EZAKI GLICO KABUSHIKI KAISHA v. LOTTE INTERNATIONAL AMERICA CORP.

Filing 55

OPINION AND ORDER denying 43 Motion to Change Venue; the Court shall hold an initial scheduling conference on February 22, 2017 at 11:30 a.m., in Courtroom 4A of the Martin Luther King Building and U.S. Courthouse. The parties are directed to electronically file a Joint Discovery Plan on or before February 16, 2017. Signed by Magistrate Judge Leda D. Wettre on 1/30/2017. (seb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

EZAKI GLICO KABUSHIKI KAISHA
and EZAKI GLICO USA
CORPORATION,

Civil Action No. 15-5477 (MCA) (LDW)

OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs,
v.
LOTTE INTERNATIONAL AMERICA
CORP.,
Defendant.

Before the Court is defendant Lotte International America Corp.’s motion to transfer this
action to the United States District Court for the Central District of California, pursuant to 28

U.S.C.

§

1404(a). (ECF No. 43). Plaintiffs commenced this trademark infringement and unfair

competition action in this District, averring that defendant is a New Jersey corporation with a
principal place of business in Ridgefield Park, New Jersey. Defendant acknowledges that it is a
New Jersey corporation but asserts that its principal place ofbusiness is in Los Angeles, California
and that the Central District of California is a more convenient forum to litigate this action.
Subsequent to the filing of this action, defendant commenced a declaratory judgment action of
trademark invalidity and unenforceability against plaintiffs in the Central District of California.
That court stayed the action before it, pending the outcome of the instant motion. In view of the
applicable facts and law, the Court now DENIES defendant’s motion to transfer.
I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Ezald Glico Kabushiki Kaisha (“Glico”) is incorporated and headquartered in
Japan. (ECF No. 9 at

¶ 1).

It has marketed and sold cookie sticks coated in chocolate, cream,

and/or almond pieces under the brand name “POCKY” in Japan since 1966 and in the United
States since 1978. Glico holds three registered trademarks with the United States Patent and
Trademark Office for POCKY product configurations. (Id.

¶f 8-15).

Glico’s wholly owned subsidiary, plaintiff Ezaki Glico USA Corporation (“Glico USA”),
sells and markets POCKY products in the United States. Glico USA is a California corporation
with a principal place of business in Irvine, California. (ECF No. 9 at ¶ 2). It also has had a New
Jersey office and at least two employees in this state since January 2015, to provide sales and
support services for its customers in the eastern United States. (ECF No. 43-4 at 13-14). These
customers include specialty grocery stories, national retail stores such as Walmart, Target, and
Costco, and online retailers like Amazon.com. (ECF No 9 at ¶ 10).
Defendant Lotte International America Corporation (“Lotte”) is incorporated in New
Jersey and asserts that its principal place of business currently is in Los Angeles, California.’
(Defendant’s Counterclaims, ECF No. 17, at

¶ 1).

Its parent company, non-party Lotte

Confectionary Co. Ltd. (“Lotte Korea”), is based in Korea. (Id.

¶ 7;

ECF No. 43-1 at 1). Lotte

sells cookie sticks under the name “PEPERO” through wholesale distributors located throughout
the United States (including in California, New Jersey and New York). (ECF No. 47-2 at 8).
Glico filed the instant action against Lotte in this District in July 2015 2 Plaintiffs allege
various trademark infringement and unfair competition claims against Lotte under federal and state

Lotte does not address the information proffered by plaintiff that Lotte’s website, as
recently as June 25, 2015, listed its “US office” as 100 Challenger Rd., Suite 710, Ridgefield Park,
New Jersey 07660. (ECF No. 47-3).
2
The Complaint was subsequently amended to include Glico USA as a plaintiff. (ECF No.
9). Glico had previously, in November 2014, filed a trademark infringement complaint against
Lotte’s sister company, Lotte USA, Inc. in the Western District of Michigan, (Civ. A. No. 1:14cv-01164-PLM (W.D.Mich.)), allegedly “under the mistaken belief that Lotte USA Inc. was the
distributor of the infringing products.” (ECF No. 47 at 8 n.3). That action was dismissed.
2

law. Lotte asserted counterclaims for false advertising and for a declaratory judgment of noninfringement of Glico’s trademarks. By Letter Order of December 13, 2016, the Court granted
Glico’s motion to dismiss Lotte’s false advertising counterclaims. (ECF No. 53).
In August 2015, shortly after the filing of this action, Lotte and Lotte Korea filed a
complaint in the Central District of California against Glico and Glico USA asserting claims for
false advertising and a declaratory judgment that Glico’s trademarks are invalid and unenforceable.
The California court stayed that action pending the outcome of the present venue transfer motion.
(See ECF No. 43-1 at 2 & n.1).

