set a status conference for June 5, 2017, and
directed Mr. Bradley to file papers by May 29, 2017, showing good cause why the case should not

21

(D.E. 48, Order, Apr. 7, 2017).

22

(D.E. 49).

23

(D.E. 50, Def.’s Ltr., May 11, 2017).

24

Id.

Id.; L. Civ. R. 10.1(a) (“Counsel and/or unrepresented parties must advise the Court of any
change in their or their client’s address within seven days of being apprised of such change by
filing a notice of said change with the Clerk.”)
25

26

(D.E. 4; D.E. 17; D.E. 19).

27

(D.E. 50, Def.’s Ltr., May 11, 2017).

28

(D.E. 51, Order, May 12, 2017).
4

be dismissed.29 Mr. Bradley did not file any papers showing good cause. He did, however, appear
for the conference on June 5, 2017, and on that day the Court received a letter from him responding
to defense counsel’s May 11, 2017 letter.30 Mr. Bradley’s letter pointed out that Mr. Rodriguez
only responded to Mr. Bradley’s December 9, 2016 document request on April 12, 2017, and that
Mr. Rodriguez did not serve any document requests or interrogatories until February 24, 2017, as
defense counsel conceded in its May 11, 2017 letter.31 Mr. Bradley’s letter also stated that he had
“communications problems [sic]” in scheduling a despotion with defense counsel and in otherwise
coordinating with defense counsel, but he did not discuss his own failure to respond to discovery
requests or to notify the Court of his change in address.32
The Court discussed a variety of issues with the parties during the June 5, 2017
conference.33 In response to the Court’s inquiry as to why he failed to notify the Court of his
change in address, Mr. Bradley claimed that when he was released from prison on December 21,
2016, he had left a letter regarding his change in address with a guard at the prison who was to
send it to the Court.34 In response to the Court’s question as to why he failed to respond to the
order to show cause, Mr. Bradley said that he thought his letter regarding discovery that the Court
received that day fulfilled his obligaitons in that regard.35 The Court also discussed the discovery

29

Id.

30

Id.

31

Id.

32

Id.

33

(D.E. 52, Oral Arg., June 5, 2017).

34

Id.

35

Id.
5

disputes with the parties, and ultimately ordered both sides to respond to the overdue discovery
requests within fourteen days.36 During a conversation over the relevance of certain personel
reports that Mr. Bradley was seeking, the Court at one point distinguished between a claim against
an officer as an individual and a claim against a city or a police department, specifically referring
to the latter as a Monell claim.37 Mr. Bradley also indicated during the conference that he was
aware of a consent decree between the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the City of Newark
relating to unconstitutional practices by the City’s police department.38 At no point during the
conference (nor in any submission prior to it) did Mr. Bradley mention a desire to amend the
complaint or to bring a claim against the City of Newark or the Newark Police Department.39 He
did discuss the possibility of acquiring counsel.40 In the Supplemental Scheduling Order issued
after the conference, the Court extended the discovery deadline until August 7, 2017.41
There was no further activity on the docket until current Plaintiff’s counsel entered an
appearance on August 3, 2017.42 The next day he filed a letter which requested an extension to the
discovery deadline, advised of a potential desire to amend the complaint, and conceded that Mr.

36

(D.E. 52, Supp. Sched. Order, June 5, 2017).

37

(D.E. 52, Oral Arg., June 5, 2017).

38

Id.

39

Id.

40

Id.

41

(D.E. 52, Supp. Sched. Order, June 5, 2017).

42

(D.E. 53, Notice of Appearance).
6

Bradley had still not responded to Mr. Rodriquez’s first set of interrogatories.43 After a status
conference a few days later, the Court issued another Supplemental Scheduling Order, which
extended the discovery deadline until November 7, 2017, and again ordered Mr. Bradley to
respond to overdue discovery requests within fourteen days.44 After a telephone conference on
September 25, 2017, the Court extended the discovery deadline solely for purposes of depositions
until December 7, 2017.45
On November 9, 2017, Plaintiff’s counsel submitted a letter notifying the Court and
defense counsel of Mr. Bradley’s death.46 After two more conferences, the Court set a date for the
filing of both the present motion and Mr. Rodriquez’s pending motion for summary judgment,
which were both filed on December 29, 2017.47 The Court heard oral argument for the motion
seeking leave to amend on February 13, 2018.48 The proposed amendment seeks to add the City
of Newark and the Newark Police Department as defendants in the action, and to add five more
counts to the single malicious prosecution count pled in the operative Amended Complaint,
including four counts of federal civil rights violations and one count of a New Jersey constitutional

43

(D.E. 57, Pl.’s Ltr., Aug. 4, 2017).

