JIMENEZ v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Filing
11
OPINION. Signed by Judge Kevin McNulty on 5/11/16. (cm )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JASON 0. JIMENEZ,
Civ. No. 15—3762 (KM)
Plaintiff,
OPINION
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
KEVIN MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.:
Jason 0. Jimenez brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g) to
review a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”)
denying his claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 401—434. For the reasons set forth below, the
decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“AU”) is AFFIRMED.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mr. Jimenez seeks to reverse an AU’s finding that he was not disabled
from November 1, 2009, the alleged onset date, through January 6, 2014. He
applied for DIB in October 15, 2012, claiming a complete inability to work as a
result of injuries he sustained in a 2009 workplace accident, but especially in a
2010 automobile accident. (R. 12)’ His application was denied initially on
January 16, 2013, and upon reconsideration on April 23, 2013. (Id.). On
November 7, 2013, AU Hilton R. Miller conducted an administrative hearing,
at which Mr. Jimenez testified and was represented by counsel. (R. 29—72) AU
Pages of the administrative record (ECF no. 6) are cited as “R.
1
—.
Miller also received testimony from Raymond E. Cestar, a vocational expert
(“yE”), who concluded that Jimenez could perform his past relevant work as a
tattoo artist, and also that a person with his residual functional capacity could
perform three other unskilled, sedentary jobs that exist in significant numbers
in the national economy. (R. 5 1—53)
On January 6, 2014, AU
Miller issued his decision denying Mr.
Jimenez’s DIB application. (R. 12—23). The Appeals Council denied Jimenez’s
request for review (R. 1—6), rendering the AU’s decision the final decision of the
Commissioner.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND REQUIRED FIVE STEP ANALYSIS
To qualify for Title II DIB benefits, a claimant must meet the insured
§ 423(c). To be eligible for SSI benefits, a
claimant must meet the income and resource limitations of 42 U.S.C. § 1382.
status requirements of 42 U.S.C.
To qualify under either statute, a claimant must show that she is unable to
engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that
asted
has 1 (or can be expected to last) for a continuous period of not less than
tweire months. 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); see, e.g., Diaz v.
Comm’rof Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 503 (3d Cir. 2009).
A. Standard of Review
As to all legal issues, this Court conducts a plenary review. Schaudeck v.
Corrrn’rof Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999). As to factual findings,
this Court adheres to the AU’s findings, as long as they are supported by
substantial evidence. Jones v. Bamhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004)
(citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g)). Where facts are disputed, this Court will “determine
whether the administrative record contains substantial evidence supporting the
findings.” Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2000). “Substantial
evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
2
adecuate to support a conclusion.” Zimsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 610 (3d
Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Substantial
evidence “is more than a mere scintilla but may be somewhat less than a
preponderance of the evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omit ted).
[I]n evaluating whether substantial evidence supports the AU’s
leniency should be shown in establishing the claimant’s
findings
the Secretary’s responsibility to rebut it should
disability, and
be strictly construed. Due regard for the beneficent purposes of the
legislation requires that a more tolerant standard be used in this
administrative proceeding than is applicable in a typical suit in a
court of record where the adversary system prevails.
...
...
Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal citations and
quotations omitted). When there is substantial evidence to support the AU’s
factual findings, however, this Court must abide by them. See Jones, 364 F.3d
at 5C.3 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g)); Zimsak, 777 F.3d at 610—11 (“[Wje are
minful that we must not substitute our own judgment for that of the fact
finder.”).
This Court may, under 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g), affirm, modify, or reverse the
Secretary’s decision, or it may remand the matter to the Secretary for a
rehearing. Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 1984); Bordes v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 235 F. App’x 853, 865—66 (3d Cir. 2007) (not precedential).
Outright reversal with an award of benefits is appropriate only when a
fully developed administrative record contains substantial evidence that the
clairi.ant is disabled and entitled to benefits. Podedwomy, 745 F.2d at 221—
222; Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 320 (3d Cir. 2000).
