COURBOIN v. SCOTT et al
Filing
18
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Kevin McNulty on 3/3/2016. (nr, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
ROBERT C. COURBOIN,
Civ. No. 15-cv-2639 (KM)
Plaintiff,
V.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
CANDACE SCOTT; SCOTT AND
DALY, LLC; CANDACE SCOTT, LLC;
KALMAN A. BARSON; BARSON
GROUP, LLC; ARTHUR J. SMITH;
ARTHUR J. SMITH APPRAISALS,
LLC,
Defendants.
KEVIN MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.:
A.
Introduction
The plaintiff, Robert C. Courboin, is suing the lawyers who represented
his ex-wife, as well as expert appraisers hired by his ex-wife, in his divorce
proceeding. He asserts claims under RICO and the antitrust laws.
Now before the Court are the following motions:
Motion (ECF no. 7) of defendants Arthur J. Smith Appraisal, LLC
and Arthur J. Smith (the “Smith Defendants”) to dismiss the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)
Motion (ECF no. 9) of defendants Candace Scott, LLC, Candace
Scott, and Scott and Daly, LLC (the “Scott Defendants”) to to
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
Motion (ECF no. 9) of defendants Candace Scott, LLC, Candace
Scott, and Scott and Daly, LLC (the “Scott Defendants”) to to
dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1)
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Defendants Kalman A. Barson and Barson Group, LLC (the “Barson
defendants”) have not filed a motion.
For the reasons stated herein, the motions will be granted.
B.
Allegations of the Complaint
This pro se complaint (“Cplt.,” ECF no. 1) is not divided into numbered
paragraphs or separate causes of action. Nevertheless, I can glean the following
allegations, which are presented in summary form.
Plaintiff’s allegations arise from his divorce proceedings in New Jersey
Family Court in 2009—11. The Scott defendants represented Mr. Courboin’s ex
spouse (here referred to by her first name, Jeanne, to avoid confusion). James
Jensen, Esq., represented Mr. Courboin. (Cplt. at 2—3)
Courboin alleges that the defendants have conspired “to remove tens of
thousands of dollars from the citizens of New Jersey, in violation of the
Sherman Act and/or the Clayton Act.” RICO is also cited. The first paragraphs
single out lawyers, judges, and the legal system. (Cplt. at 1) The trial, says
Courboin, was nothing more than a “collaboration between the players to
remove the assets of clients.” (Cplt. at 3)
It is alleged that “Jeanne was charged well over $200,000 for the
simplest of divorces,” draining the marital assets. (Cplt. at 3) In particular, the
complaint alleges that defendant Scott’s selection of appraisers resulted in
inflated charges. State Family Court Judge James DeMarzo noted the expense
but did not institute an investigation. (Cplt. at 2)
The complaint states that there are many more reasonably priced real
estate appraisers in the area, but that counsel selected the Smith Defendants,
who are the highest priced appraisers in the County. (Cplt. at 4) The Smith
Defendants seemingly charged $550. (E.g., Cplt. at 7) Plaintiff makes “a very
educated guess” that the Smith defendants used outdated software, producing
an outdated form. (Cplt. at 5) The Barson defendants, accounting/appraisal
experts, are alleged to charge prices nine times higher than others. (Cplt. at 4)
Their bills, it is stated or implied, exceeded $56,000. (Cplt. at 5)
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Courboin attaches invoices of his own experts, who charged far less.
(Cplt. at 6—8) He also attaches a letter concerning his own complaint to the
Attorney Ethics Committee of the New Jersey Supreme Court. (Cplt. at 8)
Courboin’s complaint refers obliquely to other litigation. The complaint
states that “I will not accept the dismissal of my complaint as the end of the
story.” (Cplt. at 9)
The prayer for relief is as follows:
1. I want the stolen $200,000 returned, three fold.
2. I want the entire Civil/Family Law component of NJ Law looked
at for anti-trust acts. I want criminal proceeding brought against
any instances found which resemble my charges and safeguards
put in to avoid future abuses.
3. I want to be paid for my time fighting these thieves.
4. I demand punitive damages under the Sherman Act and/or
Clayton Act, which doesn’t limit me to “treble damages”.
(Cplt. at 12)
C.
Prior actions involving these parties and matters
This action stems from Mr. Courboin’s dissatisfaction with the conduct
and outcome of his divorce proceedings in New Jersey Superior Court, Family
Division, Morris County. In other actions, he has sued the attorneys who
represented his ex-wife, as well as expert accountants and appraisers retained
by her in connection with the divorce action, the judge, the State Bar, the
Governor, and others.
