SANCHEZ v. ESSEX COUNTY

Filing 32

OPINION fld. Signed by Judge Madeline C. Arleo on 8/31/16. (sr, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
LAZARO SANCHEZ, both individually
and on behalf of a class of others similarly
situated;

Civil Action No. 15-3391 (MCA)

OPINION

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF ESSEX,
Defendant.

ARLEOg United States District Judge:
I.

INTRODUCTION
This matter has been opened to the Court by Defendant County of Essex’s (“the County”)

motion to dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 21.) Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint is brought as a putative class action contending that the County’s blanket strip search
policy violates 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (“NJCRA”). (ECF No.

15.) The County argues in its motion to dismiss that the Plaintiffs claims are precluded by the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Florence v. Board ofChosen Freeholders ofCounty of
Burlington,

—

U.S.

, 132 S.Ct. 1510 (2012), which held that ajail’s policy of conducting

visual body cavity strip searches of detainees who were committed to its general population upon
entry was reasonable. For the reasons explained in this Opinion, the Court will deny the motion
to dismiss without prejudice at this time.

1

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Court addresses only the facts necessary to resolve the instant motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff Lazaro Sanchez, a resident of Essex County, New Jersey, was arrested on family law
charges ofwillfulnonsupport on or around September 28, 2013. (ECF No. 15,

¶

30.) The Complaint alleges that “[t]he circumstances of Mr. Lazaro’s arrest were void of any
reasonable suspicion to believe that he was secreting a weapon or contraband in a private area.”
(Id. at ¶ 31.) Upon his arrival at Essex County Correctional Facility (“ECCF”), ECCF
employees performed a visual body cavity search on Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 32.)
Specifically, an officer instructed Plaintiff to remove all of his
clothes, and then to lift up his testicles, squat, and cough. The strip
search of Mr. Lazaro occurred within the view of other detainees,
who were searched in a similar manner. Mr. Lazaro had not seen a
judicial officer prior to being admitted to the Essex County Jail,
nor did he see a judicial officer prior to being strip searched.
(Id.) Plaintiff was brought before a judge two days later on September 30, 201[3], at which point
he was ordered released. (Id. at ¶ 33.) He was not actually released from ECCF until October
1
l,201[3j. (Id.)
The Amended Complaint also alleges the following facts with respect to the strip search
policy in effect at ECCF:
Essex County has instituted a written and/or de facto policy,
custom or practice of conducting blanket, group strip searches of
all detainees who enter the custody of the Essex County
Correctional Facility, and in the absence of privacy partitions.
These searches are conducted regardless of the condition of the
individual or reasonable suspicion of whether the individual is
harboring contraband.

Plaintiff’s Complaint states that he was brought before a judge on September 30, 2015, and was
not released until October 1, 2015, which would be two years after he was arrested. The Court
assumes that these two dates are typos.
2

(J 24.)

The Amended Complaint also alleges that these “these strip searches are done prior
to a

detainee being arraigned before a judicial officer to contest the circumsta
nces of their detention,
or being provided with a reasonable opportunity to post bail following arrai
gnment.” (Id.) The
Amended Complaint further alleges that
Essex County has sufficient housing and/or booking capacity to
hold pre-arraignment detainees separate from the Essex County
Jail’s general population prior to their arraignment. In the
alternative, the Defendant can, with limited effort and expense,
modify the physical plant at the Essex County Jail to provide
sufficient space to hold pre-arraignment detainees separate from
the Jail’s general population pending their arraignment.
(Id. at25.)
Plaintiff, who is represented by counsel, filed his initial Com
plaint against the County of
Essex on May 15, 2015. (ECF No. 1.) The County filed
its first motion to dismiss on July 23,
2015. (ECF No. 7.) On October 15, 2015, the Magistra
te Judge entered an Order granting
Plaintiff leave to file an Amended Complaint, which Plain
tiff filed the same day. (ECF Nos.
2
14-15.) On January 13, 2016, the County filed a moti
on to dismiss the Amended Complaint.
(ECF No. 21.) On March 7, 2016, Plaintiff filed his oppo
sition brief, and on April 15, 2016, the
County filed its reply brief. (ECF Nos. 24, 29.) The matt
er is now fully briefed and ready for
disposition.
III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure I 2(b)(6) provides that a court
may dismiss a claim “for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the moving party “bea
rs the burden of showing that no
claim has been presented.” Hedges v. United States, 404
F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing

2

The original motion to dismiss was terminated on Novemb
er 9, 2015. (ECF No. 17.)
3

Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)); United Van Lines,
LLC v. Lohr Printing, Inc., No. CIV. 1 1—4761, 2012 WL 1072248, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2012).
In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
to Rüië i2b)6)ácOui1 must

acceptail ll leaded allegtkiiriti

complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Evancho v. Fisher,
423 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir.2005). It is well settled that a pleading is sufficient if it contains “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2). Furthermore, a district court, in weighing a motion to dismiss, asks “not whether a
plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support
the claims[.j” Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n. 8 (2007) (quoting Scheuer v.
Rhoades, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).
IV.