44

(D.E. 58, Supp. Sched. Order, Aug. 7, 2017).

45

(D.E. 62, Order, Sept. 25, 2017).

46

(D.E. 63, Pl.’s Ltr., Nov. 9, 2017).

47

(D.E. 67, Order, Nov. 28, 2017); (D.E. 70, Mot. for Summ. J.); (D.E. 71, Mot. to Am.).

48

Fed. R. Civ. P. 78.
7

violation.49 (On February 9, 2017, Plaintiff’s counsel filed a motion for extension of time to file a
motion to substitute a party for the now-deceased Mr. Bradley.50)
II.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE AUTHORITY
Magistrate judges are authorized to decide any non-dispositive motion designated by the

Court.51 This District has specified that magistrate judges may determine any non-dispositive pretrial motion.52 Motions to amend are non-dispositive.53 Decisions by magistrate judges must be
upheld unless “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.”54
III.

DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS
A.

Rule 16 “Good Cause” Analysis

“Where deadlines for amending pleadings are the subject of a scheduling order and the
deadlines have passed, the moving party must meet Rule 16’s good cause standard in order to
amend.”55 What will constitute “good cause” to warrant modification “necessarily varies with the

49

(D.E. 71-3, Mot. to Am., Proposed Am. Compl.).

50

(D.E. 81, Pl.’s Mot.).
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).

51

52

L. Civ. R. 72.1(a)(1).

Continental Cas. Co. v. Dominick D’Andrea, Inc., 150 F.3d 245, 251 (3rd Cir. 1998) (internal
citations omitted).
53

54

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).

55

See Stallings ex rel. Estate of Stallings v. IBM Corp., No. 08-3121, 2009 WL 2905471, at *16
(D.N.J. Sept. 8, 2009) (citing Eastern Minerals & Chemicals Co. v. Mahan, 225 F.3d 330, 340
(3rd Cir. 2000)).
8

circumstances of each case,” 56 and the Court has discretion to determine what kind of showing a
party must make to satisfy the good cause requirement.57 Whether good cause exists largely
depends on the diligence of the moving party.58 “[A] party is presumptively not diligent if, at the
commencement of the lawsuit, the party knows or is in possession of the information that is the
basis for that party's later motion to amend.”59 “[W]hile pro se litigants in general deserve more
lenient treatment than those represented by counsel, all litigants, including pro ses, have an
obligation to comply with Court orders. When they flout that obligation, they, like all litigants,
must suffer the consequences of their actions.”60
The Court first addresses Plaintiff’s argument that Rule 16 should not apply because the
discovery deadline has been extended three times.61 Plaintiff argues, quoting In re: L’Oreal, that
“‘it would be illogical to hold Plaintiff[] to an amendment deadline date in a scheduling order that
long ago went stale.’”62 However, discovery deadlines are often extended without a corresponding

56

High 5 Games, LLC v. Marks, No. 13-7161, 2017 WL 349375, at *2 n.2 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2017)
(citing 6A Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 1522.2, at 313 (3d ed. 2010)).
57

See Phillips v. Greben, No. 04–5590, 2006 WL 3069475, at *6 (D.N.J. Oct. 27, 2006) (internal
quotations omitted); Thoman v. Philips Med. Sys., No. 04-3698, 2007 WL 203943, at *10 (D.N.J.
Jan. 24, 2007) (citing 3 James W. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 16.14[1] [b] (3d
ed.1997)).
58

Phillips, 2006 WL 3069475, at *6 (D.N.J. Oct. 27, 2006) (citing Harrison Beverage Co. v.
Dribeck Importers, Inc., 133 F.R.D. 463, 469 (D.N.J. 1990)).
59

Chancellor v. Pottsgrove Sch. Dist., 501 F. Supp. 2d 695, 702 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (citing S&W
Enters., L.L.C. v. Southtrust Bank of Ala., NA, 315 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2003)).
60

Burns v. Glick, 158 F.R.D. 354, 356 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (citation and internal brackets and quotation
marks omitted); see also id. (“[I]t was incumbent upon [pro se plaintiff] personally to ensure that
the litigation proceeded in accordance with the scheduling order.”).
61

(D.E. 71-1, Mot. to Am., Pl.’s Br., 13).