Remand is proper if the record is incomplete, or if there is a lack of
substantial evidence to support a definitive finding on one or more steps of the
five ‘tep inquiry. See Podedwomy, 745 F.2d at 221—22. Remand is also proper
if th AU’s decision lacks adequate reasoning or support for its conclusions, or
if it ‘ontains illogical or contradictory findings. See Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 119—20 (3d Cir. 2000); Leech v. Bamhart, 111 F. App’x 652,
3
658 ‘3d Cir. 2004) (“We will not accept the AU’s conclusion that Leech was not
disabled during the relevant period, where his decision contains significant
cont-adictions and is therefore unreliable.”) (not precedential). It is also proper
to remand where the AU’s findings are not the product of a complete review
which “explicitly weigh[s] all relevant, probative and available evidence” in the
reco:d. Adomo u. Shalala, 40 F’.3d 43, 48 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation
marLs omitted).
E. The AU’s Five-Step Analysis
Under the authority of the Social Security Act, the Social Security
Adrrinistration has established a five-step evaluation process for determining
whether a claimant is entitled to benefits. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520, 4 16.920.
Review necessarily incorporates a determination of whether the AU properly
followed the five-step process prescribed by regulations.
Step 1: Determine whether the claimant has engaged in substantial
gain u1 activity since the onset date of the alleged disability. 20 C.F.R.
§
404. 1520(b), 416.920(b). If not, move to step two.
Step 2: Determine if the claimant’s alleged impairment, or combination
of inipairments, is “severe.” Id.
§ 404.1520(c), 4 16.920(c). If the claimant has a
severe impairment, move to step three.
Step 3: Determine whether the impairment meets or equals the criteria
of any impairment found in the Listing of Impairments. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404,
Subpt. P, App. 1, Pt. A. (Those Part A criteria are purposely set at a high level,
to identify clear cases of disability without further analysis.) If so, the claimant
is automatically eligible to receive benefits; if not, move to step four. Id.
§
404.1520(d), 4 16.920(d).
Step 4: Determine whether, despite any severe impairment, the claimant
retains the Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) to perform past relevant work.
Id.
§ 404.1520(e)—(f), 416.920(e)—(f). If not, move to step five.
4
Step 5: At this point, the burden shifts to the SSA to demonstrate that
the claimant, considering her age, education, work experience, and RFC, is
capable of performing jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
econmy. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g); see Poulos v. Comm’rof Soc.
Sec., 474 F.3d 88, 91—92 (3d Cir. 2007). If so, benefits will be denied; if not,
they will be awarded.
AU
Miller properly followed that five step process. His conclusions may
be summarized as follows.
At step one, the AU
determined that Mr. Jimenez had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity in the relevant period. (R.14
¶J 1, 2) At step two,
the LJ found that Mr. Jimenez had the following severe impairments: “back
disoder and neck disorder (20 CFR 404.1520(c))” (R. 14
At step three, the AU
¶ 3)
determined that Mr. Jimenez’s impairment or
om )inations of impairments did not meet or medically equal the severity of
one )f the listed impairments, 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, Pt. A. (R. 16
¶ 4)
defined Mr. Jimenez’s residual functional capacity (RFC) as
The AU
follovs:
[Tjhe claimant has the residual functional capacity to
5.
perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a). The
claimant is limited to lifting and/or carrying ten pounds
occasionally and ten pounds frequently. He can stand and/or walk
with normal breaks for a total of about two hours in an eight-hour
workday. He can sit with normal breaks for a total of about two
hours in an eight-hour workday. He can occasionally climb ramps
or stairs. He can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. He is
limited to only occasional balancing, stooping, and kneeling. He
cannot crouch or crawl. He is limited to occupations that do not
require manipulation using the lower extremities such as foot
controls of foot pedals. The claimant is limited to only occasional
• overhead reaching. He is limited to frequent handling and frequent
fingering. The claimant is limited to occupations that do not
involve hazards such as dangerous machinery, vibrations, or
unprotected heights.
...
(R. 16—17
¶ 5)
5
At step four, the AU
found that Mr. Jimenez was capable of performing
past relevant work as a tattoo artist. (R. 21
¶
6) This issue was complicated to
some degree by the fact that he worked off the books and was not licensed, so
that a literal return to the same job would be problematic.