ANALYSIS
The County contends that the allegations in Plaintiffs Complaint do not state a claim for

relief under

§ 1983 or the NJCRA following the Supreme Court’s decision in Florence v. Board

of Chosen Freeholders of County ofBurlington,

U.S.

,

132 S.Ct. 1510 (2012). (ECF

No. 21-1.) Plaintiff contends that his claims fall within the exceptions recognized by the Court
in Florence, and as such, are not foreclosed by that decision.
3
The Petitioner in Florence was arrested on an outstanding bench warrant after a traffic
stop. He was subjected to a strip search upon admission to the Burlington County jail where he
was required to lift his genitals, turn around, and cough while squatting. Petitioner shared a cell
with at least one other person and interacted with other inmates following his admission to the

As noted above, Plaintiffs Complaint is brought as a putative class action; however, the issue
of class certification has not yet been addressed, and the Court need not address this issue to
dispose of the instant motion to dismiss.
4

jail. 132 S. Ct. at 1514. Six days later he was taken to ECCF and was stripped searched upon
his admission to the facility, and released one day later. Id. at 1514. Following these incidents,
petitioner sued the governmental entities that operated the jail under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983,

maintaining that “people arrested for minor offenses could not be required to remove their
clothing and expose the most private areas of their bodies to close visual inspection as a routine
part of the intake process” Id. Rather, he contended, officials could conduct this kind of search
only if they had reason to suspect a particular inmate of concealing a weapon, drugs, or other
4
contraband.” 132 S. Ct. at 1514—15.
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that ajail’s policy of conducting visual body
cavity strip searches of detainees who were committed to its general population upon entry was
reasonable. 132 S.Ct. at 1523. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, explained that
“[clorrectional officials have a significant interest in conducting a thorough search as a standard
part of the intake process.” Florence, 132 S.Ct. at 1518. He further warned that the “difficulties
of operating a detention center must not be underestimated by the courts,” and reasoned that
visual strip searches can screen detainees for lice, contagious infection, wounds that require
medical attention, gang tattoos, and contraband. Id. at 1515—19. Moreover, he stressed the
potential administrative difficulties that might arise if detainees had to be searched under
different standards according to their current or previous offenses. Id. at 1521—22. The Court,
however, appeared to limit its holding and did not consider what would be reasonable under
certain circumstances not before it, such as searches involving touching or intentional

The District Court certified a class of individuals who were charged with a nonindictable
offense under New Jersey law, processed at either the Burlington County or Essex County jail,
and directed to strip naked even though an officer had not articulated any reasonable suspicion
they were concealing contraband. Id.
5

humiliation or where an arrestee whose detention had not been reviewed by a magistrate could
be held apart from the general population. Id. at 1522—23. See also Crump v. Passaic Cty., 147
F. Supp. 3d 249, 255—56 (D.N.J. 2015) (explaining same).
TheThirdCircuithashad the opportunity to apply thereasoningofFlorenceintwo
recent published cases. InJ.B. cx rd. Benjamin v. Fassnacht, 801 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2015),
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1462 (2016), the Third Circuit held that Florence guided its decision to
uphold a blanket policy to strip search all juvenile detainees admitted to general population at a
juvenile detention center. (finding that the juvenile status of the offenders did not change the
analysis or fall within the exceptions outlined in the Florence.) The Court in Fassnacht also
recognized, however, that the majority opinion and concurrences in Florence “left open the
possibility of exceptions to [its] holding[:]”
For example, the majority acknowledged that this case did not
require it to rule on the types of searches that would be reasonable
where a detainee would be held without assignment to the general
jail population and without substantial contact with other
detainees. [Florence, 132 S.Ct. at 1522.] In such a situation, “[t]he
accommodations may diminish the need to conduct some
aspects of the searches at issue.” [Id. at 1523.] Similarly, Chief
Justice Roberts wrote separately in a concurrence to emphasize
that “the Court does not foreclose the possibility of an exception to
the rule it announces.” [Id., Roberts, C.J., concurring.] Because
“factual nuances [did not] play a significant role” in Florence,
Chief Justice Roberts admonished that “[t]he Court is nonetheless
wise to leave open the possibility of exceptions, to ensure that we
‘not embarrass the future.” [Id. (quoting Nw. Airlines, Inc. v.
Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 300 (1944)).] In another concurrence,
Justice Alito echoed Chief Justice Roberts’s sentiments, stating
“[i]t is important to note, however, that the Court does not hold
that it is always reasonable to conduct a full strip search of an
arrestee whose detention has not been reviewed by a judicial
officer and who could be held in available facilities apart from the
general population.” [Id. at 1524 (Auto, J., concurring).]
...