1. The Family Court divorce proceeding, Jeanne Courboin v. Robert C.
Courboin, No. FM-14-1380-09, ended in an agreed settlement, so-ordered by
Judge DeMarzo. (ECF no. 7-5 at 84) Apparently, Mr. Courboin was no longer
represented by counsel at the time of the settlement.
2. On February 23, 2012, Mr. Courboin filed an action against Scott and
her law firm in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Morris County.
Courboin v. Scott et al., No. L-433-12. That complaint alleges that there was
“perjury” in the divorce proceedings, that defendants multiplied the costs of the
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proceedings; that they “stole” over $100,000 from Jeanne (the reference is to
the expensive appraisers); and that the Morris County judges, who are
“buddies” with the lawyers, refused to stop it. The complaint relates that
despite his life long pacifism, Couboin was pushed into considering “violence
via a tire iron.” (ECF no. 9-2 at 5—6) On defendants’ motion, this complaint was
dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim. (ECF no. 9-2 at 10—11)
3. On May 8, 2012, Mr. Courboin filed an action against the New Jersey
Bar Association, Members of the Bar, Judges, and the Governor of New Jersey,
in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. Courboin v.
New Jersey BarAssociation, et al., No. 12-cv-0 1020. (ECF no. 9-2 at 30) The
allegations of this complaint duplicate, often verbatim, the allegations against
the Scott defendants in this action relating to inflated fees, the complaisant
attitude of the judiciary, and so forth. It contains other allegations as well. That
Florida district court action, on motion of the defendants, was dismissed on
various grounds, including failure to state a claim and failure to serve the
unidentified defendant “members of the bar.” (ECF no. 9-2 at 56)
4. In July 2012, Mr. Courboin was subjected to a Warrant and Detainer
of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Family Division, Morris County (Docket
no. FM 14 1380 09) for failure to appear on a contempt charge. (ECF no. 9-2 at
54) The contempt charge apparently arose from a series of abusive and
threatening letters from Courboin to Judge DeMarzo. Courboin himself submits
a copy of an order of the court referring to “contemptuous and/or threatening
correspondence, posting, blogs, etc. to the Honorable James M. DeMarzo,
J.S.C
“
(ECF no. 14 at 18) Defendant attaches copies of the letters
themselves, but I will confine myself to court filings.
5. On December 11, 2013, Mr. Courboin filed a second action in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. Courboin v. Scott
et al., No. 13-cv-3 109. (ECF no. 9-2 at 63) The list of defendants is precisely the
same as the defendant roster in the action: i.e., it consists of the Scott
defendants and the Smith defendants, as well as Mr. Barson and his firm. The
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allegations, too, are virtually the same as those asserted in this action—often
verbatim but virtually always in substance. The causes of action—Sherman
Act, Clayton Act, and RICO—are likewise identical to those in the current
action. The prayer for relief, too, is identical, although it includes additional
demands for a “failsafe method” to protect consumers and an investigation of
Judges DeMarzo, Rand, and Ramsey, in Morris County, New Jersey. (ECF no.
9-2 at 68) This action was dismissed: the chief grounds were lack of personal
jurisdiction and improper venue. (ECF no. 9-2 at 71) Affirming, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered the merits of the RICO claim,
and found that it was not “colorable.” It did so in connection with its
determination that Courboin was not entitled to the benefit of RICO’s
nationwide service of process provision. To the extent the district court had
found the complaint failed to state a claim or was frivolous, the Court of
Appeals vacated the decision; because jurisdiction was lacking, the substantive
rulings had no effect. (ECF 9-2 at 82)
Courboin then filed the present action in this Court on April 13, 2015.
D.
Rooker/Feidman and jurisdiction
Both the Smith defendants and the Scott defendants move to dismiss the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P. They cite
the Rooker-Feidman doctrine.
1.
Applicable standard
Rule 12(b)(1) governs jurisdictional challenges to a complaint. Rule
12(b)(1) challenges may be either facial or factual attacks. See 2 Moore’s
Federal Practice
§ 12.30[4] (3d ed. 2007); Mortensen v. First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). A facial challenge asserts that the
complaint does not allege sufficient grounds to establish subject matter
jurisdiction. Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 438. A court considering such a facial
challenge assumes that the allegations in the complaint are true, and may
dismiss the complaint only if it nevertheless appears that the plaintiff will not
be able to assert a colorable claim of subject matter jurisdiction. Cardio—Med.
