MARTUCCI et al v. PROCTER & GAMBLE, INC. et al
Filing
222
OPINION fld. Signed by Judge Jose L. Linares on 8/3/16. (sr, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Civil Action No.: 15-4434 (JLL)
WILLIAM C. MARTUCCI AND WHITE
CORPORATIONS I-X,
OPINION
Plaintiffs,
V.
PROCTER & GAMBLE, INC., El AL,
Defendants.
LINARES, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court by way of a motion to dismiss Pro Se Plaintiff William
C. Martucci’s Second Amended Complaint, filed on behalf of numerous Defendants named in this
action. (ECF No. 217). On July 22, 2016, Defendants filed a supplemental letter in support of
their motion (ECF No. 220), and on July 26, 2016, Mr. Martucci filed a document that he titled
“reply brief in support of motion in opposition” (ECF No. 221). The Court decides this matter
without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. For the reasons stated
below, this Court grants the Defendants’ motion to dismiss this action, and will dismiss this matter
with prejudice given Plaintiffs repeated failures to correct the numerous deficiencies previously
identified by this Court.
I.
Background
The Court has, on several occasions, set forth the factual allegations of Plaintiffs Complaint
(see ECF Nos. 39, 69, 199). Accordingly, the Court sets forth herein only those facts relevant to
the pending motion to dismiss.
1
On April 11, 2016, this Court granted several motions to dismiss filed by a number of
Defendants. (ECF Nos. 199, 200). Among other deficiencies, the Court explained that Plaintiffs
Amended Complaint failed to clearly identify the “Plaintiffs” to this action in violation of federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Accordingly, the Court was unable to engage in an analysis of
whether the unknown “Plaintiffs” had standing to bring this action in the first place. Therefore, the
Court granted the Defendants’ motions.
In the Order accompanying the April
11th
Opinion, the Court advised Mr. Martucci that he
would be given “one final opportunity to submit a pleading that complies with the pleading
requirements of the Federal Rules and amends the deficiencies identified in the Opinion
accompanying this Order and this Court’s prior Opinions dismissing Plaintiffs original complaint
(see ECF Nos. 69, 93).” The Court gave Plaintiff forty-five days—a generous amount of time—
to file a satisfactory amended pleading. The Court informed Mr. Martucci that if he “fails to timely
file an amended pleading, or files a pleading that fails to comply with the federal rules, the Court
will direct the Clerk of the Court to CLOSE this matter.”
On May 16, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). (ECF No. 208).
On June 8, 2016, in response to letters filed by defense counsel, Mr. Martucci informed the Court
that portions of his SAC were inadvertently not filed. (ECF No. 212). He therefore asked the
Court for permission to file a corrected pleading. (Id.). The Court granted Plaintiffs request (ECF
No. 213) and on June 20, 2016, Plaintiff filed what the Court construes as the operative SAC.
(ECF No. 214).
On July 8, 2016, several Defendants filed a joint letter requesting that the Court dismiss
Plaintiffs SAC with prejudice, pursuant to this Court’s April
y1th
Order. (ECF No. 216). That
same day, several other Defendants filed the pending joint motion to dismiss Plaintiffs SAC.
2
(ECF No. 217). Defendants note that “Plaintiffs [SAC] does nothing more than combine his prior
Amended Complaint with a legal memorandum making arguments already considered and rejected
by this Court. It does not correct any of the legal deficiencies identified by Defendants in their
prior motions to dismiss or found by the Court in its Opinion and Order of April 11.” (ECF No.
217-1 at 3).
On July 12, 2016, apparently in response to the pending motion, Plaintiff filed a letter
requesting “permission to correct the Title Page error in the Second Amended Complaint to
remove White Corporation I-V.” (ECF No. 218). Mr. Martucci did not request permission to
make any substantive amendments to the SAC. (See Id.).
Defendants filed a supplemental letter in support of their motion to dismiss on July 22,
2016 (ECF No. 220), and Plaintiff filed a document entitled “reply brief in support of motion in
opposition” on July 26, 2016 (ECF No. 221).
II.
Discussion
For at least the third time, Plaintiff has failed to file a pleading that complies with the
threshold pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). In its April 1 lt1 Opinion,
this Court addressed the argument raised by several Defendants that Mr. Martucci lacked standing
to bring this lawsuit because he has not demonstrated that he suffered a personal injury that is
separate and distinct from that of the corporations on whose behalf he attempts to bring this action.
The Court wrote:
As the Third Circuit has explained: “Article III of the Constitution restricts
the ‘judicial power’ of the United States to the resolution of cases and controversies.
Subsumed within this restriction is the requirement that a litigant have standing to
challenge the action sought to be adjudicated in the lawsuit.” Taliafei-ro v. Darby
Tp. ZoningBd., 458 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted). To
assert standing, “a plaintiff must show (a) an ‘injury in fact,’ i.e., an actual or
3
imminently threatened injury that is ‘concrete and particularized’ to the plaintiff;
(2) causation, i.e., traceability of the injury to the actions of the defendant; and (3)
redressability of the injury by a favorable decision by the Court.” NCAA v.
Governor of N.i, 730 F.3d 208, 217-18 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Summers v. Earth
Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009)). Stated differently, a plaintiff does not have
standing to challenge a defendant’s actions unless the plaintiff can “show that he
personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively
illegal conduct of the defendant.” Gladstone Realtors v. Village ofBellwood, 441
U.S. 91, 117 (1979).