Accordingly, the AU
made “alternative findings for step five of the
sequential evaluation process” (R. 21), that Mr. Jimenez was capable of
perfc rming other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
ecor my. Acknowledging the very significant limitations of Mr. Jimenez’s RFC,
and :elying on the testimony of the vocational expert, the AU identified three
sede:ltary and unskilled jobs that Jimenez could perform: order clerk (DOT #
209.567-014); assembler (DOT# 706.684-030); surveillance system monitor
(DO’’ # 379.367-0 10). Such jobs, according to the yE, existed in numbers in
the thousands regionally, and in the tens of thousands nationally. (R. 22)
Accordingly, AU
Miller concluded that Mr. Jimenez was not under a
disaility, as defined in the SSA, from November 1, 2009, through January 6,
201, the date of the AU’s decision. (R. 23
III.
¶
7)
MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND CLAIMANT’S TESTIMONY
A.
Medical Evidence
I summarize some of the more important medical evidence.
Following his accident, Mr. Jimenez was treated by Frank Rotella, D.O.
Thrc ugh July 2010, the treatment was conservative: medication, including
trigr point injections, and physical therapy (R. 485, 504-90, 650-6 1, 691702, 847-66). An MRI of the cervical spine showed muscle spasm, a right-sided
disc ‘bulge at C4-C5, and a central disc bulge at C5-C6 (R. 467, 489, 611, 703).
An PRI of the lumbar spine showed a central herniation at L4-L5, a central
bulg at L5-S1, and a focal herniation at L1-L2 (R. 469, 488, 610, 704). The
cervcal spinal cord, conus, cauda equinal, and thecal sac were all normal (R.
467, 469, 488-89, 6,10-11, 703-704). Nerve conduction studies performed on
Apri 29, 2010, showed right upper extremity radiculopathy at C5, but no
abncrmalities in the lower extremities (R. 470-73, 480-83, 490-93, 6 12-15).
6
Beginning on June 23, 2010, Mr. Jimenez saw Solomon Halioua, M.D., of
the Caddle Brook Pain Center (R. 485-87, 494-96, 607-609, 6 16-18). Jimenez
com:clained of pain radiating from his back into his arms and legs. (Tr. 485,
494, 607, 616). An examination revealed spasm and tenderness, but full
strer.gth, normal reflexes, and diminished sensation along the C6 nerve root
bilatrally (Tr. 495). Dr. Halioua’s diagnosis was lumbar pain secondary to
face; arthropathy and cervical radiculitis. He prescribed medication and
perfermed six lumbar facet injections (R. 487, 496, 592-605, 609, 618, 627-38,
669-30).
On July 20, 2Q10, for purposes of litigation arising from the car accident,
Dr. Rotella prepared a summary letter. (R. 643-48, 684-90, 847-53). He found
a limited range of motion, muscle spasm, and tenderness around the spine,
but T gross neurological deficits. He reported that the wrist pain had resolved
io
itseL. (R. 646-47, 688-89, 848-49). Two months later, Dr. Rotella wrote a
seccd, similar letter, but he had not seen Mr. Jimenez in the interim. (R. 641,
682. On Nyember 8, 2011, Dr. Rotella supplied a Certificate of Permanency in
conrection with the lawsuit arising from the car accident (R. 640, 681).
In the period November 2011—March 2012, Mr. Jimenez visited the
emegency room four times. (R. 7 14-28, 730-47, 749-6 1, 763-75, 830-46).
TwicD he reported low back pain. The physical examination, however, was
norrial, with full motion, a steady gait, normal strength, normal sensation, and
normal reflexes (R. 7 14-28, 720, 726-27, 838, 844).
On November 21, 2012, Dr. Rotella (who had not seen Mr. Jimenez since
July 20, 2010) reviewed the emergency room records and wrote a third letter
confirming his prior opinion. (R. 867-68). Dr. Rotella re-certified his prior
opinon of permanence on December 6, 2012 (R. 869).