After this Court permitted limited jurisdictional discovery relating to this proposed transfer
motion (ECF No. 36), Lotte moved to transfer venue to the Central District of California pursuant
to 2$ U.S.C.

§ 1404(a). (ECF No. 43). It argues, generally, that both venue and jurisdiction are

proper in the Central District of California and that California would be a more convenient forum
because both parties are headquartered in California and market their products from their
California offices, most of the third-party witnesses are in California, and the relevant documents
are in California. Lotte further argues that California has a stronger interest in resolving this
dispute than New Jersey because a greater quantity of the parties’ products is sold annually in
California than in New Jersey and that California has a compelling interest in regulating the
conduct of businesses headquartered there.
Plaintiffs oppose Lotte’s motion, arguing that Lotte has failed to meet its burden to
demonstrate that the case should be transferred under the relevant factors, emphasizing that the
factors Lotte identifies do not overcome the weight that should be given to plaintiffs’ choice of
this forum for the lawsuit. (ECf No. 47). They also argue that the case has sufficient connection
to New Jersey to remain here, in that Lotte is incorporated in New Jersey, both parties maintain

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offices and sell their products to retailers and/or distributors located here, and the alleged
infringement has occurred in every place Lotte’s products are sold, including New Jersey.
Furthermore, it argues, both parties are sophisticated multinational corporations and do not lack
means to travel to New Jersey from California, Korea, and Japan, to the extent necessary.
II.

DISCUSSION

“for the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest ofjustice, a district court
may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.”
2$ U.S.C.

§ 1404(a). The purpose of 1404(a) is to “prevent the waste of time, energy and money

and to protect litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense.”
Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Federal courts must engage in a two-part analysis in evaluating a motion to transfer venue
under

§ 1404(a). As a threshold matter, the Court must determine “whether the transferee district

has proper jurisdiction and venue, such that the case could have been brought in the transferee
district in the first instance.” Telebrands Corp. v. Mopnado, Civ. A. No. 14-7969 (JAD), 2016
WL 368166, at *10 (D.N.J. Jan. 12, 2016). Next, the court must engage in an “individualized,
case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness’ regarding which forum is most
appropriate to consider the case.” Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Xerox Corp., 56 F. Süpp. 2d 442, 450
(D.N.J. 1999)); see also Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
With respect to the various transfer factors to be considered, the Third Circuit has instructed
that “[w]hile there is no definitive formula or list of factors to consider.

.

.

courts have considered

many variants of the private and public interests protected by the language of 1404(a).” Jumara
v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d $73, 877 (3d Cir. 1995). The Jumara Court established a list of
private and public interests that district courts in this Circuit typically consider in deciding whether

4

to grant a

§ 1404(a) motion (the “Jumara factors”). The private interests include the following:
plaintiffs forum preference as manifested in the original choice; the
defendant’s preference; whether the claim arose elsewhere; the
convenience of the parties as indicated by their relative physical and
financial condition; the convenience of the witnesses—but only to
the extent that the witnesses may actually be unavailable for trial in
one of the fora; and the location of books and records (similarly
limited to the extent that the files could not be produced in the
alternative forum).

Id. (citations omitted). The public interests include:
the enforceability of the judgment; practical considerations that
could make the trial easy, expeditious, or inexpensive; the relative
administrative difficulty in the two fora resulting from court
congestion; the local interest in deciding local controversies at
home; the public policies of the fora; and the familiarity of the trial
judge with the applicable state law in diversity cases.
Id. at 879—80 (citations omitted).

This list of factors, however, “is merely a guide.”