Generally, when a defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct causes harm to a
corporation, it is the corporation rather than any shareholder or officer who has
standing to file suit. See, e.g., Meade v. Kiddie Academy Domestic franchising,
Civ. No. 11-4077, 2012 WL 1043120, *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2012) (“[A]bsent a direct
individual injury, a corporate shareholder or officer lacks standing to sue for an
injury to the corporation, and
the president and principal shareholder of a
corporation cam-iot claim damages to the corporation as his own.”); see also see
Central Jersey freightliner, Inc. v. freightliner Corp., 987 F. Supp. 289, 301
(D.N.J. 1997) (“It is well established that ‘a shareholder—even the sole
shareholder—does not have standing to assert claims alleging wrongs to the
corporation.”) (citation omitted); see also Fitchford v. FEPI, Inc., 531 F.2d 92, 97
(3d Cir. 1975) (holding that plaintiff; the shareholder and officer of a corporation,
lacked standing to file an antitrust action where “[t]here [was] no proof that any of
the restraints were directed against [plaintiffi individually as a shareholder or as an
officer” of the businesses).
.
.
.
In light of the above standards, the Individual Defendants argue, inter alia,
that Mr. Martucci has not suffered a personal injury at the hands of the Individual
Defendants, and that he therefore lacks standing to file the instant lawsuit. While
the Court believes that the Individual Defendants’ argument as to lack of standing
has merit, for the reasons discussed below, and on the facts alleged in the Amended
Complaint, it is impossible for the Court to properly analyze this standing issue.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a complaint must set forth,
among other things, “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Implicit within this requirement
is a precise understanding of the identity of the “pleader” who is seeking relief. Mr.
Martucci’s Amended Complaint identifies “William C. Martucci and White
Corporations I-X” as Plaintiffs. (Am. Compi. at 1-2). Mr. Martucci identifies only
himself in the “Parties” section of the Amended Complaint. Mr. Martucci does not
offer any explanation as to why he files this action on behalf of “White
Corporations I-X.” Nor does Mr. Martucci identify himself as having any
relationship, be it as a shareholder, officer, or otherwise, of any corporation relevant
to this matter. Accordingly, it is unclear who the plural “Plaintiffs” are that Mr.
Martucci references throughout his Amended Complaint. Without even an
understanding of who the “Plaintiffs” to this action are, the Court cannot properly
4
engage in an analysis as to whether the unknown “Plaintiffs” have standing to file
suit, as the Individual Defendants have requested. (ECF No. 170, Individual
Defendants’ Moving Brief, at 4-5).
Now, in Plaintiffs SAC, he lists both “Retailers Marking Group, Inc.” and William C.
Martucci as Plaintiffs. (SAC at 18). However, as the Court previously noted in the above-quoted
section of the April 11, 2016 Opinion, an individual plaintiff does not have standing to challenge
a defendant’s actions unless the plaintiff can “show that he personally has suffered some actual or
threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant.”
Gladstone
Realtors, 441 U.S. at 117. Plaintiff has not done so in this newest pleading.
Here, the factual allegations in the SAC refer to “Plaintiffs” in the plural, without delineating
between the harm allegedly incurred by Mr. Martucci as an individual and that allegedly incurred
by RMG. For example, the SAC claims that “[t]he Plaintiffs have the right to sue on a contract
despite not having originally been an active party in the contract between Manufacturer and
Inamr.” (SAC at 17). Plaintiff also alleges that “During phone calls between P&G and Plaintiffs,
P&G insisted that there was no contract with Plaintiffs.” (SAC at 26). Therefore, because Mr.
Martucci has not alleged any facts pertaining to the extent of his relationship with RMG or any
injury he suffered as an individual that is distinct from the harm allegedly suffered by RMG, the
Court finds that Mr. Martucci lacks standing to file this lawsuit.
Moreover, Mr. Martucci is not permitted to represent RMG without a law license. See Van
De Berg v. C.I.R., 175 F. App’x 539, 541 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Rowland v. Caflfornia Men’s
Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 201-202 (1993) (“It has been the law for the better part of two centuries..
that a corporation may appear in the federal courts only through licensed counsel.”). Mr. Martucci
has advised the Court on June 8,2016 (ECF No. 212) and again on July 12, 2016 (ECF No. 218 at
2), that the owner of RMG is attempting to find legal counsel; However, to date, no appearance
5
has been entered on RMG’s behalf. Therefore, the Court will not permit Mr. Martucci—who
appears Pro se—to continue to litigate this matter on RMG’s behalf.
On July 12, 2016, Plaintiff filed a letter indicating that he “did not proof read the Second
Amended Complaint” and therefore did not realize that title page of that document still references
White Corporation I-V.
(ECF No. 218).
Thus, Plaintiff requests that the Court grant him
permission to correct the title page of the Second Amended Complaint to remove any reference to
White Corporations I-V. (Id.). Because simply removing “White Corporations I-V” from the
caption of his SAC will not currently the standing deficiencies identified above and the other
deficiencies that this Court need not address in light of the standing deficiencies, the Court denies
Plaintiffs request to file a corrected title page.
This Court is mindful of Plaintiffs Pro se status, and has given Mr. Martucci the benefit of
the doubt throughout this litigation. However, the Court will not permit this litigation to continue
any further in light of Plaintiff s repeated failures to correct the deficiencies identified by this Court
in its several opinions dismissing this action. The Court did advise Mr. Martucci that his failure
to comply with the Court’s April 11, 2016 Opinion and Order will result in a dismissal of this case
with prejudice.
III.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ motion to dismiss this matter is hereby granted, and
Plaintiffs SAC is dismissed with prejudice. An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.
IT IS $0 ORDERED.
JOS
6
.
LINARES, U.S.D.J.
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?