Fassnacht, 801 F.3d at 341.

6

Most recently, in Parkell V. Danberg,

—

F.3d

—,

No. 14-1667, 2016 WL 4375620, at *4..

7 (3d Cir. Aug. 17, 2016), the Third Circuit dealt with the application of visual cavity strip
search policies to convicted prisoners held in disciplinary segregation. There, the Third Circuit
confirmed thattte F

Am

and held that issues offct

applies

precluded summary judgment as to the reasonableness of a prison search policy requiring thricedaily visual body cavity searches of convicted inmates being held in isolation for disciplinary
violations. The Court cited to Florence in reiterating the broad reach of permissible strip search
policies:
Routine, suspicionless inmate search policies may sweep quite
broadly and still be reasonable. In Florence II, the Supreme Court
declined to require jails to adopt a policy of exempting new
detainees “who ha[d] not been arrested for a serious crime or for
any offense involving a weapon or drugs” from the blanket strip
searches conducted before detainees were committed to the general
population. Florence II, 132 S.Ct. at 1520. The Court held that it
was reasonable for jails to conclude that such an exemption was
“unworkable” because “the seriousness of an offense is a poor
predictor of who has contraband” and “it would be difficult in
practice to determine whether individual detainees fall within the
proposed exemption.” Id. The Court in Florence II recognized that
narrowly targeted search policies are generally not required in
prisons and jails because they tend to be incompatible with the
setting. They are often difficult, if not impossible, to implement
without an unacceptable risk of false negatives (instances in which
dangerous contraband is missed because an inmate is incorrectly
classified as low-risk and subjected to less thorough searches).
Thus, it is usually reasonable for prisons to favor more broadly
drawn search policies.
Parkell v. Danberg, 2016 WL 4375620, at *8.
With respect to detainees held in the general population of a jail, Florence and its
progeny preclude any claim that blanket strip searches are unconstitutional merely due to lack of
individualized suspicion. See, e.g., Williams v. City of Cleveland, 771 F.3d 945, 951 (6th Cir.
2014) (explaining same.) Nor can detainees who are arrested for less serious crimes claim to be

7

exempt from the blanket strip searches conducted before they are committed to the general
population. The Court in Florence concluded such an exemption is “unworkable” because “the
seriousness of an offense is a poor predictor of who has contraband” and “it would be difficult in
practice to determine hether individual detainees fall within the proposed exemption.” Parkell,
2016 WL 4375620, at *8 (quoting Florence, 132 S.Ct. at 1520).
Here, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint asserts that “[tjhe circumstances of Plaintiffs
arrest was void of any reasonable suspicion to believe that he was secreting a weapon or
contraband in a private area.” (Am. Compi. at ¶ 31.) As noted above, Florence appears to
preclude claims that blanket strip searches are unconstitutional merely due to lack of
individualized suspicion. Plaintiff was also arrested on “family law charges of willful non
support” (id. at ¶ 30), which is not a serious crime or a crime involving guns or drugs. But, in
the wake of Florence, this fact, standing alone, likewise does not exempt Plaintiff from blanket
strip search policies.
However, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not rely on these facts alone. Plaintiffs
claim that his strip search violated his Fourth Amendment rights is premised in part on his
allegations that he was not arraigned prior to the strip search and that he could have been housed
separately from the general population. The Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff, who was
arrested on September 28, 2013, was not brought before ajudge until September 30, 2013. (Id.
at ¶J 30, 33.) It is not clear from the Amended Complaint whether Plaintiff was housed in the
general population before and/or after his arraignment. The Complaint also alleges that ECCF
either (1) has sufficient housing to hold pre-arraignment detainees separate from the general
population or (2) could easily modify its physical plant to segregate detainees who are awaiting
arraignment. (Id. at ¶ 25.)

