Mondis Technology Ltd v. LG Electronics Inc et al

Filing 704

Federal Circuit OPINION re 614 Notice of Appeal (Federal Circuit), filed by LG ELECTRONICS U.S.A., INC., LG ELECTRONICS INC. Signed by Prost, Circuit Judge; Dyk, Circuit Judge and Hughes, Circuit Judge, on 8/3/2021. (wh)

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United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________

MONDIS TECHNOLOGY LTD., HITACHI MAXELL,
LTD., NKA MAXELL HOLDINGS, LTD., MAXELL,
LTD.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees
v.
LG ELECTRONICS INC., LG ELECTRONICS USA,
INC.,
Defendants-Appellants
______________________
2020-1812
______________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey in No. 2:15-cv-04431-SRC-CLW,
Judge Stanley R. Chesler.
______________________
Decided: August 3, 2021
______________________
MARTIN JAY BLACK, Dechert LLP, Philadelphia, PA, argued for plaintiffs-appellees. Also represented by JEFFREY
EDWARDS; JEFFREY B. PLIES, Austin, TX.
MICHAEL J. MCKEON, Fish & Richardson PC, Washington, DC, argued for defendants-appellants. Also represented by MICHAEL JOHN BALLANCO, CHRISTIAN A. CHU,
ROBERT ANDREW SCHWENTKER.
______________________

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MONDIS TECHNOLOGY LTD.

v. LG ELECTRONICS INC.

Before DYK, PROST *, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.
HUGHES, Circuit Judge.
LG Electronics Inc. and LG Electronics USA, Inc. seek
interlocutory review of a decision of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey denying LG certain relief with respect to the liability portion of this case.
Because LG’s notice of appeal was not filed within thirty
days of the date at which the liability issues became final
except for an accounting, LG’s appeal is untimely. We dismiss the matter for lack of jurisdiction.
I
Plaintiff Mondis Technology Ltd. (Limited) is the assignee of U.S. Patent No. 7,475,180, which is directed generally to a display unit configured to receive video signals
from an external video source. See ’180 patent at 2:37–3:48.
In 2014, Limited brought this action for patent infringement against Defendants LG Electronics, Inc. and LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc. (collectively LG). After the district court
granted Limited leave to join Hitachi Maxell Ltd. and Maxell, Ltd. (collectively Hitachi) as plaintiffs to address a
standing challenge brought by LG, the case proceeded to a
jury trial. The jury found that the accused LG televisions
infringed claims 14 and 15 of the ’180 patent, that the
claims were not invalid, and that LG’s infringement was
willful, and awarded Plaintiffs (collectively Mondis) $45
million in damages.
Following the jury verdict, LG filed several post-trial
motions including: (1) a motion for JMOL or new trial of
non-infringement, (2) a motion for JMOL or new trial of
invalidity, and (3) a motion for JMOL, new trial, or

Circuit Judge Sharon Prost vacated the position of
Chief Judge on May 21, 2021.
*

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remittitur regarding the damages award and willfulness
finding. Mondis Tech. Ltd v. LG Elecs., Inc., 407 F. Supp.
3d 482, 484 (D.N.J. Sept. 24, 2019) (September Order).
Mondis also filed post-trial motions seeking enhanced damages, attorney’s fees, and interest. Id.
The district court disposed of the post-trial motions in
two separate orders. On September 24, 2019, the district
court denied LG’s motions regarding infringement, invalidity, and willfulness but ordered further briefing on damages. September Order, 407 F. Supp. 3d at 502–03. Then,
on April 22, 2020, the district court granted LG’s motion
for a new trial on damages. Mondis Tech. Ltd. v. LG Elecs.,
Inc., No. CV 15-4431, 2020 WL 1933979, at *5–6 (D.N.J.
Apr. 22, 2020) (April Order).
Following the April Order, on May 8, 2020, LG filed notice of this interlocutory appeal. LG seeks to challenge the
district court’s decision denying LG’s post-trial motions regarding infringement, invalidity, and willfulness (all of
which were decided in the September Order). LG also challenges the district court’s pretrial decision to allow the joinder of Hitachi and argues that, without such joinder,
Limited lacks statutory authority to bring suit.
After LG filed its notice of appeal, Mondis moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely, arguing that LG needed to file
notice of appeal within thirty days of the September Order.
We ordered the parties to address jurisdiction in the merits
briefing.
II
We have jurisdiction to hear certain interlocutory appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2), which provides the Federal Circuit with exclusive jurisdiction over “an appeal
from a judgment in a civil action for patent infringement
which would otherwise be appealable to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and is final except

