YOUNG v. EMMANUEL et al
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge Stanley R. Chesler on 6/14/2016. (ld, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
NEWARK VICINAGE
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Daniel Young,
Plaintiff,
v.
Shannon Emmanuel, et al.
Defendants.
Civil Action No. 15-4253(SRC)
OPINION
CHESLER, District Judge:
Plaintiff is a civilly committed person under New Jersey’s
Sexually Violent Predator Act (“SVPA”), confined at East Jersey
State Prison, Special Treatment Unit (“STU”). (Compl., ECF No. 1.)
Plaintiff filed a civil rights Complaint in this Court on June 23,
2015, and submitted an addendum containing his medical records on
July 9, 2015. (ECF No. 3.)
Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant
employees of the Department of Human Services improperly made the
decision to, or approved recommendations to, place Plaintiff on
treatment refusal status, demote him to Phase 1 of treatment, and
take
away
his
notwithstanding
the
privilege
fact
of
that
institutional
Plaintiff’s
failure
employment,
to
attend
treatment was caused by his inability to walk. This matter is
1
before
the
Court
alternatively
for
upon
Defendants’
summary
motion
judgment,
to
arguing
dismiss
that
or
Defendant
Emmanuel’s decision to place Plaintiff on treatment refusal status
was a reasonable exercise of professional judgment, and that the
remaining
supervisory-level
Defendants
were
not
sufficiently
involved with the decision to incur liability. (ECF No. 13.)
Defendants further argue that no liability should attach because
they are entitled to qualified immunity. (Id.) The Court has
considered the papers filed by the parties and for the reasons
that follow will GRANT Defendants’ motion.
I.
BACKGROUND
Young has been committed
under the SVPA
since 2002.
In
accordance with the Act, he has been undergoing treatment and has
progressed to “Phase 3A.” (ECF No. 1 at 18.) In his Complaint,
Plaintiff
alleges
that
Defendants
improperly
stopped
his
treatment, moved him to South Unit where no modules were conducted,
and set him back to “Phase 1” as punishment for his failure to
attend treatment, even though they knew that his absences were due
to his inability to walk. (Id. at 17-18.) According to Plaintiff,
Defendant social worker Shannon Emmanuel instructed the treatment
team to place him on treatment refusal status although she knew
about the seriousness of his medical condition, yet forced him to
continue to walk to group. (Id. at 3.) Defendant Jacylen Ottino,
program
coordinator,
likewise
placed
2
Plaintiff
on
treatment
refusal, disregarding the swelling of his feet and legs. (Id. at
4.) Defendant Shantay Adams approved of the placement and Defendant
Merril Main made the final decision to stop Plaintiff’s treatment
and place him on treatment refusal status. (Id. at 4-5.)
Plaintiff’s
foot
problems
limited
his
attendance
at
treatment. According to Young’s Annual Treatment Progress Review
Committee Report (“TPRC Report”) dated May 18, 2015,
1
Plaintiff
was initially excused from group on account of his mobility issues,
but the excuse ended when “the medical department...determined
Plaintiff submitted select pages from this report. Defendants provided the
document in its entirety with their motion to dismiss. (Main Cert., ECF No.
13-2, ¶9 and Ex. DY06-DY24.)
1
3
that [Young] did not require [walking] assistance[.]” (ECF No. 1
at 14.) Young “started attending groups again, but stopped after
a couple [of] weeks.” (Id.) The report further provides that Young
“firmly believed he needed a wheelchair or walker,” and “reported
that he would not attend group without a walking aid.... Since
[he] was not prescribed a wheelchair or walker by the medical
staff,
he
stopped
attending
[group].”
(Main
Cert.
at
DY12.)
Plaintiff was thus placed on treatment probation status “for
failing to attend his process group,” effective October 24, 2014.
(Id.) Plaintiff’s treatment notes, cited in the TPRC Report, state
that Plaintiff was required to attend all scheduled groups with at
least 90% attendance, constructively participate in all scheduled
groups, and meet other objectives
(Id.) When Plaintiff failed
these goals, he was placed on treatment refusal status on December
3, 2014. (Id.; ECF No. 1 at 17.)
Plaintiff alleges that he attempted to walk to group, but his
feet and legs became swollen because of his efforts, and he was
admitted to the hospital on December 30, 2014. (ECF No. 1 at 4.)
Plaintiff’s TPRC report, citing a March 25, 2015, interview with
Young, notes that Plaintiff was provided with a wheelchair in
January 2015 and “plans to return to group if he is able to get
around.” (Main Cert. at DY14-15.) Nevertheless, Young’s progress
notes indicate that he has not returned to treatment. (Id. at
DY14.)
