NEELD v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al

Filing 3

OPINION. Signed by Judge Jose L. Linares on 9/16/2015. (nr, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
WILLIAM NEELD,

Civil Action No. 15-6294 (JLL)

Plaintiff,

v.

OPINION

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants.

LINARES, District Judge:
Currently before the Court is the complaint of Plaintiff, William Neeld (ECF No. 1). As
Plaintiff has been granted informa pauperis status, this Court must screen Plaintiffs complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A. Pursuant to these statutes, this Court must
dismiss Plaintiffs claims if they are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or seek
damages from a defendant who is immune. For the reasons set forth below, this Court will dismiss
Plaintiffs claims against the New Jersey Department of Corrections and Northern State Prison
with prejudice, and dismiss Plaintiffs claims against the remaining Defendants without prejudice
for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted.
I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a convicted state prisoner currently incarcerated at Northern State Prison.
(ECF No. 1 at 2-3). On August 17, 2013, while descending from the top bunk to which he is
assigned, Plaintiff slipped and fell off a "smooth rounded steel [stool] with sloped edges" which
he used to aid his descent because his cell was not equipped with a ladder. (Id. at 6). As a result

of his fall, Plaintiff struck his left knee and fractured his patella. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that his
injury arises out of the failure of the New Jersey Department of Corrections ("the DOC") and
Northern State Prison to provide "safe and adequate means to enter/exit [the] top bunk in [the
prison's] cell," such as a ladder. (Id.). Plaintiff also alleges that the top bunks in Northern State
"exceed height standards for safety" and that his "medical care/treatment for [his] injuries is below
[the] standard of care" without further elaboration. (Id.). Plaintiff is therefore suing the DOC;
Northern State Prison; Gary Lanigan, commissioner of the DOC; Paul Lagana, Administrator of
Northern State Prison; and Cindy Sweeney, the Associate Administrator of Northern State Prison,
for their alleged failure to "administratively require/implement/ensure/enforce safe access to upper
bunks.

(Id. at 5).

II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66
to 1321

(April 26, 1996) ("PLRA"), district courts must review complaints in those civil actions

in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), or seeks
damages from a state employee, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The PLRA directs district courts to sua
sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This
action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §§1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A
because Plaintiff is a convicted state prisoner who has been granted in forma pauperis status and
who raises claims against state employees.

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According to the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, "a pleading that offers
'labels or conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do."'
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim, 1 the complaint must allege "sufficient
factual matter" to show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d
203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged." Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3
(3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Moreover, while prose pleadings are liberally
construed, ''prose litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim."

Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted) (emphasis
added).
B. Analysis

Plaintiff seeks to make claims against defendants for alleged violations of his Eighth
Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
a plaintiff must demonstrate a violation of a right protected by the Constitution or laws of the
United States that was committed by a person acting under the color of state law." Nicini v.

Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Woodyard v. Cnty. ofEssex, 514 F. App'x 177,
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"The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6)." Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App'x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v.
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App'x 230, 232 (3d Cir.
2012) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(l)); Courteau v. United States, 287 F. App'x 159, 162 (3d
Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).
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180 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that section 1983 provides "private citizens with a means to redress
violations of federal law committed by state [actors]"). "The first step in evaluating a section
1983 claim is to 'identify the exact contours of the underlying right said to have been violated' and
to determine 'whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at all.'"
Nicini, 212 F.3d at 806 (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5 (1998)).

This Court construes Plaintiffs complaint as attempting to assert an Eighth Amendment conditions
of confinement claim against all Defendants. 2
Initially, this Court notes that the New Jersey Department of Corrections and Northern
State Prison are not amenable to suit under § 1983, and must therefore be dismissed from this
action with prejudice. Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 applies only to "persons." "Neither
states, nor their departments and agencies ... are 'persons' within the meaning of Section 1983."
Goode v. NJ Dep 't of Corr., No. 11-6960, 2015 WL 1924409, at *10 (D.N.J. April 28, 2015); see
also Grabow v. S. State Corr. Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537, 538-39 (D.N.J. 1989) (noting that state

department of corrections and state prison facilities are not "persons" under§ 1983). As neither