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Assoc., Ltd. v. Crozer—Chester Med. Ctr., 721 F.2d 68, 75 (3d Cir. 1983);
Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 438.
This might be considered a factual attack, because defendants (and
plaintiff) proffer materials extrinsic to the complaint. The only materials I
consider, however, consist of records of other courts, cited only in order to
establish the nature and scope of prior proceedings between the parties. Such
records are subject to judicial notice:
[O]n a motion to dismiss, we may take judicial notice of another
court’s opinion—not for the truth of the facts recited therein, but
for the existence of the opinion, which is not subject to reasonable
dispute over its authenticity. See Kramer v. Time Warner Inc., 937
F.2d 767, 774 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Wood, 925 F.2d
1580, 1582 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Funk v. Commissioner, 163
F.2d 796, 800—0 1 (3d Cir. 1947) (whether a court may judicially
notice other proceedings depends on what the court is asked to
notice and on the circumstances of the instant case).
S. Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong Shipping Grp. Ltd., 181 F.3d
410, 426-27 (3d Cir. 1999). See generally Fed. R. Evid. 201.’
2.
Discussion
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts cannot
entertain federal claims that were previously adjudicated in state court or are
inextricably intertwined with a state court decision. See District of Columbia
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust
Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923); Guarino v. Larsen, 11 F.3d 1151, 1156—57 (3d
Cir. 1993); Port Auth. Police Benev. Ass’n v. Port Auth., 973 F.2d 169, 178 (3d
Cir. 1992). A federal claim is inextricably intertwined with a prior state court
decision if “granting the relief requested in the federal action requires
The proceedings in the New Jersey Family Court, because they form the basis
for the complaint, would properly be considered, even as to a facial 12(b)(6) motion.
Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014) (“However, an exception to the
general rule is that a ‘document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint’
may be considered ‘without converting the motion to dismiss into one for summary
judgment.’ “) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d
Cir.1997)); Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196
(3d Cir. 1993).
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determining that the state court’s decision is wrong or would void the state
court’s ruling.” FOCUS v. Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas., 75 F.3d
834, 839-40 (3d Cir. 1996). Rooker-Feldman thus operates to prevent a
disgruntled party in state court litigation from collaterally attacking the results
of that litigation in federal court under the guise of an alleged constitutional
error. See also B.S. v. Somerset County, 704 F.3d 250 (3d Cir. 2013); Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus., Inc., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (noting that
Rooker-Feidman bars “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of
injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of
those judgments”).
The claims here—essentially that Jeanne’s attorneys retained experts for
trial at exorbitant rates, depleting the marital estate—are inextricably
intertwined with the state divorce proceedings. (See C. 1, supra.) They occurred
in that action. Objection should have been (for all I know they may have been)
asserted there. The divorce decree divided the marital assets that remained
after expenses. The claims in this action are inextricably intertwined in that
they attack the very basis for the state Family Court judgment.
Even more to the point, Courboin asserted claims virtually identical to
those asserted here in the 2012 Morris County, New Jersey, state court action.
(See C.2, above). That action was dismissed with prejudice.
Both prior actions, support application of Rooker-Feldman.
“If the relief requested in the federal action requires determining that the
state court’s decision is wrong or would void the state court’s ruling, then the
issues are inextricably intertwined and the district court has no subject matter
jurisdiction to hear the suit.” FOCUS, 75 F.3d at 840. Mr. Courboin’s response
to the motion simply repeats and expands upon the allegations of the
complaint. Concerned substantially with rulings of Judge DeMarzo, and
attaching transcript excerpts, it tends to confirm that Courboin’s complaint
arises solely from matters intrinsic to the family court proceeding. (ECF no. 14)
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Attempts to attack family court judgments in federal court are not
unheard of. Such cases, however, are just as routinely dismissed under
Rooker-Feidman. See, e.g., Young v. Dubow, 411 F. App’x 456 (3d Cir. 2011)
(affirming dismissal of complaint filed by mother against all entities and
persons connected to state court proceedings that had awarded child custody
to father); Johnson v. City of New York, 347 F. App’x 850 (3d Cir. 2009)
(affirming district court application of Rooker-Feldman to bar claims that
would effectively review family court decisions); McKnight v. Baker, 244 F.
App’x 442 (3d Cir. 2007) (affirming summary judgment against plaintiff who
had alleged conspiracy to deprive him of visitation rights).
In addition, the current action directly attacks the dismissal of virtually
the same claims in the Morris County action. (See C.2, above.) This, too,
invokes Rooker-Feidman.
This action is therefore dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
E.