On December 26, 2012, Marc Weber, M.D., examined Mr. Jimenez at the
reqtst of the SSA. (R. 820-2 1). Jimenez reported chronic back pain and a
hist:ry of multiple lumbar disk herniations. (R. 821) An x-ray was normal (R.
822. On examination, Dr. Weber found tenderness and a limited range of
7
motbn of the lumbar spine, but no muscle spasm or atrophy; full strength in
the upper extremities, including grip and pinch strength; full strength in the
lower extremities; intact sensation; normal reflexes; normal cervical motion;
and an inconsistent positive straight leg raising (SLR) test in the supine
position.
Dr. Weber’s examination revealed that Mr. Jimenez could walk at a
reasonable pace, fully extend his hands, make fists, oppose his fingers,
separate papers, lift a pin off the table, stand on his heels and toes, squat,
indeendent1y ascend and descend from the examination table, and put his
shoes on and off. (R. 821, 824).
B.
Jime nez’s Testimony
Mr. Jimenez testified that he is in pain every day. (R. 35) The pain is in
his knee, back, neck, and right wrist; an injury to his ankle no longer bothers
him. (R. 28) His right, dominant hand, hurts and his right arm is weak; he is
told y his doctors that his neck injury is the source of that pain. (R. 39) He
canrot pick up a bag of groceries “as well as [he] used to,” and states that he
cannot lift 10 pounds. (R. 39) He estimates that he can lift 5 pounds. (R. 42)
He has sharp pains in his neck and back “every day, all the time.” (R.
39—40) He also has muscle spasms in his neck and back. (R. 40) His neck
motbn is limited, and he cannot lift his arm over his head. (R. 41) Sitting
causes his back to hurt. (R. 4 1—42) Although he testified that he is depressed,
his ttorney acknowledged that no severe psychological impairment was
clair:ied. (R. 43)
He does not exercise, and cannot play with his children. (E. 35—36) After
walking the children two or three blocks to school, he experiences terrible pain
and must rest. (41) He spends his days “[i]n pain, in the house, trying to stay
awaj from people.” (R. 42) He has not considered trying a less strenuous job,
becEuse he is in “[s]o much pain.” (R. 43).
8
III.
ANALYSIS
A.
Subjective Pain, Severe Impairment, and RFC
Citing Cotter v. Harris, 650 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1981), Mr. Jimenez faults
the LW for failing to give sufficient consideration to his subjective complaints
of pain when determining his impairments and his residual functional
capeoity. That determination required the AU
to weigh the credibility of
Jimenez’s testimony in the context of the medical evidence. I find that the AU
gave due consideration to all of the evidence, made findings, and gave reasons
for t’aem. His determinations are supported by substantial evidence.
A claimant’s subjective complaints merit careful consideration, but the
AU
is not required to accept them uncritically. Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
667 ?.3d 356, 363 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing 20 C.F.R.
§ 4 16.929). Rather, the AU
is required to assess whether and to what degree such complaints are credible.
See ‘3SR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *4
Social Security Regulation 96-7P provides:
In determining the credibility of the individual’s statements, the
adjudicator must consider the entire case record, including the objective
medical evidence, the individual’s own statements about symptoms,
statements and other information provided by treating or examining
physicians or psychologists and other persons about the symptoms and
how they affect the individual, and any other relevant evidence in the
case record. An individual’s statements about the intensity and
persistence of pain or other symptoms or about the effect the symptoms
have on his or her ability to work may not be disregarded solely because
they are not substantiated by objective medical evidence.
Such credibility determinations are reserved for the AU:
[W]hile an ALl must consider a claimant’s subjective complaints, an AUJ
has discretion to evaluate the credibility of a claimant and arrive at an
independent judgment in light of medical findings and other evidence
regarding the true extent of the pain alleged by the claimant. Subjective
complaints cannot alone establish disability.
9
Gant v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 205 P. Appx 65, 67 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). See also 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1529(c); Malloy v.
Comn’r of Soc. Sec., 306 Fed. App’x 761, 765 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing
Van Horn v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 871, 873 (3d Cir. 1983)); Davis v. Com’r of
Soc. Sec., 240 F. Appx 957, 960 (3d Cir. 2007).