2

This Court does not construe Plaintiffs conclusory statement that his medical care has been
below the relevant standard of care as an attempt to plead either medical negligence or deliberate
indifference to his medical needs. Plaintiff has not pied claims against any defendants involved
in his medical care, nor has he provided any facts to support this conclusory allegation. In any
event, to the extent that Petitioner wished to make a claim for deliberate indifference to medical
needs, negligence, such as the failure to provide treatment sufficient to meet the relevant standard
of care, is insufficient to establish an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to
medical needs. See, e.g., Jones v. County Jail C.F.C.F., 610 F. App'x 167, 169 (3d Cir. 2015).
To the extent that Plaintiff wished to raise a state law claim for negligence, this Court declines to
extend supplemental jurisdiction over that claim as this Court is dismissing all of Plaintiffs claims
over which it has original jurisdiction at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
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the Department of Corrections nor Northern State Prison are persons amenable to suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, they must be dismissed from this action with prejudice.
Plaintiff attempts to plead an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against
the remaining Defendants.

"To plead an Eighth Amendment claim based on conditions-of-

confinement, [the plaintiff] must show that he was subjected to a sufficiently serious deprivation
that resulted in the denial of 'the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,' and that officials
[at the DOC and the prison] were 'deliberately indifferent' to [the plaintiffs] safety." Jones v.

County Jail CF.CF., 610 F. App'x 167, 168 (3d Cir. 2015) (quotingFarmerv. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 834 (1994)). "To be cruel and unusual punishment, conduct that does not purport to be
punishment at all must involve more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or
safety."

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986); see also Jones, 610 F. App'x at 168.

Eighth Amendment liability may therefore not be based on simple negligence or a lack of due care.

Jones, 610 F. App'x at 169. Here, Plaintiff asserts that the failure of the named officials to require
ladders or other safe means of ingress and egress from the top bunk of all prison cells amounts to
a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs complaint, however, at best asserts that
the officials were negligent in failing to require ladders for use in cells with top bunks or otherwise
ensure safe egress from the top bunks of cells at Northern State Prison, and therefore fails to state
a claim for which relief may be granted.
Plaintiffs claim is virtually indistinguishable from the claim raised in Jones. In Jones,
the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs conditions of confinement claim where
the plaintiff pled that he had fallen while trying to step down from his top bunk without the aid of
a ladder or set of steps, resulting in the Plaintiffs striking his head and falling unconscious,
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resulting in several injuries. Id. at 168. The Third Circuit held that such allegations "taken as
true ... fail to establish that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the conditions of [the
plaintiffs] cell." Id. at 169. Absent additional facts which are equally absent from Plaintiffs
complaint, such as a history of complaints regarding the plaintiffs inability to climb down from
the top bunk without a ladder or additional aid, 3 the Third Circuit therefore found that the
plaintiffs complaint "[a]t its most generous reading, . . . alleged mere negligence, and not
deliberate indifference, in [the prison's] failure to provide a step-ladder" and that the plaintiff in
Jones therefore failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted under the Eighth

Amendment. Id. Save for the exact injuries involved, Plaintiffs claims are nearly identical to
those made in Jones. Like the plaintiff in that case, Plaintiffs complaint therefore at best makes
out a simple negligence claim relating to the failure to provide him with a ladder or other means
of egress from the top bunk to which he was assigned. Id. As such, Plaintiff has failed to state
a claim for which relief may be granted, and his complaint must be dismissed without prejudice as
to the remaining Defendants.

3

The only complaints to the named Defendants Plaintiff has provided with his complaints were
specifically filed after the fall about which he complains and related directly to that incident.
Nothing attached to or alleged in the complaint indicates that he made any complaints regarding
the bunk issue prior to his fall or that Defendants were otherwise on notice of his issues with the
top bunk.
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III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs claims against the New Jersey Department of
Corrections and Northern State Prison are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and Plaintiffs
claims against the remaining Defendants are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to
state a claim for which relief may be granted. An Appropriate order follows.

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