LG

Electronics, Inc. v. first Intern. Computer, Inc., 13$ F. Supp. 2d 574, 587 (D.N.J. 2001). The
analysis is “flexible and must be made on the unique facts of each case.” Ricoh Co., Ltd. v.
Honeywell, Inc., $17 F. Supp. 473, 479 (D.N.J. 1993).
The moving party bears the burden “to establish that a balancing of proper interests weighs
in favor of the transfer.” Shutte v. Armco Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 22, 24 (3d Cir. 1970). Indeed,
“[t]he burden is not on the plaintiff to show that the proposed alternative forum is inadequate. On
the contrary, the burden is on the moving party to show the proposed alternat[ivej forum is not
only adequate but also more convenient than the present forum.” Ricoh Co., Ltd., 817 F. Supp. at
480 (citation omitted).
The parties do not dispute that venue and jurisdiction would be proper in the Central
District of California. Accordingly, the Court turns to the Jumara factors.

5

A. Private Interest F actors
The Court finds that the majority of the Jumara private interest factors are either neutral or
weigh against Lotte’s transfer motion.
1. The Parties ‘Preferences on Forum
The Court first considers the parties’ preferences as to forum namely, that plaintiffs chose
—

this forum and that defendant Lotte, conversely, prefers to litigate the action in the Central District
of California. Ordinarily, a plaintiff’s choice of forum is a “paramount consideration in any
determination of a transfer request, and that choice.

.

.

should not be lightly disturbed.” Shutte,

431 F.3d at 25. Lotte correctly points out, however, that the weight courts give to a plaintiff’s
choice of forum is diminished when the plaintiff does not reside in that forum or when the key
facts of the lawsuit occurred elsewhere. One World Botanicals v. Gulf Coast Nutritionals, Inc.,
987 F. Supp. 317, 326 (D.N.J. 1997).
Here, neither plaintiff is incorporated or headquartered in New Jersey. Nevertheless, that
does not mean that their choice of forum is entitled to no weight at all. See LG Electronics, Inc.,
138 F. $upp. 2d at 589-90 (noting that “[a]lthough plaintiff’s choice militates against transfer, the
weight of that choice is significantly lessened by the fact that LGE does not reside in New Jersey”
but still according plaintiff’s choice some weight); Ricoh Co., Ltd., $14 F. $upp. at 480-81 (citing
Lony v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 935 F.2d 604, 609 (3d Cir. 1991) (“[R]educed deference
is not an invitation to accord a foreign plaintiff’s selection of an American forum no deference
since dismissal for forum non conveniens is the exception rather than the rule.” (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted))). Moreover, as set forth below, the facts underlying this lawsuit
are not unrelated to New Jersey. Therefore, plaintiffs’ choice of forum is accorded some (albeit,
diminished) weight and must be considered in light of the other Jumara factors.

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2.

Whether the Claim Arose Elsewhere

Lotte argues that the location of the operative facts underlying the litigation is California
because it is headquartered there and because more of the products at issue in this action are sold
in California than in other states. The Court finds that the locale of the operative facts is actually
more complex than argued by Lotte, and that the operative facts occurred in New Jersey as well as
California.
Since Lotte’s false advertising counterclaims have been dismissed, this action is primarily
one for trademark infringement. Trademark infringement claims are deemed to arise where the
“passing off’ occurs, or where the allegedly infringing products are sold to consumers who may
become confused. See Cottman Transmission
1994).

Sys.,

Inc. v. Martino, 36 F.3d 291, 294 (3d Cir.

There is no dispute that Lotte’s product is sold in many states, including New Jersey.

While Lotte’s president certifies that Lotte “sells hundreds of thousands more cookie stick products
in California than in New Jersey,” (ECF No. 19-2 at ¶ 4), he provides no overall sales figures that
might put his statement into context. He certainly does not state that Lotte’s sales in New Jersey
are de minimis—just that more product is sold in California. Because sales of Lotte’s allegedly
infringing product are admittedly made in New Jersey, the trademark claims, in part, arose here as
well as in California. See Tetebrands Corp., 2016 WL 368166, at *11 (rejecting defendant’s
argument that its products were warehoused and shipped outside of New Jersey because it
“ignore[dj the fact that, while the products at issue may have originated elsewhere, each was sold
and shipped to consumers within New Jersey”); Master Cutlery, Inc. v. Panther Trading Co., Civ
A. No. 12-4493 (JLL), 2012 WL 6597056, at *3..4 (D.N.J. Dec. 17, 2012) (noting that intellectual
property infringement occurs where the products are sold and that Defendant sold its products in
New Jersey, where Plaintiff was located); see also One World Botanicals, 987 F. $upp. at 326-27