4
In a February 26, 2015, Multidisciplinary Treatment Team
Report, Young’s treatment team recommended demoting him to Phase
1 of treatment. (Id. at DY12.) As summarized in the TPRC Report,
the treatment team noted that “[i]n early October 2014, [Young]
stopped attending his process group and, when assigned to a
Treatment
Orientation
group,
stopped
engaging
in
groups
altogether.” (Id.) “As a result of his TR status, he is not
currently attending any modules or self-help groups.” (Id. at DY
14.) The treatment team recommended that Young should “[r]e-engage
in treatment,” “[w]hen appropriate...request to be reintegrated
into a CLS process group,” “[p]articipate in process group,” resume
educational programming, participate in recreational programming,
and have a psychiatric referral. (Id.)
The Treatment Progress Review Committee, based on a review of
Young’s treatment notes and reports, communication with members of
Young’s treatment team, interview of Young, and a review of other
available material included in Plaintiff’s STU file concluded that
“[s]ince his commitment to the STU, Mr. Young has made minimal
progress in treatment.” (Id. at DY19.) Assessing the quality of
Young’s engagement, the Committee noted that it was limited:
[a]lthough he has regularly attended his
process groups, he has been described as
minimally participating in treatment with
limited knowledge of treatment concepts or
insight regarding his offending dynamics or
deviant
arousal.... Although some small
improvements were noted after he was placed in
5
a
Cognitive
Life
Skills
process
group...overall, he did not appear motivated
to meaningfully engage in treatment, address
his treatment issues, or make any meaningful
changes....
(Id.) The Committee acknowledged that Young has made some progress:
During the 2014 review period, Mr. Young
demonstrated
significant
improvement
regarding his engagement in treatment, as well
as his ability to regulate his emotions and
maintain adequate behavioral control....[H]e
showed...a genuine desire to make progress in
treatment. As a result of his increased
engagement...,
emotion
regulation,
and
behavioral control, he was advanced to Phase
3A of treatment.
(Id. DY20-21.) However, as of October 2014, Plaintiff’s engagement
in treatment ceased:
Mr. Young began the current review period by
consistently attending and participating in
his CLS process group.... Unfortunately, he
stopped attending group in October 2014
because, according to him, he was having
trouble walking and required a walker or
wheelchair. However, the medical department
determined that he did not require any
assistance to walk. He subsequently started
using a wheelchair and recently began using a
walker, but has not returned to group.
(Id. at DY21.) Consequently, the Committee unanimously affirmed
Young’s treatment team’s recommendations to demote Plaintiff to
Phase 1 of treatment. (Id. at DY06.) As a result, Plaintiff lost
his institutional job, which
is “a privilege at the Special
Treatment Unit...awarded [for] cooperation in treatment.” (ECF No.
1 at 10, 17-18.)
6
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.)
“[A]
court
must
accept
as
true
all
of
the
allegations
contained in a complaint.” Id. A court need not accept legal
conclusions
as
true.
Id.
Legal
conclusions,
together
with
threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, do not
suffice to state a claim. Id. Thus, “a court considering a motion
to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that,
because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the
assumption of truth.” Id. at 679. “While legal conclusions can
provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by
factual allegations.” Id.
“In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must consider
only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of
public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the
7
complainant’s claims are based upon these documents.” Mayer v.
Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir.
1993)). Here, Plaintiff’s claims are based in part on his May 18,
2015, TPRC Report, several pages of which he attached to the
Complaint. Merrill Main, the Clinical Director of the Special
Treatment Unit where Plaintiff is committed, authenticated the May
18, 2015, TPRC Report as custodian of records for the STU and
submitted a complete copy. (Certification of Merrill Main, ¶¶812, Ex. DY06-24.) Therefore, in considering Defendants’ motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure
12(b)(6),
the
Court
will
consider
the
Complaint,
Plaintiff’s addendum of medical records, and the complete May 18,
2015 TPRC Report.
III. DISCUSSION
A.
RIGHT TO TREATMENT
Plaintiff alleges a violation of his federal constitutional
rights by state actors. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State..., subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress....
8
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation
of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United
States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed
by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487
U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Although Plaintiff invokes his Eighth Amendment right to
treatment, as a civilly committed sexually violent predator under
the New Jersey Sexually Violent Predator Act, N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24
et seq., his right to receive sex offender treatment comes from
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. See Leamer v. Fauver,
288 F.3d 532, 545 (3d Cir. 2002)(holding that New Jersey's unique
former statutory scheme for sex offenders, that predicated the
term of sentence on a prisoner's response to treatment, created
fundamental and cognizable liberty interest in treatment). While
Leamer was not a civilly committed sex offender, his confinement
and treatment were inextricably linked pursuant to the statute.
