GASKINS v. DETECTIVE CASEY et al

Filing 7

OPINION fld. Signed by Judge Jose L. Linares on 9/9/15. (sr, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

DAVID GASKINS,
Civil Action No. 15-2840 (JLL)
Plaintiff:
v.

OPINION

DETECTIVE CASEY, et al.,
Defendants.

LINARES, District Judge:

Currently before the Court is Plaintiff David Gaskins' Complaint. (ECF No. 1). As
Plaintiff has been granted in forma pauperis status, this Court must screen Plaintiffs Complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A. Pursuant to the statutes, this Court must
dismiss Plaintiffs claims if they are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or seek
damages from a defendant who is immune. As Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state a claim for
which relief can be granted, this Court will dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint without prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND

On December 29, 2014, Plaintiff, David Gaskins, filed a complaint raising claims against
several state court judges, two prosecutors, and twenty police officers. 1 (No. 14-8088, ECF No.
1).

February 25, 2015, Judge Martini entered an order and opinion dismissing that initial

complaint. (No. 14-8088, ECF Nos. 2, 3). In his opinion, Judge Martini found the judges and

1

Plaintiff attached to this complaint some two hundred pages of documents from his state court criminal trial and
appeal.

prosecutors immune and therefore dismissed the claims against them with prejudice.

(Id.).

Judge Martini also dismissed Plaintiff's claims against the officers, albeit without prejudice,
because Plaintiff had pied no facts showing the officers personal involvement in the alleged
violations of Plaintiff's rights, which had allegedly occurred when the state courts issued warrants
to search and arrest Plaintiff.

(No. 14-8088 at ECF No. 2 at 1-5). Because Judge Martini

dismissed some claims without prejudice, he afforded Plaintiff thirty days within which to amend
his complaint. (Id. at 5-6). Judge Martini specifically required, however, that any amendment
be "complete on its face." (No. 14-8088, ECF No. 3 at 1).
On or about March 16, 2015, Plaintiff filed a purported amended complaint with Judge
Martini. (No. 14-8088, ECF No. 5). In his proposed amended complaint, Plaintiff attempted to
argue against the Court's dismissal of his claims against the prosecutors at length, but provided no
basis for the Court to reconsider its decision to dismiss the prosecutors with prejudice. (No. 148088, ECF No. 5 at 1-13). In his purported amended complaint, Plaintiff made only the following
allegation as to how the police officer and prosecutor defendants, who he did not specifically name
in the amended complaint, had violated his rights: "pursuant to [a] conspiracy, the defendant[s]
bribed, pressured or otherwise improperly caused witnesses to give untruthful, erroneous,
incomplete and/or misleading statements and testimony against [Plaintiff] . . . which taken
individually as well as together with other acts ... were the direct and proximate cause of
[Plaintiff's] wrongful and malicious prosecution . . . [which] deprived [Plaintiff] of his
constitutional right 'not to be deprived of his liberty[.]'"2 (Id. at 5-6). As these allegations were

2

Plaintiff also reattached the approximately two hundred pages of trial court documents to his amended complaint,
but made no effort to show how these unrelated documents showed that his rights had been violated.

2

made in relation to his arguments regarding the prosecutors, it is unclear whether Plaintiff wished
to reassert this claim against the immune prosecutors, or to include in this "conspiracy" the police
officer defendants. (Id.). As such, Judge Martini found that Plaintiff's amended complaint failed
to correct the deficiencies in Plaintiff's original complaint and failed to state a claim for relief
against the officers, the only defendants who had not been dismissed with prejudice. (No. 148088 at ECF No. 6). Judge Martini therefore dismissed the purported amended complaint without
prejudice on March 23, 2015, and again permitted Plaintiff the opportunity to "file a final amended
complaint, provided it complies with this Order and is complete on its face, within 30 days of the
date of the entry of this Order[.]" (Id. at 2).
On or about April 14, 2015, Plaintiff filed the instant complaint in response to Judge
Martini's March 23, 2015 Order. (ECF No. 1). Although Plaintiff placed the docket number of
his prior case on his proposed amended complaint, the Clerk's office filed it as a new complaint
and assigned it to this Court. 3 This Court initially terminated the complaint for failure to pay the
required filing fee or file a complete in forma pauperis application under the assumption that this
was a new complaint, rather than an attempt at filing an amended complaint in No. 14-8088. (ECF
Nos.

