UNITED GOVERNMENT SECURITY OFFICERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL 315 et al v. CCA OF TENNESSEE, LLC.

Filing 15

OPINION. Signed by Judge Susan D. Wigenton on 06/13/2016. (JB, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
______________________________________
UNITED GOVERNMENT SECURITY
OFFICERS OF AMERICA,
:
INTERNATIONAL UNION; UNITED
GOVERNMENT SECURITY OFFICERS OF
AMERICA, LOCAL 315,
Case: 2:15-cv-5745-SDW-LDW
:
Plaintiffs,
:
v.

:

CCA OF TENNESSEE LLC,

OPINION

:

Defendant.
:
______________________________________

June 13, 2016

WIGENTON, District Judge
Before this Court is Defendant CCA of Tennessee, LLC’s (“CCA” or “Employer” or
“Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). Jurisdiction is proper
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337, as the claims arise under Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (“LMRA”). Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391. This Opinion is issued without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
78.
For the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
a. The Parties

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Plaintiffs United Government Security Officers of America, International Union and
United Government Security Officers of America, Local 315 (collectively, the “Union” or
“Plaintiffs”) are the collective bargaining representatives for the security officers employed by
Defendant CCA at the Elizabeth Detention Center in New Jersey. (Compl. ¶¶ 3-4.)
Defendant CCA, a corporation headquartered in Nashville, Tennessee, conducts business
in several states and judicial districts, including this judicial district. (Compl. ¶ 5.) CCA is an
employer in an industry affecting commerce as defined by the LMRA. (Id.)
b. Collective Bargaining Agreement
The Union and CCA are parties to the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) that
governs the detention officers at the Elizabeth Detention Center in Elizabeth, New Jersey. (Compl.
¶ 7; Ex. A). The CBA covers the period from March 26, 2013 through September 24, 2016. (Ex.
A.)
The CBA provides that the grievance and arbitration process “shall be the exclusive method
to be followed by the Union and the bargaining unit employees in the adjustment or settlement of
all grievances and disputes regarding the interpretation or application of the express written terms
of this Agreement.” (Ex. A, Article 15.)
The CBA sets forth a two-step grievance process. First, all grievances must be presented
within ten days of the triggering event, at which time the Employer has ten days to answer. (Id.)
If the Employer’s answer is unsatisfactory, the Union has ten days to submit written notice of its
intention to proceed to step two of the process. At step two, the Employer will investigate the
grievance and provide a response. If the matter is not resolved, the parties have fifteen days from
the Employer’s Step 2 response to proceed to non-binding mediation. If the parties refuse to
mediate, or if the mediation is unsuccessful, the Union can submit the grievance to arbitration

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within fifteen calendar days. The fifteen days runs from the mediation or the issuance of the
Employer’s Step 2 response to the grievance. (Id.) Furthermore, the CBA provides, in relevant
part:
Any grievance not submitted to the Employer in writing within ten (10) days after
it occurs shall be deemed abandoned and waived. An untimely grievance shall not
[be] processed nor be considered by any arbitrator. Any grievance not processed or
appealed by the Union within the time limits set forth at any step of the grievance
procedure, shall be considered settled on the basis of the Employer’s last
proceeding answer . . . All time limits herein are calendar days and may be extended
only by mutual written agreement between the Company and the Union.
(Id.) Finally, the CBA indicates that grievances “relating or giving rise to a claim of unlawful
discrimination, employment tort, violations of public policy, or violation of any federal or state,
statute, regulation, or ordinance” are “outside the jurisdiction of any arbitrator.” (Id.)
b. Grievances
The Union seeks to compel arbitration of the following grievances:
1. Hakeim Hawkins
On July 11, 2013, the Union filed a grievance on behalf of Hakeim Hawkins, alleging that
Hawkins was wrongfully suspended for two days, and seeking rescission of the suspension and
reimbursement for lost pay. (Compl., Ex. B.) CCA responded to the grievance on July 16, 2013
and the Union did not take further action.
On January 10, 2014, Hawkins filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) based on the same two-day suspension, which
Hawkins argued was discriminatory and retaliatory under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
(Model Cert., Ex. A.)
2. Hector Orellano and Alex Lopez

