RUSSO v. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD et al
Filing
7
OPINION. Signed by Judge Stanley R. Chesler on 8/25/15. (DD, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Anthony Russo,
Civil Action No. 15-5703 (SRC)
Plaintiff,
OPINION
v.
New Jersey State Parole Board,
et al.,
Defendants.
Plaintiff Anthony Russo, a prisoner confined at South Woods
State Prison, seeks to bring this civil action in forma
pauperis, asserting claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This
Court administratively terminated this matter on August 12,
2015, because Plaintiff failed to submit a properly completed
IFP application pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (ECF No. 5.)
Plaintiff has now submitted a properly completed IFP
application (ECF No. 6), and has established his inability to
prepay the filing fee for a prisoner civil rights complaint. The
Court will reopen this matter and grant Plaintiff’s IFP
application. The Complaint is subject to review under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
I.
BACKGROUND
In his § 1983 complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendants
conspired to deny him parole and continue his illegal
incarceration in violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth
1
Amendment constitutional rights. (Compl., (ECF No. 1 at 4.)) He
seeks forty million dollars and release from prison. 1 Plaintiff
asserts:
Plaintiff will show that the New Jersey
State Parole Board, following documentation
from the East Jersey State Prison
Classification Committee, the sole authority
on sentencing calculations on inmates
sentences. That Plaintiff had maxed out, or
completed his sentences, or to use
classifications term, expired all sentences.
(Id. at 6.) Plaintiff further asserted that he attempted to seek
administrative remedies:
I filed prison
at the time
Administration
released from
his sentence
constitutional
documented in
defendants.
remedy forms, plus my attorney
wrote and phoned the Prison
seeking why Plaintiff was not
prison based on the fact that
was completed resulting in
violations.
This
is
all
Plaintiff’s presentation of
(Id. at 5.)
II.
DISCUSSION
The Court must now review the complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and dismiss the complaint if it is (1)
frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which
1
After terminating the case for failure to pay the filing fee or
submit a complete IFP application, the Court reserved this
proceeding, upon reopening, for Plaintiff’s civil rights action.
(ECF No. 5.) The Court notified Plaintiff that if he wished to
seek immediate release from prison, he should open a new matter
by filing a “Petition for Relief From a Conviction or Sentence
By a Person in State Custody Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” (ECF No.
5.)
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relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief. Courts should
liberally construe pro se pleadings. Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 891, 894 (2007). In analyzing the sufficiency of the
complaint, the Court must accept as true all factual allegations
and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, but need not
accept alleged legal conclusions as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 677-68 (2009).
Under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) “any claimant,
even if the door to federal habeas is shut and regardless of the
reason why, must establish favorable termination of his
underlying criminal proceeding before he can challenge his
conviction or sentence in a § 1983 action.” Deemer v. Beard, 557
F.App’x. 162, 167 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (dismissing § 1983
complaint against prison officials and parole board members
because inmate had not first obtained habeas relief on claim
that defendants failed to release him upon expiration of his
sentence.)
In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court
announced that a plaintiff cannot attack the
validity of his conviction or sentence in a
§ 1983 damages action without proving that
the conviction or sentence has been
“reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal authorized to make such
determination, or called into question by a
federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas
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corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” 512 U.S. [477] at
486–87, 114 S.Ct. 2364 [1994].
Id. at 164-65.
Plaintiff challenged the May 29, 2013, New Jersey State
Parole Board’s final decision denying his application for parole
in the New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division. (Compl.,
Ex. A-2 (ECF No. 1-3 at 17); Russo v. New Jersey State Parole
Bd., 2014 WL 3396085 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 14, 2014)
(per curiam). The Appellate Division affirmed the Parole Board,
and the New Jersey Supreme Court denied certification. Id.,
cert. denied 220 N.J. 208 (N.J. Dec. 16, 2014). There is no
indication that Plaintiff has otherwise sought to reverse the
Parole Board decision. Therefore, Plaintiff has not met Heck’s
favorable termination rule; and he consequently fails to state a
cognizable claim under § 1983. See Bolick v. Pennsylvania, 473
F.App’x 136, 139 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (affirming
dismissal of Heck-barred claim for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted).
III. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s § 1983 complaint is barred by Heck. In the
accompanying Order filed herewith, the Court will dismiss the
Complaint without prejudice.
s/ Stanley R. Chesler
Stanley R. Chesler
United States District Judge
Dated: August 25, 2015
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