4). As Plaintiff has filed a complete informa pauperis application, and as Judge Martini

had granted him in forma pauperis status in No. 14-8088, this Court granted Plaintiff in forma
pauperis status on September 3, 2015. (ECF No. 6). As such, this Court is required to review

Plaintiff's Complaint/Amended Complaint.
In his Complaint, Plaintiff names numerous police officers as defendants including:

3

This Court presumes this was done as Judge Martini is now on senior status and maintains a limited docket.

3

Detective Casey of the Newton or Trenton Police, Lt. Richards of the Newton Police, Detective C.
Pokrywa of the Newton Police, Detective Elmo of the Newton Police, Detective Garrigan of the
Newton Police, Detective Galinski of the Newton Police, State Trooper Bisl of the New Jersey
State Police, Seo. Cole of an unnamed Sheriffs Department, Detective Muller of the Newton
Police,

Danyal Bachak of the Newton Police, and ten unknown officers associated with either

the Newton Police or a sheriffs office. (ECF No. 1 at 2-10, 18). Plaintiff makes virtually
identical allegations as to each and every Defendant: "[a]ffidavits and reports were written giving
probable cause to issue [a] search warrant for Plaintiff, there was no C.I. that gave information for
probable cause to issue a warrant4 for Plaintiffs Arrest[,] violating [Plaintiffs] 4th, 8th, and 14th
Amendment rights, N.J., Federal and United States Constitutions." (Id.). In addition to these
allegations, Plaintiff adds only the following statement: "[t]his was a case headed for trial, many
motions were filed pointing out all violations, the state could have dismissed the criminal matter
before trial saving time and tax payer's dollars, they didn't, I went to trial and lost." (Id. at 21).
Plaintiff also asks the Court to see his original two complaints and the two hundred pages of trial
court documents he attached thereto which he alleges shows that he suffered "cruel and unusual
punishment, [violations of a] doctrine of obligation, moral turpitude, abuse of rights doctrine,
actionable per quod, actionable per se, adverse domination doctrine, civil investigation demand,
equitable wrongs, libel and slander, actual malice, actual fraud, willful misconduct, malicious
intent

(Id. at 21-22). Finally, Plaintiff attaches to his complaint five investigation reports,

authored by a Public Defender's Office employee which sought to discern which officers had

4

In some versions of this recitation, Plaintiff refers to this second warrant as a search warrant rather than an arrest
warrant.
No. 1at2-10, 18).

4

authored reports and when. (Id. at 13-17). Nothing in the reports appears to show any violation
of Plaintiff's rights.

II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66
to l

(April 26, 1996) ("PLRA"), district courts must review complaints in those civil actions

in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), or seeks
damages from a state employee, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The PLRA directs district courts to sua

sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This
action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A
because Plaintiff is a convicted state prisoner who has been granted in forma pauperis status and
raises claims against state employees.
According to the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, "a pleading that offers
'labels or conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'"
556

662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim, 5 the complaint must allege "sufficient
factual matter" to show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d

5

"The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)." Schreane v.
Seana, 506 F. App'x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitchell
v. Beard, 492 F. App'x 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(l)); Courteau v. United States, 287
F. App'x
162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

5

203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable
(3d

the misconduct alleged." Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3
2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Moreover, while prose pleadings are liberally

construed, "pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim."
Mala

Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted) (emphasis

added).
B. Analysis

Plaintiff seeks to make claims against Defendants for alleged violations of his
constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
a plaintiff must demonstrate a violation of a right protected by the Constitution or laws of the
United States that was committed by a person acting under the color of state law." Nicini v.
Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Woodyard v. Cnty. ofEssex, 514 F. App'x 177,

180

2013) (section 1983 provides "private citizens with a means to redress violations of

federal law committed by state [actors]"). "The first step in evaluating a section 1983 claim is to
'identify the exact contours of the underlying right said to have been violated' and to determine
'whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at all."' Nicini, 212 F .3d
at 806 (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998)).
The nature of the violation Plaintiff alleges has taken place is not entirely clear based on
the vague and conclusory allegations he has provided, but it appears that Plaintiff wishes to raise
claims for false arrest based on his assertion that no C.I. gave information in support of the arrest
warrant issued against him. "To state a claim for false arrest [pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983], a
6