7

(finding venue in New Jersey proper even though Defendant was located in Florida and the action
was first filed there because, inter alia, Plaintiff was located in and chose New Jersey and “[m]any
of the operative facts of th[e] lawsuit occurred within New Jersey”; specifically, Defendant sold
its products to a New Jersey distributor).
The Court recognizes that the parties must conduct much of their business activities in
California, where their headquarters are located. But both parties also have significant connections
to this forum. Lotte is incorporated in New Jersey and has at least one employee that works in
New Jersey, and Glico maintains an office and employees in New Jersey. This case thus does not
present a situation in which the forum state has no meaningful connection to the litigation other
than being one of many states in which the alleged infringement occurs. Cf Kelly-Brown v.
Winfrey, Civ. A. No. 11-4360 (SRC), 2011 WL 5325596 (D.N.J. Nov. 3, 2011) (transferring
trademark infringement action to New York where Plaintiff alleged that Defendants used
Plaintiffs mark specifically in connection with an invitation-only event in New York and in
magazines that were distributed throughout the country, Defendants’ core offices were in New
York, and the action had no significant connection to New Jersey); ESP Shibuya Enterprises, Inc.
v. Fortttne Fashions Indus., Civ. A. No. 08-3992 (PGS), 2009 WL 1392594, at *4 (D.N.J. May
15, 2009) (noting that the fact that infringing products were sold in New Jersey “does not entitle
[plaintiff] to foist upon the forum a litigation with no other meaningful relationship to it”). In view
of the foregoing, the Court finds this factor neutral as to transfer.
3.

Convenience ofthe Parties

Regarding the “convenience of the parties as indicated by their relative physical and
financial condition,” both Glico USA and Lotte are headquartered in California and most of their
employees are located in California. Nevertheless, Lotte has not convinced the Court that it would

8

be significantly inconvenient to litigate in New Jersey, given that both parties are large
multinational corporations and Lotte is incorporated in New Jersey. The Court cannot lightly
conclude that a party effectively may claim that its state of incorporation is an inconvenient forum
for it to litigate, especially where, as here, the lawsuit has a relationship to the forum in addition
to the party’s incorporation there. See Intellectual Ventures ILLC v. Altera Corp., 842 F. Supp.
2d 744, 756 (D. Del. 2012) (noting, in concluding that the balance of factors weighed against
transfer, that the fact that all parties were incorporated in Delaware was an important factor,
explaining that “one aspect of a company’s decision to incorporate in Delaware is that under our
jurisdictional and venue statutes it is agreeing to submit itself to the jurisdiction of the courts in
this state for the purposes of resolving this type of commercial dispute” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. E-Z-Em Inc., 670 F. $upp. 2d 349, 357 (D. Del. 2009) (applying
Jumara factors and noting that “when a corporation chooses to incorporate in Delaware and accept
the benefits of incorporating in Delaware, it cannot complain once another corporation brings suit
against it in Delaware”).3
Moreover, the reality of federal litigation today is that the parties’ witnesses will be
required to appear in New Jersey for little other than the trial of the case, should it proceed that
far.

Depositions of the parties’ California employees may be taken locally in California.

Participation of the parties’ employees in Japan and Korea in discovery and trial will be equally
inconvenient for those witnesses whether those activities take place in California or New Jersey.
For all of these reasons, the Court finds that the convenience of the parties only slightly favors

Lotte relies on In re Link_A_Media Devices Corp., 662 F.3d 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2011) to argue that
place of incorporation is not a significant factor. The court in that case, however, merely clarified
that a defendant’s place of incorporation is “is certainly not a dispositive factor in the venue
transfer analysis” and that district courts should still make sure to balance all of the Jumara factors.
Id., 662 F.3d at 1224.
9

California.
4.