62

Id. (quoting In re: L'Oreal Wrinkle Cream Mktg. Practices Litig., 2015 WL 5770202, at *3
(D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2015)).
9

extension to the amendment deadline. When the Court extended the discovery deadlines in this
case, it never indicated or implied that the unchanged portions of the scheduling order were no
longer applicable or “stale.” A particular amendment to a scheduling order does not render
inoperative the remainder of the scheduling order. Moreover, Mr. Bradley did not mention a desire
to amend his pleading at any time until present Plaintiff’s counsel’s letter of August 4, 2017, just
under five months after the deadline had passed.63
Of course, it is possible in certain circumstances that a court officially extends only the
discovery deadline, but practically intended to extend the amendment deadline as well, and later
recognizes such an intention by not requiring the party seeking leave to amend to meet the Rule
16 standard. That seems to have been the situation in In re: L’Oreal. But that case is far afield
from this case. In re: L’Oreal was a multidistrict class action with twenty-six alleged counts in
which “[e]very issue [was] fought tooth and nail[.]”64 The court there reflected that, “[s]imply put,
this is a scorched earth litigation battle with no party giving quarter on almost any issue. Thus,
progress has been slow. Despite a discovery period of more than a year, the parties agree that many
additional months of discovery will be needed, and that does not account for expert discovery and
motion practice. The reality is the case is still in the somewhat early stages and much remains to
be accomplished.”65 By contrast, this is a case in which a single plaintiff has alleged one count
against a single defendant,66 there has been only one (informal) discovery dispute, and there is

63

(D.E. 57, Pl.’s Ltr., Aug. 4, 2017).

64

In re: L'Oreal Wrinkle Cream Mktg. Practices Litig., 2015 WL 5770202, at *1.

65

Id.

66

(D.E. 9, Am. Compl.).
10

currently a summary judgment motion pending.67 This case more closely resembles Prime Ins.
Syndicate v. United Risk Mgmt. Servs., Inc., where then-Magistrate Judge Shwartz thrice extended
the discovery deadline without extending the amendment deadline, and then held that the plaintiff
was required to show good cause under Rule 16 in order to amend the complaint after the
amendment deadline passed (and that the plaintiff failed to do so).68 The district court upheld that
decision.69 Similarly, though the Court here extended the discovery deadline three times, it never
extended the amendment deadline, which expired approximately five months before Plaintiff
evinced any desire to amend the complaint. Therefore, Plaintiff must show good cause under Rule
16.
The Court finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated good cause for his failure to comply
with the scheduling order deadline of March 10, 2017 for seeking leave to file a motion to amend
the Complaint. Plaintiff’s counsel acknowledges that “[t]he most common basis for finding a lack
of good cause is the party’s knowledge of a potential claim before the deadline to amend has
passed[,]”70 but claims that “Plaintiff was unaware of his potential Monell claim until he retained
counsel in August 2017.”71 As noted above, however, the District Court explicitly discussed
Monell in its screening opinion, and included a description of what a plaintiff is required to plead

67

(D.E. 70, Def.’s Mot. Summ. J.).

68

2006 WL 2085388, at *1 (D.N.J. July 25, 2006).

69

Id., at *4.

(D.E. 71-1, Mot. to Am., Pl.’s Br., 15) (citing Stallings ex rel. Estate of Stallings v. IBM Corp.,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81963, at *16 (D.N.J. Sept. 8, 2009)).
70