plaintiff must establish: (1) that there was an arrest; and (2) that the arrest was made without
probable cause." James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d Cir. 2012). "Probable
cause to arrest exists when the facts and the circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge
are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or
is being committed by the person to be arrested." Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d
782, 788 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Orsatti v. New Jersey State Pol., 71 F .3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995)).
Here, Plaintiff provides no more than vague and conclusory allegations that "reports" were written,
which led to a search warrant based on probable cause, and that there after "there was no C.I. that
gave information for probable cause to issue a warrant for Plaintiff's arrest." (ECF No. 1 at 2, 8).
Plaintiff provides no information as to which officers authored these reports, which reports if any
were used as a basis for the arrest warrant, whether any of those reports referred to information
obtained from a criminal informant, whether any such statements by a criminal informant were
material to the finding of probable cause, or any other information which would support the
contention that any of the named officers had any direct involvement in violating Plaintiff's rights.
Plaintiff has at best provided the sort of unadorned, "the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me"
allegations which the Supreme Court rejected as insufficient to state a claim for relief in Iqbal. 6
556

at 678. Plaintiff's allegations therefore fail to state a claim for relief as to any of the

newly named Defendants, and his claims against the officers must therefore be dismissed. 7

6

Plaintiffs attempts to incorporate by reference his previous complaints are unavailing. Not only have those
previously dismissed complaints been dismissed for failure to state a claim, they contain no clear allegations against
the Defendants named here, and certainly no allegations sufficient to state a claim for relief against these Defendants.
In any event, as Plaintiff was ordered to file a complaint which was complete on its face by Judge Martini, his failure
to plead sufficient facts in his new complaint, without reference to the dismissed complaints, warrants dismissal here.
7
To the extent that Plaintiff wished to raise any state law claims, a point on which his complaint is not clear, this
Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them as this Court is dismissing Plaintiffs sole claim over

7

An additional issue arises out of the fact that Plaintiff's claims against these Defendants
arises out of their conduct prior to his arrest. Presumably that arrest occurred prior to the creation
of the investigator's reports Plaintiff attaches to his complaint which were authored as part of his
criminal prosecution in 2010. (ECF No. 1 at 13-17). As the officer's actions apparently occurred
prior to those 2010 reports, Plaintiff's claims also appear to be time barred. See Patyrak v. Apgar,
511
statute

App'x 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2013) (section 1983 claims in New Jersey are subject to a two year
limitations); Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009) (cause of action under§

1983 accrues when plaintiff "knew or should have known of the injury upon which its action is
based"). Because it is not clear from the complaint the exact dates involved, however, this Court
does not rely on the time bar for the dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint.
This Court is confronted with one final issue in relation to Plaintiff's filing of complaints
in the federal courts. Plaintiff filed the instant complaint in forma pauperis. Upon further review
of Plaintiff's filing history, however, it appears that Plaintiff has, on three or more previous
occasions, had an action, which was filed informa pauperis, dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or
for failure to state a claim. This Court notes that in 2012, Judge Martini denied Plaintiff informa

pauperis status as to one of his filings because he had previously filed three complaints while
incarcerated, all of which had been dismissed for failure to state a claim: Gaskins v. 17 Officers,
No.

982; Gaskins v. Unitg., No. 08-4522; and Gaskins v. Untig., No. 08-3277. (See Gaskins

v. Hastings, No. 12-7274, ECF No. 5 at 2). Petitioner has received another such dismissal through
his complaints in this matter. (See No. 14-8088, ECF No. 2, 3, 6).

which this Court has original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

8

Under the three strikes provision of the PLRA, "a prisoner may not 'bring a civil action or
appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding' [in forma pauperis] if the prisoner has, on three
or more prior occasions, had an action or appeal 'dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under
imminent danger of serious physical injury."' Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 455-56 (3d Cir.
201

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). As Plaintiff has had at least four of his actions filed in

forma pauperis in this Court dismissed for failure to state a claim, he has more than three strikes

for the purposes of§ 1915(g), and, as such, is not entitled to file new actions in forma pauperis in
this Court unless he can show that he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury. "Imminent
dangers are those dangers which are about to occur at any moment or are impending." Id. at 467
(quotations omitted). The danger required for this exception to apply must be imminent "at the
time the complaint or appeal is filed." Id. Plaintiff is therefore informed that he will not be
permitted to file further matters in forma pauperis while incarcerated unless he pleads facts
sufficient to show that he is in imminent danger at the time he files them.
Ill. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim
for which relief may be granted. An appropriate Order follows.

ose L. Hnares,
"United States District Judge

9