The AU
may reject subjective complaints, for example, if they are not
credible in light of the other evidence of record. Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 1999). The AU is called upon to evaluate the
inter’sity, persistence, and limiting effects of a claimant’s symptoms to
dete:mine the extent to which they limit his ability to perform basic work
activities. See 20 C.F.R.
evidence
...
§ 404.1529(c)(2). As to that issue, “[ojbjective medical
is a useful indicator.” Id. The AU
may also examine factors that
precipitate or aggravate the symptoms, medications and treatments, and daily
living activities. 20 C.F.R.
§ 1529(c)(3).
The AU’s credibility determination “must contain specific reasons for the
finding on credibility, supported by the evidence in the case record.” SSR 967P; ee also 20 C.F.R.
that the AU
§ 404.1529(b), 4 16.929(b). What is required overall is
give the claimant’s testimony “serious consideration,” state his
reas ns for discounting it, and make “specific findings.” Rowan v. Barnhart, 67
F. App’x 725, 729 (3d Cir. 2003). Where that has been done, a reviewing court
will defer to the AU’s credibility determinations.
The AU here discharged that responsibility. By no means did the AU
sim ly dismiss Mr. Jimenez’s complaints; the stringent limitations of the RFC
are stimony to that. But Judge Miller did find Jimenez less than credible as
to the disabling severity of his impairments. (R. 18) The AU’s decision,
supported by substantial evidence of record, represents a classic credibility
determination and a weighing of the evidence, to which the court must defer.
10
The AU
found back and neck impairments, the legacy of a 2010 auto
accicent, to be severe. (R. 14)2 In so finding, he discounted the contrary
opinions of Drs. Esther Tomor and Rizwan Mohammed, who opined that it was
a noi-severe impairment. The medical evidence, including MRIs, convinced the
AU
:hat a finding of severity was justified. (R. 20)
The real focus of Mr. Jimenez’s application was a claim of constant,
disabling pain. Jimenez testified that he is in severe pain every day, that he
canrot lift more than 5 pounds, and that the pain is so great that he does little
besides sit at home and avoid people. He acknowledged no daily activities of
any kind, and stated that he cannot even try to return to any sort of work.
AU
Miller considered this testimony in the context of, inter alia, prior
statements by Mr. Jimenez. As for daily activities, the AU
noted that Mr.
Jimenez had made inconsistent representations to physicians. To Dr. Weber,
he r’:ported that he could perform activities of daily living. In a function report
date :1 October 24, 2012, he reported that he cares for a dog, washes dishes,
and vatches movies. He reported preparing meals, shopping twice a month,
and Dleaning his home. He stated that he takes public transportation, reads
magazines, and socializes with his girlfriend. (R. 19—20)
In short, the AU’s skepticism as to Mr. Jimenez’s testimony about his
daily activities had a substantial basis in the evidence of record.
The AU considered other impairments but found that, alone or in
combination with the others, they were not severe. That finding was supported by
subs:antial evidence. Medical evidence, including x-rays and the examination by Dr.
Marc Weber, demonstrated that prior, separate ankle and knee injuries from 2009 had
healed to the point that they imposed only minimal limitations. (R. 14) A skull
contusion from 2010, as well as a small testicular hydrocele, had not been treated
recently, were not the subject of recent complaints, and did not give rise to any serious
funcional limitation. (R. 15) “Anxiety post motor vehicle accident,” again dating from
201(, was apparently not even claimed to be severe or disabling. (R. 15) A spinal
diso ier did not meet the requirements of Listing 1 .04A. Dr. Weber’s examination
shov’d 5/5 muscle strength of both arms and legs, with normal gait and reflexes.
There was some limitation of motion of the lumbar spine, but no muscle atrophy or
spasn. (R. 16)
2
11
The AU
also considered Mr. Jimenez’s testimony in the context of the
medcal evidence.
