SANTA MARIA v. CITY OF ELIZABETH (N.J.) et al

Filing 2

OPINION. Signed by Judge Kevin McNulty on 5/20/2015. (ld, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
1)ISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

FRED SANTA MARIA, Jr.,
PIaintift

Civ. No. 15-3243 (KM) (SCM)
OPINION

V.

CITY OF ELIZABETH (N.J.), et al.,
Defendants.

I.

INTRODUCTION

l’he plaintiff Fred Santa Maria, Jr., is a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the Union
County Jail in Elizabeth, New Jersey. He is proceeding pro se with a civil rights complaint filed
pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§

1983. Mr. Santa Maria’s application to proceed inJörmapauperis will

be granted based on the information provided therein and the Clerk will be ordered to file the
complaint.
The Court must now review the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§

1915(e)(2)(B) and

191 5A to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from suit. For the reasons set forth below, the complaint will be dismissed as
against the Elizabeth Police Department but otherwise permitted to proceed.
II.

BACKGROUND

The allegations of the complaint will be construed as true for purposes of this Opinion.
The complaint names four defendants: (1) City of Elizabeth; (2) Elizabeth Police Department;
(3) Detective Jose Martinez

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Elizabeth Police Department.

Elizabeth Police T)epartrnent; and (4) Detective Raul Delaprida

The allegations of the Complaint are taken to be true for purposes of screening only. The
Complaint alleges that on April 8, 2014, Officers Martinez and Delaprida, undercover detectives.
were chasing Mr. Santa Maria in his automobile. After Mr. Santa-Maria was involved in an auto
accident, Martinez and Delaprida pulled him out of his car, shoved him to the ground and
handcuffed him behind his back. They allegedly kicked and punched his face and body. Mr.
Santa Maria sustained a broken nose, a deep laceration to his upper lip, an injured hand and
several “broken/bruised” ribs. While detained for over twenty-four hours in a holding cell, he
was denied medical attention despite his pleas for help.
Mr. Santa Maria alleges that the Elizabeth Police Department is responsible for
continuing to employ Detectives Martinez and I)elaprida, who had had “frequently been
involved in illegal activities.” He also claims that the City of Elizabeth bears ultimate
responsibility for their acts. 1-Ic seeks compensation for his medical bills and for his pain and
suffering.
III.

LEGAL STANDARDS

A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 for certain violations of

his constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable.

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Thus, to state a claim for relief under

§

1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of

a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and second, that the alleged
deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See harvey v.
Plains Ti’ip. Police Dep’t, 635 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see also West v,
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,48(1988).
Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. 104-134,

801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to

§

1321-77 (Apr. 26, 1996) (“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil actions
in which a prisoner is proceeding injàrma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C.

§

redress against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C.

1915A(b), or brings a claim

with respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C.

§

§

l9l5(e)(2)(B), seeks

1997e. The PLRA directs district courts to sua

sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C.

§

1915(e)(2)(B).

“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28
U.S.C.

§

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (per
curiam) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F.
App’x 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (discussing 42 U.S.C.

§

1997e(c)(1)); Courteau v.

United States, 287 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C.

§

1915A(b)). That

standard is set forth in Ashcroft v. Jqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), as explicated by the U.S. Court of Appeals fbr the Third Circuit.
To survive the court’s screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege
“sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible. See Fowler v. UPMC

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Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inherence
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Denzpster, 764
F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “[A] pleading that offers
‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.” Iqbul, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Thvomhly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Pro se pleadings, as always, will be liberally construed. Nevertheless, “pro se litigants
still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Iviala v. Crown Bay
Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
IV.

DISCUSSION

A. Excessive Force Claim
Claims of excessive force during arrest are governed by the Fourth Amendment. See
Rivas

City ofPassaic, 365 F.3d 181, 198 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.

386, 395 (1989)). The defendant’s use of force will be analyzed to determine whether it was
objectively reasonable under the circumstances. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. That
reasonableness inquiry “requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each
particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether suspect poses an immediate
threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or
attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. at 396.
The complaint alleges the officers kicked and punched Mr. Santa Maria when he was
handcuffed and in the prone position. Fle allegedly suffered a broken nose, lacerations, and other
injuries as a result. Those allegations are sufficient to permit Mr. Santa Maria’s excessive force
claims against Martinez and I)elaprida to proceed past screening.