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The Union filed grievances for Hector Orellano and Alex Lopez on May 4, 2014 and May
11, 2014, respectively. (Compl., Ex. B.) On September 13, 2014, CCA declined to mediate both
the Lopez and Orellano Grievances. (Model Cert., Ex. B.)
On November 17, 2014, the Union informed CCA that the Lopez and Orellano grievances
were “slated for Arbitration.” (Model Cert., Ex. B.) In response, CCA claimed that these
grievances were never submitted to arbitration and that the time to proceed expired on September
28, 2014. (Id.) As a result, the Union attempted to proceed to arbitration, but CCA declined to
move forward.
3. Annie Cannon
On February 27, 2014, the Union submitted a grievance on behalf of Annie Cannon, and it
was mediated without resolution. (Compl., Ex. B.) The parties agreed to toll the time to further
process the grievance and on September 9, 2014, CCA informed the Union that the time to submit
the grievance to arbitration had begun to run pursuant to the time limits under the CBA. (Model
Cert., Ex. D.)
In its November 18, 2014 correspondence, CCA stated that the Union had failed to act
within the required time limits. (Model Cert., Ex. B.) When the Union attempted to arbitrate the
grievance, CCA declined, alleging the attempt was untimely.
4. Tina Jones
The Union filed a grievance on behalf of Tina Jones on March 27, 2014. (Compl., Ex. B.)
On June 12, 2014, CCA denied the grievance and indicated that the Union had fifteen days to
proceed to arbitration. (Model Cert., Ex. D.) The Union claims that CCA failed to move for
arbitration by the June 27, 2014 deadline.

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c. NLRB unfair labor practice charge
On November 28, 2014, the Union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National
Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) alleging that CCA interfered with employees’ rights by
declining to arbitrate the above grievances. (Model Cert., Ex. E.) CCA asserts that on February
27, 2015, the NLRB dismissed the charge because the record “failed to reveal evidence that the
Employer acted in bad faith or that it modified terms and conditions of the parties’ CBA.” (Def.’s
Br. 8.) The NLRB determined that CCA’s refusal to arbitrate was based on the CBA provisions
for time limits and for precluding discrimination claims from arbitration. (See id.)
d. Complaint and Motion to Dismiss
On July 24, 2015, the Union filed its two-count Complaint, alleging that the Union timely
sought arbitration and the Employer breached the CBA. (Dkt. No. 1.) On November 23, 2015,
CCA filed the present Motion to Dismiss, and on January 5, 2016, the Union filed opposition.
(Dkt. No. 8, 13.) CCA filed its reply on January 12, 2016. (Dkt. No. 14.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The adequacy of pleadings is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), which requires that a
complaint allege “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” See also Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating that Rule
8 “requires a ‘showing’ rather than a blanket assertion of an entitlement to relief”). In considering
a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court must “‘accept all factual allegations
as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether,
under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.”’ Phillips,
515 F.3d at 231 (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)).
However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint

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is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) (“Twombly”). If the
“well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,”
the complaint should be dismissed for failing to “show[] that the pleader is entitled to relief” as
required by Rule 8(a)(2). Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (internal quotation marks omitted). According
to the Supreme Court in Twombly, “[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’
of his[or her] ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations
omitted). Furthermore, the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level.” Id. The Third Circuit summarized the Twombly pleading standard as
follows: “‘stating . . . a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to
suggest’ the required element.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
In Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, the Third Circuit devised “a two-part analysis.” 578 F.3d
203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). First, the court must separate the complaint's factual allegations from its
legal conclusions. Id. at 210-11. Having done that, the court must take only the factual allegations
as true and determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a “plausible claim for relief.” Id. (quoting
Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 679).
III. DISCUSSION
a. Converting the Motion to Dismiss
The general rule is that a district court may not consider material extraneous to the
pleadings when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In re Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d 1410,