8

The majority in Florence acknowledged that it need not rule on the types of searches that
would be reasonable where a detainee would be held without assignment to the general jail
population and without substantial contact with other detainees. See Florence, 132 S.Ct. at 1522.
Justice Auto’s concurrence further emphasized that “the Court does not hoidthat it is
reasonable to conduct a full strip search of an arrestee whose detention has not been reviewed by
a judicial officer and who could be held in available facilities apart from the general population.”
Id. at 1524 (Alito, J., concurring)(emphasis added).
It is well established that the touchstone of whether a given search or seizure is
reasonable is whether the jail’s “need for the particular search” outweighs “the invasion of
personal rights that the search entails.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 559. Thus, if a prison possesses no
readily available alternative other than to engage in the particular conduct at issue, its conduct
likely is reasonably related to its legitimate penological interests. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,
90 (1987). But where a particular search or seizure involves significant intrusion into a
detainee’s privacy interests, the existence of “obvious, easy alternatives

...

that fully

accommodate[] the prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests” suggests
that the institution’s need to proceed in its chosen manner does not outweigh the burdens it
imposes upon the detainee and is therefore unreasonable. Id. at 90—91.
Here, Plaintiff’s alleges that (1) his detention was not reviewed by ajudicial officer prior
to the strip search and (2) that ECCF could have easily segregated detainees that were awaiting
arraignment. Assuming the truth of these allegations, it appears to the Court that Plaintiff’s
Fourth Amendment claims premised on these facts are not foreclosed by Florence. The Court
also declines to find, at this early stage, that his claims based on these facts fail as a matter of
law.

9

Moreover, Plaintiff also alleges he was subjected to a visual body cavity strip search in
the presence of other detainees. (Am. Compl. at ¶ 32.) The County suggests in its moving
papers that the manner in which it conducts strip searches was essentially approved in Florence.
Notably, hovever, in Florence, the plaintiff alleged that the jaWs decision to strip search him
was unreasonable not because it was conducted in an unreasonable manner but because it lacked
sufficient justification; namely, that it was conducted absent individualized suspicion that he was
concealing contraband. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 559. 99 S.Ct. 1861 (noting that “the manner in
which [the search] is conducted” and “the justification for initiating it” are two different aspects
of whether a particular search is reasonable).
As recently explained by the Sixth Circuit in Williams v. City ofCleveland, 771 F.3d 945,
951(6th Cir. 2014), “nothing in Florence upends the long-standing rule that a search of a
detainee, even if it does not need to be based upon individualized suspicion, still “must be
conducted in a reasonable manner.” Id. (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 560); see also United States v.
Fowlkes, 770 F.3d 748, 758, 2014 WL 4178298, at *6 (9th Cir. Aug.25, 2014) (observing that an
otherwise justified strip search must be performed in a reasonable manner); Evans v. Stephens,
407 F.3d 1272, 1281 (11th Cir.2005) (en bane) (“While searches need not be delicately
conducted in the least intrusive manner, they must be conducted in a reasonable manner.”).
As further explained in Williams,
Florence took pains to emphasize that its holding applied only to
the blanket policy before it, which required a visual strip search
and a compulsory shower with self-applied delousing solution. 132
S.Ct. at 1523. Florence specifically declined to decide whether any
other particular mode of carrying out a blanket search policy would
violate the Constitution. Id. The court observed, for example, that
if an officer “engag [ed] in intentional humiliation [or] other
abusive practices,” the search of a particular detainee could be
unreasonable, even if conducted pursuant to a uniformly applicable
policy. Id
10

Williams, 771 F.3d at 951. Significantly, as the Sixth Circuit reasoned, the “wider an audience
for a strip search, the more humiliating it becomes, especially when the stripped individual is
exposed to bystanders who do not share the searching officers’ institutional need to view [the
detaineej unclothed.” Williams, 771 F.3d at 953. Here, Plaintiffs claims here are less egregious
than those in Williams, which involved allegations of a strip search in the presence of other
detainees

alleged physical contact by those performing the search. The Sixth Circuit’s

reasoning as to non-private strip searches is nevertheless persuasive. See also Crump, 147 F.
Supp. 3d at 56—57 (relying on Williams, and finding, on a motion to amend, that claim alleging
Fourth Amendment violation based on strip searches conducted in full view of other detainees
was not futile as a matter of law). Following that persuasive authority and authority in this
District, the Court finds that Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claims based on strip searches
conducted in the view of other detainees who were searched in a similar manner is not foreclosed
by Florence and does not fail to state a claim for relief as a matter of law.
Finally, the County also argues that Plaintiffs supplemental state law claims for relief
under the NJCRA should be dismissed because the NJCRA is modeled after

§ 1983, and is

“subsumed” by the federal analysis. (ECF No. 2 1-1, Mov. Br. at 16.) Because the Court has
denied the motion to dismiss the federal claims, it need not address this argument, and the
motion to dismiss the state law claims is also denied without prejudice at this time.
V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in the foregoing Opinion, the County’s motion to dismiss

Plaintiffs Complaint is denied without prejudice. An appropriate Order follows.

11

Madeline Cox Arleo, U.S.D.J.
Date:

/

,2016

12