Because the SVPA similarly predicates the length of confinement on
treatment response, the Third Circuit’s holding in Leamer clearly
extends to an involuntarily committed sex offender under the SVPA.
See
N.J.S.A.
30:4–27.34(b)
(“The
Division
of
Mental
Health
Services in the Department of Human Services shall provide or
arrange for treatment for a person committed pursuant to this act.
Such treatment shall be appropriately tailored to address the
specific needs of sexually violent predators.”); N.J.S.A. 30:4–
9
27.36(a) (“At any time during the involuntary commitment of a
person under this act, if the person's treatment team determines
that the person's mental condition has so changed that the person
is not likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if released,
the treatment team shall recommend that the Department of Human
Services authorize the person to petition the court for discharge
from involuntary commitment status.”).
Therefore, Young has a
cognizable liberty interest in sex offender treatment under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
B.
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DEFENSE
Defendants assert they are entitled to qualified immunity
against Plaintiff’s claims because:
[N]o reasonable state official would know that
placing plaintiff on treatment refusal status
after (i) the medical department determined
that he did not need assistance to walk, and
(ii) plaintiff failed to return to treatment
even after the doctor provided him with a
wheelchair and later a walker...[would violate
the Constitution].
(Defs’ Br., ECF No. 13-3 at 31.)
Qualified
immunity
protects
government
officials
“from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800,
818
(1982)).
A
right
can
10
be
clearly
established
under
precedent of a Circuit Court of Appeals. See, e.g., Mammaro v. New
Jersey Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency, 814 F.3d 164, 169 (3d
Cir. 2016). Qualified immunity is immunity from suit, and should
be resolved as early as possible. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231-32. It
protects from suit “all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743
(2011) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
There are two steps for resolving qualified immunity claims,
but the steps may be addressed in any sequence. Pearson, 555 U.S.
at 242 (citing two-step test in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194
(2001)). In other words, courts need not first determine whether
the
facts
alleged
by
the
plaintiff
state
a
violation
of
a
constitutional right before addressing whether such a right was
clearly
established
at
the
time
of
the
defendant’s
alleged
misconduct. Id.
A defendant has not violated a clearly established right
unless the contours of that right were “sufficiently definite that
any
reasonable
official
in
the
defendant’s
shoes
would
have
understood that he was violating [the right.]” Plumhoff v. Rickard,
134 S.Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014) (citing al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741.)
Stated another way, “̔existing precedent must have placed the
statutory or constitutional question’ confronted by the official
‘beyond
debate.’”
Id.
(quoting
al-Kidd,
563
U.S.
at
741.)
Furthermore, courts should not define clearly established law “at
11
a high level of generality” because to do so avoids the question
of
whether
the
official
acted
reasonably
in
the
particular
circumstances. Id.
There is a clearly established constitutional right, under
Third Circuit precedent, to treatment for civilly committed sex
offenders whose ultimate release depends on progress in treatment.
See Leamer, 288 F.3d at 545 (New Jersey's unique former statutory
scheme
for
sex
offenders
created
fundamental
and
cognizable
liberty interest in treatment.) This, however, is a generally
defined right to treatment.
Here,
Defendants
did
not
deprive
Plaintiff
of
all
opportunities for treatment, but imposed sanctions for Plaintiff’s
failure to attend based on determinations made by the medical
department
regarding
Plaintiff’s
condition.
Plaintiff’s
STU
documents indicate that his absences were excused until the medical
department determined that he did not require walking assistance.
Only
then
was
Plaintiff
subsequently,
after
status.
if,
Even
placed
continued
after
being
on
treatment
absences,
cleared,
on
probation,
treatment
Plaintiff’s
and
refusal
condition
deteriorated and again impeded his ability to walk, Young was
subsequently provided with a wheelchair and then a walker, but
still did not return to treatment. Under these circumstances, there
is
no
clearly
established
precedent
12
that
would
have
alerted
reasonable officials in Defendants’ shoes that they were violating
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants violated his rights by
taking away his job assignment based on his treatment refusal
status. (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 9-10.) STU jobs are a privilege
awarded for cooperation in treatment. The loss of employment is a
collateral
consequence
of
failure
to
attend.
There
is
no
independent right of a civilly committed sex offender to maintain
institutional employment. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s claims.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, in the accompanying Order
filed herewith, the Court will GRANT Defendants’ motion to dismiss
the Complaint.
s/Stanley R. Chesler
_______________________
STANLEY R. CHESLER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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