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1426 (3d Cir.1997). However, a court may consider a “document integral to or explicitly relied
upon in the complaint . . . without converting the motion [to dismiss] into one for summary
judgment.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff “cannot prevent a court from looking
at the texts of the documents on which its claim is based by failing to attach or explicitly cite
them.” Id. In support of the Motion to Dismiss, CCA attaches exhibits to its Model Certification
confirming the dates when the Union’s claims accrued and showing that the Hawkins grievance is
not covered by the CBA. (Dkt. No. 8, Model Cert.) This Court finds that these exhibits are
integrally related to the Union’s claims regarding the statute of limitations and this Court’s
jurisdiction to compel arbitration. Therefore, the Motion to Dismiss need not and will not be
converted into a motion for summary judgment.
b. Statute of Limitations
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (“LMRA”)
applies to “violation[s] of contracts between an employer and a labor organization.” Because the
LMRA lacks an express statute of limitations, the court must “borrow the most suitable statute”
from another source. DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158
(1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). The cause of action “arises when the employer takes
an unequivocal position that it will not arbitrate.” Fed’n of Westinghouse Indep. Salaried Unions
v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 736 F.2d 896, 902 (3d Cir. 1984).
In DelCostello, the Supreme Court of the United States held that Section 10(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) carries a six-month statute of limitations that applies to
a hybrid LMRA—duty of fair representation action where an employee claims that his employer
breached the collective bargaining agreement and his union unfairly managed the grievance and
arbitration process. 462 U.S. at 168. In support, the Court noted that a six-month limitations

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period allows for the “relatively rapid final resolution of labor disputes favored by federal law.”
Id.
Similarly, the Third Circuit has held that the six-month statute of limitations under Section
10(b) applies to LMRA actions seeking to compel arbitration, citing the DelCostello ruling in
support. Westinghouse, 736 F.2d at 901-02. In Westinghouse, plaintiffs sued under the LMRA to
compel arbitration of a grievance filed by the union on behalf of a former employee. 1 Id. at 897.
This Court finds that Westinghouse is analogous to the present matter and governs the analysis
herein.
Accordingly, the Union’s Complaint is barred by the six-month statute of limitations. The
cause of action arose on November 28, 2014, when the Union filed its charge with the NLRB
indicating that CCA had taken the unequivocal position that it would not arbitrate the grievances.2
(Model Cert., Ex. E). Although the Union had six months to file a Section 301 LMRA claim, it
waited to file the Complaint to compel arbitration on July 24, 2015. As such, the Complaint is
untimely and will be dismissed in its entirety.3
c. Hawkins grievance
In addition to the statute of limitations bar, the grievance filed by Hawkins is non-arbitrable
pursuant to the CBA. The CBA provides that grievances “relating or giving rise to a claim of

Plaintiff’s attempt to distinguish Westinghouse is unpersuasive. Plaintiff argues that unlike the
present case, Westinghouse involved a hybrid action. However, the underlying claim in
Westinghouse involved an LMRA claim to compel arbitration and not an additional claim for
breach of the duty of fair representation as was the case in the hybrid DelCostello case.
1

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The Union’s argument that this was not an unfair labor practices charge because the NLRB
dismissed the charge is to no avail. The Union itself filed it as an unfair labor practices charge
alleging that Defendant breached the CBA and failed to arbitrate the subject grievances.
3
This Court finds no basis for tolling the limitations period. See Kolomick v. United Steelworkers
of Am., District 8, 762 F.2d 354, 356 (4th Cir. 1985).
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unlawful discrimination, employment tort, violations of public policy, or violation of any federal
or state, statute, regulation, or ordinance” are “outside the jurisdiction of any arbitrator.” (Compl.,
Ex. A.) Because the Hawkins charge and grievance are based on alleged discriminatory conduct,
the grievance is outside the scope of arbitration.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, CCA’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
s/ Susan D. Wigenton, U.S.D.J.
Orig:
cc:

Clerk
Hon. Leda D. Wettre, U.S.M.J.
Parties

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