The Convenience of Witnesses

Regarding the availability of witnesses, Jumara instructs that that courts should consider
witness convenience “only to the extent that witnesses may actually be unavailable for trial in one
of the fora.” Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. Accordingly, the fact that most of the parties’ employees
are located in California does not significantly affect this portion of the transfer analysis; the most
relevant consideration is the location of non-party witnesses. See Liggett Grp. Inc. v. R.i Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 102 F. Supp. 2d 518, 534 n.19 (D.N.J. 2000) (“Party witnesses are presumed to be
willing to testify in either forum despite any inconvenience, and therefore, the relative convenience
of such witnesses carries little weight.”). furthermore, courts must consider “the substance of the
dispute and what bearing the testimony of such unavailable witnesses will have on the prosecution
or defense of the claims.” Kelly-Brown, 2011 WL 5325596, at *4 (citing Van Cauwenberghe v.
Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 528 (1988)). Specifically, the court must “evaluate what proof is required,
and determine whether the pieces of the evidence cited by the parties are critical, or even relevant,
to the plaintiff’s cause of action and to any potential defenses to the action.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Here, to establish a cause of action for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act,
plaintiffs will have to prove (1) that they own the mark, (2) that the mark is “valid and legally
protectable,” and (3) that Lotte’s use of the mark “to identify goods or services is likely to create
confusion.” Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Technologies, Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 279
(3d Cir. 2001). further, for Lotte to establish its laches defense under Third Circuit law, it must

In evaluating the third factor, courts consider the ten additional factors identified in Interpace
Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 f.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir. 2001), which include the degree of similarity

‘

10

show “(1) inexcusable delay in bringing suit, and (2) prejudice to [Lotte] as a result of the delay.”
Kaujhotd v. Caiafa, 872 F. $upp. 2d 374, 379 (D.N.J. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In support of its motion, Lotte purports to identify non-party witnesses that are in California
and thus outside the Court’s subpoena power.

It points to distribution agreements between

plaintiffs and a few California distributors, the dates of which range from 2010 to 2015. (ECF No.
44-2). Lotte also relies on plaintiffs’ interrogatory responses that identify contracts between Glico
and California non-parties, including distribution agreements, lease agreements for office space,
employment contracts, and contracts for consulting and advertising services. (ECF No. 44 at 711). Lotte argues that the wholesaler and distributor witnesses could provide information about
the sales of Glico’s products, advertising, and instances of actual confusion, as well as whether
Glico knew or should have known that Lotte had been selling its products in the United States for
several years. (ECF Nos. 43-1 at 10, 48 at 8-9).
Lotte’s arguments are insufficient to tip the scale in favor of transfer to California.
Conceivably, the California distributors could provide information relating to likelihood of
confusion and inexcusable delay. But Lotte has failed further to explain the specific testimony
these identified distributors would provide and, more importantly, the significance of that
testimony to the litigation. It did not provide affidavits or other materials showing that these
distributors would be key—or even relevant—witnesses. Rather, Lotte recites broad categories of
information that the witnesses might be able to provide, such as evidence of actual confusion and
plaintiffs’ knowledge of the fact that Lotte had been selling its products in the United States for
“over 20 years.” (ECF No. 43-1 at 10).

Further, Lotte does not explain why the California

between the marks, the price of the goods and sophistication of consumers, evidence of actual
confusion, and whether the goods are marketed through the same channels of trade, among others.
11

distributors’ knowledge in this regard, assuming they have such knowledge, is unique; it would
seem plainitffs’ own employees could testify readily to their awareness (or lack thereof) of the sale
of Lotte’s products. And there are myriad other witnesses and sources ofproof that will be relevant
on the subject of actual confusion. See ESPN, Inc. v. Quiksilver, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 2d 542, 548
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“In an infringement action, the most critical witnesses maybe those officers and
employees who were involved in the design, production, and sale of the allegedly infringing
products.” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)); see also supra n.4.
In any event, while it is possible that the California distributors could provide relevant
information, the Court is not required to speculate in that regard. See Plum Tree, Inc.

V.

