HUMPHREY v. PENNYMAC HOLDINGS, LLC.
Filing
12
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Kevin McNulty on 3/2/16. (cm )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
VIRGIL HUMPHREY,
•
Plaintiff,
Civ. No. 15-cv-3622 (KM)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PENNYMAC HOLDINGS, LLC,
Defendant
KEVIN MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.:
The plaintiff, Virgil Humphrey, brings this action under the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692; the Fair Credit Reporting
Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681; and the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act
(“NJCFA”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-1 et seq. The underlying debt is apparently a
home mortgage or home equity loan, and the original lender is alleged to be
Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. Currently before the court is the motion of the
defendant, PennyMac Holdings, LLC, to dismiss the complaint for inadequate
service and also for failure to state a claim, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
The complaint
The complaint (ECF no. 1) is based on a note secured by a mortgage,
having Washington Mutual Bank as lender and Humphrey as borrower. (Cplt.
¶J36, 37) The defendant attaches a copy of the note and mortgage, in the
amount of $182,000. (ECF nos. 4-3,
44)1
The complaint alleges that
Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014) (“an exception to the
general rule is that a ‘document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint’
may be considered ‘without converting the motion to dismiss into one for summary
judgment.’ “) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d
1
Washington Mutual “assigned, placed with, or otherwise transferred” the loan
to the defendant here, Pennymac, “for collection.” (Cplt.
¶ 7)
The complaint alleges that PennyMac filed a “debt collection action”
which “masqueraded as a foreclosure action” in New Jersey Superior Court,
Chancery Division. (Cplt.
¶ 8) Again, the defendant attaches a copy of the state
court complaint in foreclosure, and it is permissible to consider it as
corroboration that the foreclosure action exists. (ECF no. 4-6).
Count 1 alleges a violation of the FCRA. PennyMac, it says, is a “credit
furnisher.” See 15 U.S.C.
§ 168 la(c). Such a furnisher is obligated to furnish
accurate information and correct misinformation given to credit agencies. See
15 U.S.C.
§ 168 ls-2(a). Plaintiff allegedly gave notice that credit reporting
agencies Equifax, Experian, and Transunion possessed inaccurate information,
but neither they nor PennyMac corrected it. (Cplt.
¶f 17-24)
Count 2 alleges a violation of the NJCFA, N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 56:8-1
et seq.
It rests on essential the same factual allegations as Count 1.
Count 3 alleges a violation of the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C.
alleges that he is a “consumer,” 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692. Humphrey
§ 1692a(3), that PennyMac is a “debt
collector,” 15 U.S.C.
§ l692(a)(6), and that the debt is for “household
purposes,” 15 U.S.C. § l692a(5). The complaint alleges that Humphrey served
PennyMac with notice that he disputed the debt, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(2), but that
defendant failed to provide verification in response. This count also claims that
preconditions to the foreclosure action, such as a demand for payment in full,
were not met. All of these, according to the complaint, constituted violations of
FDCPA because they were unfair or deceptive means of collecting a debt.
Cir.1997)); Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196
(3d Cir. 1993).
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Standard on a motion to dismiss
Defendants have moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a
claim, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(6) provides for the
dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, if it fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. The defendant, as the moving party, bears the
burden of showing that no claim has been stated. Hedges v. United States, 404
F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must
take the allegations of the complaint as true and draw reasonable inferences in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515
F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (traditional “reasonable inferences” principle not
undermined by Twombly, see infra).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) does not require that a complaint
contain detailed factual allegations. Nevertheless, “a plaintiff’s obligation to
provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Thus, the
complaint’s factual allegations must be sufficient to raise a plaintiff’s right to
relief above a speculative level, so that a claim is “plausible on its face.” Id. at
570; see also Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Serv., Inc., 542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 2008).
That facial-plausibility standard is met “when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). While “[tihe plausibility standard
is not akin to a ‘probability requirement’.
.
.
it asks for more than a sheer
possibility.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Where the plaintiff, like Humphrey here, is proceeding pro se, the
complaint is “to be liberally construed,” and, “however inartfully pleaded, must
be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants
still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v.
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Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013). “While a litigant’s
pro se status requires a court to construe the allegations in the complaint
liberally, a litigant is not absolved from complying with Twombly and the
federal pleading requirements merely because s/he proceeds pro
Se.”
Thakar v.
Tan, 372 F. App’x 325, 328 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
Analysis
1.
Service of process
PennyMac moved to dismiss the complaint for inadequate service of
process, in that the summons was not properly signed and sealed. It appears
that the defect has been remedied. (See FDCF nos. 7, 11) The motion to dismiss
on this basis is therefore denied.
2.
Count 1 (FCRA)
This count alleges that PennyMac, as a credit information furnisher,
breached a duty to provide accurate information, to refrain from providing
information after a consumer has informed it that its accuracy is disputed, and
to correct and update information already provided. 15 U.S.C.