As found by the AU, the medical evidence, including the MRIs, were
con’stent with degenerative disc disease and cervical radiculopathy. Disc
bulges and disc herniations of the lumbar spine were present. The conus,
cauca equine, and thecal sac were unremarkable, and there were no signs of
nerve root impingement or cord involvement. The AU
noted that physical
exar.s (apparently, the 2011—12 emergency room visits) had shown no signs of
locazed weakness, normal motor strength, and normal sensation, as well as a
y
1
stea gait. (R. 18)
AU Miller noted that the course of care had been conservative and
spordic, undermining any conclusion of disability. There was physical therapy
in 2’ 10, but very little thereafter. (R. 20) Jimenez’s physical therapist described
his : am
as “intermittent”; improvement was clearly documented, for example
in cvical range of motion. (R. 18) There had been no surgery or inpatient
treaznent. (R. 20) Physical therapy aside, care had consisted mostly of
presoription pain medication. (R. 20)
The AU
summarized the examinations of Dr. Rotella through July 20,
201t. These revealed tenderness and spasm, but no gross neurological deficits,
norra1 muscle tone, and no spasticity or atrophy. Gait and reflexes were
al.
1
norr (R. 19)
Pain medicine injections in 2010 provided some relief, but it was
temorary. There were three visits to Jersey City Medical Center. On November
14, 010, he presented with pain and swelling of the right hip and left thigh.
On “bruary 26, 2011, he complained of musculoskeletal pain and abscesses
on ls neck and arms. On September 16, 2011, he complained of testicular
pair. During that visit, he reported no painful distress and showed no sign of
spir -l tenderness. He was ambulatory upon discharge. (R. 19)
On March 19, 2012, Mr. Jimenez again returned to the emergency room,
corn laining of chronic lower back pain. The intake physician noted no obvious
12
disccmfort, and reported that he walked with a steady gait. The exam was
negEtive for tenderness, spasm, and deformity. He exhibited full motor strength
and intact sensation. He was nevertheless prescribed Percocet and Naprosyn.
(R 19)
The AU
noted that there was no significant further treatment. On
Decmber 26, 2012, Mr. Jimenez was examined by Marc Weber, a consultative
internist. Jimenez reported taking no pain medication. He reported lower back
pain, extremity weakness, and occasional numbness or tingling, but showed
few igns of any neurological deficits. He ambulated without assistance. He
ayed
1
disp full muscle strength in his arms and legs, including grip strength.
Sensation was intact. Range of motion for the cervical spine was normal. A
straight leg raise test was positive only in the supine position. Range of motion
was normal for the lower extremities. He was able to extend his hands, make
fists, and oppose his fingers. He got on and off the examination table, and put
his
‘ioes on and off, without assistance. An x-ray of the lumbar spine showed
no rrve root compromise. (R. 19)
AU Miller noted, and discounted, conclusions of Dr. Rotella and Dr.
Vijakumar Kulkarni that Mr. Jimenez had a disability. Both opinions, he
founi, were conclusory. They did not involve a careful function-by-function
analjsis. They were also inconsistent with much of the medical evidence, the
conErvative and sporadic treatment history, and Jimenez’s ability to engage in
the E.ctivities of daily living. (R. 20)
It was based on this weighing of the evidence that the AU
found the
impirment severe, and defined Mr. Jimenez’s RFC (quoted at p. 5, above),
which limited him to sedentary work.
The AUJ’s weighing of evidence was careful, and he made specific
findngs to support his conclusions. Whether the court would weigh the
evidnce the same way is irrelevant. Because the AUJ’s findings and
conclusions are supported by substantial evidence, I must sustain them.
13
Past Relevant Work (Step 4)
B.
AU
Miller considered whether Mr. Jimenez could return to his prior
work as a tattoo artist, given his residual functional capacity:
[Tjhe claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform
sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a). The claimant is
limited to lifting and/or carrying ten pounds occasionally and ten
pounds frequently. He can stand and/or walk with normal breaks
for a total of about two hours in an eight-hour workday. He can sit
with normal breaks for a total of about two hours in an eight-hour
workday. He can occasionally climb ramps or stairs. He can never
climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. He is limited to only occasional
balancing, stooping, and kneeling. He cannot crouch or crawl. He
is limited to occupations that do not require manipulation using
the lower extremities such as foot controls of foot pedals. The
claimant is limited to only occasional overhead reaching. He is
limited to frequent handling and frequent fingering. The claimant
is limited to occupations that do not involve hazards such as
dangerous machinery, vibrations, or unprotected heights.