71

(D.E. 71-1, Mot. to Am., Pl.’s Br., 15).
11

in order to establish a Monell claim.72 Mr. Bradley undoubtedly read and understood that opinion,
as he filed the operative Amended Complaint in line with that opinion’s holding that only the
individual capacity claim was to proceed against Mr. Rodriquez.73 Mr. Bradley, therefore, was
indeed aware of a potential Monell claim in the first half of 2015, over two years before counsel
claims he informed Mr. Bradley of such a potential claim. Even were the Court were to assume
that in order to be aware of his potential Monell claim, Mr. Bradley needed to be aware of the
March 2016 consent decree between the City of Newark and the DOJ mentioned in Plaintiff’s
reply, that decree was announced publically eight months before the Scheduling Order was issued
and almost a year before the amendment deadline.74 Mr. Bradley also mentioned the decree during
his June 2017 appearance before the Court, which was approximately two months before his
contact with present counsel.75 These facts undermine Plaintiff’s counsel claim that, “Plaintiff was
unaware of his potential Monell claim until he retained counsel in August 2017.”76
The Court also finds that Mr. Bradley has not been diligent. Plaintiff’s counsel claims that
Mr. Bradley “continuously exercised reasonable diligence throughout the course of these
proceedings,”77 but that is contradicted by the record. Mr. Bradley got out of prison on December

72

See supra nn. 9-12 and accompanying text.

73

(D.E. 9, Am. Compl.).

(D.E. 78, Pl.’s Reply, 6). Plaintiff’s counsel confuses his dates in this portion of his argument,
claiming that the March 30, 2016 consent decree came after the amendment deadline of “March
10, 2016,” when the actual deadline was March 10, 2017.
74

75

(D.E. 52, Oral Arg., June 5, 2017).

76

(D.E. 71-1, Mot. to Am., Pl.’s Br., 15).

77

(D.E. 71-1, Mot. to Am, Pl.’s Br, 13).
12

21, 2016, and failed to inform the Court of that change in address. 78 Even if it were true that he
left a note with a prison guard, that is not an exercise in reasonable diligence. Instead, it would
have been diligent for Mr. Bradley to have mailed that notice himself given that he was being freed
from incarceration. Mr. Bradley made no contact with the Court between December 8, 2016 and
his appearance on June 5, 2017 (despite being required to do so at least twice – once in order to
update his address and another to file papers showing good cause79). Furthermore, though it is true
that Mr. Rodriquez was not timely with his discovery demands and responses, Mr. Bradley was
also dilatory in his responses to discovery requests.80 On August 4, 2017, Plaintiff’s counsel
conceded that Mr. Bradley had still not produced discovery that was ordered to be produced by
June 19, 2017.81 Mr. Bradley also never raised any issue regarding Mr. Rodriguez’s dilatoriness,
despite having the instructions for doing so in the Scheduling Order,82 until after the Court ordered
Mr. Bradley’s appearance on June 5, 2017. Mr. Bradley had two-and-a-half months between his
release from prison and the amendment deadline, and he did not once engage with the Court from
the time of his release until his appearance almost three months after the amendment deadline. He
first raised the issue of amending his pleading two months after that appearance, in the very same
submission in which he conceded he had not provided discovery that the Court had previously

78

(D.E. 52, Oral Arg., June 5, 2017).

79

(D.E. 51, Order, May 12, 2017).

80

(D.E. 50, Def.’s Ltr., May 11, 2017).

(D.E. 57, Pl.’s Ltr., Aug. 4, 2017) (“Plaintiff acknowledges that his responses to defendant’s
first set of interrogatories remain outstanding[.]”); (D.E. 52, Order, June 5, 2017) (“Each party is
to respond to overdue discovery requests within 14 days.”).
81

82

(D.E. 43, Sched. Order, Nov. 10, 2017).
13

ordered produced.83 For these reasons, Mr. Bradley did not excercise the necessary diligence to
demonstrate good cause under Rule 16 for his failure to seek amendment until five months after
the amendment deadline.84
Because Mr. Bradley was aware of a potential Monell claim long before the amendment
deadline passed, and because he was not diligent, he cannot meet Rule 16’s good cause standard.
Though this renders Rule 15 analysis unnecessary, the Court will nonetheless briefly address Rule
15 to demonstrate that Mr. Bradley would fail to meet that standard as well.

B.

Rule 15 Analysis

“[A] party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the
court’s leave.”85 The decision to grant or deny leave to amend is “committed to the sound

83

(D.E. 57, Pl.’s Ltr., Aug. 4, 2017).