§ 168 ls-2(a)(1),
(2) & (3). PennyMac contends that there is no private right of action for
violation of those subsections, which merely list “responsibilities” of credit
furnishers. PennyMac cites Wright v. Portfolio Recovery Affiliates, No. Civ. A. 09612-GMS, 2011 WL 1226115, at*3 (D. Del. Mar. 30, 2011).
In Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Mgmt., 641 F.3d 28 (3d Cir. 2011), the Third
circuit rested its holding, in part, on the lack of any such private right of
action:
Furthermore, Huertas cannot base his claim on 15 U.S.C. § 1681s—
2(a)(1)(A), because no private right of action exists under that
provision. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s—2(c), (d); Nelson v. Chase
Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 282 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir. 2002).
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of
Huertas’s FCRA claim against AMP.
Id. at 34—35. That statement was reaffirmed in more detail in Seamans v.
Temple Univ., 744 F.3d 853 (3d Cir. 2014):
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FCRA imposes an explicit duty on furnishers of credit information
to report a dispute to all CRAs to whom it provides the information
as part of a reasonable investigation. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s—2(a)(3). 10
Private enforcement of that obligation, however, as with other
duties arising under § 1681s—2(a), is not permitted. Id. § 1681s—
2(c) (1).
IcL at 866.
I will therefore grant the motion to dismiss count 1.
Seamans also suggests, however, that the dismissal should be without
prejudice, as amendment might not be wholly futile:
We
conclude that a private cause of action arises under 15
U.S.C. § 168 ls-2(b) when, having received notice of a consumer’s
potentially meritorious dispute, a furnisher subsequently fails to
report that the claim is disputed.
...
Id. at 867. Such a cause of action is properly asserted via 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681o.
Any amended complaint should state the particular manner in which the
information furnished to the credit reporting agencies was inaccurate. As it
stands, it merely states that the information was “inaccurate or erroneous” and
that it misstated the debt in some way.
3.
Count 2 (NJCFA)
To state a claim under the NJCFA, a plaintiff must allege that the
defendant engaged in an unlawful practice that caused an
ascertainable loss to the plaintiff. Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 138
N.J. 2, 647 A.2d 454, 462—465 (1994)....
The NJCFA defines “unlawful practice” as:
The act, use or employment by any person of any
unconscionable commercial practice, deception, fraud,
false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the
knowing concealment, suppression, or omission of any
material fact with intent that others rely upon such
concealment, suppression, or omission, in connection
with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise....
N.J.S.A. § 56:8—2. “Unlawful practices fall into three general
categories: affirmative acts, knowing omissions, and regulation
violations.” Cox, 647 A.2d at 462.
5
Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 202 (3d Cir. 2007).
The only “unlawful practice” alleged is the alleged violation in Count 1. I
have dismissed Count 1, albeit without prejudice to amendment. Count 2 is
likewise dismissed without prejudice.
3.
Count 3 (FDCPA)
PennyMac contends that it is not covered by the FDCPA, which applies
to “debt collectors,” not to creditors acing on their own account. The Complaint
states, and PennyMac seems to agree, that it owns the mortgage by virtue of
assignment. (The chain of assignments, however, and the date of the
assignment to PennyMac, is unclear.)
The Complaint alleges, however, that PennyMac is in reality a debt
collector for another, and that the state court action is a collection action
masquerading as a foreclosure action. (Cplt. ¶j 8—12)
The term “creditor” means any person who offers or extends credit
creating a debt or to whom a debt is owed, but such term does not
include any person to the extent that he receives an assignment or
transfer of a debt in default solely for the purpose of facilitating
collection of such debt for another.
15 U.S.C.
§ 1692(a)(4).
Those allegations, though far from specific, are barely sufficient to go
forward, particularly in light of the plaintiff’s pro se status. I note, however,
that certain of the factual averments in Count 3 seem to pertain directly to the
merits of the foreclosure, not to plaintiff’s federal-law claims as such.
CONCLUSION
A word about the future progress of this case. Although certain of the
relevant documents are attached, the surrounding circumstances remain
murky. To be sure, the defendant has raised serious concerns about the
viability of the claims. The court also has concerns about potential issues of
jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman or abstention under Colorado River,
depending on the relation between these allegations and the merits of the
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foreclosure action; foreclosure-related issues should be decided in the
foreclosure action, not in satellite federal court litigation.
It seems, however, that targeted discovery could furnish the basis for a
resolution of claims via summary judgment. Such issues, extrinsic to the
pleadings, would include PennyMac’s status as a bona fide assignee vs. debt
collector; the progress and status of the state court foreclosure; the alleged
status of the loan as a “household” debt; the chain of assignments to
PennyMac; and other matters. Rather than haggle about “specificity” of
allegations, we may simply resolve the issues factually. The parties shall,
within 30 days, arrange a conference with the Magistrate Judge to guide and
schedule such discovery.
For now, however, the Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint (ECF
no. 4) is GRANTED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to Counts 1 and 2, but DENIED
as to Count 3.
Dated: March 2, 2016
KEVIN MCNULTY
United States District Ju
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