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B. Denial of Medical Care
As stated above, Mr. Santa Maria allegedly suffered a broken nose, lacerations, and other
injuries. The complaint alleges that he was denied medical treatment for “over 24 hours” while
he was held in an Elizabeth Police Department holding cell. He allegedly was in tremendous
pain, and cried out ibr help. This is best understood as a claim that the police violated his right to
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
A pretrial detainee asserting a due process claim must allege facts to suggest that
defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. See Lenhart v.
Pennsylvania, 528 F. App’x 111, 115 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (citing Revere, 463 U.S. at
243-44; Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2003)). The
applicable standard is as follows:
For the delay or denial of medical care to rise to a violation of the
Eighth Amendment’s’ prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment, a prisoner must demonstrate “(1) that defendants were
deliberately indifferent to [his] medical needs and (2) that those
needs were serious.” Rouse v, Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir.
1999). Deliberate indifference requires proof that the official
“knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety.” Natale v. Camden Cniy. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582
(3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837
(1994)). We have found deliberate indifference where a prison
official: “(1) knows of a prisoner’s need for medical treatment hut
intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary medical
treatment based on a nonmedical reason; or (3) prevents a prisoner
from receiving needed or recommended treatment.” Rouse, 182
F.3d at 197. Deference is given to prison medical authorities in the
diagnosis and treatment of patients, and courts “disavow any
attempt to second-guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular
course of treatment. (which) remains a question of sound
professional judgment.” Inmates ofAllegheny Cnty. Jail i Pierce,
612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting Bowring v. Godwin, 551
F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977)). Allegations of negligent treatment or
.

.

In this particular area, Fourteenth Amendment and Eighth Amendment standards are
similar. See Natale, 318 F.3d at 581-82.
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medical malpractice do not trigger constitutional protections.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976).
Pierce v. Pitkins, 520 F. App’x 64, 66 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
“A medical need is serious if it ‘has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring
treatment,’ or if it ‘is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a
doctor’s attention.” See Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x 230, 236 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam)
(quoting Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 272-73 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Monmouth Cnly. Inst.
Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987))). Deliberate indifference can be found
“where the prison official persists in a course of treatment in the face of resultant pain and risk of
permanent injury.” McCluskey v. Vincent, 505 F. App’x 199, 202 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
Mr. Santa Maria’s allegations of deliberate indifference to medical needs are thin.
Nevertheless, if I give this pro se complaint a liberal construction, they meet the minimal
standards of screening. The complaint alleges injuries that were far from life-threatening, but
nevertheless should have been obvious (particularly to the officers who allegedly inflicted them).
Mr. Santa Maria alleges that he cried out from his cell, alerting officers to his condition, but
received no care. That is enough to permit the case to go forward past the screening stage.
C. Vicarious Liability of City of Elizabeth and Elizabeth Police Department
The complaint alleges that the tortious acts were committed by officers Martinez and
Delaprida, but it also names the City of Elizabeth and the Elizabeth Police Department as
defendants. I will permit the claim of vicarious liability to proceed as against the City, but
dismiss the claims against the Police Department.
Mr. Santa Maria alleges that the City of Elizabeth is liable for the actions of Martinez and
Delaprida because it continued to employ these two officers, despite their having “frequently
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been involved in illegal activities.” (Complaint p. 4) “Failure to train.

.

municipal employees

can ordinarily be considered deliberate indifference only where the failure has caused a pattern
of violations.” See Kline cx rel. Arndt v. Mansfield, 255 F. App’x 624, 629 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing
Berg v. Cnty, ofAllegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 276 (3d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (citing Bd. of Cnty.
Comm ‘rs of Bryan Cnly., Okia. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 408-09 (1997))). Additionally, a claim
may arise even in the absence of a pattern of violations:

[un a narrow range of circumstances, a violation of federal rights
may be a highly predicable consequence of a failure to equip law
enforcement officers with specific tools to handle recurrent
situations. The likelihood that the situation will recur and the
predictability that an officer lacking specific tools to handle that
situation will violate citizens’ rights could justify a finding that
policyrnakers’ decision not to train the officer reflected “deliberate
indifference to the obvious consequence of the policymakers’
choice namely, a violation of a specific constitutional or statutory
right.
“

—

Brown, 520 U.S. at 409.