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for an accounting.” Appeals under § 1292(c)(2) are subject
to the time limits prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a):
Except as otherwise provided in this section, no appeal shall bring any judgment, order or decree in
an action, suit or proceeding of a civil nature before
a court of appeals for review unless notice of appeal
is filed, within thirty days after the entry of such
judgment, order or decree.
Thus, LG had thirty days from the date at which the district court’s judgment became “final except for an accounting” to file an interlocutory appeal.
We have previously held that under § 1292(c)(2), a
judgment is final except for an accounting when all liability
issues have been resolved, and only a determination of
damages remains. See Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg.
Corp., 719 F.3d 1305, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) (“An
‘accounting’ in the context of § 1292(c)(2) includes the determination of damages . . . .”). LG does not challenge this
holding, nor could it, since LG seeks interlocutory review
of the district court’s liability determination while damages
remain outstanding.
In this case, all liability issues were resolved with the
district court’s September Order which ruled on LG’s posttrial motions regarding infringement and invalidity and
left only damages-related motions outstanding. Therefore,
for the purposes of appeal under § 1292(c)(2), this case was
final except for an accounting after the September Order,
and LG had thirty days from the September Order to file
notice of interlocutory appeal. Since LG did not file its notice of appeal until May 8, 2020, more than seven months
after the September Order, LG’s appeal is untimely, and
we lack jurisdiction to consider the matter.
Our ruling is consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196
(1988). Following a jury verdict in a diversity case removed

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to federal district court, the petitioner in Budinich timely
filed motions for a new trial and for attorney’s fees. Id.
at 197. In a first order, the district court denied the newtrial motions but did not resolve attorney’s fees. Id. at
197–98. Months later, the district court issued a final order
resolving attorney’s fees. Id. at 198. Within thirty days of
the final order, the petitioner filed notice of appeal covering
all the district court’s post-trial orders. Id. The petitioner
argued that such an appeal was timely with respect to the
merits, relying on a provision of Colorado state law which
instructed that a claim was not final and appealable until
attorney’s fees had been determined. Id. The Supreme
Court disagreed, finding that federal law governed under
the Supremacy Clause, and that under federal law, the
merits decision was final after the first post-trial order that
resolved all issues except for attorney’s fees. Id. at 200
(“[W]e think it indisputable that a claim for attorney’s fees
is not part of the merits of the action to which the fees pertain . . . .”). Similarly, here the district court’s decision was
final as to liability at the time of the September Order that
resolved all liability issues. Just as the outstanding matter
of attorney’s fees could not toll the time for appeal in Budinich, the outstanding damages determination cannot toll
the time for LG to appeal here.
III
LG’s timeliness arguments focus on the Federal Rules,
rather than the statutory requirements for jurisdiction. As
an initial matter, the Rules cannot override federal statute
any more than state law could do so in Budinich, and to the
extent that there is any conflict between the Rules and federal statutes, the statutes must prevail. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007) (“[The Supreme Court] has
no authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional
requirements . . . .”). But we do not read any conflict between the Rules and the statutory requirements of appeal
and conclude that, read together, the statutes and the
Rules bar this interlocutory appeal.

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The parties first disagree over what interlocutory judgment is being challenged in this appeal. Mondis argues
that LG is appealing from the September Order because
that order resolved all liability issues such that the judgment became final except for an accounting. LG argues
that the underlying judgment being challenged is the jury’s
special verdict, which was constructively entered as a judgment by operation of Rule 58(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (FRCP) on September 9, 2019, prior even to the
September Order. 1
We agree with Mondis that the September Order is the
operative date that started the thirty-day clock to file a notice of appeal, because that is the date that all liability issues became final, such that the judgment on liability
became ripe for an appeal. No matter what judgment is being challenged, the date that matters under § 1292(c)(2) is
the date at which the case became final except for an accounting.
The parties next dispute the effect of Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (FRAP). FRAP 4(a)(4) instructs that, if a party timely files any of several
enumerated motions, including post-trial motions for judgment under FRCP 50(b) or for a new trial under FRCP 59,
“the time to file an appeal runs for all parties from the entry of the order disposing of the last such remaining motion.”