Other grounds for dismissal
For the sake of thoroughness, I briefly discuss other grounds for
dismissal. These are alternative grounds; assuming the validity of the Rooker
Feldman jurisdictional ruling, supra, they need not be reached
1.
Res judicata
Rooker-Feidman aside, the judgment in the Morris County state court
action (see C.2, supra), should be given preclusive effect. The claims in the
current action could have been raised, and for the most part were raised, in
that action. The action was finally dismissed with prejudice.
Whether a state court judgment should have a preclusive effect in a
subsequent federal action depends on the law of the state that adjudicated the
original action. See Greenleaf u. Garlock, Inc., 174 F.3d 352, 357 (3d Cir.1999)
(“To determine the preclusive effect of [the plaintiffs] prior state action we must
look to the law of the adjudicating state.”). See also Allen u. McCumj, 449 U.s.
90, 96, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980) (“Congress has specifically
required all federal courts to give preclusive effect to *518 state-court
8
judgments whenever the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged
would do so.”). New Jersey claim preclusion law, like federal law, has three
basic elements: (1) a final judgment on the merits; (2) the prior suit involved
the same parties or their privies; and (3) the subsequent suit is based on the
same transaction or occurrence. Watkins v. Resorts Int’l Hotel and Casino, Inc.,
591 A.2d 592, 599, 124 N.J. 398 (1991) (state law); United States v. Athlone
Indus., Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 983 (3d Cir.1984) (federal law).
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New Jersey also has a robust “entire controversy” rule, an equitable
doctrine that extinguishes any claim that could have been, but was not, raised
in a prior action:
Under the entire controversy doctrine, a party cannot withhold
part of a controversy for separate later litigation even when the
withheld component is a separate and independently cognizable
cause of action. The doctrine has three purposes: (1) complete and
final disposition of cases through avoidance of piecemeal decisions;
(2) fairness to parties to an action and to others with a material
interest in it; and (3) efficiency and avoidance of waste and delay.
See DiTrolio v. Antiles, 142 N.J. 253, 662 A.2d 494, 502 (N.J. 1995).
As an equitable doctrine, its application is flexible, with a case-bycase appreciation for fairness to the parties.
Paramount Aviation Corp. v. Agusta, 178 F.3d 132, 137 (3d Cir. 1999).
The prior state court judgment was on the merits, see Velasquez v.
Franz, 123 N.J. 498, 507, 589 A.2d 143, 148 (1991) (under both federal and
New Jersey law, dismissal with prejudice for failure to state claim is on the
merits). It asserted nearly identical claims against the Scott defendants, and
could have asserted them against the Smith or Barson defendants. The the
current action arises from precisely the same events. Mr. Courboin has had,
and availed himself of—not to say abused—the opportunity to pursue his
claims. He is precluded from doing so any further in this action.
The second Middle District of Florida action, although it overlaps in parties and
subject matter, presents a more problematic issue as to whether the judgment was on
the merits. (See C.5, supra.)
2
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2.
Failure to state a claim
a.
Standard
Rule 12(b)(1) governs jurisdictional challenges to a complaint. Rule
12(b)(1) challenges may be either facial or factual attacks. See 2 MoORE’S
FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 12.30[4] (3d ed. 2007); Mortensen v. First Fed. Sat’. & Loan
Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). A facial challenge asserts that the
complaint does not allege sufficient grounds to establish subject matter
jurisdiction. Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 438. A court considering such a facial
challenge assumes that the allegations in the complaint are true, and may
dismiss the complaint only if it nevertheless appears that the plaintiff will not
be able to assert a colorable claim of subject matter jurisdiction. Cardio—Med.
Assoc., Ltd. v. Crozer—Chester Med. Ctr., 721 F.2d 68, 75 (3d Cir. 1983);
Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 438. Here, the parties rely only on the complaint
and matters relied upon in it, or attached to it.
Rule 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in
part, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The defendant,
as the moving party, bears the burden of showing that no claim has been
stated. Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005). In deciding
a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must take the allegations of the complaint as true
and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Phillzs v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (traditional
“reasonable inferences” principle not undermined by Twombly, see infra).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) does not require that a complaint
contain detailed factual allegations. Nevertheless, “a plaintiff’s obligation to
provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Thus, the
complaint’s factual allegations must be sufficient to raise a plaintiff’s right to
relief above a speculative level, so that a claim is “plausible on its face.” Id. at
570; see also Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Serv., Inc., 542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 2008).
10
That facial-plausibility standard is met “when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). While “[tjhe plausibility standard
is not akin to a ‘probability requirement’
.