The allegations against the City are not very specific or persuasive. I nevertheless
liberally construe this pro se complaint to allege that Detectives Martinez and Delaprida had
engaged in a pattern of violations, of which the City was or should have been aware. That
allegation—unproven, of course—is sufficient as to the City of Elizabeth.
The complaint separately names as a defendant the Elizabeth Police Department. A New
Jersey municipal police department is not an independent entity with the capacity to be sue and
be sued, but only “an executive and enforcement function of municipal government.” N.J. STAT.
ANi’..

§ 40A:14-ll8. The case law under Section 1983 uniformly holds that the proper defendant

is therefore the municipality itself, not the police department. See Jackson v. City of Erie Police
Dep ‘1, 570 F. App’x 112, 114 n.2 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (“We further agree with the
District Court that the police department was not a proper party to this action. Although local
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governmental units may constitute ‘persons’ against whom suit may be lodged under 42 U.S.C.
1983, a city police department is a governmental sub-unit that is not distinct from the
municipality of which it is a part.”) (citation omitted); see also Bonenberger v. Plymouth Twp.,
132 F.3d 20, 25 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997) (Court “treat[sj the municipality and its police department as
a single entity for purposes of section 1983 liability”); Michaels v. State of New Jersey, 955 F.
Supp. 315, 317 n.1 (D.N.J. 1996) (Newark police department not a proper party),
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A claim against the 1)epartment is in reality a claim against the City. The Court will
therefore dismiss Mr. Santa Maria’s claims against the Elizabeth Police Department with
prejudice.
D. Application for Appointment of Pro Bono Counsel
Mr. Santa Maria has also filed a request for the appointment of counsel. Indigent persons
raising civil rights claims have no absolute right to counsel. See Parham v. .Johnson, 126 F.3d
454, 456-57 (3d Cir. 1997). As a threshold matter, there must be some merit in fact or law to the
claims the plaintiff is attempting to assert. See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993).
In determining whether to appoint counsel, a court considers the following: (1) the plaintiffs
ability to present his or her own case; (2) the complexity of the legal issues; (3) the degree to
which factual investigation will be necessary and the ability of the plaintiff to pursue such
investigation; (4) the amount a case is likely to turn on credibility determinations; (5) whether
the case will require the testimony of expert witnesses; and (6) whether the plaintiff can attain
and afford counsel on his own behalf. See id. at 155-56, 157 n.5; see also Cuevas v. United
States, 422 F. App’x 142, 144-45 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (reiterating the Tabron factors).
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1 have previously so held with respect to the police departments of Elizabeth, NJ and Byram, NJ. Jefferson
Elizabeth Police Dept., 2015 WL 733688 at *3 (D.N.J. 2015); Rivera v. Zwiegle, 2014 WL 6991954 at *3
(D.N.J. 2014). See also Desposito v. New Jersey, 2015 WL 2131073 at *7 (D.N.J. 2015) (Arleo, J.) (citing Rivera
and dismissing claims against Westwood Police Department); Stewart v. City ofAtlantic Police Dept., 2015 WL
1034524 at *3 (D.N.J. 2015) (Hillman, J.) (citing Rivera and dismissing claims against Atlantic City Police
Department).
i’.

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The power to appoint counsel lies solely with the discretion of this Court. See Parham, 126 F.3d
at457.
The complaint is fairly straightforward and easy to follow. It is impossible to say at this
early stage that the claims are meritorious, or that the other Tabron factors have been established.
See Miller v. A/ew Jersey Dep’t o/Corr., No, 08-3335, 2009 482379, at *15 (D.N.J. Feb. 25,
2009) (citing Chatterjee v. Phi/a. Fed’n of Teachers, Nos. 99-4122, 99-4233, 2000 WL 1022979
(E.D. Pa. July 18, 2000)). Accordingly, the Court will deny the request for the appointment of
counsel. This denial will be without prejudice to a reapplication depending on the development
of the claims and facts in the pretrial discovery process.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the complaint will be permitted to proceed for the most part.
As against the City of Elizabeth, Martinez, and I)elaprita, the claims of excessive force,
deliberate indifference to medical needs, and failure to train officers will be permitted to proceed.
As against the Elizabeth Police Department, however, the complaint will be dismissed with
prejudice. The application for informa pauper/s status is granted. The request for appointment of
counsel is denied without prejudice to renewal later in the case. An appropriate order will be
entered.
Dated: May 20, 2015

KEVIN MCNULTY
United States District Judge

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