However, when asked at oral argument, LG’s attorney appeared to agree that the September Order was being
challenged.
See
Oral
Arg.
at
0:35–0:48,
http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=201812 05062021.mp3 (Q: “What is the interlocutory order
that you’re challenging?” A: “We’re challenging the liability
order—the September 2019 liability order.”)
1

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LG timely filed post-trial motions including the liability-related motions ruled on by the district court in the September Order and the damages-related motions ruled on by
the district court in the April Order. Because the entry of
the order disposing of the last remaining post-trial motion
occurred in the April Order, LG argues that Rule 4(a)(4)
tolled the start of the thirty-day clock for appeal until the
entry of the April Order.
We disagree with LG’s interpretation of FRAP 4 when
applied to an interlocutory appeal under § 1292(c)(2).
FRAP 4(a)(4) applies to both interlocutory appeals and final appeals. See, e.g., Lane v. New Jersey, 725 F. App’x 185,
187 (3d Cir. 2018) (applying FRAP 4(a)(4) in an interlocutory appeal). But when FRAP 4(a)(4) pertains to interlocutory appeals under § 1292(c)(2), the enumerated motions
can only toll the time to appeal if they relate to the interlocutory judgment such that the judgment is not final except for an accounting until the court disposes of the
motions. To read the Rule to toll the interlocutory appeal
period for motions unrelated to the interlocutory judgment
would conflict with the statute. Lane is consistent with this
reading of FRAP 4(a)(4) because it involved tolling for an
enumerated motion related to the interlocutory judgment
being appealed. See 725 F. App’x at 187 (holding that FRAP
4(a)(4) tolled time to appeal the denial of a preliminary injunction until the district court ruled on a related FRCP 59
motion to alter or amend the judgment). Thus, here, Rule
4(a)(4) did toll the time to file the interlocutory appeal regarding liability based on the post-trial motions concerning
liability, but only until those motions were resolved—September 24, 2019.
LG argues that the text of FRAP 4(a)(4) requires that
the timeframe for an interlocutory appeal must be tolled
even for motions unrelated to the judgment being appealed. See Appellant’s Reply Br. at 4 (citing the provision
of FRAP 4(a)(4)(A)(ii) that motions under FRCP 52(b) can
toll, “whether or not granting the motion would alter the

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judgment”). At most, this suggests that a timely motion
will toll the time for appeal even though the judgment being appealed will not be altered. But it does not suggest
that a motion need not relate to the judgment appealed
from. FRCP 52(b) motions to amend or make additional factual findings related to an interlocutory judgment being
appealed might not alter the judgment, but, while they remain outstanding, the interlocutory judgment is not final
except for an accounting because the district court’s decision could be affected. When only motions unrelated to the
judgment being appealed remain, the judgment is final except for an accounting and the time to file an interlocutory
appeal begins.
Because FRAP 4(a)(4) does not toll the interlocutoryappeal period for outstanding motions unrelated to the interlocutory judgment, the damages motions that remained
outstanding after the September Order did not toll the time
frame for LG to file its notice of appeal on the liability portion of this case. Thus, Rule 4(a)(4) is consistent with the
combined requirements of § 1292(c)(2) and § 2107(a) that
notice of appeal be filed within thirty days of the date at
which the case became final except for an accounting. Because LG did not file its notice of appeal within thirty days
of the issuance of the September Order, its notice of interlocutory appeal was untimely.
IV
As a final matter, we note that interlocutory appeals
are voluntary, and LG is not precluded from challenging
the liability determinations of the district court under our
§ 1295 jurisdiction once the damages determination is completed. Mondis admits as much. See Appellee’s Br. at 19 n.1
(“LG will eventually have a right to appeal the liability
judgment.”). For the purposes of this interlocutory appeal,
however, LG has missed the statutory deadline and is untimely. We therefore dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
DISMISSED