(R. 15—17
¶
5).
The ALl concluded that Mr. Jimenez could perform such work. Jimenez
obje-ts that he was not licensed, and held that job on an informal, off-thebooks basis. In a literal sense, then, he could not legally return to that job. He
also claims that he would be physically unable to meet its demands.
3
The SSA essentially concedes the issue, because it is of no consequence.
The LJ, after making this step 4 finding, made step 5 findings in the
alternative that independently rule out a finding of disability.
C.
Work Existing in the National Economy (Step 5)
“Although the claimant is capable of performing past relevant work, there
are cther jobs existing in the national economy that he is also able to perform.
Thei fore, the Administrative Law Judge makes the following alternative
3 The agency notes in passing, however, that a licensing issue should be
con&dered irrelevant, because it is an issue of legal eligibility, not one of medical
impairment or functional capacity. See Meluin. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 226 F. App’x 126,
128 3d Cir. 2007).
14
findi:igs for step five of the sequential evaluation process.” (R. 21)
Ackrowledging the very significant limitations of Mr. Jimenez’s RFC, and
relying on the testimony of the vocational expert, the AU identified three
sedentary and unskilled jobs that Jimenez could perform:
(a) order clerk (DOT # 209.567-014) (1100 jobs regionally, 19,000
natidnally);
(b) assembler (DOT# 706.684-030) (600 jobs regionally, 20,000
natir nally);
(c) surveillance system monitor (DOT # 379.367-010) (1400 jobs
regionally, 74,000 nationally). (R. 22)
Counsel’s general skepticism about the existence of one or more of these
jobs. and his attack on the notion of relying on the DOT, are unfounded. A
vocajonal expert may rely on the DOT, and the AU may rely on the VE’s
testimony to the extent it is consistent with the DOT. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1566
(d) (I (“we will take notice of—( 1) Dictionary of Occupational Titles, published by
the Department of Labor....”); Sargent v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 476 F. Appx 977,
980 n.1 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Both the AU
and the [vocational expert] relied on the
classifications in the DOT, as the applicable regulations permit.”). Indeed, the
AU may himself rely on the DOT in lieu of calling a vocational expert. See
Benon v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:i1-CV-4629, 2012 WL 3133937, at *10
(D.N.J. July 31, 2012); see also Coates v. Colvin, No. CIV. 14-0265, 2014 WL
4792199, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2014) Devault v. Astrue, No. 2:13-CV-0 155,
201 WL 3565972, at *6 (W.D. Pa. July 18, 2014).
Plaintiff’s counsel attacks the vocational expert’s testimony as “ignorant,”
4
“incc mpetent,” “biased,” “frankly incoherent,” and the like. Substantively,
Here, counsel’s argument is consistent with the tone he took at the hearing. It
is fair to say that counsel’s attitude toward the AU, civil at first, degenerated into
15
how wer, his complaints have little to support them. A typographical error as to
dates on the VE’s resume was corrected on the spot. (R. 45-46) The fact that
the TE had not himself placed anyone in a job, and was unfamiliar with
licensing requirements for tattoo artists, does not undermine the AU’s
conclusions here. (R. 53—54)
Mr. Jimenez’s real complaint is that the AU’s step 5 conclusion was
based on the RFC, which Jimenez disputes. As found above, however, the AU’s
findings were supported by substantial evidence. Where that is true, it is not
error for the AU
to pose a hypothetical to the VE which reflects the AU’s
earlier findings as to the claimant’s residual functional capacity. See Plummer
u. Apfel, 186 F.2d 422, 431 (3d Cir. 1999).
The AU’s conclusion of non-disability at Step 5 was well supported by
the stimony of the VE and other evidence.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed above, the AU’s decision is AFFIRMED.
Datcd: May 11,2016
,*
//
KEVIN MCNULTY
United States District Judg
ins&ent sarcasm, far out of proportion to any perceived provocation. The AU is to be
commended for his patience and judicial demeanor. (See R. 68—72)
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