.
.
it asks for more than a sheer
possibility.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Where the plaintiff, like Mr. Courboin here, is proceeding pro Se, the
complaint is “to be liberally construed,” and, “however inartfully pleaded, must
be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants
still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v.
Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013). “While a litigant’s
pro se status requires a court to construe the allegations in the complaint
liberally, a litigant is not absolved from complying with Twombly and the
federal pleading requirements merely because s/he proceeds pro se.” Thakar v.
Tan, 372 F. App’x 325, 328 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
b. RICO
A civil RICO claim requires standing: a proximate injury to business or
property. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) Once that is established, the claim requires
(1) an enterprise affecting interstate commerce; (2) that defendants were
employed by or associated with the enterprise; (3) that defendants participated
in the conduct or affairs of the enterprise; and (4) that they did so through a
“pattern” of racketeering activity. See Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473
U.S. 479 (1985); Annulli v. Panikkar, 200 F.3d 189, 198 (3d Cir. 1999).
Here, the “injury” is a rather indirect one, consisting of the ex-wife’s
depletion of the marital property through expenses in the course of the divorce
proceedings. This complaint fails to allege a coherent enterprise or
participation. Nor is there alleged a pattern of racketeering activity, consisting
of two or more predicate crimes in a ten-year period, standing in the requisite
relation. Allegations of overpayment for experts or tactical disagreements fall
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far short of alleging a predicate criminal offense listed in 18 U.S.C. 1961.
§
Hyperbolic accusations of “thievery” (actually, overcharging) are no substit
ute.
As for an enterprise, generalized, unsupported allegations about corruption
of
the legal profession or the courts will not do. Nor does plaintiff, simply by
stating that they are all corrupt, allege facts tending to show the existence
of
an enterprise that engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity.
It was for these reasons, among others, that the Eleventh circuit found
that very similar allegations in the second federal action in Florida did not
state
even a “colorable” RICO claim. (See C.5, supra). I will not repeat that Court’
s
reasoning (ECF no. 9-2 at 88-90), but I do adopt it.
c.
Sherman/Clayton Acts
The complaint also fails to state a claim for violation of the antitrust
laws, because the requisite factual support is absent. I write briefly.
As to a Sherman Act claim under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1, the complaint does not
define a relevant geographic or product market. It does not offer a coherent
account of how competition is restrained (indeed, plaintiff states that he easily
found cheaper alternatives). And although plaintiff claims that the marital
assets were reduced by the wife’s litigation choices, he does not explain how
that constituted an antitrust injury—i.e., one resulting from a competitive
restraint—as opposed to an incidental injury. See generally Rossi v. Standa
rd
Roofing, Inc., 156 F.3d 452, 464—65 (3d Cir. 1998)
( 1 claim requires
combination; anticompetitive effect within a relevant product and geographic
market; an illegal object; and proximate antitrust injury); Fleer Corp. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, 658 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1981).
As to a monopolization claim under 15 U.S.C. § 2, there are no plausible
factual allegations as to a relevant market, or these defendants’ possession of
monopoly power in that market. See generally Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Tech. Sucs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992); A.D. Bedell Wholesale Co. v. Phillip
Morris, Inc., 263 F.3d 239, 249 n.27 (3d Cir. 2001).
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As to a claim under the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 4, there are no factual
§
allegations indicating that Mr. Couboin suffered as a “direct purchaser”
of the
relevant product. See Illinois Brick v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 728 (1977) Indeed
.
,
any injury from the wife’s litigation decisions is quite indirect.
Mr. Courboin alleges a “tying arrangement” (presumably between legal
services and appraisal services). That allegation lacks factual support.
There is
no allegation that Mr. Courboin’s ex-wife was forced to choose an apprais
er,
and no account of how that could have occurred. Even assuming that Mr.
Courboin has standing to assert her alleged injury, there is no eviden
ce that a
“seller” is coercing buyers “to purchase [a] tied product when they otherw
ise
would not.” Harrison Aire, Inc. v. Aerostar Int’l, Inc., 423 F.3d 374, 385
(3d Cir.
2005).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reason, the motions to dismiss (ECF nos. 7, 9) are
GRANTED to the extent that the complaint is dismissed as against the Smith
Defendants and the Scott Defendants for lack of jurisdiction under Rooke
r
Feldman. The other grounds for dismissal are discussed and granted,
but only
in the alternative, should jurisdiction be found.
An appropriate order accompanies this opinion.
Dated: March 3, 2016
KEVIN MCNULTY
United States District Judg
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