Stockment,

488 F.2d 754, 756-57 (3d Cir. 1973) (ordering district court to vacate its transfer order because the
movants failed to supply evidence in the form of “affidavits, depositions, stipulations, or other
documents” to support a

§ 1404(a) transfer); Popkin v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 244, 248

(E.D. Pa. 1966) (“[D]efendants must show more than their assertion that a certain number of
witnesses will be inconvenienced

.

.

.

.

They must show the materiality of the matter to which

these witnesses will testifj and some justification that they will probably be called to the stand.”);
cf Telebrands Corp. v. martFIVE, LLC, Civ. A. No. 13-3374 (JLL), 2013 WL 4675558, at *8
(D.N.J. Aug. 30, 2013) (granting transfer because defendants “provided the names, locations, and
expected testimony of specific individuals” while plaintiff identified only three northeastern non
party entities who might have discoverable information). Since the Court has already allowed
limited jurisdictional discovery, Lotte’s inability specifically to demonstrate the relevance of the
California non-party witnesses fails to carry its burden on this important factor of the transfer

12

analysis.5
5. The Location ofBooks and Records
Similarly, regarding availability of documents, although Lotte asserts that the documents
necessary to litigate this case are located in its California headquarters, it has not set forth why the
documents could not readily be produced in this District for trial. It would be indeed the unusual
case in this day and age of electronically stored information ifthe parties’ relevant communications
were neither created and stored electronically at their inception nor put into electronic form shortly
after the lawsuit’s commencement for the parties’ and their counsel’s own use and convenience.
Lotte has not shown that this is the unusual case where paper discovery and hence physical transfer
of voluminous records will be necessary.
***

While the Court recognizes that Lotte would prefer that the action be litigated in California
because that forum would be more convenient for certain of its party witnesses there, Lotte has
failed to meet its burden to show that the private interest factors as a whole favor transfer. Plaintiffs
chose New Jersey as the forum, both parties have offices and/or employees in New Jersey,
defendant is incorporated in New Jersey, and the alleged infringement would have occurred in part
in New Jersey, where both parties’ products are sold.
B. Public Interest Factors
As Lotte concedes, most of the public interest factors in this case are neutral. Lotte argues,

Lotte also claims that plaintiffs have certain former employees who may possess relevant
information and “likely” reside in California. (ECF No. 43-1 at 10). Lotte refers to 4 of 25
employees identified in interrogatory responses, whose current business addresses are listed as
“unknown.” These include an intern, two sales representatives and a marketing assistant. (ECF
No. 44 at 25). Despite the Court’s having permitted Lotte jurisdictional discovery, Lotte neither
identifies any relevant personal knowledge of these four individuals nor demonstrates they are
outside of this Court’s subpoena power. Therefore, the Court does not consider this speculative
argument in performing its transfer analysis.

13

however, that practical considerations favor transfer to California and that California has a stronger
interest in this dispute than New Jersey. In support of the former argument, Lotte raises mainly
the parties’ physical presence there, which this Court already has addressed in the preceding
section. Lotte also notes that the second-filed action it commenced in the Central District of
California is another factor favoring that District. The Court finds it inappropriate to place weight
on defendant’s filing after the commencement of this lawsuit of a nearly identical action in
California, which action was stayed by that court at its inception.
With respect to the respective interests of New Jersey and California in this action, the
Court cannot conclude that California necessarily has the stronger interest in this dispute because
the parties have their main offices there. Lotte is a New Jersey corporation, in whose conduct this
state has an interest. Glico has an office and employees here. And both parties’ products are sold
in New Jersey. Therefore, the Court does not find that this factor favors transfer.
In summary, application of the Jumara factors causes the Court to conclude that Lotte does
not meet its burden of demonstrating that transfer to the Central District of California is
appropriate.

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III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the motion to transfer is DENIED. The Clerk is accordingly
directed to terminate ECF No. 43.
The Court shall hold an initial scheduling conference on February 22, 2017 at 11:30 a.m.,
in Courtroom 4A of the Martin Luther King Building and U.S. Courthouse. The parties are
directed to electronically file a Joint Discovery Plan on or before February 16, 2017.
Dated: January 30, 2017

jiion. Leda Dunn Wettre
United States Magistrate Judge

Original:
cc:

Clerk of the Court
Hon. Madeline Cox Arleo, U.S.D.J.
All Parties

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