In his argument regarding diligence, Plaintiff’s counsel makes much of the fact that Mr.
Bradley asked three times for the appointment of pro bono counsel. (See D.E. 71-1, Mot. to Am.,
Pl.’s Br., 10; D.E. 78, Reply, 3-4). However, civil litigants possess neither a constitutional nor a
statutory right to appointed counsel, Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 498 (3d Cir. 2002),
and a court must “take note of the significant practical restraints on the district courts’ ability to
appoint counsel[.]” Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 157 (3d Cir. 1993). In denying Mr. Bradley’s
first request, the Court discussed the relevant factors and noted that Mr. Bradley’s “filings with
the Court thus far reflect a general understanding of the litigation process” and that “without the
aid of counsel, [Mr. Bradley] provided a detailed report of the facts and showed familiarity with
the nature of his legal claims.” (D.E. 14, Order, July 28, 2015, 1). The Court also noted that “the
legal issues at this juncture of the case do not appear to be particularly difficult or complex, and
they do not present any novel issues of law[,]” but rather “relate to standard civil rights
allegations[,]” and that expert testimony would likely not be necessary. (D.E. 14, Order, July 28,
2015, 2-3). Mr. Bradley’s second request consisted of a single sentence without any discussion
of the factors the Court discussed in its denial, (D.E. 29, Pl.’s Ltr., May 3, 2016), and his third
request, (D.E. 38, Pl.’s Mot., Oct. 13, 2016), was “substantially identical to his first request.”
(D.E. 41, Order, Nov. 2, 2016). Due to their summary nature, the second and third requests do
not represent any particular diligence on Mr. Bradley’s part.
84

85

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
14

discretion of the district court.”86 While courts have broad discretion to decide motions to amend,
they are to “heed Rule 15(a)’s mandate that amendments are to be granted freely in the interests
of justice.”87 This ensures that “a particular claim will be decided on the merits rather than on
technicalities.”88 In the absence of unfair prejudice, futility of amendment, undue delay, bad faith,
or dilatory motive, the court must grant a request for leave to amend.89 “Prejudice may result from
an amendment where a party has to change ‘tactics or case theories’ because of the new claims.”90
“Prejudice may also result where the amendment will require the re-opening of discovery, would
delay resolution of the matter, or would unnecessarily increase the cost of litigation.”91
As discussed, the operative Amended Complaint alleges a single count of malicious
prosecution against an individual defendant.92 The proposed amendment seeks to add two
governmental defendants and five additional counts.93 The proposed amendment, therefore, would
vastly expand the scope of this case. Plaintiff claims that “any additional discovery would be
extremely limited in scope[,]”94 but it is doubtful that hypothetical counsel for the proposed

86

Arab African Int’l Bank v. Epstein, 10 F.3d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 1993).

87

Voilas et al. v. General Motors Corp., et al., 173 F.R.D. 389, 396 (D.N.J. 1997) (internal
citations and quotations omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
88

Dole v. Arco Chem. Co., 921 F.2d 484, 487 (3d Cir. 1990) (internal citation omitted).

89

Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 292 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).

90

Stallings, 2009 WL 2905471, at *17 (citing Kiser v. Gen. Elec. Corp., 831 F.2d 423, 428 (3rd
Cir. 1987)).
91

Stallings, 2009 WL 2905471, at *17.

92

(D.E. 9, Am. Compl.).

93

(See D.E. 71-3, Mot. to Am., Proposed Am. Compl.).

94

(D.E. 71-1, Mot. to Am., Pl.’s Br., 18).
15

defendants would agree, and given that Mr. Bradley has died and will not be available for any
further deposition or cross examination, the prejudice would be particularly unfair. Furthermore,
the amendment would unquestionably delay resolution of the matter. As Plaintiff rightly concedes,
“the matter is extremely old and further delay may place an unwarranted burden on the Court[.]”95
For these reasons, Plaintiff fails to meet the Rule 15 standard for amendment.

IV.

CONCLUSION
Since Plaintiff has not demonstrated good cause under Rule 16 nor met the Rule 15

standard, his motion for leave to amend is denied.
An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
IT IS on this Wednesday, February 28, 2018,
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the Complaint is DENIED.

2/28/2018 1:15:04 PM

Original: Clerk of the Court
Hon. Susan D. Wigenton, U.S.D.J.
cc:
All parties
File

95

(D.E. 71-1, Mot. to Am., Pl.’s Br., 19).
16